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
Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada

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Multiculturalism and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada



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
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JWB
RK
DMT
Kingston and Montreal
October, 1976

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At the core of the image of Canada is its diversity—geographic, historical and cultural (Lower, 1964, p. 564). This state of affairs is a fact; whether people consider it desirable remains a question. And while little can be done about historical or geographical diversity, the question of cultural diversity is the subject of extensive current debate and action. This study is concerned with the perceived desirability of cultural diversity in Canadian society.

In this first chapter the basic research questions are outlined. Concepts of cultural pluralism and multiculturalism, and some issues in Canadian population, immigration and multicultural policy are examined. The present research is then related to multicultural policy and reality both in Canada and in a few other countries.

The Basic Research Questions

As the title of this volume indicates, we are interested in discovering the attitudes held by Canadians towards multiculturalism in Canada. The notion of multiculturalism is not easy to define; for this reason we are devoting some considerable attention to it in our next section. But for our present introductory purposes, it refers to the existence of ethnic groups in Canada which derive from cultural traditions in addition to French and British, some members at least of whom wish to maintain their ethnic identity. Multiculturalism here also refers to the current policy of the federal government which seeks to promote the retention of these heritages and the sharing of them with all Canadians.

The historical roots of the research lie in Book IV of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism concerned with "the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada, and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution" (Book IV, p. 1). Pointing out that Canada is a country of heavy immigration the report argues that the integration of the various elements:

does not imply the loss of an individual's identity and original characteristics or of his original language and culture. Man is a thinking and sensitive being; severing him from his roots could destroy an aspect of his personality and deprive society of some of the values he can bring to it. (p.5)

Thus a proposition of the Royal Commission is that immigration creates the possibility of cultural diversity; without it, ethnic groups would not have developed in Canada. However, it remains to be seen whether continuing immigration is necessary for the maintenance of these groups. A second proposition

of the Royal Commission is that the maintenance of diversity is psychologically necessary for the well-being of the individual. And a third proposition is that such diversity could be a valuable resource for the society as a whole.

From this position, a set of sixteen recommendations was made to the federal government in October 1969. And in October 1971, the response of the Government was announced in the form of the multiculturalism policy. Termed a "policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" (Prime Minister's statement, House of Commons Oct. 1971, p. 2), it sought to encourage the retention of characteristic cultural features by those groups which desired to do so, and to encourage the sharing of these cultural features with other members of the larger Canadian society. The policy was based upon the assumption that if an individual is to be open in his ethnic attitudes, and have respect for other groups, he must have confidence in his own cultural foundations (p.2). Given this assumption, the policy is also designed to "help break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies" (p.2). In essence the policy asserts that in Canada "although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other" (p.1). Further, the policy asserts that the other cultural communities "are essential elements in Canada and deserve government assistance in order to contribute to regional and national life in ways that derive from their heritages, yet are distinctively Canadian" (p.3).

A great number of questions for research are contained or implied in these various assumptions and policy positions. Two issues emerge as particularly important. First, do Canadians view cultural diversity as a valuable resource? Second, is it the case that confidence in one's own identity is a prerequisite for the development of positive attitudes toward others (hereafter referred to as the "multicultural assumption")?

The first question has numerous components deserving of study. For one, whether the various ethnic groups consider their own culture and language to be of value, an earlier study (O'Bryan, Reitz & Kuplowska, 1975) provided a positive reply. Other components which are addressed in this present study are what Canadians think of immigration, what their attitudes are toward various ethnic groups, and how they view the existence and promotion of cultural diversity in this country. Clearly the attitudes of Canadians toward these questions will affect the promotion of multiculturalism in this country.

As a second question, the "multicultural assumption" is assessed by analysing the attitudes in a specific way: what the relationship is between attitudes held toward one's self or one's own group, and those held toward other groups. The "multicultural assumption" may be contrasted with the "ethnocentric assumption," which holds that positive self or own-group attitudes are generally associated with negative attitudes toward other groups (LeVine & Campbell, 1972). If the "ethnocentric assumption" is borne out, then the development of ethnic group tolerance is unlikely to be nurtured by the enhancement of individual cultural identities. On the other hand, if the "multicultural assumption" is borne out, then such a route would seem advisable.

In addition to these two basic questions, a number of related issues are also examined. For example what undercurrents of racism and discrimination exist in Canada is an important question; important too are how the mutual attitudes of English and French Canadians are likely to change in a multicultural Canada, and how relationships between ethnicity and social class may be affected.

The study has approached these questions with more than a descriptive intent. Rather than remaining at the level of describing attitudes and their relationships to each other, the goal was to examine their systematic patterning in the Canadian population in relation to a host of demographic, socio-economic, ethnic, political and psychological variables. With these more detailed analyses, it is possible to infer some of the internal dynamics and causal factors in the attitudinal patterns which emerge.

Cultural Pluralism and Multiculturalism

With the rise of interest in ethnicity as a political and cultural phenomenon, there has been a proliferation of concepts, terms, definitions and prescriptions pertaining to relations among groups (e.g., Glazer & Moynihan, 1975). It is, of course, not possible to provide an overview of all the currents and conflicts in the theoretical debate; however, it is necessary to draw a broad outline, and indicate sources for more specific arguments*.

The debate centres upon two issues: how to describe the dimensions of cultural diversity along which societies may vary, and how to allocate a particular society to a position on that dimension. With respect to the first issue, there is general agreement that some societies are fairly homogeneous in cultural terms, and others are fairly heterogeneous. At the homogeneous pole, there is little disagreement about the cultural situation: there is usually a single nation-state, with a common language, religion and way of life. Although often stratified or segmented along occupational and political lines, the basic cultural system is relatively homogeneous and monistic. However, few societies are homogeneous. For heterogeneous societies, the varieties of descriptive possibilities become greater, and there is usually less agreement on how to describe these more diverse groupings. Single nation-states cross linguistic and cultural lines, raising questions of how to organize and manage the newly-incorporated diversity. Increasing heterogeneity occurs when migrant populations move across original boundaries and come to dominate indigenous populations (as during colonization), and even greater heterogeneity is met when continuing migration from other cultural sources is superimposed on an original migrant population which in turn was imposed on an indigenous people. This latter situation prevails in Canada, the United States, South America, South Africa, New

* Among the many useful sources of ideas and debate on the topic are: Bagley (1973), v.d. Berghe (1967), Burnet (1973, 1975, 1976), Despres (1968), Kuper & Smith (1971), Newman (1973), Palmer (1971, 1972, 1976) and Smith (1960).

Zealand, and Australia among many others.

At this point there is often confusion between description and prescription (Burnet, 1973, p.1) in dealing with diversity. Popular catch words (such as "melting pot" and "mosaic") in which differential degrees of retained cultural diversity are implied often shift back and forth between an assumed description of reality and a prescription of an ideal; myth and reality become hopelessly confused (Palmer, 1972; Richmond, 1969).

In addition to this relatively popular level of discourse, there is an academic discussion surrounding what is meant by the term "plural society." Originally coined by Furnivall (1944) to refer to the complex set of ethnic relations in Dutch colonial life, it has in recent years become the term employed to refer to the most heterogeneous form of society (Depres, 1968, p.11; Newman, 1973, p.51). Its defining characteristics are not totally agreed upon, but the necessary precondition is the existence of multiple cultural or ethnic groups which maintain relatively distinct and independent traditions within a larger (national, social or political) framework. In addition, a "peaceful coexistence" is thought necessary (Newman, 1973, p. 67); that is, if conflict were the dominant mode of interaction, then the society would not be considered plural. Some writers (e.g., Smith, 1965) argue that in addition to having cultural diversity and peaceful relations, a society to be plural must also have separate legal and political institutions. If these three conditions are present, the term "plural" may be properly applied; however, if one is lacking, and less diversity is present, then it may be more appropriate to use the term "quasi-pluralism" (Matthiasson, 1974) to describe the society.

It appears that the term "multiculturalism" as it is often used in Canada is intended to capture the larger meaning of cultural pluralism, rather than its lesser usage. That is, it appears to refer to the maintenance of many cultural groups with distinctive life styles cooperating within a larger national framework, rather than to the persistence of ethnic groups with a few residual and distinguishing cultural features. However, Matthiasson (1974) has argued that the Canadian situation may actually only be "quasi-pluralistic." And Burnet (1973, 1975), while accepting that Canada is plural, has argued that the multicultural policy might be more accurately described as "polyethnic," since distinctive structures do not exist for the "other ethnic" groups.

The precise position of present Canadian diversity, then, is the subject of controversy and debate. As we noted in our introduction, it is not necessary for the purposes of this study to take a firm position or to attempt an allocation; it is sufficient to be aware of, and employ, the variable of cultural diversity in our research.

Before leaving this discussion, it should be noted that the debate which followed the announcement of the multiculturalism policy pointed up some ambiguities in the usage of the term "culture" in the context of Canadian multiculturalism. They are considered here because these difficulties had to be taken into account in our study. The first problem (Heintzman, 1971) is that two

meanings of culture are not clearly separated in the official discussion. On the one hand, culture may refer simply to aspects of "leisure, recreation and entertainment" which can be based upon such institutions as "cultural centres" and "cultural festivals"; this is a common usage of the term "culture," one which many citizens are likely to approve of. On the other hand, culture may refer to the "way of life associated with an entire people or society" and must be based upon more fundamental institutions; this is a deeper and more technical meaning, one which may be less acceptable to many people. In the present study, then, both aspects had to be represented in the survey questions.

A second problem surrounds the distinction between the terms "cultural" and "ethnic" (Burnet, 1973; Gold, 1973). In the Report of the Royal Commission, an "ethnic group" was defined in terms of a social identity, not in terms of national or cultural origin. However, the Report, "then inconsistently chose to substitute the term cultural group for ethnic group, reserving the term ethnic for origin category" (Burnet, 1973, p.13). In Burnet's view, the multicultural policy continued this error, with the implication that there was to be the promotion of "cultural groups" who were in possession of a distinctive culture. In her view a clear distinction should be recognized:

An ethnic group maintains and creates cultural symbols, but the culture associated with an ethnic group can and does change over time. To assist those members of an ethnic group who want to do so to maintain their ethnic identity in Canada—as, for example, many Scots and Jews have done for generations—is not identical with assisting those who want to do so to maintain a particular museum culture. (Burnet, 1973, p.14)

In the present study, elements of both the "ethnic identity" and "preserved culture" meanings are represented in the research.

In summary, it is apparent that most observers agree that cultural pluralism is characterized by cultural diversity and institutional distinctiveness. There is also some agreement that Canada is indeed a plural nation. However, at a more detailed level, there remains a debate over the meanings assigned to the terms *culture*, *ethnic* and *multiculturalism*. These unresolved issues have been raised so that their dimensions may be heeded in the research, not in order to resolve them here. However, the implicit meaning of one of the terms—*multiculturalism*—is a major focus in our later analyses.

Cultural Policy in Canada

In this section we briefly examine the history and present status of population, immigration*, native and cultural policy in Canada.

Population policy. With respect to population policy, it is safe to say that Canada has never espoused a clear policy with respect to population levels or distribution. Historically, though, the higher birthrate in French Canada may indi-

* The present study was initiated, and the data collected, prior to the publication of the "Green Paper: Report of the Canadian Immigration and Population Study."

cate positive attitudes toward population growth (often termed "the revenge of the cradle") in order to maintain the relative positions of the two language communities. This phenomenon, though, was more probably a consequence of clerical than of governmental influence.

At the present time, although the Green Paper (Vol. I, Immigration and Policy Perspectives) considers population issues in relation to the question of immigration, no definite statement is made regarding an ideal population level or even short term goals. However, with respect to attitudes toward population (Tienhaara, 1974) there has been a considerable shift away from an orientation favouring growth towards one favouring stability at current levels.

Immigration policy. During the early periods of colonization, immigration was promoted and was considered essential to the well-being of the developing nation. Originally, both French and British interests were established on the basis of a developing population, largely from those two countries. And over the past century, immigration from a variety of sources has generally been viewed as necessary for the development of the nation (Hawkins, 1972; Palmer, 1975). Such a policy appears to have been questioned only during the depression of the 1930's and in recent times. However, the *kind* of immigration which was promoted varied during Canadian history, with resistance to non-British and non-French peoples, and even stronger resistance to non-white peoples (Palmer, 1975). In fact, there is a good deal of evidence to suggest that policy and practice were in part based upon racial criteria (Palmer, 1976; Hughes & Kallen, 1974; Ferguson, 1975; Tulloch, 1975). However, in the period since the Second World War, resistance to non-British, non-French immigration has moderated (as it had from time to time during the previous century), and since 1962, the racial bias has been weakened somewhat.

Historically immigration to Canada has been viewed in a number of periods or phases (Book IV, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, p. 17-31; Jaenen, 1971). Initially, of course, those peoples now termed "native" arrived in the New World, and occupied what is now Canada. Beginning in the 16th and 17th Centuries a second wave of immigration began, from France and the British Isles; for the British, it has continued to the present, but for the French, immigration virtually stopped after the conquest. As Hawkins has argued, this immigration phase is the "central fact" (1972, p. 34) of Canadian history. In the 1870-71 Census, there were over one million of French and over two million of British extraction (31% and 60% respectively of the total population), with all other groups much smaller; the largest of the others was made up of 200,000 Germans. The early arrival and the predominant numbers of these two "founding" groups, combined with their continuing political and economic power, has given rise to their description as "charter groups" in Canadian society (Porter, 1965, p. 60).

A third phase marked by the immigration of peoples from many other countries (predominantly European) began about 1880, and has also continued up until the present day. Of course, these various groups had been represented earlier in the population (about 8% in 1871) and indeed many individuals played

prominent roles within the largely British and French communities (RCBB, IV, p.18). At the same time some non-European immigrants arrived (notably from the Far East) but their numbers did not constitute a major element in the population.

In this century, it is usual to consider three phases of immigration. The first (prior to 1914) brought predominantly peasant families from Northern and Eastern Europe who settled on the Prairies (O'Bryan et al., 1975, p. 15).

Between the two wars, immigration continued from many countries, but settlement tended to be not in the west, but in the urban and industrial areas of Ontario and Quebec, and in frontier resource areas. And thirdly, following 1945, immigration resumed once again, but now was even more diversified than ever before: for the first time Southern Europeans became a significant element and in recent years immigration from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean has increased substantially.

Over these three phases of immigration, two fairly clear motives for migration may be discerned: economic and political. These may be important both for a group's interest in maintaining its identity or culture, and for the acceptance of a group by the existing population. Among those who migrated primarily for political reasons (notably after the European upheavals in the 1850's and after the two World Wars), the possibility of a return or even of major communication with the homeland may be low or even nonexistent; in such a case the transplantation of the home culture into Canada may be of great importance to the group and to the host population. But among those who have migrated primarily for economic reasons, there may be a lesser interest in maintaining the traditional culture. Indeed, their interest in economic advancement may direct them away from such cultural maintenance.

In overall proportions, those of British and French origins still constitute the majority of the Canadian population. The proportion of Canadians of British origin has declined from 60% in 1871 to about 44% in 1971, while those of French origin have maintained a relatively constant proportion (between 31% in 1871 and 29% in 1971). However, those of other origins have increased dramatically in the past century from 7% to 27% (see Table 3.2 for an overview of the present composition of the Canadian population).

We may discern, then, a gradual diversification in immigration in Canada; however, recent regulatory decisions appear to effect a halt in this long-term trend. But it is difficult to assess whether such a decision reflects more the increased resistance to a growing population (numbers *per se*) which we have noted, or a real discontinuity with the observed liberalization. Such policy trends are not clearly related to immigration attitudes (as presented in Tienhaara, 1973). Over the period 1952 to 1973 there was little variation in the perceived need for immigrants in Canada, while the question of the *kind* of immigrants was not examined.

One longstanding feature of immigration attitudes which has been documented frequently (e.g., Peterson, 1955; Hawkins, 1972, chap. 8; Palmer, 1975) is the attack on continuing immigration by French Canada. For example, Henri

Bourassa charged that the purpose of immigration was to swamp the French minority in a sea of "drunkards, paupers, loafers and jailbirds" (quoted in Peterson, 1955, p.122). In contemporary political life, Hawkins (1972, p. 217-219) notes the frequent indications of negative attitudes toward immigration among Quebec officials; the major concern appears to be the overwhelming orientation of immigrants toward English Canada. One response of the Quebec Government was to establish (in 1965) an Immigration Department "to assist the integration of immigrants into Quebec's French-speaking community" (p. 214). The entry of a Provincial Government into the field of immigration had a precedent in the activity of Ontario early in the century and again immediately after the Second World War II.

This historical and contemporary official attitude of French Canada is of particular importance for the present study. Since we are concerned primarily with the individual attitudes which are held by members of the two charter groups toward other ethnic groups, we have paid special attention to these public indicators in Quebec society. Although the relationship between official and individual attitudes is never a simple one, the possibility of finding negative individual attitudes toward immigration among French Canadians must be entertained. Indeed, as Hawkins (1972, p. 218) has pointed out, in paraphrasing a Quebec official, opposition toward federal immigration policies may be translated into a hostility toward immigrants themselves. The extension of this hostility to the continuation in Canada of ethnic groups may be only a short step.

Present immigration policy is now under review (the Green Paper), and Canadians have been asked to consider three options: the retention of the present "responsive" system, the gearing of immigration more to economic conditions, and the setting of targets or quotas. Although our study is not explicitly concerned with immigration questions but with cultural ones, and was initiated prior to the current Green Paper discussions, it is clear that the two issues are related. For this reason we have developed our immigration-relevant material into a single section (see Chapter 4).

Cultural policy. Cultural policy generally is not a well-developed area of government nor of social science research. In Canada, such concerns are clearly divided both historically and politically into "native" and "immigrant" sectors, with the latter often divided into "charter groups" and "other immigrant" peoples.

Initially native peoples in Canada were considered in military terms; their roles in military alliances, especially with French and British forces (and later American forces) is well documented. As trade expanded, relationships acquired an economic basis, particularly for territorial exploration and fur-trading purposes. Eventually, legal issues became predominant, as the European peoples sought to regularize their occupation of the territory: treaties were offered and signed, leading to town settlement and in some areas massive cultural change. Finally, questions of culture and political relations became dominant, with lingering interest in economic and legal aspects. Essentially the cultural issue lies in the question of "how much diversity," and the political, economic

and legal issues reside in the question of how to relate within a larger society. Over the past century and a half, native policy appears to have taken three forms: "co-occupants"; "wards"; and now "quasi-autonomy." In the "co-occupants" period, native peoples and newcomers occupied the territory jointly as partners in military and economic pursuits. Legal regularization of this co-occupation (by treaties) led to the "wards" period in which the federal government (through the Indian Act) assumed the responsibility for native peoples; in effect they became wards of the state. This continued until 1969 when the federal government made an abortive attempt to shed part of this responsibility (in part to the native peoples themselves, and in part to the provinces), but resistance from native peoples was too great. Since then, specific changes have been made in educational policy (e.g. the policy of native control of education, National Indian Brotherhood, 1972), and other areas, so that a new period of "quasi-autonomy" is apparent. Such cultural independence may be further bolstered by the federal multiculturalism policy, and by the changes in native political and cultural self-awareness and self-assertion.

Turning to the question of cultural policies for non-native peoples, we find historically that cultural assimilation did not follow military defeat. The struggle for linguistic and cultural retention by the French Canadian people coupled with "the colonial ideology of political and ethnic pluralism encouraged by the British" (Ossenberg, 1967) resulted in the survival of linguistic, religious, social and political institutions in French Canada. The Quebec Act of 1774 reinforced this pluralism, and the British North America Act of 1867 gave explicit recognition to the cultural duality in Canada (Smiley, 1975, p.7). However, in the interval the Durham Report which followed the 1837-38 rebellions had made recommendations that were "explicitly designed to swamp the French," but which in effect increased their cohesiveness and resistance to assimilation (Smiley, 1975, p. 5-6).

These two peoples have developed side by side, though not without conflict, within a single political entity, each retaining distinctive cultural features. These original immigrant groups (the two "charter groups") have now been the subject of formal linguistic and cultural policy for over two centuries, most recently in the enactment of the Official Languages Act (1969).

The history of cultural policy has been well reviewed by Jaenen (1971), Burnet (1973) and Palmer (1972, 1976). At the time of confederation, when the French-British dualism was given recognition, there was little basis for considering the cultural role of other groups; only seven percent of the three and one half million were of some other ethnic origin (Palmer, 1972, p.3). In the latter part of the nineteenth century, immigrants of other origins arrived and settled primarily in the west. This trend continued, and between 1900 and 1920, three million persons arrived; many Anglo-Saxons stayed in the east, and many of the "others" settled in the west (Palmer, 1972, p.4). During this period there "was no explicit federal government policy with regard to the role of non-British and non-French ethnic groups in Canadian society" (Palmer, 1972, p.5).

In French Canada (Palmer, 1972, p.6) there was also no policy concerning

relations with the other cultural groups: "They were generally more preoccupied with a defence of their own status than they were with other ethnic groups." But at the level of public attitudes in Quebec, "the French-Canadian group did not encourage massive integration of foreign elements" (Gendron Commission Report, Vol. 3, 1972, p.13). And in Western Canada (Painchaud, 1976, p.2), there is a general concern that the development of "other ethnic" groups "will undermine their position as one of the cornerstones of Canadian society." Thus there appears to be an orientation in French Canada which may be termed one of isolation; this view of relationships with the other cultural groups is consistent with their view of immigration, which was outlined earlier.

In English Canada, it has been argued that there have been three phases in the history of views about relationships with the "other ethnic" groups: Anglo-conformity, melting pot and cultural pluralism (Palmer, 1976). The first of these considered that assimilation to British culture was the appropriate model for the developing English-Canadian society to pursue. It was the "predominant aim of the public school system, and was an underlying theme in the textbooks" (Palmer, 1976, p.14). Among the many examples of the ideology of Anglo-conformity are the closing, early in the twentieth century, of bilingual schools on the Prairies for members of the "other ethnic" groups (Jaenen, 1971). The two following examples illustrate the flavour of this view.

In 1919, the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire (IODE):
passed resolutions advocating a "Canadianization Campaign" to "propagate British ideals and institutions," to "banish old world points of view, old world prejudices, old world rivalries and suspicion" and to make new Canadians "one hundred percent British in language, thought, feeling and impulse." At the same meeting the Order also passed a resolution protesting "foreigners" taking British names. (Lethbridge Herald, May 29, 1919. Quoted from Palmer, 1972, p.35a)

And later, Stephen Leacock (1930, 195-196), in a non-humorous vein, argued that:

Canada, especially in its north-west provinces, is badly damaged . . . (as a result of the great foreign immigration before the war). From the point of view of the Russians and the Galicians, etc., this meant improvement for the north-west. Not so from ours. Learning English and living under the British flag may make a British subject in the legal sense, but not in the real sense, in the light of national history and continuity . . . A little dose of them may even by variation, do good, like a minute dose of poison in a medicine . . . I am not saying that we should absolutely shut out and debar the European foreigner, as we should and do shut out the Oriental. But we should in no way facilitate his coming. Not for him the free ocean transit, not the free coffee of the immigrant shed, nor the free land, nor the found job, nor the guaranteed anything. He is lucky if he is let in "on his own." (Quoted from Porter, 1965, p.67)

Although still a strong voice in contemporary debate, the ideology of Anglo-conformity did not succeed for at least two reasons. Firstly, the "other eth-

nic" groups were "too numerous and they were settled in homogeneous communities in many cases" (Jaenen, 1971, p.11); that is, they were too strong to be absorbed into a dominant British life style. Secondly, the Anglo-Canadian community was "unprepared and unable to absorb so large and so diverse a segment of the population" (Jaenen, 1971, p.11), and in the view of Palmer (1976, p.7), "there has been a long history of racism and discrimination in English-speaking Canada," which effectively excluded non-British peoples. Indeed such exclusion may have been a significant factor in the development of in-group feelings among the "other ethnic" groups.

A second ideology, the "melting pot," "was an import into Canada and never achieved the popularity it enjoyed in the United States" (Palmer, 1972, p.10). Although J.S. Woodsworth, and members of the Scandinavian and Dutch communities, advocated such a fusion, the notion never found much support in Canada. There are two possible reasons for this lack of acceptance. One is the combination of circumstances which was noted in relation to the failure of "Anglo-conformity": the "other ethnic" groups themselves were culturally strong, and Anglo-Canadians preferred to exclude them rather than "melt" with them. Alternatively, it is possible that there was sufficient tolerance among Anglo-Canadians to permit the development of a culturally plural society. However, the historical review by Palmer (1976) casts some doubt upon this latter explanation.

A third ideology, that of "cultural pluralism," developed during the 1930's and became identified by the catchword "mosaic." This term had been proposed earlier by Hayward and Watson (1922) and Kate Foster (1926), and soon caught the public imagination. Opponents argued that such pluralism would weaken the unity of Canada; but "advocates of pluralism believed that ethnic diversity was not incompatible with national unity . . . They believed that recognition of the cultural contribution of non-Anglo-Saxon groups would heighten the groups' feeling that they belonged to Canada and thus strengthen Canadian unity" (Palmer, 1976, p.36). In contrast, advocates argued that a plural society provided greater cultural opportunities for people of "other ethnic" background, and more options for dealing with new situations which may confront the nation as a whole. Recent political and cultural developments, primarily among the "other ethnic" communities, have focused public attention on this pluralist option. This third ideology of a plural mosaic in which peoples are "integrated" rather than "melted" has now become policy, with the advent of the policy of multiculturalism (1971).

This policy of multiculturalism outlined four areas of support:

First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop, a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized. Second, the Government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society. Third, the Government will promote creative encounters and in-

terchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity. Fourth, the Government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society. (Prime Minister's statement, October 1971, p.3)

The announcement of the policy triggered a vociferous response. Among ethnic groups there was general support, if the ethnic press is representative of ethnic opinion (see Palmer, 1972, p.21). And the *Non-Official Languages Study*, (O'Bryan et. al. 1975) provided further indication of general support for the policy among ethnic groups. Among the balance of the population, opinion was divided, with the more negative views tending to find printed expression. In particular, the impact of the policy on French Canada was worrisome to many (see Palmer, 1972, p.22 for newspaper editorial commentary), and this was clearly expressed by Rocher (1969, 1972, 1976) both before and after the policy announcement. The cultural support now being offered to the other groups was seen as undermining that available for French Canada, and the logical conclusion of such a policy was seen as multilingualism, making a farce of the Official Languages Act.

Other criticism was based upon the ambiguities in the notion of culture (Heintzman, 1971); was the whole "way of life" to be encouraged or only the entertainment institutions such as folk festivals? In another approach Porter notes that there are at least two ways in which cultural retention can be achieved: one is by encouraging the voluntary association of individuals who share an interest in some "culture" (be it art or entertainment in Heintzman's second sense, or a whole way of life in his first sense); the second is by encouraging ethnic descent groups (1972, p.200; 1975, p.288). But in Porter's view "making descent groups of such importance because they are the carriers of culture borders on racism with all the confused and emotional reactions that that term brings" (1972, p.199). For Porter, emphasizing ethnic descent is irrelevant to life in the post-industrial world, and may serve to inhibit vertical mobility in the larger society (1972, p.201; 1975, p.288).

In reply to Rocher, Palmer (1971, p.109) has argued that "multiculturalism would not undermine official bilingualism, and is no threat to French Canada," because the policy promotes the value of cultural diversity in general. And in response to Porter's criticism, Palmer (1972, p.24-26) points out that the policy seems to be promoted by ethnic groups themselves, and this would be unlikely if it were a real threat to their upward mobility. Further, he argues "the way to break down the vertical mosaic is surely to change attitudes of the elites, rather than encourage Anglo-conformity, which is Porter's solution" (1972, p.26).

In a recent discussion, Burnet has argued that:

multiculturalism within a bilingual framework can work, if it is interpreted as it intended—that is, as encouraging those members of ethnic groups who want to do so to maintain a proud sense of the contribution of their own group to Canadian society. Interpreted in this way, it becomes something very North American: voluntary marginal differentiation among peo-

ples who are equal participants in the society. If it is interpreted in a second way—as enabling various peoples to transfer foreign cultures and languages as living wholes into a new place and time—multiculturalism is doomed. (Burnet, 1975, p.211-212)

More recently in discussing the “new ethnicity” (Glazer & Moynihan, 1975), many writers have emphasized that ethnic groups can be considered “as forms of social life rather than survivals from the past, as mobilizers of interests rather than bearers of cultures or traditions, and as collectivities with which people choose to identify rather than as groups into which they are born and from which they sometimes struggle to escape” (Burnet, 1976, p.199). When ethnicity comes to be understood in this way, it is possible that the deep concerns felt by many critics may be lessened. For example, Porter (1972, p.201; 1975, p.301) accepts that “a strong case can be made for the role of ethnic group affiliation in solving problems of personal identity in the modern world of bureaucracy and technology.” Further, he recognizes the value of ethnicity in developing a firm self-image, a base from which to achieve in the larger society (Porter, 1972, p.202; 1975, p.302). Thus some (but not a complete) communality in views is becoming apparent; this appears to be centering around the notion of ethnicity as a voluntary association for the enhancement of status in a complex society.

These various criticisms and defenses of the multiculturalism policy, of course, serve a necessary function; they help to clarify it and to relate it to existing social science knowledge and theory. But an important element in the eventual success of such a policy is the degree of acceptance or rejection it meets in the general population. It is within this context that the present study of attitudes has been conducted.

Cultural Policy: Some Comparative Perspectives

Canada has not been alone in its experience of cultural diversity, even though the specific experience and the multicultural orientation may be unique. Although many nations (for example, Belgium, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union) are comprised of distinct linguistic and cultural groups indigenous to the territory, it is perhaps more useful to examine the experience of those countries which, like Canada, developed during colonial expansion, which retain a significant indigenous population, and which experience a continuing flow of migrant peoples from diverse sources; these include the United States, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand. It is not our intention to consider in any detail the various answers provided to the dual question “how much cultural diversity is desirable, and how should various cultural groups relate to each other?” It is however instructive to note the range of answers, and to consider Canada’s position in this range.

With respect to the first question, the two extremes appear to be occupied by South Africa and Australia. In the former, indigenous African cultures are forcefully retained, and this is done in a context of an immigrant dualism (Afrikaaner and British) which is made more diverse by the existence of a large

mixed (Cape Coloured) and Asian population. In Australia, an exclusive immigration policy (the "white Australia Policy") and a long history of efforts at Aboriginal absorption or assimilation* have produced a relatively homogeneous population. However, recent immigration from Southern Europe has tended to reduce this homogeneity somewhat. As recently as the 1950's the then Australian Minister of Immigration (Calwell) was able to argue in favour of non-white exclusion ("Two Wongs don't make a White"), and receive public acclamation for it. The position of the United States, with its "melting pot" ideology, may be close to that of Australia but, as Glazer & Moynihan (1963, 1975) and Novak (1971) have pointed out, ethnic diversity and identity have persisted despite the ideology. On this dimension Canada would appear, in terms both of "mosaic" ideology and of cultural reality, to occupy a position between the extreme diversity which is found in South Africa, and the more intermediate situation found in New Zealand where Maori life style has been retained to some degree.

With respect to the second question, the forceful exclusion and separation of groups (as in South Africa) anchors one end of the dimension, while the total integration of ethnic groups into national life defines the other. Of course, in those nations where the ethnic groups tend to disappear because of policies or other pressures reducing diversity, this second question is not really applicable. Thus national examples of the polar opposite to segregation are not as clear as in our first question. The position of Canada, at least at the level of ideology and policy, is probably toward this other pole; each group retaining its cultural distinctiveness, having its "place," and all pulling together for common national goals. However, the reality is far less integrated, as Porter (1965) and many others have clearly demonstrated. The general conclusion is that in this comparative context Canada appears to combine more acceptance of diversity and less assimilation and segregation than other nations considered in this brief overview.


A Final Comment

This introductory chapter has attempted to provide a historical, cultural and comparative setting for our enquiry into the distribution and structure of multiculturalism and ethnic attitudes in Canada. It should be clear, even from this brief presentation, that the issues are complex and consequently that no single study is likely to be in a position to clarify all the conceptual issues or to answer all the empirical questions. However, by focusing specifically on two key research questions—the acceptance of multiculturalism, and the validity of the "multicultural assumption"—and by remaining eclectic in their definition, we are in a position to present both a comprehensive and focused account of the key issues.

The balance of this volume begins in Chapter 2 with a specification of the

* Replaced in 1973 by a policy of Aboriginal "self-determination" and a more open immigration policy (Zubrzycki, 1974).

research questions and research methodology. In Chapter 3, the characteristics of the sample are outlined and compared to the 1971 Census distributions; these characteristics essentially constitute the independent variables in the study and in order to understand the bases for later analyses, some inter-relationships among these background variables are also presented. The basic findings in each of the four attitude areas (psychological variables, immigration, ethnic groups, multiculturalism) are then presented in Chapters 3 to 6 and in each, the distributions are presented both for the total sample, and as a function of the various background factors, such as ethnicity, region and socio-economic status. In Chapters 7 and 8 the various findings are integrated and considered in the light of the historical and cultural features of Canadian life which have been discussed in the present chapter. And in Chapter 9, guided by a tentative theory, some implication of these findings for multiculturalism and intergroup relations in Canada are considered. Finally, Chapter 10 presents a summary of the study.



This chapter outlines the specific goals of the study, and how these goals were pursued. It is divided into six sections. The first examines what the study intended to accomplish. This is followed by a description of the survey instrument, an outline of how the sample was selected, and some interviewer ratings of respondent behaviour. The last two sections present a description of the independent variables employed in the study and a discussion of the data analysis.

Goals of the Survey

In the first chapter, a brief outline of the purpose of the study was provided. In the words of the *Citizens Cultures Programme Plans* (p. 3.6) the intention was to "determine the nature of majority group attitudes toward the existence of minority ethno-cultural groups, and their development within Canadian society." This statement of intent contains two distinguishable goals: the first pertains to the assessment of attitudes toward specific ethnic groups, and the second concerns the study of attitudes toward the maintenance and sharing of these cultures; that is, the acceptance of multiculturalism. Two further goals were added because of their logical or psychological relevance. It is obvious that ethnic groups develop and are maintained partly by a process of continuing immigration. Clearly, then, attitudes toward immigration form a necessary part of the study of attitudes toward ethnic groups and their position in society. Furthermore, a large portion of the psychological literature on ethnic attitudes, which when negative is often termed *prejudice*, is concerned with some basic psychological characteristics of individuals.

These four goals constitute the basic thrust of the study. It is of fundamental importance to understand the *distribution* of general prejudice and of attitudes toward ethnic groups, multiculturalism, and immigration. Beyond this, the goal was to comprehend the *structure* of these attitudes, how they relate to each other, and to a number of features of Canadian society. In particular, relationships between these attitudes and how an individual views his own group will permit the evaluation of the multicultural and ethnocentric assumptions (see p. 1.5). Furthermore, a number of other important questions, such as the role region, socioeconomic status and ethnicity play in these attitudes, can also be examined.

Another clear indication in the quotation from *Citizens Cultures Programme Plans*, is that the study should concern itself with these attitudes as

they are held by the "majority group;" that is, we were directed toward a study of the attitudes held by those Canadians who trace their ancestry to the British Isles or to France whatever their recency of arrival. A decision was therefore taken to design a study, and construct a research instrument which was primarily concerned with the two charter groups. Inevitably this meant some lack of sensitivity to the orientations of those respondents of "other ethnic" origins, and a discussion of this problem will be presented in Chapter 7.

However, a decision was also taken to go beyond this mandate and to expand this focus to include within the study those Canadians who derive from other backgrounds. This decision had three implications: first, it meant that a sample of the general Canadian population should be taken, to produce a *representative* study; secondly, it meant that the analyses of the findings should be *comparative*, across the two majority groups and those of "other ethnic" origins; but, thirdly, it meant that data gathered from these other peoples should receive less emphasis in the overall presentation.

While the focus was enlarged to include persons of "other ethnic" backgrounds, the languages of interviewing were restricted to English and French. Thus approximately 1.5% (1970 Census Bulletin, 92-759) of the Canadian population could not be included in the study. This point illustrates only one of many differences between the goals of the present study and those of the Non-Official Languages Study (O'Bryan et al., 1975). First, the NOL study was concerned primarily with the views of those Canadians of "other ethnic" origins (and only in urban areas), while the present study sought a representative sample of all Canadians. Second, the NOL study primarily enquired about the attitudes which were held about the respondents' own language and culture, while the major interest in the present study was in the views held by respondents about a variety of ethnic groups and their development in Canadian society. These differences in goals are important, for they provide a context or frame of reference for the respondent, one which conveys a meaning to questions and concepts over and above their specific intended meaning. The effects of these differential frames of reference will become apparent in later chapters.

With the basic orientations established there remained five important stages to the completion of the research: 1) the development of a survey instrument; 2) the delineation of a national sample; 3) fieldwork associated with administering the survey instrument (these first three stages were accomplished with the technical assistance of the Survey Research Centre at York University and the Centre de Sondage at the Université de Montréal); 4) data analysis; and 5) interpretation of the results. Following is a description of each of these five stages of research.

The Survey Instrument

The instrument was developed to assess the attitudes in the four domains noted previously and to gather information on the demographic, social, and cultural characteristics of the respondents. But, of course, particular emphasis was placed upon the assessment of attitudes toward ethnic groups and multi-

culturalism, and upon determining the ethnicity and other relevant characteristics of the individual respondent.

When considering the range of possible approaches which could be taken in survey work, we decided at the beginning to attempt some more "psychological" techniques than is usual in surveys. The Survey Research Centre was receptive to such innovation, and provided valuable criticism and comment about the probable success of various novel suggestions. Rather than simply seek opinion (primarily through verbal responses), we sought to exploit the precision in scales and measurement which is available in the psychological literature; this was accomplished primarily through the use of a standard 7-point rating scale throughout the survey. Such rating scales enable respondents to express shades of opinion better than simple yes/no or agree/disagree answers. The meaning of scales was explained to respondents by providing them with anchor points for the extreme judgments, and by indicating that points between the extremes could be used to express degrees of opinion. For example, a 7-point scale was used to express disagreement/agreement. Respondents were instructed that a rating of 1 would express strong disagreement with the statement under consideration and 7 would express strong agreement. They were encouraged to use numbers in between 1 and 7 to express degrees of disagreement/agreement. Besides disagreement/agreement, the 7-point rating scale was used to assess whether a respondent definitely would not (rating of 1) or definitely would (rating of 7) do something; the degree to which a particular ethnic group possessed a given characteristic (1 = not at all, 7 = very much); whether certain types of immigrants should be definitely rejected (rating of 1) or definitely accepted (rating of 7). In the case of bipolar rating scales (e.g., disagreement/agreement), a rating of 4 would indicate a neutral reaction, undecidedness, or ambivalence on the part of the respondent. The scales were used consistently in that a 7 always meant something positive (agree, would very much, accept) and a 1 something negative (disagree, not at all, reject). Since all questions used the same format, respondents quickly adapted to this form of responding. From the point of view of statistical analysis, the more response alternatives the respondent can confidently use, the greater the precision in the statistical analysis.

In addition to using rating scales extensively, non-verbal responses were sought through the use of a card sorting procedure, and attempts were made to assess "behavioural intentions" in addition to opinions. The literature on attitude measurement often deals with the discrepancy between what people say and what people do (eg., Wicker, 1969). The use of tasks, such as card sorts, is one way of reducing the reliance upon verbally-expressed opinion. Another technique, developed by Triandis (1971), is to phrase attitude questions in concrete terms so that the respondent reports on his or her previous or intended behaviour, rather than on his or her beliefs or opinions. We consider that this behavioural dimension of the survey is important, enhancing the authenticity of the data.

Between November 1973 and March 1974, the investigators developed a

set of ideas, and transformed them into a series of drafts of the survey instrument. During this period, the Survey Research Centre provided commentary and suggestions regarding phrasing, length and sequencing of the various materials. Some of the items were derived from standard psychological tests and conventional attitude survey instruments, others stemmed from the previous research and interests of the investigators, and others were developed anew for the purposes of this study. The source, background and description of the various items will be discussed in each of the sections dealing with the different topics.

During March 1974, a pilot study with 60 anglophone and 60 francophone respondents was conducted in the Montreal and Toronto areas. Meetings with the interviewers and field personnel of the two survey centres led to a final version of the instrument; this was employed in the field and completed by 1849 respondents during June and July 1974.

The use of the instrument in the field took approximately 50 to 70 minutes for each respondent. The interview was preceded by a letter indicating the intention to approach the household. Each interviewer had been trained by one of the two survey centres, and had been instructed by a field supervisor who had met with the investigators. In addition, each interviewer was supplied with a set of instructions and was requested to become thoroughly familiar with them.

The introductory letter simply announced that an interviewer would visit in a few days, and requested the participation of the potential respondent. The letter indicated that the person's address had been scientifically selected, and provided the basic information that the interview would concern the views of Canadians toward various groups and people in Canada. A note in French (on the English version, and vice versa) indicated that if the recipient preferred, an interview in the other language would be available.

Each interviewer was given a copy of the Interviewer Instructions which had been written specifically for the project. The instructions indicated the purpose of the study, and outlined the intent of each question. Where it was deemed necessary (for example, in the use of card sorting or the standard 7-point scale) detailed instructions were provided. In addition, standing instructions for all interviewers were contained in the Survey Research Centre *Interviewers Reference Manual* in which the selection of and approach to the respondent, recording of responses, probing and response checking were all discussed.

In all, 165 interviewers were employed in the gathering of the survey data. Of those working in Quebec for Centre de Sondage, 56 were female and one was male. Of the 108 working in the rest of Canada for the Survey Research Centre, 97 were female and 11 were male. In Quebec, 567 interviews were conducted by the Centre de Sondage, yielding an average interview load of ten per interviewer. In the rest of the country the average load was twelve (108 interviewers did 1282 interviews). Generally the interviewers were well-educated and most were experienced: for the Survey Research Centre 61 of the 108 had been

previously employed by them, and of the 57 working for the Centre de Sondage 48 were previous employees. For this study, all interviewers were instructed to make up to four “call backs” if their first visit to the household found no one present.

Sample Selection

Our decision was to seek a representative national sample of 2000 respondents. It was drawn by the Survey Research Centre from a national sampling frame which included 95% of all Canadians. An overview of the sample numbers is provided in Table 2.1. Anticipating a 30% loss, a total of 2844 households were drawn initially. Of these, 216 were ineligible or dead addresses, and of the 2628 effective households, there was a 30% incompleteness rate; the final number in the sample was 1849, representing a 70% completion rate. As we shall see (Chapter 3) those included in the sample do not differ from the distributions available in the 1971 census on most of the important demographic variables. Thus, this overall sample attrition rate of 30% does not constitute a serious problem for the representativeness of the survey data. However, there were regional differences in attrition, and in Quebec refusals accounted for over 50% of the total number of incomplete interviews (137 of 270), and in the other areas they constituted from 42% to 50%. Thus some element of self-selection is present even though the eventual sample is representative, in demographic terms, of the population base.

The sample was selected from a national sampling frame developed by the two survey centres and consisted of most Census Enumeration Areas in the country.* A multi-stage selection was carried out: firstly Enumeration Areas were drawn, then households were sampled, and finally individual respondents were selected from the households.

In the first stage, all Enumeration Areas were listed except those located in the Yukon, Northwest Territories, extreme northern regions of some provinces, in unorganized territory, or those that were public or private institutions, or Indian Reservations. A total of 347 Enumeration Areas were selected, and were designated as Primary Stage Units (PSU).

In the second stage, 2844 households were selected from the 5.7 million households in the frame. These were designated as Secondary Stage Units (SSU). And in the final stage, 2628 persons were chosen (Final Stage Units or FSU). Each eligible person in a household was listed, and the interviewer selected one at random. An eligible person was any one in the household who was aged 16 years or more and was competent in the English or French language.

To help in the selection of the primary and secondary stage units, a stratification procedure was employed. First, the country was divided into three

* A technical report on the sample design is available from the authors upon request.

modules: Ontario, Quebec and the remainder of Canada. Following this regional stratification, a further classification was made by the degree of urbanization. All metropolitan communities and those whose 1971 census populations were over 100,000 persons were automatically included in the primary stage units; there were 25 of these. In addition, the two largest metropolitan communities (Toronto and Montreal) were further stratified into geographical districts.

Another procedure which was employed in addition to stratification was that of clustering. The intention of this procedure is to limit the number of sampling points in order to reduce costs and simplify the logistics of the survey. In the present sample, clusters of both primary and secondary stage units were employed.

Finally within each stage, and after stratification and clustering took place, selections were made on a random basis. For example, in the case of individuals, a table of random numbers was employed by the interviewer to select a respondent from the listing of eligible members of the household.

Interviewer Ratings of Respondents

After the interview was completed, the interviewer provided some ratings of the respondent's behaviour. From these ratings it is possible to conclude that the data gathering took place in an atmosphere characterized by good rapport, good communication and relative quiet.

In 84.3% of the interviews, the respondents' attitudes were rated as "favourable" ("not favourable" in 2.8% and 12.9% "indifferent"), and in only 9.8% was a respondent's interest rated as "indifferent" (50.2% as "interested" and 40.0% as "very interested"). Furthermore, the interviewers assessed the truthfulness of the respondents as high (92.2% were rated as "truthful," with only 5.8% as "evasive" and 0.3% as "untruthful").

With respect to communication 85.9% were rated as understanding the language "very well" (with 11.2% "somewhat" and 2.9% as "not well"). Considering that an adequate facility in English or French was a sample selection criterion, this distribution must be viewed within that context; that is even those rated "not well" must have had adequate facility for initial sample listing. Finally, in 72.6% of the interviews, no disturbances were reported. In the 26.5% of cases, where disturbances were reported, they could range from minor intrusions (such as a telephone call) to larger household crises; however, no information on the severity of the disturbance is available.

In summary, the interviews appear to have been conducted under satisfactory conditions. Although clearly not the standard conditions available in laboratory settings, they are acceptable as household conditions for survey work.

Table 2.1
Sample Selection and Interview Completion by Region

Region	Number selected addresses	Multiple house- holds	Total	Dead addresses	Ineligible (non- French English)	Effective base	Total completed <i>n</i> %	Ill or aged	Absent	Refused	Other	Total incom- pleted <i>n</i> %
Atlantic provinces	223	0	223	9	1	213	148 69	8	27	29	1	65 31
Quebec	930	1	931	80	14	837	567 68	33	100	137	0	270 32
Ontario	932	15	947	36	26	885	648 73	22	98	108	9	237 27
Prairies	433	10	443	15	12	416	317 76	12	36	49	2	99 24
British Columbia	295	5	300	17	6	277	169 61	7	45	51	5	108 39
Total	2813	31	2844	157	59	2628	1849 70	82	306	374	17	779 30

Independent Variables

A number of questions were asked in the survey to provide background information on each respondent. This information was used, singly and in combination, to construct the independent variables according to which the total sample was broken down, namely: (1) geographic location, (2) ethnicity, (3) socioeconomic status, (4) political party preference, (5) age and (6) sex. The first three variables had multiple indicators. A detailed definition of each of these variables follows.

Geographic region. This variable identified the geographic location of the interview. A common division of Canada into five regions was employed.

- (1) Atlantic provinces: Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick ($N = 176$)
- (2) Quebec ($N = 488$)
- (3) Ontario ($N = 695$)
- (4) Prairies: Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta ($N = 291$)
- (5) British Columbia ($N = 199$)

Metropolitan area. It was considered of special interest to compare the views of respondents from the five largest metropolitan areas in Canada. Accordingly, a second geographic analysis included only those respondents who lived in one of these areas. The definition and boundaries of the census metropolitan areas were identical to those used in the 1971 census. A census metropolitan area is the main labour market of a continuously built-up area with a population of at least 100,000 (Census publication 92-701, Vol. I, Part 1, p. 11). The five metropolitan areas examined were:

- (1) Montreal ($N = 220$)
- (2) Toronto ($N = 216$)
- (3) Winnipeg ($N = 54$)
- (4) Edmonton-Calgary ($N = 70$)
- (5) Vancouver ($N = 106$)

Degree of urbanization. In addition to specifying the geographic location of respondents' residences, the degree of urbanization of their home community was also coded. Statistics from the 1971 census were used for this purpose. Each community was categorized into one of four levels of urbanization:

- (1) rural: communities with populations of less than 1,000.
- (2) towns and villages: communities with populations of 1,000 to 9,999.
- (3) small cities: population between 10,000 and 100,000.
- (4) metropolitan areas: population greater than 100,000.

Due to differences in degree of urbanization in various regions of the country, this category system could not be employed consistently across the country. Hence, the following exceptions were made. In the Atlantic provinces, only three levels of urbanization were coded. Towns and villages were combined with small cities. It was also the case that, for some locations in Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland the precise degree of urbanization could not be determined, in which case the community was classified as rural. Since Ontario and Quebec contain several large cities in addition to the two largest cities

in Canada, Montreal and Toronto were kept apart from the other large cities. Consequently five categories were coded in these two provinces.

Ethnicity. The definition of ethnicity is not a simple matter. One way to proceed might have been to follow the conventions used in the census and simply categorize respondents according to paternal country of origin. A number of other possibilities existed, however. One could rely on the individual's self identity, or one could take note of his or her mother tongue. To rely on only one feature would make sense if the various defining features of ethnicity coincided. Preliminary cross-tabulation showed that such was not the case. It was not uncommon to find such inconsistencies as exemplified by respondents who described their national origin as French, whose mother tongue was English and who identified themselves as Canadian. Assignment to an ethnic category in such cases would be difficult. A decision was made to construct four ethnicity categories, i.e., Angloceltic, French, anglophone "other ethnic," and francophone "other ethnic," by using as much relevant information as was available. Five criteria guided the definition: (1) the categories should be conceptually clear and simple, (2) the categories should be as "pure" as possible, (3) the definition should be easily communicable, (4) the definition should be as inclusive as possible, and (5) the categories should be mutually exclusive. That is, it was desirable to categorize as many respondents as possible in order to retain the representativeness of the sample and to preserve a large number for further breakdowns. It should be clear that criteria 1 to 3 were opposed to criterion 4. The resulting definition was a compromise.

The definition took into account five pieces of information; namely, (1) father's national origin (2) mother's birthplace (3) ethnic identity (4) mother tongue (5) language of interview. Specifically, the four ethnicity categories were defined as follows:

(1) *Angloceltic*: a respondent whose father's ancestry is British, Irish, or unknown, AND whose mother was born in Canada, or the British Isles/Ireland, AND who considers him- or herself an English-, Irish-, Scottish Canadian, or Canadian, or English, Irish, or Scottish, AND whose mother tongue AND language of interview is English ($N = 691$).

(2) *French Canadian*: a respondent whose father's ancestry is French or unknown, AND whose mother was born in Canada or France, AND who considers him- or herself to be Canadian, French Canadian, or Quebecois, AND whose mother tongue AND language of interview is French ($N = 349$).

(3) *anglophone "other ethnic"*: a respondent whose father's ancestry is other than British/Irish or French, AND whose language of interview is English ($N = 520$).

(4) *francophone "other ethnic"*: a respondent whose father's ancestry is other than British/Irish or French, AND whose language of interview is French ($N = 34$).

It should be clear from these definitions that Angloceltic and French Canadian are relatively "pure" categories, while the "other ethnic" groups are more

inclusive. With this definition, 1593 of the 1849 respondents could be categorized. The remaining 256 respondents were excluded from analyses involving ethnicity.

The ethnicity variable is strongly associated with such variables as geographic region and religious affiliation. The great majority of Quebec residents are French Canadians. Yet there are also French Canadians outside of Quebec. In order to examine the relative importance of region and ethnicity, respondents were categorized according to two variables simultaneously in many analyses reported later in this volume. These variables were geographic region (Quebec/other) and language of interview (English/French). Language of interview, instead of the more precise ethnicity classification, was used in order to retain as many respondents as possible for this analysis. The small number of francophone respondents outside of Quebec would have made the analysis by ethnicity problematic.

The strategy for separating the contribution of geographic region and ethnicity involved the following reasoning. If francophone respondents from Quebec have attitudes similar to anglophone Quebecers, but different from francophone respondents from outside Quebec, the geographic variable would be the important determinant of attitudes. If, on the other hand, francophone respondents were alike whether they lived in or outside Quebec, and the same held true for anglophones, ethnicity would be the important variable.

French Canadians are also predominantly Roman Catholic. In order to examine whether attitude differences between French Canadians and others could be explained in terms of religion, the respondents' religious affiliation was examined in the context of ethnicity.

Religious affiliation. Respondents were categorized into one of five categories according to their answer to Question 37 in the survey instrument. These categories were:

- (1) *no religion*: respondents who gave their religion as "agnostic," "atheist," or "no religious preference." ($N = 116$)
- (2) *Anglican*: respondents who gave their religion as "Anglican." ($N = 203$)
- (3) *United Church*: respondents who gave their religion as "United Church." ($N = 242$)
- (4) *anglophone Roman Catholic*: respondents who gave the interview in English and described themselves as "Roman Catholic." ($N = 390$)
- (5) *francophone Roman Catholic*: respondents who gave the interview in French and described themselves as "Roman Catholic." ($N = 426$)

Respondents who gave any other response ($N = 423$) were omitted from this analysis. The general strategy for the analysis by religion was as follows. If Roman Catholics are alike in their attitude, whether they are anglophone or francophone, and different from members of the other major religious denominations, one could argue that religion and not ethnicity is the effective source of attitudes. If on the other hand, anglophone Roman Catholics are similar in their attitudes to anglophones of other denominations, but different from francophone Roman Catholics, ethnicity and not religion would be the important

determinant of attitudes.

Generational status. Another aspect of ethnicity is recency of immigration. Respondents were grouped into three categories.

- (1) *immigrant*: respondents who were born outside of Canada.
- (2) *second generation*: respondents who were born in Canada, but whose father was born outside of Canada.
- (3) *third and higher generation*: respondents who were born in Canada and whose fathers were also born in Canada.

A cross-tabulation between generational status and ethnicity showed a strong association between these two variables. Virtually all French Canadians, i.e., 97%, were third generation or higher. In other words, there were practically no recent immigrants among French Canadians. Since, in addition, the total number of francophone "other ethnic" respondents was too small to be further subdivided, only anglophone respondents were used for the generational analysis. It was important however, to distinguish between immigrants from the British Isles and those from "other ethnic" origin. Consequently the analysis of generational status always involved a two-way breakdown with ethnicity (Angloceltic versus anglophone "other ethnic").

Ancestral country of origin for selected ethnic groups. The category of "other ethnic" in the basic ethnicity classification obviously contains an ethnically heterogeneous lot. The only common feature is ethnic origin other than Angloceltic or French. In order to examine possible differences among members of various "other ethnic" groups, respondents were categorized according to paternal country of origin. Eight categories were created, representing the seven ethnic groups most represented in the sample and an eighth category for all "other ethnic" respondents not among the seven most numerous groups. The categories were:

- (1) Dutch ($N = 44$)
- (2) German ($N = 106$)
- (3) Italian ($N = 51$)
- (4) Polish ($N = 42$)
- (5) Russian ($N = 44$)
- (6) Scandinavian ($N = 46$)
- (7) Ukrainian ($N = 31$)
- (8) others ($N = 176$)

The number of respondents in some of these categories is quite small, raising the possibility that analyses based on this categorization may not be reliable. However, the following points should be noted. Insofar as the sampling procedure was systematic, respondents chosen from each of these groups should be representative of the particular ethnic groups in Canada. In addition, tests of statistical significance are employed in the evaluation of the results, in order to distinguish between sampling error and real differences. Despite the relatively small numbers involved, it is still possible to draw reliable conclusions from this classification.

Occupational status of head of household. Respondents were asked what

kind of work the head of household normally did, and the kind of organization, business, or industry he or she worked for. This information was coded into a job classification according to the Occupational Classification Manual, Census of Canada, 1971. The resulting job list was then converted into the socioeconomic status scale developed by Blishen (1976) based on the 1971 Census. Each job category is assigned a number ranging from the seventies (indicating high status) to the twenties (indicating low status). This so-called Blishen index is objective in the sense that it is based on the educational attainments of job occupants and their typical earnings as revealed in the census. For the correlational analyses to be reported later, the Blishen index was used in its continuous form. For most analyses, however, it was categorized into six groups.

- (1) under 30.0000 ($N = 480$)
- (2) 30.0000–39.9999 ($N = 318$)
- (3) 40.0000–49.9999 ($N = 354$)
- (4) 50.0000–59.9999 ($N = 221$)
- (5) 60.0000–69.9999 ($N = 253$)
- (6) 70.0000–79.9999 ($N = 84$)

For 138 respondents the information for head of household's work was insufficient to be coded. They were omitted from the analyses involving occupational status.

Income of head of household. Respondents were asked to indicate the total income for the past year for the head of household, by naming one of 15 income ranges provided on a card. The 15 ranges were grouped into five categories.

- (1) under \$4,000 ($N = 302$)
- (2) \$4,000–\$7,999 ($N = 411$)
- (3) \$8,000–\$13,999 ($N = 621$)
- (4) \$14,000–\$19,999 ($N = 234$)
- (5) \$20,000 or more ($N = 110$)

Information for 171 respondents was not available. Consequently they had to be excluded from analyses involving income of head of household.

Educational level of respondent. Respondents were asked to indicate the highest level of education attained, by choosing one of seven response categories. The last two categories were combined.

- (1) some primary school, but no completion ($N = 183$)
- (2) primary school, with graduation ($N = 258$)
- (3) some high school, no graduation ($N = 541$)
- (4) high school, with graduation ($N = 347$)
- (5) technical training beyond high school ($N = 193$)
- (6) some college, university or more ($N = 310$)

Seventeen respondents failed to answer this question and therefore had to be eliminated.

Political party preference. Respondents were asked to indicate the political party which they generally support in federal elections. It should be noted that most interviews were completed just prior to the 1974 federal election. In addi-

tion to choices of the four federal political parties, answers such as "abstention," "no particular party" or some other party were also recorded. In the present analyses, only supporters of one of the four major parties were included. A cross-tabulation of language of interview with party support revealed a strong association between these two variables. Francophone respondents were strongly over-represented among Liberal supporters. Consequently, analyses of political party preference were completed separately within the anglophone and the francophone sample. Only 1148 of the 1849 respondents provided a choice of one of the four major parties. The other 701 respondents were omitted from this analysis. The first number following each party indicates the number of anglophone supporters; the second number refers to francophones.

- (1) Liberal ($N = 430,193$)
- (2) New Democratic Party ($N = 152,19$)
- (3) Progressive Conservative ($N = 296,22$)
- (4) Social Credit ($N = 12,25$)

Age and sex of respondent. Information on age and sex was obtained by the interviewer in the process of enumerating all the members of a particular household. Age in years was coded into one of six categories.

- (1) teens: 16–19 ($N = 204$)
- (2) twenties: 20–29 ($N = 429$)
- (3) thirties: 30–39 ($N = 327$)
- (4) forties: 40–49 ($N = 314$)
- (5) fifties: 50–59 ($N = 267$)
- (6) sixty and over ($N = 291$)

Data Analysis

Statistical tests of significance. Extensive use of tests of statistical significance was made in the analyses of the data. The purpose of such tests is to decide whether a given empirical outcome could have resulted from chance, or whether it reflects a reliable result. By applying a test of significance we obtain the probability that a given outcome was due to chance or random variation. The lower this probability, the higher the significance of the test and the more certain we can be that the results are stable and would appear again if we drew a different sample. Probability levels are indicated by asterisks in the tabular material which follows. One asterisk means that a chance outcome could only happen five times in a hundred ($p < .05$); two asterisks once in a hundred ($p < .01$); and three asterisks once in a thousand ($p < .001$).

Statistical tests were used for two major purposes. First, they were applied to determine whether differences between various categories of respondents were of sufficient magnitude to be significant and reliable. Analyses of variance and t-tests were applied for this purpose. Any statistics textbook will provide the detailed descriptions of these tests. A computer based system of social science data analyses, DATA-TEXT (Armor & Couch, 1972) was used for most analyses.

Second, statistical tests were applied to determine how strongly two or more variables were associated or related to each other and whether such relationships were significant. Correlation coefficients (Pearson r), chi-square tests and multiple stepwise regression analysis were employed. For more specialized purposes, such as determining the structure of a domain of items, factor analysis and multidimensional scaling procedures (Romney, Shepherd & Nerlove, 1972) were used.

Weighting. Weighting procedures were routinely applied for all analyses. Household weights were used for those analyses involving households as units (i.e., when respondents were categorized according to the socioeconomic status of the head of household). Person weights were employed when individual respondents were the unit of analysis. The household weight was equal to the inverse of the probability of including a given household in the sample. The person weight was equal to the household weight times the number of eligible respondents in the household. One disadvantage of using weights as defined in this manner, is that analyses of frequencies reveal population estimates and not sample characteristics. It becomes therefore misleading to apply tests of significance for frequency data, such as chi-square tests. In order to overcome this disadvantage, the weighting factors were further transformed by dividing the weight for each respondent by the average weight for all respondents. As a result of this transformation the average weight became 1.0 and frequency counts yielded sample characteristics and not population estimates.

Missing observations. It was necessary to treat several response outcomes as missing observations. A respondent's inability or refusal to answer a particular question was coded as a missing observation. Also treated as missing were items that were inappropriate for particular respondents. For example, one question ("have you heard about the policy?") was inappropriate for respondents who had answered the prior question in the affirmative ("Do you know about the federal government's policy of multiculturalism?"). In a few instances, miscellaneous responses were treated as missing data. For example, in questions which dealt with ethnic identity, a few respondents did not fit any of the eight categories provided. This would apply to someone, e.g., who considers himself or herself a Newfoundlander, but not a Canadian. The DATA-TEXT system used in the data analysis treated missing observations routinely in all statistical analyses.



3

Demographic and Psychological Profile of National Sample

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first is concerned with the basic demographic, economic and socio-cultural characteristics of the respondents, and their relationship to the 1971 Census distributions. In the second section a number of inter-relationships among these demographic characteristics is presented. In the third section some of the psychological characteristics of the sample are outlined.

Demographic Characteristics

In outlining the nature of the sample, not all the available data are employed. Only those variables are reported which are required to define the sample in broad terms, or which are usually implicated in the study of attitudes. These variables are those of geographic region, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, political preference, age and sex.

It should be noted that although a total of 1849 respondents were interviewed, the number of responses to many questions fell short of that total. The reasons for this included inability to answer, non-applicability of the question, and in some cases, refusal to answer.

In the tables which follow and in the analyses in subsequent chapters, the data which are presented are weighted either by an individual or a household weight. The weight employed is the inverse of the probability of the unit being represented in the sample. For most of the data (i.e., those pertaining to the individual respondents) the individual weight is employed; however, for some of the data the household weight has been used where that is more appropriate (e.g., in the distribution of the household heads' occupational status).

Geographic characteristics. The distribution of our sample by province of residence is provided in Table 3.1, along with comparative data from the 1971 Census. Anticipating our later data analysis by region, these distributions are aggregated from province to region in the table. These two distributions are similar; the largest deviations are a 1.6% under-sampling in Quebec and a 1.8% over-sampling in Ontario.

Ethnic characteristics. Distribution of our sample by father's ancestral country of origin is provided in Table 3.2, along with comparative data from the 1971 Census. Since our interest lies primarily with "majority attitudes," these data are presented first; details of origin in the "other ethnic" category are then provided at the bottom of the table.

These distributions are somewhat different; those of French origin appear

Table 3.1**Province and Region of Residence**

Province REGION	<i>N</i>	Survey		1971 Census ^a %
		Actual %	Weighted %	
Newfoundland	26	1.4	2.2	2.4
Prince Edward Island	10	0.5	0.7	0.5
Nova Scotia	62	3.4	3.5	3.7
New Brunswick	50	2.7	3.2	3.0
ATLANTIC PROVINCES	148	8.0	9.5	9.6
QUEBEC	567	30.7	26.4	28.0
ONTARIO	649	35.1	37.6	35.8
Manitoba	98	5.3	4.2	4.6
Saskatchewan	80	4.3	4.2	4.3
Alberta	139	7.5	7.3	7.6
PRAIRIES	317	17.1	15.7	16.5
BRITISH COLUMBIA	168	9.1	10.8	10.1
CANADA TOTAL	1849	100 %	100 %	100 %

^a Comparative data from 1971 Census (#92-762) have been re-calculated to exclude Yukon and Northwest Territories.

Table 3.2

Father's Ancestral Country of Origin

Country	N	Survey		1971 Census ^a
		Actual %	Weighted %	%
Britain	690	41.8	43.4	44.6
France	418	25.3	23.1	28.7
Other	544	32.9	33.4	26.7
Don't know and no answers	197			
Total	1849	100.0	100.0	100.0
Further Breakdown of "Other" Ancestral Countries of Origin				
Other European				23.0
Germany	103	6.2	5.9	6.1
Italy	48	2.9	2.8	3.4
Jewish ^b	15	.8	.9	1.4
Netherlands	42	2.5	2.4	2.0
Poland	41	2.5	2.3	1.5
Russia	45	2.7	2.5	.3
Scandinavia	46	2.8	2.6	1.8
Ukraine	34	2.0	1.7	2.7
Other	79	4.8		3.9
Other Asian				1.3
China	8	.5	.6	.6
Japan	1	.1	.1	.2
Other	22	1.3	.7	.6
Other				2.4
Indian / Eskimo	16	1.0	.7	1.4
Other and unknown	59	3.6		1.0

^a Census data from # 92-723.^b Jewish data derived from the question on religious denomination, rather than the question on father's ancestral country of origin.

to be under-represented, while those of "other ethnic" origins are over-represented. However, the large numbers of non-responses may account for the bulk of this difference. The largest portion of those responding "don't know" (112 of 197) were residing in the Province of Quebec and took the interview in French; this represents a 22.8% (112 of 491 francophone Quebec respondents) non-response. Another 12 francophone respondents (of a total of 28) residing outside of Quebec similarly responded "don't know." A reasonable assumption is that most of these 124 respondents were of French ancestral origin; with this assumption, the percentage increases to a point very close to the 1971 Census proportion.

There also appears to be a discrepancy between sample and population in the percentage of persons of Russian and Ukrainian origin. Those of Russian origin seem over-represented and those of Ukrainian origin under-represented. This discrepancy may in fact represent sampling error. However, there are several alternative explanations. National boundaries have shifted repeatedly in Eastern Europe over the past 100 years. The question of ethnic origin may not be unambiguous for persons deriving their origin from those parts of the world. It is also possible that an ethnic identity among immigrants that conforms to the census classification may not develop until after arrival in Canada, or may shift over time. Given the fluidity of national boundaries in Eastern Europe, ethnic origins of respondents from that part of the world may be less precise than from other parts.

Turning to our subjective index of ethnic identity, the distribution of responses is displayed in Table 3.3. Respondents were supplied with eight response alternatives to the question "How do you usually think of yourself?"

From earlier questions, the interviewer knew the respondent's ancestral country of origin on both the father's and mother's side. This information was inserted by the interviewer in four of the response alternatives. In two of them, the parental ethnic background was inserted prior to the word "-Canadian," so that the respondent heard a "hyphenated" or "other ethnic" response alternative (e.g., "Greek-Canadian"); and in the other two, the parental ethnic background was supplied alone, so that the respondent heard another "national" response alternative (e.g., "Greek"). The other four response alternatives were: "Canadian," "English Canadian," "French Canadian," and "Québécois" (read out in Quebec only).

It is clear that there has been a differential drift in "subjective" classification in Table 3.3 from the "objective" classification in Table 3.2. Of the 23.1% "France" in Table 3.2, there remain a full 21.3% "French Canadian" or "Québécois" in Table 3.3; of the 33.4% "other" in Table 3.2, there remain only 15.6% "other ethnic" or "nationality" in Table 3.3; and of the 43.4% "Britain" in Table 3.2, there is a minimal 4% "English Canadian" response in Table 3.3. It appears that the French-origin population has retained its ethnic status while the Angloceltic and other-origin populations have largely shifted to a generalized "Canadian" ethnic status. This interpretation is confirmed by the cross-tabulation in Table 3.4. Of those who are of British origin, only 5.4% identify as

“English Canadian”; the bulk—80.5%—shift to a “Canadian” identity, 3.3% to a French identity, and 12.8% shift to another identity. On the other hand, of those who are of French origin, 66.1% retain a French identity, while 26.3% shift to “Canadian.” And in between, of those who are of an “other” origin, 59.2% shift to “Canadian,” while only 33.3% retain an “other ethnic” identity. The meaning of these results on the “subjective” classification are important. Despite a number of realities of North American life in general, and Canadian life in particular, which make it a challenge for non-English speaking groups to keep their language and culture, French Canadians have largely retained their cultural and linguistic identity. In the face of this challenge, then, French Canada has not only survived, but has developed into a well-defined ethnolinguistic group with a strong subjective identity.

Table 3.3
Ethnic Identification of Respondents

Response	N	Survey	
		Actual %	Weighted %
Canadian	1046	57.5	59.0
English-Canadian	73	4.0	4.0
French-Canadian	289	15.9	14.2
Québécois	140	7.7	7.1
“Other ethnic”	212	11.6	12.7
Nationality	60	3.3	2.9
Missing	29		
Total	1849	100 %	100 %

The survey instrument was taken into the field by Centre de Sondage within the Province of Quebec, and by the Survey Research Centre in all other provinces. But no matter where the interview took place, a respondent was entitled to take the interview in either English or French. Thus the language of interview becomes another variable which may be indicative of the respondent’s ethnicity. In the overall sample 1330 (71.9%) took the interview in English, and 519 (28.1%) took it in French.

The distribution of our sample on mother tongue is provided in Table 3.5, along with comparative data from the 1971 Census. Once again, our interest has focused on English and French; details of the “other” category are not provided in this report. These distributions are very similar, the only deviation being a 3% shortfall in the “English” category and a 3% excess in the “other” cate-

Table 3.4

Distribution of Sample on Ethnic Identity and Father's Ancestral Country

N = 1623

Ethnic identity	Father's ancestral country							
	Britain		France		Other			
	Actual	%	Weighted	%	Actual	%	Weighted	%
Canadian	79.2		80.5		25.9		26.3	
English-Canadian	6.0		5.4		1.7		2.5	
French-Canadian	2.2		2.4		45.2	67.7	43.8	66.1
Québécois	1.2		.9		22.2		22.3	
"Other ethnic"	8.8		8.4		2.9		3.1	
Nationality	2.6		2.4		2.0		2.0	
Total	100 %		100 %		100 %		100 %	

gory. It is interesting to note that the proportion taking the interview in French (28.1%) is within a single percentage point of those respondents who report their mother tongue to be French (27.4%). This latter finding further supports the contention that French Canadians have retained a well-defined ethno-linguistic identity. It also makes clear how important language is as a symbol of that identity.

The numbers of respondents who were classified in each of the four ethnicity categories (described in Chapter 2) were 661 Angloceltic Canadians (41.2%), 398 French Canadians (24.8%), 503 anglophone "other ethnic" (31.4%) and 41 francophone "other ethnic" (2.6%). When these percentages are compared to those in Table 3.2 (father's ancestral country of origin), a good approximation is apparent. However, by employing the multiple criteria, a more discriminating allocation of respondents has been possible, one which enhances the clarity of the statistical analyses to be undertaken in later chapters.

Socioeconomic status characteristics. Three variables have been employed to assess the socioeconomic status of respondents: head of household's occupation (Blishen Index), head of household's income, and respondents' education.

In Table 3.6, the sample distribution on occupational status is provided.

Table 3.5**Mother Tongue of Respondents**

Mother tongue	<i>N</i>	Survey		1971 Census ^a %
		Actual %	Weighted %	
English	993	54.0	56.9	60.1
French	555	30.2	27.4	26.9
Other	291	15.8	15.7	13.0
Missing	10			
Total	1849	100 %	100 %	100 %

^a Census data from # 92-725.

Table 3.6**Occupational Status^a of the Head of Household**

Category	<i>N</i>	Survey	
		Actual %	Weighted %
under 30.0000	493	28.7	28.1
30.0000–39.9999	314	18.3	18.6
40.0000–49.9999	362	21.1	20.7
50.0000–59.9999	215	12.5	12.9
60.0000–69.9999	251	14.6	14.8
70.0000–79.9999	82	4.8	4.9
Missing	132		
Total	1849	100 %	100.00 %

^a Blishen Index

The sample distribution by mean income of the head of household is indicated in Table 3.7. There is an apparent discrepancy between the survey data and those from the 1971 Census. However, income increases based upon data from Revenue Canada totaled 25.5% between tax years 1970 and 1973. If the Census mean is augmented by this amount (\$7041 + 25.5%) the expected mean income for 1973 is \$8836, a figure which falls within the limits (\$8000 to

Table 3.7
Income of Head of Household

Level in \$	<i>N</i>	Survey		1971 Census ^a
		Actual %	Weighted %	%
under 4000	285	17.0	18.0	31.0
4000–7999	414	24.8	24.5	35.7
8000–13,999	628	37.6	37.0	25.5
14,000–19,999	228	13.6	13.9	5.0
20,000 and over	117	7.0	6.5	2.8
Don't know	69			
Missing	108			
Total	1849	100 %	100 %	100 %
Mean income		\$8000 to \$8999		\$7041

^a Census data are from # 92-749 and # 93-749.

Table 3.8
Educational Attainment of Respondents

Educational level	<i>N</i>	Survey	
		Actual %	Weighted %
Primary (no graduation)	207	11.3	10.0
Primary (graduation)	278	15.2	14.1
High school (no graduation)	499	27.2	29.5
High school (graduation)	332	18.1	18.9
Technical training	191	10.4	10.5
University (no graduation)	181	9.9	9.5
University (graduation)	144	7.9	7.4
Missing	17		
Total	1849	100 %	100 %

\$8999) yielded by the survey. We may conclude that our sample household head's income approximates the national mean.

In Table 3.8, the distribution of respondents' educational level is indicated. Since the categories used in this survey question were not the same as in the 1971 Census, comparative data cannot be provided.

Political party preference. With respect to voting preference, respondents indicated their general support as displayed in Table 3.9. Note that this question was posed during the final weeks of a federal election campaign; for comparative purposes, we are including data on the final distribution on the July 8th, 1974 voting. The large number of responses not assigned to a particular party makes it difficult to compare directly. Nevertheless, there is a fairly obvious shortfall in Progressive Conservative and Social Credit voters in the survey. However, in the case of Liberal and New Democratic parties there is a good approximation.

Table 3.9
Political Party Preference of Respondents

Party	N	Survey		Election ^a %
		Actual %	Weighted %	
Liberals	644	42.6	41.6	43.2
PC	308	20.4	21.2	35.5
NDP	170	11.2	11.4	15.4
Social Credit	43	2.8	2.5	5.1
Abstention	43	2.8	2.8	
No particular party	294	19.4	19.9	
Other or no party	10	0.7	0.7	0.9
Refuse to answer	198			
Inappropriate	134			
Total	1849	100 %	100 %	100 %

^a Election data from Table 2 of the Preliminary Report of the Chief Electoral Officer.

Age distribution. The age distribution of the sample is presented in Table 3.10, along with comparative data from the 1971 Census. In general the sample closely approximates the census distribution. Only in two age groups (50-59 and 60 and over) are the percentages discrepant by a percentage point or more.

Table 3.10**Age of Respondent**

Age group	N	Survey		1971 Census ^a %
		Actual %	Weighted %	
16-19	143	7.8	11.1	11.3
20-29	424	23.1	23.4	23.6
30-39	367	20.0	17.8	17.4
40-49	293	16.0	17.1	17.0
50-59	266	14.5	14.6	13.6
60 and over	339	18.5	15.9	17.2
missing	17			
Total	1849	100 %	100 %	100 %

^a Comparative data from 1971 Census (# 92-715) have been re-calculated to include only those 16 years of age and above.

Sex distribution. The sex distribution of our sample is provided in Table 3.11 along with comparative data from the 1971 Census. There is a difference of 3.3%, with the survey including females more often than in the general population. However, to anticipate later findings, there is a virtual absence in sex differences on most of the attitude dimensions; thus this deviation from the national sex distribution is of little consequence.

Table 3.11**Sex of Respondent**

Sex	N	Survey		1971 Census ^a %
		Actual %	Weighted %	
Male	826	44.7	46.2	49.5
Female	1023	55.3	53.8	50.5
Total	1849	100 %	100 %	100 %

^a Comparative data from 1971 Census (# 92-757) have been re-calculated to include only those 16 years of age and above.

Other demographic variables. A number of other variables were examined in the survey which do not bear directly on the data analysis presented in the following chapters. However they do help to define the sample and so are included here.

First, the distribution by marital status is provided in Table 3.12, along with comparative data from the 1971 Census. There is a deviation in the sample of around 4.0%; single respondents are under-represented while married respondents are over-represented.

Table 3.12
Marital Status of Respondent

Marital status	N	Survey		1971 Census ^a %
		Actual %	Weighted %	
Single	392	21.2	24.4	28.25
Married (& separated)	1300	70.3	70.3	64.38
Widowed	136	7.4	4.8	6.22
Divorced	21	1.1	0.6	1.15
Total	1849	100 %	100 %	100 %

^a Comparative data from 1971 Census (# 92-717) have been re-calculated to include only those 16 years of age and above.

The distribution of our sample by citizenship is provided in Table 3.13 along with comparative data from the 1971 Census. It is clear that the sample and census distributions are not different. A further question was posed regarding immigration status: of the 6.0% who were not citizens 87.5% claimed to be landed immigrants. Overall, the sample included less than one percent who were neither citizens nor landed immigrants.

The distribution of our sample by religious denomination is provided in Table 3.14 along with comparative data from the 1971 Census. These two distributions are very similar, with most denominations falling within two percentage points of each other.

Summary of demographic characteristics of the sample. For most of the demographic variables on which comparisons may be made, the survey sample closely approximated the national population. Although a small sex and marital status deviation has been noted, the major variables of region, ethnicity and socioeconomic status (which often appear important in studies of social attitudes) displayed a notable similarity to the national distribution. We may conclude, then, that the sample is appropriate for the purposes of the study, and that some confidence can be placed in the attitudinal data drawn from it.

Table 3.13
Citizenship of Respondent

Citizenship	<i>N</i>	Survey		1971 Census ^a %
		Actual %	Weighted %	
Canadian	1730	94.0	93.8	93.8
Non-Canadian	111	6.0	6.2	6.2
Missing	8			
Total	1849	100 %	100 %	100 %

^a Census data from # 92-728.

Table 3.14
Religious Denomination of Respondent

Religious denomination	<i>N</i>	Survey		1971 Census ^a %
		Actual %	Weighted %	
Roman Catholic	839	50.1	48.8	46.3
United Church	285	17.0	17.5	17.5
Anglican	196	11.7	12.1	11.8
Presbyterian	86	5.1	5.1	4.0
Baptist	70	4.2	4.7	3.1
Lutheran	55	3.3	3.3	3.3
Other	103	6.1	6.3	9.7
Agnostic / Atheist	42	2.5	2.3	4.3
Missing	173			
Total	1849	100 %	100 %	100 %

^a Census data from # 92-724.

Interrelationships Among Characteristics

In this section, our interest is directed toward the various relationships which were obtained among the demographic characteristics of the sample. Of course not all relationships are of equal interest, and so a selection will be made based upon two criteria. The first is the interest in some of the relationships which stems from previous work in Canada (for example, between ethnicity and occupational status, from the work of Porter, 1965). The second is the requirements for data analyses in Chapters 4 to 6. For some of the analyses, background variables are highly related, such as region and ethnicity. To understand how they may be related to attitudes it is important here to consider their covariation. And for most of the analyses a few background variables emerge as especially important contributors to the patterning of attitudes. In anticipation of these results, we provide here a more detailed statement of how they are distributed in relation to other background variables.

Socioeconomic status. In the determination of socioeconomic status three variables have been employed: occupational status of the head of the household (Blishen Index), income of the head of the household, and education of the respondent. It is useful to know how these three variables relate among themselves, for if the relationships are high it would not be necessary to carry through subsequent analyses with all three indices of status. In Appendices 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, cross-tabulations are provided for the three variables; all X^2 statistics are substantial and significant. These analyses indicate that as education and income increase so does occupational status. This is not surprising, given that the Blishen Index is based upon a formula which incorporates both educational and income characteristics. An analysis by correlation reveals coefficients of $+ .49$ and $+ .39$ for education and income relationships with occupational status respectively. Of more empirical interest is the relationship (Appendix 3.2) between education and income; the correlation coefficient between these two variables is $+ .35$.

Despite this substantial level of relationship, these coefficients are far from unity; less than 25% ($.49$ squared) of the variance is accounted for. Reasons for this level of relationship may be suggested: one, of course, is that some data derive from the head of household and some from the respondent; another is that in an upwardly mobile society, some slippage between education and income is bound to occur. The effect of both of these would be to keep the correlation from rising to near unity. In view of this level of correlation, it was decided to employ all three indices in most subsequent analyses.

Relationships between region and ethnicity. In addition to socioeconomic status, our later analyses will consider the effects of both region of residence and the ethnicity of the respondent upon attitudes. It is therefore useful to know how these two variables are themselves related. In Table 3.15, a cross-tabulation is provided for the two variables. Even without the extremely large X^2 statistic, it is obvious that respondents are separated by region and ethnicity into distinct segments: 81% of respondents in Quebec are French Canadian, while only 7.3% in other regions are. On occasion, some later analyses will em-

Table 3.15

**Cross-tabulation of Region of Residence and Ethnicity
in the Total Sample**

Region		Ethnicity				Total
		Anglo-celtic	French Canadian	Anglo-phone "other ethnic"	Frano-phone	
Atlantic provinces	<i>N</i>	114	8	22	0	144
	%	79.0	5.7	15.3	0	100.0
Quebec	<i>N</i>	24	331	21	33	410
	%	6.0	80.9	5.1	8.1	100.0
Prairies	<i>N</i>	103	0	150	0	253
	%	40.5	0	59.3	0	100.0
Ontario	<i>N</i>	359	10	236	0	605
	%	59.4	1.6	39.0	0	100.0
British Columbia	<i>N</i>	91	0	90	0	181
	%	50.1	0	49.9	0	100.0
Total	<i>N</i>	691	349	520	34	1593
	%	43.4	21.9	32.6	2.1	100.0

Chi-square = 1369.5***

Note: asterisks in this and all subsequent tables refer to the probability levels of chance occurrence associated with the statistics. The lower the probability, the less likely a given result is due to chance, that is, the more likely it is to reflect a real state of affairs in the population sampled. Specifically various asterisks mean the following:

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

ploy the language in which the interview took place rather than ethnicity as a classifying variable. In Table 3.16, a cross-tabulation is provided for languages of interview by region. Once again, there is a clear separation of respondents, with the bulk of interviews in French taking place in the Province of Quebec.

Relationships between region and socioeconomic status. Given the geographic and economic diversity in Canada, it should be expected that there will be regional economic disparity in our sample. As Appendices 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 indicate, there is indeed a significant relationship between region of residence and all three socioeconomic variables. For occupational status, there is evidence that Ontario is under-represented in the lower ranges of the Blishen Index, but the effect is not a strong one. However, it is stronger when income is

Table 3.16

**Cross-tabulation of Region of Residence
and Language of Interview in the Total Sample**

Region		Language of interview		
		English	French	Total
Quebec	<i>N</i>	76	491	567
	%	13.4	86.6	100.0
Outside Quebec	<i>N</i>	1254	28	1282
	%	97.8	2.2	100.0
Total	<i>N</i>	1330	519	1849
	%	71.9	28.1	100.0

examined; those in the Atlantic region are over-represented in the lower income range, and Ontario is under-represented. Conversely, Ontario and the Prairies tend to be over-represented in the higher income range. Education, too, varies by region, with Quebec notably over-represented in the lower range.

Relationships between ethnicity and socioeconomic status. This is a topic of major interest since Porter (1965) demonstrated a close relationship between ethnicity and stratification in Canadian society. On the basis of his findings, and those reported in the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book IV, we would expect to find a similar relationship in our sample. As Tables 3.17, 3.18 and 3.19 show, for occupational status, Angloceltic respondents are under-represented in the lower ranges of the Blishen Index, while French-Canadian respondents are somewhat over-represented. Anglophone "other ethnic" respondents, however, are even more over-represented in the lower ranges. In the upper ranges the most striking result is the under-representation among French-Canadian respondents; only 24.3% are in the upper three categories compared to 31.9% of the total sample and 38.8% of Angloceltic respondents.

The income and education distributions by ethnicity (Tables 3.18 and 3.19) confirm the earlier findings. Of particular interest here is the contrast between the two distributions for French-Canadian respondents. While they are very much over-represented in the lower education categories, there is a lesser degree of over-representation in the lower income categories. This suggests that for lower ranges of education French-Canadian respondents may earn relatively more. However, as Table 3.18 indicates, this tendency is not carried through to the higher income ranges where French-Canadian respondents are under-represented (11% at \$14,000 or more, compared to 24.4% of the Angloceltic

Table 3.17

Cross-tabulation of Ethnicity of Respondent and Occupational Status^a of the Head of Household in the Total Sample

		Occupational status						Total
		30.0000 40.0000 50.0000 60.0000 70.0000						
		Under 30.0000	to 39.9999	to 49.9999	to 59.9999	to 69.9999	to 79.9999	
Ethnicity								
Angloceltic	<i>N</i>	147	104	126	76	122	40	615
	%	23.9	16.9	20.5	12.4	19.9	6.5	100.0
French Canadian	<i>N</i>	109	76	88	38	43	7	361
	%	30.2	21.1	24.4	10.5	11.9	1.9	100.0
Anglophone "other ethnic"	<i>N</i>	161	82	94	62	55	21	475
	%	33.9	17.3	19.8	13.1	11.6	4.4	100.0
Francophone "other ethnic"	<i>N</i>	9	13	6	5	3	4	40
	%	22.5	32.5	15.0	12.5	7.5	10.0	100.0
Total	<i>N</i>	426	275	314	181	223	72	1491
	%	28.6	18.4	21.1	12.1	15.0	4.8	100.0

Chi-square = 50.5***

^a Blishen Index

respondents).

Summary of interrelationships. Throughout this section, some striking relationships emerged, all of which were anticipated on the basis of previous literature. Among socioeconomic variables there was a moderate covariation, but not sufficiently high to warrant the use of a single variable in later analyses. Between regional and ethnicity variables a strong relationship was apparent, which requires their separation by statistical means in later analyses. And among region, ethnicity and socioeconomic status there was a strong indication in our sample that the analysis of Porter (1965) and others is correct; there are status differences in Canada which are significantly related to one's ethnicity and one's region of residence.

Psychological Characteristics

In addition to collecting demographic information on respondents, we decided to add measures of psychological characteristics. These were selected according to the following criteria. The measures had to show a relationship with prejudice and ethnic attitudes in previous research. They had to be suitable for administration within the survey format. They had to provide a psycho-

Table 3.18

**Cross-tabulation of Ethnicity of Respondent and
Income of Head of Household in the Total Sample**

Ethnicity		Income					Total
		Under 4000	4000 to 7999	8000 to 13999	14000 to 19999	20000 +	
Angloceltic	<i>N</i>	105	130	229	97	53	614
	%	17.1	21.2	37.3	15.8	8.6	100.0
French Canadian	<i>N</i>	62	117	129	29	9	346
	%	17.9	33.8	37.3	8.4	2.6	100.0
Anglophone "other ethnic"	<i>N</i>	74	99	168	74	41	456
	%	16.2	21.7	36.8	16.2	9.0	100.0
Francophone "other ethnic"	<i>N</i>	5	10	14	4	2	35
	%	14.3	28.6	40.0	11.4	5.7	100.0
Total	<i>N</i>	246	356	540	204	105	1451
	%	17.0	24.5	37.2	14.1	7.2	100.0

Chi-square = 42.2***

logical characterization of the sample. Finally, they had to have been employed in other countries so that cross-national comparisons would be possible, not only in terms of the specific measures, but also more generally in terms of Canada's proneness to prejudice. Scales measuring authoritarianism and ethnocentrism and a value survey were judged to meet these criteria and were therefore included.

The measures for authoritarianism and ethnocentrism were derived from scales developed by Adorno and his coworkers in their massive study of the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson & Sanford, 1950). These authors attempted to discover the psychological bases of prejudice. They hypothesized that prejudice is not specific but generalized, and that it is a function of primarily unconscious personality characteristics.

The authoritarian character structure is not easy to define, because it consists of a complex syndrome of traits without a central organizing feature. A reasonably succinct description of this syndrome has been provided by Allport (1962), and Brown (1965). It involves what has been called "authoritarian submission," that is, the uncritical acceptance of an idealized moral authority. With it goes a strong desire to be aligned with authority figures and to be part of an idealized in-group. The authoritarian person also shows a tendency for "authoritarian aggression," that is, he or she is vigilant for those who violate con-

Table 3.19

Table 3.19

ventional values and quick to condemn and punish them. The authoritarian is preoccupied with power and toughness, tends to think in rigid categories and is intolerant of ambiguity. To him or her, people are weak or strong, things are black or white and shades of grey do not exist.

The authoritarian's relationship with other people is characterized by ethnocentrism. The concept of ethnocentrism was first introduced by William Graham Sumner (1906). According to Sumner:

Ethnocentrism is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it . . . Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn. (p.12)

Levine & Campbell (1972) have recently provided a conceptual elaboration and empirical test for the concept of ethnocentrism. For Adorno et al. (1950) "to be ethnically centered means to be rigid in one's acceptance of the culturally alike and in one's rejection of the culturally unlike" (p.102). These authors have given a definition of ethnocentrism as an attitude system:

Ethnocentrism is conceived as an ideological system pertaining to groups and group relations. A distinction is made between *ingroups* (those groups with which the individual identifies himself) and *outgroups* (with which he does not have a sense of belonging and which are regarded as antithetical to the ingroups). Outgroups are the objects of negative opinions and hostile attitudes; ingroups are the objects of positive opinions and uncritically supportive attitudes; and it is considered that outgroups should be socially subordinate to ingroups. (Adorno et al. 1950, p. 104)

In short, the concept of ethnocentrism involves: (1) positive attitudes toward ingroups, (2) negative attitudes toward outgroups, and (3) the belief in the inferiority of outgroups.

Scales measuring ethnocentrism and authoritarianism have been widely used in research on prejudice (Christie & Cook, 1958). The scales used in the present study are much abbreviated and somewhat modified versions of the original scales. The authoritarianism scale consisted of eight items (see Table 3.20) drawn from the original scale used by Adorno et al. A larger pool of items had been administered by one of the present authors to a sample of contemporary Canadian university students. Those eight items were selected that showed the highest item-total correlations. The ethnocentrism scale consisted of six items (see Table 3.21). The criteria for selecting these items were as follows: (1) high item-total correlations in the original work by Adorno et al., and (2) suitability in the Canadian context. Several of the items had been previously used by Gardner (1974) in Canadian samples. Although ethnocentrism and authoritarianism are theoretically and empirically related, scales measuring both concepts were included in order to tap the various aspects of authoritarian

ideology.

The measurement of authoritarianism and ethnocentrism has been subjected to a number of criticisms (see Christie & Jahoda, 1954). The most serious flaw of the scales is the fact that all items are phrased in an authoritarian direction. Scale scores can therefore become distorted by what has been called acquiescence response set. This problem could be solved by phrasing half the items in a non-authoritarian direction. Such a solution has been attempted by several authors (e.g., Bass, 1955). However, attempts at item rever-

Table 3.20

Authoritarianism in the Total Sample

N = 1820

	Mean	<i>SD</i>	% Disagree (1-3)	% Neutral (4)	% Agree (5-7)
Total score	4.86	1.29	21.0	4.1	74.9
a. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.	3.71	2.27	45	17.7	37.3
b. An insult to our honour should always be punished.	3.80	2.12	44.1	19.5	36.3
d. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.	5.29	1.91	17.1	13.3	69.6
e. A person who has bad manners, habits and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.	5.00	2.03	23.6	13.2	63.2
f. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents.	5.22	2.04	20.8	11.4	67.9
i. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped.	4.76	2.32	30.0	9.7	60.3
j. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.	5.77	1.70	12.1	7.6	80.3
l. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.	5.36	1.78	15.2	12.5	72.4

Table 3.21

Ethnocentrism in the Total Sample

 $N = 1817$

	Mean	<i>SD</i>	% Disagree (1-3)	% Neutral (4)	% Agree (5-7)
Total score	3.53	1.29	62.9	5.6	31.5
c. Foreigners are all right in their place, but they carry it too far when they get too familiar with us.	3.16	2.14	58.2	15.4	26.5
g. It is only natural and right for each person to think that his family is better than any other.	4.41	2.24	33.9	13.8	52.3
h. The worst danger to real Canadianism during the last 50 years has come from foreign ideas and agitators.	3.52	2.10	49.9	19.0	31.1
k. It would be a mistake ever to have coloured people for foremen and leaders over whites.	2.65	2.04	69.2	11.8	19.1
m. People who do not believe that we have the best kind of government in the world should be made to leave the country.	2.50	1.96	73.2	9.5	17.3
n. Canada may not be perfect, but the Canadian Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society.	4.91	1.90	21.5	17.5	60.9

sal have also been criticized by Christie, Havel, and Seidenburg (1958), and Brown (1965) who have argued that it is extremely difficult to phrase statements that are the direct psychological opposites of the original items. It is not surprising then that none of the attempts at constructing a balanced authoritarianism scale has been generally accepted. It seemed therefore advisable to employ the items from the original version developed by Adorno et al.

Total scores for ethnocentrism and authoritarianism were obtained by taking the mean ratings of the respective sets of items. In order to examine whether ethnocentrism and authoritarianism constituted internally consistent dimensions in our sample, item-total and inter-item correlations were computed. These results are presented in Appendices 3.7 and 3.8. For the computation of the item-total correlations, the relevant item was subtracted from the total score. For authoritarianism, item-total correlations ranged from .26 to

.60 with a median of .52. The inter-item correlations ranged from .11 to .52. For ethnocentrism the item-total correlations ranged from .27 to .55 with a median of .44. Inter-item correlations ranged from .11 to .48. These results indicate that despite the apparent heterogeneity of the overt content of the items, they nevertheless represent coherent syndromes of beliefs.

Authoritarianism and ethnocentrism showed a correlation of .61 (see Appendix 3.9), which is well within the range of correlations typically found between these two measures, even when longer versions of the scales have been employed (Adorno et al. 1950; Brown, 1965).

In order to provide further psychological information on the respondents, a substantial part of the value survey developed by Rokeach (1973) was included in the present survey instrument. Rokeach has made a distinction between terminal and instrumental values. Terminal values are defined as idealized end-states of existence and instrumental values as idealized modes of behaviour. A value system, according to Rokeach, "is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance" (p.5). The value system is assessed through the value survey which consists of presenting respondents with a list of value names, such as "freedom," to which are added very brief descriptions, such as "independence, free choice." The respondent is asked to rank the values in order of their importance to him or her. In the complete value survey Rokeach includes 18 terminal and 18 instrumental values. In order to make the task feasible for our respondents, only 12 terminal values were included in the present survey.

The score for each value is the rank assigned to that value by a respondent. A low number indicates a high rank; that is, the lower a number an individual assigned to a given value, the more important is that value in the individual's value system. It may be argued that since ranks are not truly continuous variables and are not normally distributed, it is not appropriate to use parametric statistics. However, such statistics were used in the present investigation for the sake of continuity in the treatment of other data, and because Rokeach (1973) has reported that the use of parametric and non-parametric statistics yields highly similar results.

The correlations between authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and the values are presented in Appendix 3.9.

Psychological characteristics in the total sample. As shown in Table 3.20, the mean authoritarianism score in the total sample was 4.86, which is remarkably high as some comparisons presented below will indicate. A majority of respondents agreed with six of the eight items on the authoritarianism scale. Respondents agreed most strongly with the statements: "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn," and "Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up, they ought to get over them and settle down."

Table 3.21 gives results for the ethnocentrism scale. The mean score for ethnocentrism was considerably lower than the score for authoritarianism. Ac-

cording to this measure, a majority of Canadians are not ethnocentric. A majority of respondents agreed with only two of the six items on this scale. They were: "Canada may not be perfect, but the Canadian way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society," and "It is only natural and right for each person to think that his family is better than any other." The strongest disagreement was directed toward the items, "It would be a mistake to have coloured people for foreman and leaders over whites," and "People who do not believe that we have the best government in the world should be made to leave the country." The most explicitly racist and chauvinist statements received the lowest endorsement.

Table 3.22 presents the average ranks for the twelve values. The column headed "Composite rank" is simply the rank order of the average ranks. From this table, it appears that the values of greatest importance to Canadians are: family security, a world at peace and happiness. Least important of the twelve values are: national security, a world of beauty and social recognition. It should be noted that equality, which has been found to be predictive of ethnic tolerance, ranks in the bottom half of the values.

Table 3.22
Personal Values in the Total Sample

N = 1801

	Mean rank	<i>SD</i>	Composite rank
Comfortable life	6.70	3.41	8
A world at peace	4.45	3.24	2
A world of beauty	8.29	2.91	11
Equality	6.21	3.03	7
Family security	4.41	2.69	1
Freedom	5.78	3.12	4
Happiness	5.13	2.99	3
National security	8.06	3.10	10
Salvation	8.05	4.02	9
Self-respect	5.84	3.15	5
Social recognition	8.74	2.96	12
True friendship	5.98	2.81	6

Geographic differences in psychological characteristics. Respondents were categorized according to region of residence. Results of this breakdown are

Table 3.23

**Means of Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism and Personal
Values by Geographic Region**

	Region					F-test
	Atlantic provinces	Quebec	Ontario	Prairies	British Columbia	
<i>N</i>	176	480	690	283	193	
Authoritarianism	5.1	5.0	4.7	4.8	4.8	6.75***
Ethnocentrism	3.8	3.9	3.4	3.3	3.2	19.17***
Personal values:						
Comfortable life	6.8	6.5	7.0	7.5	7.4	4.28**
A world at peace	4.1	4.3	4.5	4.4	4.8	1.32
A world of beauty	8.0	8.7	8.0	8.5	8.0	4.58**
Equality	6.2	6.1	6.2	6.0	6.6	1.32
Family security	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.2	.54
Freedom	5.8	6.9	5.4	5.2	5.2	20.98***
Happiness	4.8	5.6	5.0	5.2	4.8	4.04**
National security	8.0	8.2	8.2	7.8	7.8	1.19
Salvation	8.4	7.6	8.2	7.7	8.5	2.96*
Self-respect	6.3	5.7	5.9	5.8	5.6	1.68
Social recognition	9.0	7.0	9.4	9.3	9.5	60.13***
True friendship	5.9	6.6	5.6	6.2	5.4	10.88***

presented in Table 3.23. Respondents from the Atlantic provinces and Quebec are higher in both authoritarianism and ethnocentrism than respondents from other regions. With respect to values, Quebec residents are distinctly different from all others. They place a higher value on a comfortable life and especially on social recognition, and they emphasize less the values of a world of beauty, freedom, happiness and true friendship than residents from outside Quebec. There is a remarkable similarity in values among respondents from all primarily anglophone regions.

Ethnic differences in psychological characteristics. The means of the psychological variables according to the ethnic classification of respondents are presented in Table 3.24. This table reveals that Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnic" respondents are remarkably similar in terms of these psycho-

logical characteristics. The differences that appear are primarily due to French Canadians, and to some extent francophone "other ethnics," being different from anglophone Canadians. French Canadians are higher in authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, they place a higher value on salvation and particularly social recognition, and they value freedom and true friendship less than anglophone Canadians. Francophone "other ethnic" Canadians are in some respects like French Canadians and in other ways like anglophones. They are similar to French Canadians in being high in authoritarianism, in placing a relatively high value on social recognition, and a relatively low value on freedom and true friendship. They are more like anglophone Canadians in being less ethnocentric than French Canadians and in placing a relatively low value on salvation.

Table 3.24

**Means of Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism and
Personal Values by Ethnicity**

	Ethnicity				F-test
	Anglo-celtic	French	Anglo-phone	Franco-phone	
			"other ethnic"		
<i>N</i>	686	348	503	34	
Authoritarianism	4.7	5.1	4.8	5.1	9.45***
Ethnocentrism	3.4	4.0	3.2	3.5	32.08***
Personal values:					
Comfortable life	6.9	6.5	7.3	7.1	3.66*
World at peace	4.6	4.3	4.4	4.5	.63
World of beauty	8.1	8.8	8.2	9.2	4.89*
Equality	6.2	6.4	6.1	5.7	.90
Family security	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.0	1.77
Freedom	5.4	7.2	5.2	6.0	35.71***
Happiness	4.9	5.5	5.0	5.7	4.21**
National security	7.9	8.4	8.2	7.5	2.69*
Salvation	8.5	7.3	8.0	9.1	8.57***
Self-respect	5.9	5.6	6.0	5.4	1.17
Social recognition	9.5	6.9	9.2	6.8	75.59***
True friendship	5.8	6.5	5.8	7.0	7.04***

Socioeconomic differences in psychological characteristics. Education was chosen as the index of socioeconomic status because in previous research (Brown, 1965) it has shown the strongest relationship of several indices, with measures of prejudice. The relationship between education and the psychological characteristics is shown in Table 3.25. Authoritarianism and ethnocentrism show a strong linear and inverse relationship with education. That is, the least educated are the most authoritarian and ethnocentric. Four of the values also show a reasonably strong relationship with education. The highly educated, as compared with the less educated, place a lower priority on a comfortable life and on salvation, and a greater priority on freedom and self-respect. These results are consistent with those found by Rokeach (1973), in a national American sample. The relationship noted above between education and authoritarianism and ethnocentrism has also been repeatedly observed in previous research (Brown, 1965). Christie (1954) has estimated that the correlation between years of education and authoritarianism is between $-.50$ and $-.60$. In the present sample, the correlation between education and authoritarianism is $-.39$ and between education and ethnocentrism $-.42$.

Psychological characteristics in a comparative perspective. The psychological characteristics of Canadians, as revealed in the present study, can be compared with various descriptions of Canada by social scientists, and with the results of empirical studies completed in other countries. While precise comparisons are of course difficult, suggestive trends can nevertheless be noted. In a representative sample taken in the United States in the early 1950's, two questions similar to ones in the present survey were asked. Of the respondents in the United States sample, 64% agreed that, "The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents." In the present Canadian sample, 80.3% agreed with an equivalent statement. In the United States sample 34% agreed that, "Prison is too good for sex criminals. They should be publicly whipped or worse," while 61% of the Canadians in our sample agreed with a similar statement (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954). More than 20 years have elapsed between the American study and the current one. Is such a comparison therefore meaningful? Given the nature of results it probably is. Explicit authoritarianism has likely decreased since the 1950's. Had Canadians at that time been the same as Americans in authoritarianism, they now should score lower on this variable than did Americans 20 years ago. The fact that they score higher is a good indication that they are in fact more authoritarian.

It is also possible to compare the present results with norms given by Adorno et al. (1950). Large numbers of men and women from a variety of backgrounds responded to the same eight items presented to respondents in the current study.

It has been pointed out, of course, that the respondents surveyed by Adorno et al. were not representative of the American population (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954). They came primarily from organized groups and were biased toward the upper levels of the socioeconomic status continuum. The following comparison should be viewed with caution. However, it reinforces the conclu-

Table 3.25

Means of Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism and Personal Values by Education

	Education					
	Some primary	Primary (graduated)	Some high school	High school (graduated)	Technical training	Some college, university or more
<i>N</i>	179	255	535	344	192	306
Authoritarianism	5.5	5.5	5.0	4.8	4.8	4.0
Ethnocentrism	4.5	4.2	3.5	3.4	3.2	2.7
Personal values:						
Comfortable life	5.9	6.8	6.8	7.1	7.2	7.8
World at peace	4.7	4.0	4.2	4.4	4.6	4.9
World of beauty	8.8	8.3	8.2	8.5	8.3	7.9
Equality	6.7	6.4	6.3	6.1	6.0	5.9
Family security	4.4	4.2	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.8
Freedom	6.8	6.4	5.8	5.6	5.8	4.8
Happiness	5.4	5.6	5.0	4.8	5.5	4.9
National security	8.0	7.8	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.4
Salvation	6.9	6.9	8.3	8.1	7.8	9.4
Self-respect	5.9	6.6	6.0	6.0	5.4	5.0
Social recognition	8.0	8.7	8.8	9.0	8.7	8.8
True friendship	6.3	6.2	6.0	5.9	6.4	5.4

sions drawn from comparing the results from American and Canadian national samples. Canadians appeared to be more authoritarian than Americans. The mean response on each of the eight items used in the current survey was lower in the American than in our Canadian sample. The mean response for the eight items was 4.86 for the current Canadian sample and 4.12 for the American respondents. Since the general trend toward liberalization, noted above, should have produced a difference in the opposite direction, these results confirm the earlier conclusion that Canadians are more authoritarian than Americans.

A comparison of ethnocentrism between the present sample and norms from the United States is more difficult, because results for a national sample are not available. Comparisons are possible with the norms presented by Adorno et al. (1950) from the various groups to which the ethnocentrism scale had been administered in the late 1940's. This comparison suggests that American and Canadian responses to ethnocentrism items are quite similar. For example, large samples of men and women from a variety of backgrounds, who completed forms 40 and 45 of the ethnocentrism scales, had means ranging from 3.25 to 3.81 for the statement, "The worst danger to real Americanism during the past 50 years has come from foreign ideas and agitators". The mean response in the present Canadian sample to a similar statement was 3.52. United States samples responded to the statement, "It would be a mistake ever to have Negroes for foremen and leaders over whites," with means ranging from 3.86 to 4.32; the mean in the current sample was 2.65, that is, considerably lower than the reported American means.

Considering the probable decrease in explicit ethnocentrism over the past 20 years it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions concerning differences in ethnocentrism between Canada and the United States. Given the lack of comparability of the samples and the likely change in attitudes over 20 years it seems only safe to conclude that Canadians have not been demonstrated to be different from Americans in ethnocentrism.

A comparison between the Canadian and American value systems is possible on the basis of data from a representative United States sample provided by Rokeach (1973). The following differences in procedure should be noted between the two studies: the American respondents ranked 18 values, while the Canadian sample only ranked 12; Rokeach used median ranks while here mean ranks were employed; and finally, Rokeach did not present the results for the total sample, but had them broken down by sex. Despite these differences in procedure, the value systems of Canadians and Americans appear to be remarkably similar. To make the comparison possible, only those 12 values from the American sample were used that had been included in the present survey. These values were ranked from 1 to 12. In both countries, a world at peace and family security were the most important values, while a world of beauty and social recognition were least important. The value equality was ranked in seventh position in both countries. The only differences between the two countries were that Canadians valued national security and salvation somewhat less than Americans and they valued true friendship somewhat more.

These cross-national comparisons confirm some of the characterizations of Canada made by social scientists and challenge others. Porter (1967) has described the Canadian value system as consisting of conservatism, traditionalism, religiosity, authoritarianism and elitist values. The present analysis supports Porter in that Canadians, when compared to Americans, were found to be more authoritarian. It challenges Porter in that Canadians placed a lower value on salvation (an indication of religiosity) than Americans.

Naegele (1961), and Lipset (1963) have argued that Canadians place less emphasis on equality than Americans do. This assertion is supported when the levels of authoritarianism are compared in the two countries, if we assume that a high level of authoritarianism indicates a lack of emphasis on equality. However, a more direct test of the hypothesis failed to confirm the views of Naegele and Lipset. The value equality occupied the exact same rank position in Canadian and American national samples.


Turning now to psychological differences within our sample, the outstanding finding to emerge is the unique position of French Canadians. They, as compared with anglophone Canadians, were more authoritarian and ethnocentric, and they placed a higher value on salvation and social recognition and a lower value on freedom and true friendship. The analysis by ethnicity accounts for most of the regional differences; that is, Quebec residents were different from all other regions because Quebec is primarily populated by French Canadians. An analysis of possible reasons for the distinctive psychological profile of French Canadians is not attempted here. This issue is treated extensively in Chapters 8 and 9. The present findings should alert us, however, that French Canadians may be different from others in the more specific attitudes to be described in subsequent chapters.

A second notable finding is the absence of differences among other groups. Anglophone "other ethnic" Canadians were very similar to Canadians of Angloceltic origin. The geographic analysis yielded the impression of remarkable similarity among the regions outside Quebec. The only exception to this generalization was the Atlantic region, which was somewhat higher in authoritarianism and ethnocentrism than the other anglophone regions.

The similarities noted in the preceding paragraph do not imply that anglophone Canada is homogeneous. The present analysis makes it clear that socioeconomic status, especially education, was strongly related to the psychological measures under consideration. The relationships obtained in this study are completely in line with previous research and they suggest that in subsequent analyses socioeconomic status will show a positive relationship with ethnic tolerance.

Summary of psychological characteristics. The scales for authoritarianism and ethnocentrism were shown to measure coherent belief systems. They also correlated substantially with each other. While precise comparisons of the present results with those from other countries are difficult, it appears that Canadians were more authoritarian than Americans, but not demonstrably dif-

ferent from Americans in ethnocentrism. Canadians, like Americans, valued a world at peace and family security the most and a world of beauty and social recognition the least. The value equality, considered predictive of ethnic tolerance, appeared in the middle of the value hierarchy in the present Canadian as well as in a United States sample. Analyses of differences within the present sample showed that French Canadians occupied a unique position in terms of the psychological characteristics under consideration. They, compared with anglophone Canadians, were more authoritarian and ethnocentric, and they placed a relatively higher value on salvation and social recognition and a lower value on freedom and true friendship. Francophone "other ethnic" Canadians were like French Canadians in some respects and like anglophone Canadians in other ways. Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnic" Canadians were not different from each other in terms of these psychological characteristics. The geographic analysis showed a remarkable similarity among residents from Ontario to British Columbia. Quebec, being populated primarily by French Canadians, showed a profile essentially similar to that of French Canadians. Respondents from the Atlantic provinces were more authoritarian and ethnocentric than residents from other anglophone regions. Educational level, the index of socioeconomic status chosen here, showed a strong linear and inverse relationship with authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. With regard to values, it was found that the highly educated, as compared with the less educated, placed a lower priority on a comfortable life and on salvation, and a greater priority on freedom and self-respect.



Attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are an important aspect of the ideology of multiculturalism. The extent and nature of future immigration will certainly have an impact on ethnic diversity in Canada. If we are to understand Canadians' reactions toward multiculturalism, it is crucial to know how Canadians feel toward immigration.

Since the national survey in May-July, 1974, interest in immigration has greatly increased in Canada. The government has issued a green paper on immigration (made public in February, 1975) which has prompted considerable debate and public involvement. It is important to realize that the national survey took place prior to the increased concern with immigration issues. It is not clear whether the validity of respondents' answers would be higher or lower when immigration issues are not particularly salient. In addition, it should be noted that the survey questions dealing with immigration were designed within a context of multiculturalism and not within the framework of immigration policy. Thus the questions were quite general, and specific concerns arising out of the immigration debate may not be answerable with the current data.

The following general questions guided the design of this part of the interview schedule: What consequences do Canadians perceive from further immigration? Are these consequences positive or negative? What are judged to be the most and the least worrisome consequences? What types of immigrants are most, and which least, acceptable? Are Canadians as willing to interact with immigrants in personal and business relationships as they are with members of the charter groups?

Scales Assessing Attitudes toward Immigration

Attitudes toward immigrants and immigration were tapped in three general areas: (1) Perceived consequences of immigration, (2) Acceptability of immigrants, and (3) Behavioural intentions toward and discrimination against immigrants.

Perceived consequences of immigration. Respondents were asked their opinions regarding possible consequences of further immigration. They had to indicate their degree of agreement/disagreement with ten potential outcomes, nine of which were phrased in a negative and one in a positive direction. Among the possible consequences of immigration were: "more unemployment," "this country would be better off," "the purity of the Canadian race would be affected" (see Table 4.1 for details of items).

In order to test whether a general attitude exists regarding consequences of immigration, correlations among all the items were computed. A total score was also constructed by reversing all the negative items and taking the mean of all ten items. Item reversal was accomplished by subtracting the item score from 8. The total score reflects an individual's perception of consequences of immigration, with a high value indicating the perception of positive consequences and a low value indicating the perception of negative consequences. Once a total score was calculated, each item within the scale was correlated with the total score (minus the given item) in order to determine the internal consistency of the scale.

The results of this item analysis are presented in Appendix 4.1. The inter-correlations among the items are all in the predicted direction and highly significant, and range from .16 to .65. The correlations between each item and the total minus the particular item are also highly significant and range from .40 to .69. These results strongly suggest that if respondents were positive about immigration in some specific areas, they tended to be positive overall, and vice versa. Because the items correlated highly with each other, the total score was taken as the major dependent variable in subsequent analyses.

The description of results from the total sample will deal with all items. However, in further analyses where the total sample is broken down according to independent variables, only the total score and two items of particular interest will be treated: "unemployment" and "the purity of the Canadian race." For these two items a high score indicates respondent agreement that the consequence named in the item, more unemployment or a change in the purity of the Canadian race, would happen.

Acceptability of immigrants. Ten types of immigrants were described to our respondents. Respondents were asked to indicate whether the government should accept or reject immigrants of each type. A rating of 7 indicated that the government should definitely accept that type of immigrant while a rating of 1 indicated that such an immigrant should be rejected; numbers between 1 and 7 represented degrees of rejection-acceptance. Types of immigrants included, among others, those "who have relatives in Canada," "who are highly educated," "who are coloured," and those "from communist countries" (see Table 4.2 for details of items).

In order to test whether respondents' reactions were consistent, a total score was calculated for each respondent by taking the mean of his or her ratings of the ten types of immigrants. The total score (minus the given item) was then correlated with each of the items and the items among themselves. All correlations (Appendix 4.2) are in the predicted direction and highly significant. The item-total correlations range from .35 to .69 and the item-item correlations from .15 to .77. These correlations indicate that there was a general attitude concerning the acceptability of immigrants.

Analyses reported subsequently will deal primarily with the total score concerning the acceptability of immigrants. A high score on this variable indicates that a respondent found immigrants acceptable. In addition to the total

score, two items of special interest will be emphasized: the items referring to "immigrants who are coloured" and to "immigrants from communist countries." While some of these categories may have been ambiguous to respondents (e.g., are immigrants from communist countries "pro-" or "anti-communist?"), it would have been difficult to be completely specific within the context of a survey.

Behavioural intentions toward immigrants. In order to examine the behavioural intentions of Canadians toward immigrants, and to test for the existence of discrimination against them, respondents were presented with questions designed to determine how willing they were to interact with certain persons, called "target persons" in this study. The ethnicity of target persons, as well as their social status and the nature of the relationship, was varied. An experiment involving three factors, each of which had two levels, was carried out. The factors and their respective levels were: (1) ethnicity of the target person (immigrant/English or French Canadian. That is, all respondents were asked to rate their willingness to interact with immigrants. Anglophone respondents also had English Canadians as target persons while francophone respondents had French Canadians.); (2) status of the target person (low status/high status); (3) type of relationship (friendship/business).

Each level of every factor was represented by two questions. For example, the score for low status immigrant in a friendship relationship consisted of the mean rating to the questions: "Would you be willing to have an immigrant shoemaker as a close friend of your family?", and "Would you be willing to have an immigrant plumber as a close friend of your family?" To represent high status, the occupations teacher and dentist were chosen.

It should be made clear at this point that any experiment nested in a survey instrument cannot hope to represent all possible social relationships and social statuses. Thus the selection of appropriate target persons presents some problems, and requires a rationale. Two previous studies (Jones and Lambert, 1959; 1965) had focused upon service relationships, and upon a variety of occupational statuses (e.g. doctor, lawyer, teacher, craftsman, and labourer). In the present study we wished to build upon this earlier work by adding another kind of relationship, and by selecting from the range of previously employed occupational statuses. Thus we added "close friend", and selected "shoemaker" and "plumber" as relatively low status occupations, and "teacher" and "dentist" as relatively high status occupations. The selection of "teacher" from the Jones and Lambert list emphasizes the continuity with that study, and directs the respondent toward the culturally-sensitive role of the teacher as an agent of socialization. The selection of "dentist", was intended to avoid the use of "doctor" in the study, since at the time of the survey there was public concern about the number of immigrant doctors in Canada; but it was intended to provide some continuity with the more intimate higher status occupations employed by Jones and Lambert.

Discrimination against immigrants. Scores were derived in the following manner. The four separate scores of behavioural intentions toward English

(French) Canadians were summed. From this total, the sum of behavioural intentions toward immigrants was subtracted. The resulting difference score is the discrimination against immigrants measure. It indicates the degree to which respondents preferred English (French) Canadians in business and personal relationships over immigrants. A high score indicates a preference for English (French) Canadians over immigrants. A score of zero indicates no preference for one group over the other while a negative score indicates that immigrants are preferred over English (French) Canadians.

Relationships among Scales Assessing Attitudes toward Immigration

The scales just described were expected to reflect a general attitude toward immigration. To the extent that this is the case, substantial correlations should be obtained among the scales. Although these correlations are significant and in the predicted direction, they are not particularly high (see Appendix 4.3). In other words, each of the three scales measures something unique in addition to reflecting a general attitude toward immigration.

Effects of Ethnicity, Status and Type of Relationship on Behavioural Intentions

Experimental results. The means of behavioural intentions appear in Appendix 4.4 and the corresponding analysis of variance in Appendix 4.5.

The ethnicity of the target person has a very strong effect on behavioural intentions. Respondents express a much greater willingness to interact with someone who is English (French) Canadian than with an immigrant. Significant effects due to status, type of relationship and the interaction of status and type of relationship are also found. Since these effects account for a relatively small amount of the overall variance and are not relevant to the question of ethnicity, they will be ignored in this report. Of direct interest, however, are the significant interaction effects of ethnicity by status, and of ethnicity by status by type of relationship. An examination of the means shows that respondents indicate a greater willingness to interact with English (French) Canadian target persons of high status than with those of low status, but are more willing to interact with low status immigrants than with high status immigrants.

The triple interaction effect suggests that the willingness to interact with immigrants depends on the type of relationship involved and the status of the target person. The results are graphically depicted in Figure 4.1.

For friendship relationships, the patterns of results are quite similar for English (French) Canadians and immigrants. Persons of high status are preferred as friends over persons of low status. For business relationships a more complicated pattern of results emerges. Respondents express a strong willingness to do business with English (French) Canadians regardless of their status. However, respondents express a much greater willingness to seek the services of a low status immigrant (shoemaker, plumber) than of a high status immigrant (teacher, dentist).

The results in Figure 4.1 can be summarized as follows: while there is dis-



Figure 4.1 Behavioural Intentions toward Target Persons of Varying Ethnicity and Status and Involving Two Types of Relationships

crimination against immigrants regardless of their status or the type of relationship involved, discrimination is greatest against the high status immigrant in a business relationship and least against the low status immigrant involved in a business relationship. This pattern is consistent with the earlier findings of Jones and Lambert (1965) in their study of an anglophone sample in an Ontario city. In that study respondents indicated less willingness to use the services of high status immigrants in relation to low status immigrants. On the other hand, there was a general preference for admitting higher status immigrants to Canada.

Discussion of experimental results. In order to appreciate the significance of the results on behavioural intentions, it is necessary to recall how the relevant data were obtained. Respondents were asked whether they definitely would (rating of 7) or would not (rating of 1) interact with various types of target persons. Ratings approaching 1 indicate an avoidance of certain target persons. The lowest rating in the survey was 5.69, given to immigrants of high status in business relationships. Such a rating reveals a considerable willingness on the part of respondents to interact with that type of immigrant. The design of our survey instrument, however, allowed for a determination of the willingness to interact with an immigrant *relative* to the willingness to interact with

a member of the two charter groups without presenting respondents with direct questions on this point. It is clear that in these relative terms, respondents preferred English (French) Canadians over immigrants. While this preference was not great in absolute terms, statistically it was highly significant. It therefore appears safe to conclude that with everything else equal and given a choice, Canadians would rather interact with a member of the charter groups than with an immigrant. While this preference for charter group members means discrimination against immigrants, results do not indicate that contact with immigrants is avoided at all costs. The high behavioural intentions scores suggest that Canadians *are* willing to interact with immigrants when the situation calls for such interactions.

Although limited to a small selection of occupational statuses, the specific patterns of results revealed in Figure 4.1 have implications for immigration and multiculturalism policies. Canadians are more willing to seek the services of a low status immigrant while they are more reluctant to have business relationships with immigrants of high status even though, for purposes of friendship, they prefer high status to low status immigrants. The policy implications of these results are that, whereas Canadians may express a preference for highly educated and skilled immigrants, they may be reluctant to use the services of such immigrants once admitted.

Attitudes toward Immigration in the Total Sample

Perceived consequences of immigration. The total score on the perceived consequences of immigration scale is slightly above the neutral point of 4 (see Table 4.1). It seems safe to say, therefore, that respondents do not perceive the consequences of further immigration to be negative. It is equally clear that they do not perceive these consequences to be overwhelmingly positive.

Overall scores close to the neutral point could indicate that respondents are uncertain or neutral concerning further immigration. An examination of the standard deviations and the percentage distributions in Table 4.1 indicates, however, that such is not the case. Rather, respondents seem to be considerably divided on this issue.

The highest item mean (i.e., strongest agreement) is associated with the possibility that "there would be more unemployment." This mean is not very far from the midpoint though, which indicates some concern about unemployment but with considerable difference in opinion among respondents. Reactions to most of the other possible consequences are also close to the midpoint. There was, however, reasonable consensus concerning the implications of further immigration for English and French Canadians and for the relations between these two groups. Respondents express strong disagreement with the statement that "English Canadians would lose their identity." In addition, that "relations between English Canadians and French Canadians would become worse" and that "French Canadians would lose their identity" are also rejected.

Acceptability of and discrimination against immigrants. Results on the ac-

Table 4.1

**Perceived Consequences of Immigration
in the Total Sample**

N = 1842

	Mean	<i>SD</i>	% Disagree (1-3)	% Neutral (4)	% Agree (5-7)
Total score	4.36	1.42	36.8	2.9	60.2
a. . . . there would be more unemployment	4.57	2.23	32.0	14.3	53.7
b. . . . this country would be better off	3.53	2.00	47.3	21.7	31.0
c. . . . relations between English Canadians and French Canadians would become worse	3.11	2.06	58.7	16.6	24.7
d. . . . English Canadians would lose their identity	2.73	2.02	68.3	10.3	21.4
e. . . . French Canadians would lose their identity	2.91	2.10	64.9	9.8	25.2
f. . . . there would be more slums	3.80	2.16	46.4	15.2	38.4
g. . . . the purity of the Canadian race would be affected	3.33	2.31	55.3	11.7	33.0
h. . . . cheap labour would make wages lower	3.82	2.29	46.0	13.3	40.6
i. . . . there would be more criminals in our society	3.39	2.22	53.9	14.0	32.1
j. . . . there would be more political problems	4.19	2.20	37.2	14.8	48.0

ceptability of immigrants are depicted in Table 4.2. The mean of 4.99 for acceptability indicates that Canadians as a whole are receptive toward immigrants. Considering the items separately it is noted that eight of the ten types of immigrants receive scores on the positive side of the neutral point.

Rated as most acceptable are "immigrants who could be useful to this country," "immigrants with a skilled trade," and "immigrants who are highly educated." The only types of immigrants who receive negative ratings are "immigrants from communist countries," and "anyone who wants to immigrate."

In view of the abundant public debate on the issue, it is noteworthy that respondents are quite accepting of coloured immigrants. "Coloured immigrants" are only slightly less accepted than "immigrants who have relatives in Canada." It should also be noted that of the immigrants that are accepted,

Table 4.2**Acceptability of Immigrants in the Total Sample***N* = 1831

	Mean	<i>SD</i>	% Reject (1-3)	% Neutral (4)	% Accept (5-7)
Total score	4.99	1.19	16.1	2.7	81.2
a. Immigrants who have relatives in Canada.	5.43	1.64	9.5	19.4	71.1
b. Immigrants who are highly educated.	5.73	1.58	8.0	13.1	78.9
c. Immigrants who have a skilled trade.	5.74	1.57	8.5	10.7	80.8
d. Immigrants who speak English.	5.39	1.64	10.5	19.3	70.2
e. Immigrants who speak French.	5.23	1.72	13.0	20.5	66.5
f. Immigrants who will do the work no Canadian wants to do.	4.69	2.09	25.5	19.3	55.2
g. Immigrants who are coloured.	5.19	1.84	14.8	19.5	65.8
h. Immigrants from communist countries.	3.49	2.20	49.8	17.7	32.5
i. Immigrants who could be useful to this country.	5.91	1.53	7.1	9.8	83.2
j. Anyone who wants to immigrate.	3.13	2.11	57.0	19.4	23.6

Table 4.3**Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration
by Geographic Region**

Region	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Atlantic provinces	175	4.2	4.5	3.6
Quebec	485	4.0	4.9	4.2
Ontario	692	4.6	4.2	2.9
Prairies	291	4.5	4.8	3.0
British Columbia	199	4.5	4.6	3.0
F-test		10.67***	7.84***	26.54***

“immigrants who will do the kind of work no Canadian wants to do” receive the lowest rating.

The discrimination score in the total sample is positive (mean = 2.57, SD = 5.07) indicating that Canadians as a whole prefer English (French) Canadians over immigrants in social and business interactions.

Geographic Differences

Perceived consequences of immigration. The results of the geographic breakdown of perceived consequences of immigration are presented in Table 4.3.

Respondents from Quebec are least positive in their perception of consequences and they are most concerned that “there would be more unemployment” and that “the purity of the Canadian race would be affected.” Residents from the Atlantic provinces follow Quebec in seeing fewer positive consequences than residents of other provinces and in being relatively concerned about the loss of “racial purity.” There are no substantial differences among Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia except that Ontario respondents reveal themselves as being least concerned with high unemployment.

A further geographic analysis was performed comparing the major metropolitan areas (see Appendix 4.6). Results from the various cities are remarkably similar. Only with regard to “racial purity” do Montreal respondents show a somewhat greater concern than do the residents of the other cities.

The fact that regional differences nearly disappeared when the metropolitan areas of the various regions were compared suggest that the regional differences are primarily due to differences in rural areas. An analysis of results by degree of urbanization confirmed this suspicion (see Appendix 4.7). Respondents from cities in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces (but not in the other regions) are considerably more positive in their perception of immigration consequences than are rural respondents in those regions. It is instructive to compare the results from the urban areas of the Atlantic provinces and Quebec with the other regions. Although the Atlantic provinces as a whole are less positive than Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia, respondents from the Atlantic cities are more positive than respondents from Ontario and the west. A similar pattern emerges in Quebec with Montreal residents almost as positive about immigration as residents west of the Ottawa River.

Acceptability of and discrimination against immigrants. Regional differences in the acceptability of immigrants generally, and in the acceptability of “coloured immigrants,” are virtually nonexistent (see Table 4.4). However, residents from Quebec and the Atlantic provinces are somewhat more likely than residents from other regions to reject “immigrants from communist countries.”

Discrimination scores differ significantly among the five regions, with Quebec showing the strongest tendency to discriminate followed by the Atlantic provinces. In line with earlier results, differences between Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia are very small.

Table 4.4

**Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants
by Geographic Region**

Region	N	Acceptance of immigrants			N	Discrimination
		Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
Atlantic provinces	176	5.2	5.4	3.2	176	3.6
Quebec	481	4.9	5.2	3.2	481	4.3
Ontario	693	5.0	5.2	3.7	692	1.3
Prairies	285	4.8	5.0	3.4	289	2.0
British Columbia	197	5.0	5.4	3.9	196	.9
F-test		3.08*	1.45	6.28*		37.84***

An analysis by metropolitan areas showed no significant differences between the cities on the measures of acceptability of immigrants (see Appendix 4.8). However, Montreal shows higher discrimination than the other cities.

The relationships between degree of urbanization and the measures of acceptability of immigrants and discrimination against them, are not very strong or consistent across the various regions. Relevant results are presented in Appendix 4.9. The general trend, however, is for the more urbanized areas to show greater tolerance.

The relationship between degree of urbanization and discrimination is depicted in Appendix 4.9. A generally inverse relationship between these two variables appears in the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, and Ontario. Respondents from large cities are generally the least discriminatory in all three regions. Respondents from small towns tend to be even more discriminatory than residents from rural areas. Degree of urbanization shows no significant relationship with discrimination in the Prairies or in British Columbia.

Summary of geographic differences. Quebec residents were least positive in their perception of consequences of immigration. They were followed in this view by residents of the Atlantic provinces. Respondents from Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia were the most positive and there was little difference among them, with the possible exception that Ontario residents were less concerned than respondents from any other region about potential unemployment resulting from immigration. The more negative perceptions in the Atlantic provinces and Quebec were primarily obtained from respondents in the small towns and rural areas of those regions. There were virtually no differences in the views of respondents from the five largest cities in Canada.

Regional differences in acceptability of immigrants were smaller than in perceived consequences. The five regions of Canada were only different in the degree to which they would accept "immigrants from communist countries," with Quebec and the Atlantic provinces being least accepting. Discrimination was highest in Quebec, followed by the Atlantic provinces. Analyses by metropolitan areas and degree of urbanization showed no strong trends except that Montreal was highest in discrimination, and respondents from urbanized areas found immigrants somewhat more acceptable and discriminated less against them than rural respondents.

Ethnic Differences

Perceived consequences of immigration. Ethnic differences in perceived consequences of immigration are presented in Table 4.5.

French-Canadian respondents are least positive in their perception of immigration consequences, respondents of "other ethnic" origin most positive, and Angloceltic respondents almost as positive as those of "other ethnic" origin. Similarly, French-Canadian respondents are most concerned about "unemployment" and the "purity of the Canadian race" and respondents of "other ethnic" origin least concerned, while Angloceltic respondents are only slightly more concerned than those of "other ethnic" origin.

The results of this analysis must be examined in the context of the analyses by region. Regional analyses indicate that Quebec respondents are least positive about the prospects of further immigration. Region and ethnicity are, of course, strongly related. The question therefore arises whether region (i.e., living in Quebec vs. elsewhere) or ethnicity is the crucial variable for the attitudes under examination. In order to answer this question, the sample was broken down by region and by language of interview (see Appendix 4.10). This

Table 4.5
Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration
by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	N	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Angloceltic	688	4.5	4.5	3.0
French	349	3.8	5.1	4.5
Anglophone "other ethnic"	518	4.7	4.2	2.8
Francophone "other ethnic"	34	4.7	4.0	2.9
F-test		32.84***	12.64***	49.53***

breakdown shows that ethnicity, not region, is the crucial variable associated with immigration attitudes. French-Canadian respondents perceive less positive consequences of immigration than English Canadians whether they live in or outside Quebec.

A possible explanation for the French-Canadian attitudes might be found in the fact that French Canadians are predominantly Roman Catholic. If this explanation were valid, one might expect anglophone Catholics to hold attitudes no different from those of francophone Catholics. In order to test this explanation, respondents were grouped according to religious preference (see Appendix 4.11). Francophone Catholics are less positive in their perceived consequences, and they are more concerned about unemployment and racial purity than are the other religious groups. Anglophone Catholics are indistinguishable from members of the United and Anglican Churches. These results suggest that Catholicism in itself is not the basis for French-Canadian attitudes.

Another important aspect of ethnicity is the recency of immigration to Canada. For reasons noted in Chapter 2, however, this aspect of ethnicity was only examined among anglophone respondents. Results appearing in Appendix 4.12 show the relationship between recency of immigration and perceived consequences to be quite small. There is a trend for immigrants to be more positive toward immigration than persons born in Canada.

A final analysis of ethnicity involved the classification of "other ethnic" Canadians according to their father's ancestral country of origin. Results of this analysis are presented in Appendix 4.13.

Respondents of Russian and Ukrainian origin are considerably less positive in their perception of immigration consequences and are more concerned about unemployment from further immigration than those of other origins.

The current analysis demonstrates that "other ethnic" Canadians are not a homogeneous group. When the attitudes of these respondents (Appendix 4.13) are compared with those of Anglocelts (see Table 4.5) the following picture emerges. "Other ethnic" respondents, except those of Russian and Ukrainian descent, are more positive in their perception of immigration consequences than Angloceltic respondents. Respondents of Ukrainian and Russian descent are considerably less positive than Anglocelts and hold attitudes which are similar to those of French Canadians.

Acceptability of and discrimination against immigrants. Differences in the acceptability of immigrants between the four categories of ethnic groups are relatively small—much smaller, for example, than differences in perceived consequences of immigration (see Table 4.6). French Canadians are slightly less accepting of immigrants than are Angloceltic and "other ethnic" Canadians. Francophone "other ethnics" are the most accepting. With regard to accepting "immigrants from communist countries" the differences between the four groups are more pronounced. French Canadians are considerably less accepting than members of the "other ethnic" categories. French Canadians also show a considerably greater tendency to discriminate against immigrants than all other respondents.

Table 4.6

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Ethnicity

Ethnicity	N	Acceptance of immigrants			N	Discrimination
		Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
Angloceltic	685	5.0	5.1	3.6	686	1.8
French	348	4.9	5.2	2.9	349	5.2
Anglophone "other ethnic"	515	5.1	5.2	3.9	515	1.2
Francophone "other ethnic"	34	5.4	5.8	3.8	34	1.6
F-test		4.35**	1.59	12.56***		61.59***

Further analyses show that the attitudes of French Canadians cannot be explained as a "Quebec effect" or as a function of the Catholic religion (see Appendices 4.14, 4.15). Francophone respondents have similar attitudes whether they live in or outside Quebec. Anglophone Roman Catholics have attitudes that are different from francophone Roman Catholics and are indistinguishable from members of the United and Anglican Churches.

Results on the relationship between generational status and acceptability of and discrimination against immigrants appear in Appendix 4.16 and they show that generational status is only slightly related to these attitudes. As with perceived consequences of immigration, there is again a trend for immigrants, as compared with persons born in Canada to be slightly more positive in the acceptance of immigrants.

A final analysis dealing with respondents' ethnicity examines the paternal origin of "other ethnic" Canadians (see Appendix 4.17). Those of Ukrainian and Russian descent are less willing to accept immigrants than those from the other ethnic groups. The same basic pattern applies to the total acceptability score and the items dealing with "coloured immigrants" and "immigrants from communist countries." The paternal origin of "other ethnic" respondents is unrelated to discrimination against immigrants.

Summary of ethnic differences. French-Canadian respondents were least positive in their perceptions of the consequences of immigration. They were also most concerned about "unemployment" and the "purity of the Canadian race." French Canadians also found immigrants of all types, and particularly "immigrants from communist countries" less acceptable than members of the other ethnic categories, and they were most prone to show discrimination

against immigrants. Detailed analyses showed that French-Canadian attitudes cannot be explained as a Quebec response, or as a result of the Catholic religion. French Canadians outside Quebec were very similar in their attitudes to French Canadians from Quebec. Anglophone Catholics were indistinguishable in their attitudes from anglophones of other religions. There was a remarkable similarity between the attitudes of Anglocelts and members of "other ethnic" groups as a whole. Recency of immigration was only slightly related to the attitudes under consideration, after controlling for ethnicity of respondents with immigrants being more positive than Canadian born respondents. The classification of respondents from "other ethnic" origin showed that those of Russian and Ukrainian descent were somewhat less positive in their perception of immigration consequences, most concerned about unemployment, and found immigrants of all kinds less acceptable than members of other non-English/non-French origins.

Socioeconomic Differences

Perceived consequences of immigration. We employed three specific indices of socioeconomic status: (a) occupational status of the head of household, (b) income of the head of household, and (c) education of the respondent. The results from all three indices are basically the same: the higher the socioeconomic status of the respondent, the more likely he or she is to perceive positive consequences of immigration and the less he or she is concerned about possible "unemployment" and the "purity of the Canadian race."

Of the three indices, education is most strongly related to perceived consequences of immigration (see Table 4.7), income is second and occupational status third (see Appendix 4.18).

Table 4.7
Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration
by Education

Education	N	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Some primary	181	3.6	5.0	4.3
Primary (graduated)	257	3.7	5.0	4.3
Some high school	540	4.3	4.8	3.3
High school (graduated)	347	4.5	4.4	3.2
Technical training	192	4.8	4.1	2.8
Some college, university or more	309	5.0	3.9	2.3
F-test		44.03***	12.84***	32.79***

Table 4.8

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Education

Education	N	Acceptance of immigrants			N	Discrimination
		Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
Some primary	180	4.8	4.8	2.8	181	4.4
Primary (graduated)	258	4.8	5.0	2.7	257	3.3
Some high school	538	5.1	5.3	3.4	539	2.4
High school (graduated)	343	5.1	5.3	3.6	345	2.1
Technical training	192	5.0	5.3	4.0	192	1.9
Some college, university or more	309	5.0	5.2	4.2	310	.9
F-test		3.45**	2.93*	19.25***		15.72***

Acceptability of and discrimination against immigrants. The relationships between the socioeconomic indices and acceptability of immigrants are not as clear and strong as the relationships with perceived consequences of immigration. Results are given in Table 4.8 and Appendix 4.19. Of the three indices, education shows again the clearest results. Respondents with primary school education are less accepting of "coloured immigrants" and of "immigrants in general" than are respondents with a higher educational attainment. There is no difference between respondents who started high school and those who attained higher educational levels. The item on "immigrants from communist countries" shows a direct linear relationship with educational attainment. The higher the educational level, the more willing respondents are to accept such immigrants.

The relationship between socioeconomic status and discrimination against immigrants is quite clear. Each of the three indices is inversely and linearly related to discrimination against immigrants, that is, the higher the social status of a respondent, the less likely he or she is to discriminate against immigrants. Education is most strongly related, followed by income level and then occupational status.

Summary of socioeconomic status differences in immigration attitudes. Three indices of socioeconomic status showed very similar relationships with immigration attitudes. The higher the socioeconomic status of respondents the

more positive they were in their attitudes. Education was most strongly related, followed by income and occupational status.

Political Party Preference Differences

Perceived consequences of immigration. Political party preference is only slightly related to perceived consequences of immigration (Appendix 4.20). Among anglophone respondents, no differences emerge. Francophone Liberal, and to some extent NDP supporters, are more positive in their perception of immigration consequences than those supporting the Progressive Conservative and Cr ditiste parties.

Acceptability of and discrimination against immigrants. Political party preference is more strongly related to acceptability of immigrants (Appendix 4.21). Among anglophone respondents, Liberal supporters are most and Social Credit supporters least willing to accept immigrants. Social Credit supporters show strikingly low acceptance of "coloured immigrants," and "immigrants from communist countries." No differences in discrimination are apparent in the anglophone sample.

Among francophone respondents, Liberal and NDP supporters show greater acceptance of immigrants than supporters of the Progressive Conservatives and Cr ditistes. Concerning "coloured immigrants," NDP supporters are most and Progressive Conservative supporters least accepting. Large differences emerge concerning the acceptance of "immigrants from communist countries." By far the most accepting are NDP supporters and the least accepting those who prefer the Progressive Conservative party. Liberal and NDP supporters are least likely to discriminate against immigrants.

Age Differences

The relationship between age and perceived consequences appears to be curvilinear (Appendix 4.22). Respondents in their thirties and forties are most positive and they are least concerned about "unemployment" and "race purity." Respondents in their teens and twenties as well as those in their fifties and older are less positive and more concerned about "unemployment" and "race purity."

An inverse linear relationship between age and the acceptability of immigrants emerges (Appendix 4.23). The older the respondents, the less willing they are to accept "immigrants in general," and particularly "coloured immigrants" and "immigrants from communist countries." The relationship between age and discrimination is linear and direct. Older respondents are more likely to discriminate against immigrants than younger ones.

Sex Differences

Sex differences are nonexistent or slight (see Appendix 4.24, 4.25). Women are somewhat more in agreement than men that unemployment might ensue from further immigration. Women are also more willing than men to accept immigrants.

Psychological Predictors of Attitudes toward Immigration

In addition to the variables discussed so far, a number of psychological measures were related to immigration attitudes. The results are displayed in Appendix 4.26, which also presents the correlations with the demographic variables for comparison purposes. Among the psychological variables, the ethnocentrism scale score has the highest simple correlation with each of the attitude measures. Ethnocentric respondents are more likely to perceive negative consequences of immigration, they are less willing to accept immigrants and more likely to discriminate against them. Authoritarianism shows basically the same but weaker relationships.

Of the Rokeach life values, four show consistent relationships with the immigration attitudes. It should be noted that since the scores of these life values are ranks, the direction of the relationships must be interpreted in opposite ways from the other variables. A positive correlation means that the *less* important a given value, the higher the attitude score. A negative correlation indicates that the *more* highly a given value is ranked, the higher the attitude score. The four values showing consistent relationships with the attitude measures are: a comfortable life, equality, freedom and social recognition. The higher a value respondents place on equality and freedom, and the lower a value they place on a comfortable life and social recognition, the more positive they are in perceived consequences of immigration, the more accepting of immigrants, and the less likely to discriminate.

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Multiple Regression Analysis

Among the goals of this study was the prediction of the major attitudes from knowledge of demographic and psychological variables. Multiple regression analysis was used for this purpose. The following description specifies in some detail the goals and procedures of these analyses.

In multiple stepwise regression, an equation is constructed which relates a set of independent variables to a dependent variable. Once this equation is known, it becomes possible to predict the dependent variable from the independent variables. Multiple stepwise regression can also be used to select from a large list of independent variables a smaller set that can best predict the dependent variable. Thus, this technique allows us to pick the most important and most reliably predictive variables from a set of variables. In addition, this technique makes it possible to determine the relative predictive power of the variables that are selected.

The nature of the problem to which multiple stepwise regression is directed is best described by reference to Appendix 4.26, where the simple correlation coefficients between 29 independent variables and three immigration attitude variables are shown. Twenty of the 29 independent variables are significantly related to perceived consequences of immigration, 16 of 29 to acceptance and 22 of 29 to discrimination.

Given so many significant correlations it becomes important to know

which of the variables are most strongly related to immigration attitudes. We might pick those variables that show the highest simple correlations. But such a procedure would be misleading because it would fail to take into account the fact that independent variables are correlated among themselves. In order to identify those independent variables that give the best *independent* prediction of the dependent variable, multiple stepwise regression is needed.

The regression analysis employed in the present study involved two stages. The purpose of the first was to select those predictor variables that, as a set, gave the best prediction of the dependent variable. A further requirement was that each of the variables in the set had to contribute a significant amount of variance to the dependent variable. The purpose of the second stage was to test the stability of the equation by testing it in two independent subsamples. Only those variables that provided independent and significant predictions of the dependent variables in both samples were retained.

In the present study the forward method for selecting predictor variables was always employed. The variable selection criterion varied according to the stage of the analysis. In the first stage, the BEST criterion was employed (Armor & Couch, 1972). According to this criterion, the first variable selected was the variable with the highest simple correlation with the dependent variable. At each subsequent step, that variable was selected which had the highest partial correlation with the dependent variable, controlling for predictor variables already in the equation. Variables were selected up to that step where the last variable entered made a significant contribution to the prediction of the dependent variable.

In the second stage, new variables were selected for inclusion in the prediction equation according to a predetermined order. Only those independent variables that showed significant coefficients in the first stage were entered at the second stage. The order for including them in the equation was determined by the size of the standardized coefficients as revealed in stage one.

Respondents with a missing value in the dependent variable were omitted from a given regression analysis. Beyond that, simple correlations were based on varying numbers of respondents, depending on the number of observations present for a given pair of variables.

The multiple regressions reported here start with two sets of independent variables. The first and smaller set includes the variables from region through religiosity as listed in Appendix 4.26. These are generally demographic variables. The second and larger set contains, in addition to the variables of the first set, the psychological variables. These psychological variables could be regarded as dependent as well as independent variables. Because of their special status, the regression equations were constructed, excluding and including them.

Results of Multiple Stepwise Regressions

Perceived consequences of immigration. Results of the regression analysis with psychological variables excluded are presented in Appendix 4.27. In the

total sample, seven variables emerge as independent and significant predictors of perceived consequences of immigration. Four variables remain significantly predictive in each of the two subsamples: ethnicity (French Canadians/others), education, ethnicity (Anglocelts/others) and income. The more a respondent possesses the following characteristics the more likely he or she is to have a positive perception of immigration consequences: (a) not being French Canadian, (b) being highly educated, (c) not being Angloceltic, (d) living in a household whose head has a high income.

It is possible to draw conclusions concerning the relative contribution of these four variables by examining the size of the standardized coefficients. Ethnicity (being or not being French Canadian) and level of education are more important than ethnicity (being or not being Angloceltic) and income level of head of household.

The inclusion of the psychological variables in the regression equation changes the picture considerably. The ethnocentrism scale becomes the strongest predictor. Education and income remain as important and significant predictor variables. Ethnicity becomes less important. Three new variables attain the status of significant and independent predictors: the life value "family security", generational status, and church attendance. However, their contributions to the dependent variable are minimal compared with ethnocentrism. Thus, respondents are likely to be positive in perceived consequences of immigration to the extent that they possess the following characteristics: (1) low ethnocentrism scale score, (2) high level of education, (3) high income of head of household, (4) a high value of family security, (5) recent generational status, and (6) frequent church attendance.

Acceptability of immigrants. Four variables emerge as significant and reliable predictors of acceptability (Appendix 4.28): (1) generational status (with immigrants being more accepting than older generation Canadians); (2) age (with younger respondents being more accepting); (3) community size in childhood (with respondents from larger communities being more accepting); and (4) religiosity (with frequent church attenders being more accepting). Generational status is slightly more important than the other three.

The inclusion of psychological variables in the equation results in ethnocentrism becoming first in importance followed by authoritarianism. Generational status remains in the equation, with community size in childhood, and church attendance. Age was no longer a reliable predictor.

A notable relationship appears between authoritarianism and acceptability of immigrants. With the contribution of ethnocentrism removed, authoritarianism becomes positively related to the acceptability of immigrants. In summary, respondents show greater acceptance of immigrants to the extent that they are (1) low on ethnocentrism scale, (2) high on authoritarianism, (3) of recent generational status, (4) grew up in a large community, and (5) frequent church attenders.

Discrimination against immigrants. Six predictor variables attain statistical significance in the total sample, but only two remain significant in the two sub-

samples (see Appendix 4.29). Respondents are likely to discriminate to the extent that they possess the characteristics of (1) being French Canadian, and (2) being old.

The addition of the psychological variables results in the ethnocentrism scale score becoming the most important predictor, followed by ethnicity (being French Canadian vs. not being French Canadian). Age is no longer a significant predictor.

Discussion of Results on Attitudes toward Immigration

Attitudes toward immigration were described in terms of three different variables: perceived consequences of immigration, acceptability of immigrants, and discrimination against immigrants. To what extent are these variables equivalent? The intercorrelations among them were statistically significant and in the predicted direction, indicating a common attitude. However, the values of the correlation coefficients were not particularly high, suggesting that each variable measured something unique also. How did the three variables compare in providing meaningful results? Least successful in this respect was acceptability of immigrants. In general it was less strongly related to the predictor variables than the other two. A possible reason for this is the fact that there was greater consensus among respondents on the issue of immigrant acceptability than on perceived consequences and discrimination. This greater consensus was indicated by more extreme item means and by lower standard deviations. Given the smaller variance, less variation was associated with the independent variables.

At the beginning of this chapter a number of questions were asked. We are now in a position to provide answers to them. While in general Canadians saw the consequences of immigration to be positive, there was considerable disagreement on this issue. The most worrisome prospect was the possibility of increased unemployment. Of least concern was the possibility that English and French Canadians would lose their identity and that relations between English and French Canadians would deteriorate. Most types of immigrants were considered to be acceptable, especially "immigrants who have a skilled trade" and those "who are highly educated."

The questions of the acceptability of various types of immigrants yielded some unexpected results. "Immigrants from communist countries" were among the least acceptable, but "coloured immigrants" were quite acceptable. It may well be that respondents interpreted the phrase "immigrants from communist countries" to mean immigrants who are communists. Respondents may not have rejected individuals of various political persuasions who happen to live in communist countries, but only people who are committed communists.

Does the fact that 66% of the sample found coloured immigrants acceptable suggest a lack of racism in Canada? It does seem to indicate a considerable degree of racial tolerance. The issue of race was also touched upon in the question of consequences of immigration. There, a majority of Canadians disagreed that "the purity of the Canadian race would be affected" by further

immigration. In both questions, however, there was a considerable difference of opinion among respondents. While it appears that race was an important issue for no more than a minority of Canadians, this issue may become a problem for the implementation of immigration and multiculturalism policies to the extent that this minority is vocal.

An examination of how immigration attitudes varied according to different breakdowns of the total sample produced reasonably clear results. The geographic analysis revealed that residents of Quebec were least tolerant of and receptive to immigration. A subsequent analysis according to respondents' ethnicity showed that the Quebec response was not due to geography as such but to the fact that Quebec was predominantly populated by French Canadians. French Canadians outside of Quebec were found to be very similar to French Canadians living in Quebec. The difference in attitudes between French Canadians and respondents from other ethnic groups could not be explained in terms of Catholicism, the religion of most French Canadians. Anglophone Catholics did not differ in their attitudes from members of the United or Anglican Churches. An explanation of the unique response of French Canadians must be found within French Canadian history and culture. Possible explanations are discussed in Chapters 8 and 9.

Some further results from the geographic analysis deserve notice. Degree of urbanization of respondents' communities was related to immigration attitudes. Respondents from large cities were generally more tolerant of immigration than were those from rural areas or small towns. In considering that there were only very small differences in attitudes among the major metropolitan areas, interesting implications suggest themselves. For instance, the regional differences in attitudes were primarily the result of differences in the rural areas which compose the various regions. In other words, the most negative attitudes toward immigration were held in the rural parts of Quebec and the Atlantic provinces. Respondents in these rural sections were considerably less positive than respondents living in rural areas of the other regions. The urban sections of Quebec and the Atlantic provinces were hardly distinguishable in terms of immigration attitudes from the other urban areas in Canada. Such a geographic pattern is quite favourable for the implementation of immigration and multiculturalism policies considering that (a) the destinations of most immigrants are the metropolitan areas and (b) the majority of "other ethnic" Canadians are located in the urban centres. Immigrants settle in those locations where attitudes toward them are most favourable.

Sometimes the lack of attitude differences is as interesting as their presence. In this study a surprising attitude similarity between Eastern and Western Canada was revealed. This fact deserves notice because the concentration of "other ethnic" Canadians in the western prairies is considerably greater than it is in the east. Immigration patterns in terms of time and origin also differ. Furthermore, there is the general "rift" between east and west, frequently mentioned in the press, which might lead one to expect differences.

A finding of interest emerged from the comparison of "other ethnic" Ca-

nadians with those from the charter groups. Although "other ethnic" Canadians were more positive toward immigration than French Canadians, there was virtually no difference between "other ethnic" and Angloceltic respondents. When "other ethnic" Canadians were divided according to father's origin, substantial differences among them emerged. Canadians of Russian and Ukrainian descent were considerably less positive in their attitudes toward immigration than were Anglocelts; the remaining "other ethnic" Canadians (particularly Dutch, German, Italian, Polish and Scandinavians) were more positive than Anglocelts. "Other ethnic" Canadians who were least positive (Russians and Ukrainians) were those from whose homelands there has been little recent immigration to Canada. Thus for Russian and Ukrainian Canadians, the term "immigration" may refer only to immigration of *other* ethnic groups. Correspondingly, the positive attitudes held by "other ethnic" Canadians such as Dutch, Italian, and Scandinavian may result from the interpretation of "immigrants" to mean immigrants of their *own* as well as other ethnic groups.

Immigration attitudes varied consistently and directly with socioeconomic status. Such a finding is consistent with many other studies (see Brown, 1965). Several plausible explanations of this exist. Attitudes toward immigration may be simply a specific manifestation of ethnic attitudes in general. Alternatively, it may be that lower status individuals are threatened by immigrants who are in competition for scarce jobs. A further explanation for the relationship between status and attitudes toward immigration has important implications for the validity of this survey: it may be that lower status individuals, particularly those with little education, are simply less sophisticated than persons of higher status. The former may express their opinions with perfect honesty, while high status respondents may disguise and distort their opinions and express attitudes that are socially acceptable.

Differences in immigration attitudes among the supporters of the various political parties were not large, especially among anglophone Canadians. This may be due to the fact that immigration had not been an issue in federal politics at the time of the survey. Should immigration become a contentious party issue, individuals may realign themselves with that party whose policy reflects their own attitudes. Generally, the supporters of the Liberal party were most favourable in their attitudes toward immigration. While the Progressive Conservative party would find a positive reception for an active immigration policy among its anglophone supporters, its francophone contingent would receive the policy much less favourably.

The discussion thus far has been limited to describing relationships between one and occasionally two predictors with the attitude variables. Regression analysis was used to consider the simultaneous contribution of a number of predictor variables.

Two major conclusions emerged: one, that the number of effective predictors of attitude variables was reduced to very few; the other that the predictive significance of a given predictor depended on the context provided by other predictors. These conclusions have a number of implications and there-

fore deserve elaboration.

It was pointed out earlier that a great many predictor variables, when taken singly, are related to the attitude variables. This happens in part because there is covariation among the predictor variables. It is the task of multiple regression analysis to eliminate this covariation and assess the *independent* contribution to the dependent variable of each predictor variable. What are these independent predictors? Ethnicity (being vs. not being French Canadian) was most important for two of the three immigration attitudes when psychological variables were excluded. Age was also predictive in two out of three cases. The fact that education and income were independent predictors deserves some attention. These variables were conceptualized as reflecting socioeconomic status. Their independent contribution to the attitude variables suggests that they reflect something in addition to socioeconomic status.

When psychological variables were added to the regression equations, the picture changed considerably. The ethnocentrism scale score became most important for all three attitudes.

The importance of the context of variables for the predictive significance of a particular predictor variable can be seen in a number of circumstances. Variables that singly were significant predictors of the attitude variables lost their predictive power when embedded among other predictor variables. More interesting are variables that were singly unrelated to attitudes but became predictive when employed in the context of other variables. An example is provided by the relationship between authoritarianism and acceptability of immigrants. Authoritarianism by itself was unrelated to acceptability but when the covariation of ethnocentrism was removed, authoritarianism became positively related. This is a remarkable finding because to the best of our knowledge, it represents the first time that authoritarianism has been shown to be positively related to a measure of ethnic tolerance. It may well be that authoritarianism, with ethnocentrism removed, changes its functional significance.


The fact that the predictive significance of variables changes with the context does not mean that these variables are useless or unimportant. They remain important for predictive purposes when they are the only information that is available. Although the score on the ethnocentrism scale was the most important predictor of attitudes toward immigration, information on ethnocentrism is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain by a politician or a government official. Access to geographic information is much easier. There is no reason to reject such information for predicting attitudes even though it can be shown that the predictive power of geographic variables disappears when other information is used in the prediction.

One major discrepancy between the analysis by single independent variables and the regression analysis, appeared in the case of generational status. The source of this discrepancy most likely results from the fact that ethnicity was controlled in one analysis but not in the other. Generational status in the regression analysis included all respondents for whom information was available. Thus, French Canadians were included. Since most French Canadians are

third generation or older, the inclusion of this group could have heavily influenced results. Hence, in the earlier analyses involving generational status, the contribution of ethnicity was removed. This was accomplished in two ways: (1) French Canadians were excluded from the analysis and (2) the relationship between generation and attitudes was examined separately for "other ethnic" and Angloceltic respondents. The appropriate conclusions concerning the relationship between generational status and attitudes toward immigration seem to be as follows: Without controls for ethnicity, generational status was inversely related to attitudes toward immigration. Re-expressing this, it appears that more recent Canadians had more positive attitudes toward immigration, than did those whose ancestors have been in Canada for generations. When careful controls for ethnicity were introduced, the relationship between generational status and attitudes toward immigration was greatly reduced.

Given these results, what is the climate for continued immigration in Canada? Clearly it is not negative, as a majority of Canadians see primarily positive consequences of immigration and are willing to accept new immigrants. Although there is discrimination against immigrants, there is no outright avoidance. On the race issue, a majority shows tolerance. While there is reluctance to admit "immigrants from communist countries" the importance of this finding as a current issue is limited.

Although there is general tolerance toward continued immigration, there are some indications of concern. Greater unemployment is seen as a possible consequence of further immigration. Should economic circumstances decline and concern for unemployment increase, attitudes toward immigration may well change. While a majority of Canadians show racial tolerance, there is a minority for whom race is an important concern. The admission of an increased number of non-white immigrants may mobilize the racist minority and/or increase its membership. Another sign for concern is the inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward immigration. The more negative attitudes toward immigration among lower status people may be reinforced to the extent that these people see immigrants as competitors for scarce jobs. This process may be accelerated by a deterioration of the economy and increased unemployment. Another chilling factor in an otherwise favourable climate for immigration, is that French Canadians hold a considerably less favourable attitude than Anglocelts. This difference in attitudes between the two may make it difficult to achieve a national consensus concerning immigration.



This chapter deals with Canadians' attitudes toward ethnic groups. If the number of ethnic groups in Canada were small, our task would have been straightforward; instead we were faced with a large number of ethnic groups, each of which has a unique history and special place within modern Canadian society. With such a plurality of ethnic groups, a respondent will likely be aware of only some of the ethnic groups which comprise Canadian society. Further, we as investigators had to at some point limit our survey of attitudes to a selected number of ethnic groups.

With this in mind our approach was to begin with more global issues and move gradually to the study of specific attitudes toward selected ethnic groups. We began by asking respondents which ethnic groups they were aware of. Next, we provided the respondents with an extensive list of ethnic groups in Canada and examined the manner in which they categorized or perceived these groups. Finally, we asked detailed questions about respondents' attitudes toward nine standard ethnic groups. One of the limitations of the survey technique was that we could not use the data from earlier questions as a basis for selecting the nine ethnic groups to study in the last question. Nevertheless, we were able to make informed decisions about which groups to study in detail and the results served as a formal check on our decisions.

The present chapter follows the sequence established in the interview schedule and is divided into four major sections. The first section is concerned with which ethnic groups were visible to respondents; the second, based upon a card sorting task, deals with how ethnic groups were perceived and categorized by respondents; the third examines attitudes held by respondents as a whole toward selected ethnic groups, then examines those attitudes in terms of the geographic region, ethnicity and status of respondents; and the final section attempts to integrate the findings of the previous three.

Awareness of Ethnic Groups

Throughout our survey, respondents were asked to express their attitudes toward a variety of specific ethnic groups. However, the first question asked of respondents was: What ethnic groups, that immigrated to Canada over the past few hundred years, are you aware of? The purpose of this question was to discover the visibility of various groups. The question was open-ended to allow respondents to define for themselves what constituted an ethnic group, and to avoid biasing the answers by mentioning the names of specific ethnic groups in

the question itself. Analysis was limited to a measure of the frequency with which a particular group was mentioned, but we are at least sure that we have obtained an unbiased measure of ethnic group awareness. To avoid repetition, we have omitted reference to the Canadian identity of ethnic groups. It should be assumed that when we talk of "Italians," for instance, we are referring to "Italian Canadians" or "Canadians of Italian origin."

Awareness in the Total Sample

In the first column of Table 5.1 we present a list of the ethnic groups that are mentioned spontaneously by at least 5% of the respondents. By examining the more frequently mentioned groups we gain some idea of the relative visibility of these groups for Canadians. It is clear that Italians are visible, and, with the French, English and Germans which are mentioned by at least 40% of our respondents form a cluster of well-known ethnic groups. Other groups such as the Ukrainians, Chinese, and Poles are the next most frequently mentioned; however, these groups are mentioned by only 26% or fewer of the respondents.

Aside from the charter groups, which are most visible to our sample, Italians and Germans are also the most numerous in the Canadian population, with Italians comprising 3.4% and Germans 6.1% of the population. In general, then, the more numerous groups are also the most visible. Further, 75.4% of Germans and 45.8% of Italians were born in Canada. Thus the Italians who are less numerous and who have more recently immigrated to Canada are more visible than the Germans.

Ethnic Differences in Awareness of Groups

Table 5.1 also contains a breakdown in terms of the percentage of Anglo-celtic, French-Canadian, anglophone "other ethnic" and francophone "other ethnic" respondents who spontaneously mention particular ethnic groups. Italians, French and English are well-known to nearly all our respondents. Many of the other ethnic groups are mentioned most often by Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnic" respondents and much less frequently by French-Canadian and francophone "other ethnic" respondents. Reversals of this trend occur for groups such as: Greeks, Belgians, Spaniards, Negroes and Jews who are mentioned more often by French-Canadian and francophone "other ethnic" respondents.

It would seem that there are certain groups, like the Italians and of course French and English, who are familiar to everyone. Others such as Germans, Ukrainians, Scots and Irish are better known to English-speaking respondents. Groups such as the Greeks, Jews, Negroes, Spaniards and Belgians are more often mentioned by French-speaking respondents.

Finally it will be recalled that we selected nine ethnic groups for a detailed study of ethnic attitudes. A number of the groups we chose for detailed study emerge as highly visible groups for our respondents, including French, English,

Table 5.1

**Awareness of Ethnic Groups:
Percentage and Rank in the Total Sample and by Ethnicity**

Groups aware of	Total sample (<i>N</i> = 1869)		Angloceltic (<i>N</i> = 763)		French Canadian (<i>N</i> = 471)		"other ethnic"			
	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank	Anglophone (<i>N</i> = 511)		Francophone (<i>N</i> = 58)	
							%	Rank	%	Rank
Italian	56.4	1	55.2	1	67.6	1	52.6	2	80.8	1
English	43.2	2	47.9	2	32.5	3	43.4	3	20.2	7
French	42.7	3	42.0	4	41.4	2	42.5	4	30.4	5
German	42.5	4	44.8	3	19.9	5	56.3	1	36.5	4
Ukrainian	25.6	5.5	27.3	7	8.2	12	36.6	5	15.6	10
Chinese	25.6	5.5	27.5	6	22.1	4	27.4	7	17.0	8
Polish	24.4	7	22.6	8	17.4	7	34.1	6	15.7	9
Scottish	18.5	8	29.8	5	1.4	23	17.0	12	0.0	23.5
Irish	15.8	9	22.2	9	5.4	17	14.2	16	8.4	14.5
Japanese	15.3	10	16.9	12	9.4	11	18.7	10	7.7	16.5
East Indian	15.2	11	21.6	10	2.5	19.5	18.3	11	4.4	20
Dutch	14.9	12	19.5	11	1.7	22	21.3	8	1.9	22
Greek	14.2	13	10.4	15	19.7	6	15.4	13	45.7	2
Scandinavian	11.6	14	14.9	13	2.2	21	15.0	14	4.9	19
Russian	11.0	15.5	8.6	18	3.6	18	20.4	9	7.7	16.5
Hungarian	11.0	15.5	11.3	14	7.2	16	13.5	17	11.9	13
Portuguese	10.7	17	9.8	16	7.7	14	14.7	15	13.1	11
Jewish	9.5	18	7.4	20	14.8	8	7.2	22	39.3	3
Czech	7.5	19	9.2	17	2.5	19.5	9.2	19	0.0	23.5
West Indian	7.3	20	7.9	19	7.3	15	7.7	21	8.4	14.5
Yugoslav	6.4	21	5.5	21	1.3	24	12.5	18	6.7	18
Negro	6.2	22.5	5.3	22	10.6	10	4.4	23	3.2	21
Spanish	6.2	22.5	3.5	23	8.1	13	8.3	20	23.1	6
Belgian (includes Flemish)	5.2	24	1.5	24	13.1	9	2.4	24	12.8	12

Italian, German, Ukrainian and Chinese Canadians.

Majority Group Perception of Ethnic Groups

The purpose of this question was to find out how respondents organized their perceptions of the large number of ethnic groups which constitute a significant segment of Canadian society. Our strategy was to use a method which would bias our respondents as little as possible. To this end we provided each respondent with 27 cards with the name of a different ethnic group on each card. On card twenty-eight was printed "Myself." The respondent was asked to sort the cards into piles on the basis of which ethnic groups were, in the opinion of the respondent, similar to each other; in short, which ethnic groups belonged together. The respondent was free to create as many piles, and to put as many ethnic group cards in a pile, as he or she wished.

By assessing the frequency with which any two ethnic group cards were placed together in the same pile, we were able to perform an analysis of how respondents perceived or categorized the ethnic groups. The procedure we used was a form of non-metric multidimensional scaling.

Non-metric multidimensional scaling involves the fitting of points (representing ethnic groups, in this case) to a metric space in such a way that points which are close together in the space reflect the respondents' judgement of similarity, and points which are far apart in that space reflect judgements of dissimilarity. It is clear that not all ethnic groups are judged as similar for the same reason. That is, three different ethnic groups may be construed as similar with respect to characteristic A for instance, but may be seen as quite different in terms of characteristic B. In this example, were all judgements made solely on the basis of A, we would need only a one dimensional space along which we could rank order the groups. However, if respondents were also judging the groups in terms of B, their judgements can now vary in two directions. Where this is consistently the case we would need two dimensions to properly 'fit' the respondents' judgements; that is to say, one dimension along which groups are rank ordered in terms of characteristic A and another dimension where the same groups are rank ordered in terms of characteristic B. Thus, a two dimensional space is necessary to map accurately a set of points whose interpoint distances were determined by respondents using both A and B as a basis for judging similarity-dissimilarity. In reality the investigator does not know on an *a priori* basis the constructs or structure respondents use in making their judgements. Respondents make their judgements on the basis of whatever characteristics they deem appropriate. Multidimensional scaling procedures allow for response freedom while providing a rigorous quantitative model to reveal the underlying structure used by respondents.

In this way multidimensional scaling locates in a K dimensional space the underlying or essential structure of similarity judgements (similarity in this context referring to concurrence of ethnic groups placed in the same pile). Displaying the underlying structure is desirable because it reduces the variation in numerical magnitudes arising from a 28 x 28 matrix of co-occurrences to an

essential pattern, the content of which can be both accessible to the eye in its spatial representation, and be parsimoniously interpreted. This K dimensional space usually is more reliable than the relations (concurrence) from which it derives because of the considerable reduction and consequent averaging of the data inherent in multidimensional scaling.

To perform a multidimensional scaling we require some estimate of the similarity which exists between a number of stimuli. In our case the frequency of concurrence of two ethnic group cards in the same pile serves as an index of similarity. The outcome of the analysis then is a plotting of ethnic groups in Euclidian space such that groups placed close together in the space were judged by respondents to belong together, whereas those placed far apart were judged to be different. By focusing special attention on the placement on "My-




Figure 5.1. Two dimensional solution for Kruskal-Shepard multidimensional scaling analysis for Angloceltic respondents ($N = 661$)

Table 5.2
Concurrence of "Myself" Card With Other Groups Cards

	Anglocelts (<i>N</i> = 661) % Rank		French Canadians (<i>N</i> = 398) % Rank	
Myself with:				
Arab Canadian	11.1	24	9.7	23
Belgian Canadian	18.9	12	25.8	6
Canadian Eskimo	32.2	5	21.6	8
Canadian Indian	33.4	4	31.6	4
Chinese Canadian	15.1	19	13.0	15
Czechoslovakian Canadian	15.4	18	10.0	21.5
Doukhobors	7.4	27	2.1	26.5
Dutch Canadian	21.4	9.5	16.2	13
East-Indian Canadian	13.1	23	7.0	24
English Canadian	75.3	1	65.4	3
French Canadian	47.8	2	84.0	2
German Canadian	22.3	8	18.2	10
Greek Canadian	14.5	21	12.3	16
Hungarian Canadian	16.0	17	11.2	18
Hutterites	8.3	26	5.7	25
Immigrants	17.1	15	16.8	12
Italian Canadian	18.7	13	29.0	5
Japanese Canadian	14.9	20	11.1	19
Jewish Canadian	24.1	7	20.5	9
Mennonites	11.0	25	2.1	26.5
Métis	21.4	9.5	17.7	11
Negro Canadian	27.5	6	24.5	7
Polish Canadian	16.2	16	14.2	14
Portuguese Canadian	14.4	22	12.0	17
Québécois	36.7	3	90.2	1
Scandinavian Canadian	19.0	11	10.0	21.5
Ukrainian Canadian	17.4	14	10.1	20

self" relative to the various ethnic groups we can gain some understanding of how respondents perceived Canadian ethnic groups relative to themselves. We performed a separate multidimensional scaling analysis for Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents.

Once again, we have not referred to the Canadian identity of the "ethnic groups". Furthermore, we have consistently referred to "ethnic groups". However it should be made clear that not all the groups studied are *ethnic* in the anthropological sense. Some are religious, others are racial or political and still others are combinations of groups (e.g., Czechoslovak). For the sake of simplicity, then, the term ethnic group is used generically to refer to all groups involved in the card sorting task. Table 5.2 lists the full names of each group as they appeared on the cards presented to respondents.




Figure 5.2 Two dimensional solution for Kruskal-Shepard multidimensional scaling analysis for French-Canadian respondents ($N = 398$).

Angloceltic Perceptions

Prior to performing the multidimensional scaling analysis we examined the frequency with which Angloceltic respondents placed the "Myself" card with each of the other ethnic group cards. These frequencies are presented in Table 5.2, and, as can be seen, the frequencies range from a low of 7.4% for "Doukhobors" to 75.3% for "English." As expected "Myself" and "English" are placed together frequently (75.3%). What is striking, however, is the number of times "Myself" is associated with "French" (47.8%). The frequencies of association with other groups is quite low. "Myself", then, is associated often with both "English" and "French" but not with other Canadian ethnic groups. Further, Angloceltic respondents frequently place the "English" and "French" group cards in the same pile (54.8%).

A more complete picture of this relationship is contained in the results of the multidimensional scaling analysis which is presented in Figure 5.1. From that analysis it is clear that Angloceltic respondents align themselves most closely with "French" and "English" and to some extent with "Quebecois." When we consider the entire list of ethnic groups the goodness of fit measure (or "stress") values indicate that our Angloceltic respondents conceive the various ethnic groups in two dimensions. By examining the placement of the groups on the horizontal axis we note that those to the right of the origin are what might be labelled established Canadian groups: "Indians," "Eskimos," "Metis," "Quebecois," "Myself," "French," "English," and "Negroes." The inclusion of "Negroes" among the established Canadian groups requires further study. It may indicate an awareness on the part of Angloceltic Canadians that certain groups of Negro Canadians, such as those from Nova Scotia, have had a lengthy history in Canada. Those to the left of the origin are all groups who have more recently immigrated to Canada. It is noteworthy that the new Canadian groups are not placed on the extreme left of this dimension but only slightly removed from the origin. The first dimension, then, is an established-Canadian/new-Canadian dimension and appears to be an important basis upon which Angloceltic Canadians judge ethnic groups.

The vertical axis classifies the various groups on the basis of religion, culture and race. At one end are the well-defined and visible religious groups such as "Hutterites," "Doukhobors," and "Mennonites," while clustered at the opposite pole are various non-white racial groups including "Chinese," "East Indian," "Japanese," "Arab," and "Negro." Between these two clusters are all the groups who are distinguished on the basis of culture rather than religion or race. Angloceltic respondents view themselves to be mid-way between these poles along with most other groups of non-British or French origin.

French-Canadian Perceptions

Table 5.2 presents the frequency with which French-Canadian respondents place the "Myself" card in the same pile as each of the other ethnic

group cards. Note that the pattern of frequencies mirrors closely the results of Angloceltic respondents. That is "Myself" is most often placed with "Québécois" (90.2%), "French" (84.0%) and "English" (65.4%) while the frequencies for other groups are much lower. It follows of course that French-Canadian respondents frequently place the "English" and "French" group cards together (69.3%).

The results of the multidimensional scaling are presented in Figure 5.2. From the "stress" values it is difficult to determine whether French-Canadian respondents judge ethnic groups on two or three dimensions. In order to make direct comparisons with the Angloceltic respondents we have presented the results in two dimensions. The meaning of these dimensions is a little less clear than was the case for the Angloceltic respondents. The vertical axis is defined at one end by: "Québécois," "Myself," "French," "Indians," and "Eskimos," and at the other by: "Doukhobors," "Mennonites," and "Hutterites." This axis might be interpreted as an established Canadian/new-Canadian dimension, however, familiarity might also play a role. That is, the groups above the origin on this dimension are charter groups, indigenous groups, and groups such as "Italians," and "Jews" which our earlier analysis of group visibility showed to be the ethnic groups most familiar to French Canadians.

The horizontal dimension is less well defined but appears to reflect the religion to race contrast noted in the Angloceltic solution. At the extreme left of the dimension are well defined religious groups including the "Mennonites", "Doukhobors", "Hutterites", and the "Metis". Some of the ambiguity of this dimension is the placement of "Metis" with these religious groups. Anchoring the racial pole of the dimension are groups such as the "Japanese", "Chinese", "East Indian" and "Arab", with the remaining "culturally" defined groups occupying a middle position on this dimension. Again, the placement of "Negro" in the cultural as opposed to racial cluster of groups adds further ambiguity to the interpretation of this dimension. The "English" while not placed far from "Myself," are nevertheless not contained within the tight cluster surrounding "Myself." The position of "Myself" reveals the ethnic groups with which French Canadians identify most closely. Associated with "Myself" are the two groups "French" and "Quebécois" along with "Canadian Indians."

Attitudes toward Selected Ethnic Groups

The following sections are concerned with the ethnic attitudes which were held by our respondents. In parallel with the other chapters which report the basic results, the description of ethnic attitudes begins with the rationale used for selecting the specific ethnic groups and the attitude dimensions which were employed. Then, in turn, total sample, regional, ethnic, and status variables are investigated to determine their effect on ethnic attitudes.

There is in Canada a large number of ethnic groups and for each group there is an infinite number of questions one could ask. Our task was to make an

informed selection of ethnic groups for detailed study. We were guided in our selection by statistics on the size and concentration of ethnic groups from the 1971 Census, from the results of informal pilot research and from the scientific literature on ethnic group relations. On this basis nine ethnic groups were chosen for detailed study. The groups selected were: English Canadians, French Canadians, Canadian Indians, Italian Canadians, Chinese Canadians, German Canadians, Ukrainian Canadians, Jewish Canadians and Immigrants in general. In addition, the first two ethnic groups mentioned by the respondent (in the earlier open-ended question) which were not already included in our preselected list were included for detailed study. Thus, every respondent indicated his or her attitudes toward eleven different ethnic groups, nine of which were standard for all respondents and two which were selected by the respondent.

For each of these eleven groups, respondents were asked to make judgments about typical members of these groups along ten attitudinal dimensions. Six of the dimensions were chosen because of their highly evaluative connotations. These evaluative dimensions were: "likeable," "clean," "hard-working," "important," "Canadian" and "interesting." Beyond their shared evaluative qualities each of the six dimensions is important in its own right. For example, the dimension "Canadian" serves as an indication of who, in the opinion of Canadians, may participate fully in Canadian society; the "hardworking" dimension is one that is often applied in a stereotyped fashion to groups of other than British or French origin; and the "important" dimension provides some indication of social status. Thus, while each of the six dimensions is unique, they share the feature of being highly evaluative.

The remaining four dimensions were each included to deal with an important issue in the context of multiculturalism. Thus "stick together as a group" is a measure of the extent to which various groups are perceived to remain separate, "similar to me" provides a test of the assumption that people are attracted to those who are similar, "wealthy" provides a further measure of social status and "well known to me" allows us to examine how familiarity with a group affects attitudes toward that group. Respondents then made judgments about eleven ethnic groups on each of these ten attitude dimensions.

Attitudes toward Ethnic Groups in the Total Sample

In this section, we present an overview of the attitudes held by respondents toward various ethnic groups. In Table 5.3 are the average ratings given by respondents to each of the nine standard ethnic groups on the ten attitude dimensions. The reader can examine the magnitude of these ratings in order to gain some perspective on the range of responses given to the various ethnic groups. In order to draw meaningful conclusions about ethnic attitudes, it was necessary to perform a more sophisticated analysis, and these data are available in Appendix 5.1. The method of analysis is particularly important in a study of ethnic attitudes because of the frequent misinterpretations that are made of this type of data. The ratings given by respondents to any particular ethnic group cannot be interpreted in any absolute sense. For example, if peo-

Table 5.3

Means of Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups in the Total Sample

	Rating scale								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
	Not at all							Very much	
	Quite								
	English Canadian	French Canadian	Immigrants in general	Canadian Indians	German Canadian	Chinese Canadian	Ukrainian Canadian	Jewish Canadian	Italian Canadian
Hardworking	5.4	5.3	5.5	3.6	5.7	5.6	5.5	5.6	5.5
Important	5.8	5.7	5.0	4.9	4.8	4.7	4.8	5.2	4.9
Canadian	5.9	5.8	4.5	5.8	4.6	4.3	4.6	4.7	4.6
Clean	5.7	5.5	4.9	3.4	5.7	4.8	5.3	5.2	4.7
Similar to me	5.6	5.2	4.1	3.1	4.4	3.0	4.0	3.8	3.8
Likeable	5.6	5.5	4.9	4.8	5.0	4.8	5.0	4.7	4.8
Stick together as a group	4.8	5.5	5.3	6.1	5.1	6.0	5.3	6.0	6.0
Wealthy	5.1	4.5	4.0	2.1	4.5	4.3	4.3	6.1	4.7
Interesting	5.1	5.3	4.8	5.0	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.5
Well known to me	5.8	5.3	3.9	3.4	3.8	3.1	3.4	3.9	4.1

ple judge a specific group to be "likeable" (rating of 7, 6 or 5), this by itself is of little value. Such a rating is sometimes interpreted as meaning that the group is judged positively since the rating is on the positive side of the midpoint 4. However, it may be that respondents feel that most people in the world are quite friendly (rating of 6) and hence by comparison a rating of 5 would be interpreted as a relatively negative judgement. The point to be made here is that any judgements about ethnic groups must be interpreted in *relative* terms and each individual respondent will have his or her own relative standard for judging ethnic groups.

With this in mind, our approach was to take one attitude dimension at a time and ask: What is the average rating given by a particular respondent to all of the ethnic groups? We then examined each ethnic group to see whether the rating the respondent gave for that particular group was above or below the average rating he or she gave to all groups. For example, we calculated the average rating a respondent gave to all nine ethnic groups on the scale "likeable." By subtracting the average rating from the rating given to a specific ethnic group, we could calculate for that respondent his or her relative attitudes. By using this approach we avoided the use of absolute judgements (e.g., Group X is disliked) and instead had an accurate reflection of how each group was judged relative to the others. In point of fact an examination of the ratings of ethnic groups reported in Table 5.3 reveals that the *absolute* ratings for all nine ethnic groups were quite favourable.

Stereotypes of ethnic groups. A discussion of the relative ratings given to each standard ethnic group on each dimension would not be useful for isolating the dimensions which are most salient (stereotypical) for a particular ethnic group; in order to highlight the stereotypes of our sample we present in Table 5.4 a list of those dimensions where the ratings of the ethnic group were at least .5 scale units above or below the average. It is possible at a glance to gain some impression of the manner in which our respondents stereotype each of the standard ethnic groups. In general, respondents react very favourably to English and French Canadians, while their responses are relatively less favourable for the groups of other than British or French origin. Of these groups, Germans seem to be evaluated more positively than some of the others. These stereotypes, of course, reflect the views of all respondents, the majority of whom (over two thirds) are of Angloceltic or French-Canadian background. Thus Table 5.4 illustrates essentially the majority view.

In addition to the standard groups, ratings were obtained for the first two nominated groups in the earlier open-ended question for each respondent. We cannot place the same degree of confidence in the data derived from the nominated groups as we can for the standard ones. Some respondents may nominate a group because they are particularly attracted to or familiar with that group, others because they dislike the group, and still others because in their geographic region there are many members of that particular group. The results are nevertheless informative since they provide information about Canadian reactions to a number of groups, which for practical reasons, could not be in-

Table 5.4

**Attitude Dimensions for which Standard Ethnic Groups
Received Higher and Lower than Average Ratings
in the Total Sample**

	Mean difference + .5 Above average	Mean difference - .5 Below average
English Canadians	important Canadian clean similar to me likeable wealthy well known to me	stick together
French Canadians	important Canadian clean similar to me likeable interesting well known to me	
Immigrants in general		Canadian
Canadian Indians	Canadian stick together	hardworking clean similar to me wealthy well known to me
German Canadians	hardworking clean	
Chinese Canadians		Canadian similar to me well known to me
Ukrainian Canadians		well known to me
Jewish Canadians	stick together wealthy	
Italian Canadians	(not higher or lower in any dimension)	

cluded in the list of standard ethnic groups. (In Appendix 5.2 we present the relative ratings given to the more frequently nominated groups, parallel to the analysis used for Appendix 5.1.)

The analysis is summarized in Table 5.5, where again we present a list of only those attitude dimensions where the ratings were .5 scale units above or below the standard. From this table it is possible to gain a rough impression of the stereotype of our respondents to each of the sixteen ethnic groups nominated most frequently.

Table 5.5
Attitude Dimensions for which Nominated Groups
Received Higher and Lower than Average Ratings
in the Total Sample

	<i>N</i>	Mean difference + .5 above average	Mean difference - .5 below average
Belgian	48	clean similar to me likeable interesting well known to me	
Czechoslovakian	45	clean	Canadian
Dutch	137	hardworking clean similar to me likeable well known to me	stick together
East Indian	101	stick together	hardworking important Canadian clean similar to me likeable well known to me
Greek	122		Canadian similar to me likeable
Hungarian	93	clean similar to me	
Irish	142	clean similar to me likeable well known to me	stick together

Table 5.5 (Continued)

	<i>N</i>	Mean difference + .5 above average	Mean difference - .5 below average
Japanese	111	hardworking clean	similar to me
Negro	51		hardworking important clean similar to me wealthy interesting
Polish	228	(not higher or lower on any dimension)	
Portuguese	112		important Canadian wealthy
Russian	78	hardworking	important
Scandinavian	94	hardworking clean similar to me likeable well known to me	stick together
Scottish	185	Canadian clean similar to me likeable well known to me	stick together
Spanish	38		hardworking important Canadian wealthy
West Indian	49		Canadian wealthy
Yugoslavian	54		Canadian

The specific stereotypes for any particular ethnic group can be determined quickly from Tables 5.4 and 5.5. Certain features, however, are noteworthy. French and English Canadians receive above average ratings on almost every attitude dimension. Two important exceptions are "hardworking" and "stick together" which are apparently not stereotypic of the charter groups. By contrast some of the groups of other than British or French origin are stereotyped

Table 5.6

Means of Evaluations of Various Ethnic Groups

Standard list of ethnic groups	Mean	N	Rank	Respondent nominated ethnic groups	Mean	N
English	.52	1801	1			
			2	Scottish	.49	186
French	.47	1786	3			
			4	Dutch	.46	138
			5	Scandinavian	.39	94
			6	Irish	.37	142
			7	Belgian	.35	48
			8	Japanese	.13	111
			9	Hungarian	.10	93
			10	Polish	.08	230
Jewish	.04	1717	11			
German	.02	1716	12			
			13	Czech	.02	47
			14	Russian	-.07	79
			15	Yugoslavian	-.09	54
			16	West Indian	-.11	48
Immigrants in general	-.12	1736	17			
Ukrainian	-.13	1601	18			
Italian	-.20	1719	19			
			20	Portuguese	-.25	112
Chinese	-.26	1736	21			
			22	Spanish	-.31	39
			23	Greek	-.36	127
Canadian Indian	-.46	1786	24			
			25	Negro	-.52	51
			26	East Indian	-.95	102

as "hardworking" (Germans, Dutch, Russians, Japanese, Scandinavians), others as "sticking together" (Canadian Indians, Jews, East Indians).

Evaluative reactions to ethnic groups. Respondents reacted favourably to most ethnic groups; however, they did have clear preferences. In order to delineate these preferences we examined respondents' evaluative reactions to each of the standard groups as well as the more frequently nominated ethnic groups. An overall evaluation score was calculated for each ethnic group by taking the mean ratings of that group on the six evaluative dimensions minus the mean on the same six dimensions across all nine standard groups. The six dimensions which served as the basis for the overall evaluation score were "hardworking," "important," "Canadian," "clean," "likeable," and "interesting." Table 5.6 contains the mean total evaluation scores given by our respondents to twenty-six ethnic groups and they are presented in order from most positively to least positively evaluated. As we noted earlier these rankings are based upon the attitudes of all respondents, the bulk of whom are of Angloceltic or French-Canadian background. Thus Table 5.6 reflects, essentially, the majority attitude. Furthermore, as was stated earlier, we cannot place the same degree of confidence in the means derived from the nominated groups as we can for the standard ones, and this is why they have been presented separately in Table 5.6.

There appears to be some pattern to the evaluative reactions to the various ethnic groups. For the most part North and West European groups receive favourable ratings. Central and South European groups appear next in the ratings while non-white groups are judged least favourably. A notable exception to this trend is the relatively favourable response to the Japanese.

Relationship between "familiarity" and "perceived similarity" and overall evaluation of ethnic groups. Two important questions which arise in the context of ethnic group relations are, first, the extent to which familiarity with an ethnic group is associated with a favourable evaluation of that group, and, second, whether people are attracted to people from other groups who are perceived to be similar to themselves.

Our data permit a modest test of the extent to which familiarity and perceived similarity relate to favourable or unfavourable reactions to various ethnic groups. Respondents rated each of the nine standard ethnic groups on the attitude dimension "well known to me." A respondent's relative rating of a group then serves as an indirect measure of familiarity. As was discussed earlier we had previously calculated for each respondent, a relative overall evaluation score for each of the standard ethnic groups. In Table 5.7 we present the correlations between the respondent's familiarity and overall evaluation score for each of the standard ethnic groups.

The fact that all nine correlations are significant and in a positive direction indicates that for each ethnic group, respondents who claim greater familiarity with that group are more favourably disposed to the group. Familiarity, then would seem to be associated with favourable attitudes although it is not clear if familiarity represents actual contact. Similarly it is unclear whether contact pro-

duces positive attitudes, or whether people only seek contact with groups toward which they are already favourably disposed.

Paralleling the analysis of familiarity, the results of correlations between relative ratings on the attitude dimensions "similar to me" and overall evaluation are also presented in Table 5.7. Again, all nine correlations are significant and in a positive direction. If anything the correlations are consistently higher than was the case for familiarity and evaluation. Thus, it seems that respondents react more favourably to groups who are perceived to be similar to themselves. What is not discernable from this analysis however is whether people are attracted to those who are similar to themselves or whether people judge the people they are attracted to as more similar to them.

Regional Differences in Attitudes toward Selected Ethnic Groups

In this section, each of the nine Canadian ethnic groups is examined in turn with a view to comparing the reactions of respondents from different parts of the country. The comparisons focus on how respondents from the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia, differed in

Table 5.7

Correlations between Ratings of "well known to me" and "similar to me" and Evaluative Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups in the Total Sample

Group being rated	"Well known to me" and overall evaluation	"Similar to me" and overall evaluation
English Canadian	.31	.46
French Canadian	.55	.64
Immigrants in general	.39	.52
Canadian Indian	.28	.52
German Canadian	.46	.53
Chinese Canadian	.26	.31
Ukrainian Canadian	.45	.54
Jewish Canadian	.35	.44
Italian Canadian	.34	.54

Note. All ratings are relative scores. Scores for individual items are ratings of that particular group on that item minus the average rating on that item for all groups. Evaluation score is the mean of six evaluative items for a particular group minus the mean of six evaluative items for the average of all groups.

Table 5.8
Means of Differences between Overall Evaluation Ratings of Each Standard Ethnic Group and
Respondents' Average Ratings of Ethnic Groups by Geographic Region

Region	N	English	Canadian	French	Immigrants in general	Canadian	Indian	German	Chinese	Canadian	Ukrainian	Canadian	Jewish	Canadian	Italian
Atlantic provinces	169	.85		.62	-.10	-.28		-.33	-.42		-.42		-.19		-.30
Quebec	475	.64		1.14	-.43	-.35		-.22	-.52		-.56		-.15		-.33
Ontario	691	.38		.22	.01	-.40		.04	-.21		-.07		.06		-.11
Prairies	283	.51		.11	-.13	-.84		.31	-.03		.25		-.01		-.22
British Columbia	195	.44		.07	.03	-.57		.29	-.11		.04		-.01		.18
F-test		18.83***	131.47***	30.32***	14.98***	41.57***	27.51***	54.16***	7.61***	7.18***					

their reactions to each of the standard ethnic groups in terms of four variables: (1) overall evaluation, (2) "similar to me," (3) "stick together," and (4) "well known to me." The most important of these variables is the overall evaluation score and hence in Table 5.8 we present the regional differences for each ethnic group on the overall evaluation score. We will discuss briefly the regional differences for the other three variables. The details of the analyses are presented in Appendix 5.3.

Significant regional differences emerge for evaluative reactions to *English Canadians*. Respondents in the Atlantic provinces react most favourably. Those from Quebec are next most favourable, followed by the Prairies, British Columbia, with residents of Ontario reacting least favourably.

Respondents from the Atlantic provinces judged English Canadians to be most "similar to me," followed by respondents from Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia. Quebecers judge English Canadians to be least "similar to me," even though they previously evaluated English Canadians very highly. In the eyes of most Canadians, English Canadians do not "stick together." This view is especially prevalent among respondents from Ontario, the Prairies, and British Columbia. Finally, English Canadians are least "well known to me" in Quebec and are most "well known" in the Atlantic provinces.

In terms of overall evaluation of *French Canadians*, respondents in Quebec are extremely favourable in their responses. Respondents from the Atlantic provinces are quite favourable, with respondents west of Quebec reacting generally less favourably. Quebecers judge French Canadians high on "similar to me." Interestingly, no regional groups judged French Canadians to be dissimilar to themselves. Quebecers do not judge French Canadians as "sticking together," whereas those from the other regions feel French Canadians do "stick together." Finally, French Canadians are most "well known" to Quebecers, and those in the Atlantic provinces. Respondents in the Prairies and British Columbia feel they did not know French Canadians as well as those from the other regions.

Regional differences emerge for *Immigrants in General* on overall evaluation, with Quebecers in particular judging Immigrants less favourably than others. Quebecers also judge Immigrants to be not "similar to me," as compared with respondents from other regions. Respondents from the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, and the Prairies claim that Immigrants are not "well known to me," whereas those in Ontario and British Columbia claim relatively more knowledge of Immigrants.

Respondents in the Prairies are least favourable in their overall evaluation of *Canadian Indians*, followed by British Columbia, Ontario, and finally the Atlantic provinces. This same pattern of regional differences emerges for the judgement "similar to me"; those in the Prairies rating Canadian Indians least "similar" with those in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces at the other extreme. Respondents in Quebec and Ontario, more than those in other regions, judge that Canadian Indians "stick together." Finally, Canadian Indians are felt to be relatively "well known" in Ontario and British Columbia, are less known in the

Atlantic provinces and Quebec and are more "well known" in the Prairies.

Atlantic province residents and Quebecers are relatively unfavourable in their reactions to *German Canadians*, those in Ontario are relatively neutral and respondents west of Ontario are relatively positive in their overall evaluation. As well, respondents from Quebec and the Atlantic provinces judge Germans not to be "similar to me," whereas those west of Quebec rate Germans as "similar." Everybody agrees that Germans do not "stick together," however, this is most pronounced for Quebecers and least pronounced for residents of Ontario. German Canadians are relatively "well known" in the Prairies and British Columbia but not so "well known" in the other regions of Canada, especially the Atlantic provinces and Quebec.

Chinese Canadians receive relatively unfavourable ratings particularly by those in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces. Again, the Chinese are not judged by our respondents to be "similar to me," especially by those in Quebec. Respondents in the Prairies and British Columbia are most pronounced in their judgement that Chinese Canadians "stick together." The Chinese are not "well known," especially in Quebec, Ontario, and to some extent in the Atlantic provinces.

Ukrainian Canadians are judged favourably in the Prairies and British Columbia, but relatively unfavourably in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces. As well, in the Prairies and British Columbia, Ukrainians are rated "similar to me," whereas this is not the case for respondents from Ontario, Quebec, and the Atlantic provinces. There is general agreement from respondents of all regions that Ukrainians tend not to "stick together." Ukrainians are "well known" in the Prairies, but are not at all "well known" in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces.

Jewish Canadians are evaluated more positively in Ontario and to some extent in the Prairies and British Columbia as compared to Quebec and the Atlantic provinces. Jewish Canadians are not judged to be "similar to me," especially in Quebec. All regions believe that Jewish Canadians "stick together" except those from the Atlantic provinces. Only in Quebec are Jewish Canadians at all "well known to me"; in the other provinces, especially in British Columbia, they are not "well known."

Italian Canadians are judged more negatively, in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces than in other regions. In addition, Italians are not rated as "similar to me," especially by Quebecers. Respondents from Ontario are most extreme in judging that Italians "stick together." Finally, Italians are "well known" in Quebec and Ontario, but are less "well known" in the Atlantic provinces, the Prairies, and British Columbia.

Summary of regional differences. There were consistent regional differences in the perception of ethnic groups. Quebecers, and to a lesser extent respondents from the Atlantic provinces, were relatively negative in their judgements of groups of other than British or French origin. This pattern was broken for groups such as English and French Canadians and to some extent for Canadian Indians, but for the remaining groups relatively negative ratings emerged in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces.

Ethnic Differences in Attitudes toward Standard Ethnic Groups

In the following three sections, we deal with the variables which had the most potent influence on ethnic attitudes, namely, the ethnicity of the respondent. Specifically, the focus is on how the respondent's own ethnic background affects his or her attitudes toward various ethnic groups in Canada. Because of the importance of this question, a series of analyses were performed which provided some understanding of the manner in which a person's own ethnic background related to attitudes toward other ethnic groups. The first analysis is a descriptive one and deals with how Angloceltic, French-Canadian, anglophone "other ethnic" and francophone "other ethnic" respondents judge the nine ethnic groups on the four attitude dimensions. This analysis is followed by a summary analysis of the differences between Angloceltic and French-Canadian stereotypes toward ethnic groups. Finally, we present an analysis of the structure of Angloceltic and French-Canadian attitudes.

The attitudes of respondents of different ethnicity. The first analysis examined how Angloceltic, French, anglophone "other ethnic" and francophone "other ethnic" Canadians compared in their attitudes to each of the standard ethnic groups. There were four attitude dimensions which were used as the basis for the comparison: 1) overall evaluation of the specific group, 2) how "similar to me" the group was perceived, 3) the extent to which the group was judged to "stick together," and 4) how "well known to me" was the group. The most important of these variables is the overall evaluation and the details of this analysis for each ethnic group are presented in Table 5.9 while the details of the other three variables are presented in Appendix 5.4.

Anglophone "other ethnic" Canadians are less positive than others in their overall evaluation of *English Canadians*. Angloceltic respondents especially judge English Canadians to be very "similar to me." English Canadians do not "stick together" in the opinion of Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnic" Canadians, while French and francophone "other ethnic" Canadians are in agreement but less extreme in their opinion. Finally, English Canadians are "well known" to every one, but especially to Angloceltics.

It was also anglophone "other ethnic" respondents who are least favourable in their reactions to *French Canadians*. Conversely, French-Canadian respondents and to some extent francophone "other ethnics" evaluate French Canadians highly. This pattern is maintained for the remaining attitude dimensions. French-Canadian and francophone "other ethnic" Canadians rate French Canadians as very "similar to me," very "well known to me," and as not "sticking together." By contrast, anglophone "other ethnic" respondents perceive French Canadians to be less "similar to me," less "well known to me," and, along with the Anglocelts are neutral in their perception of the extent to which French Canadians "stick together."

Anglophone "other ethnic" respondents evaluate *Immigrants in General* favourably as compared to the evaluations of French and francophone "other ethnic" respondents. For "similar to me" high ratings are given by anglophone "other ethnic" respondents and relatively low ratings are given by French-

Table 5.9

Means of Differences between Overall Evaluation Ratings of Each Standard Ethnic Group and Respondents' Average Ratings of Ethnic Groups by Ethnicity of Respondents

Ethnic category	N	English Canadian	French Canadian	Immigrants in general	Canadian Indian	German Canadian	Chinese Canadian	Ukrainian Canadian	Jewish Canadian	Italian Canadian
Angloceltic	683	.57	.26	-.08	-.42	.06	-.19	-.09	.00	-.22
French Canadian	344	.63	1.28	-.47	-.41	-.32	-.59	-.73	-.21	-.30
Anglophone "other ethnic"	507	.32	.06	.08	-.59	.20	-.16	.12	.04	-.10
Francophone "other ethnic"	32	.69	.70	-.29	-.46	-.06	-.33	-.25	-.15	-.20
F-test		16.37***	200.64***	43.95***	3.28*	32.81***	28.97***	66.12***	9.39***	4.86**

Canadian respondents. All four groups of respondents agree that Immigrants "stick together." Anglophone "other ethnic" respondents are familiar with Immigrants, whereas Immigrants are not "well known" to French Canadians, francophone "other ethnics" and to some extent Angloceltic Canadians.

There are few differences among respondents in their reactions to *Canadian Indians*. Anglophone "other ethnics" are slightly more negative in their evaluation of Indians and also judge that Indians are least "similar to me." Beyond this, all groups agree that Indians "stick together" and are not "well known to me."

Anglophone "other ethnic" respondents rate *German Canadians* relatively favourably, French-Canadian respondents react negatively, while Angloceltic and francophone "other ethnic" respondents are neutral in their evaluation of Germans. Anglophone "other ethnics" perceive Germans as "similar to me" and again for French-Canadian respondents, Germans are not "similar." Francophone "other ethnic" respondents are particularly strong in their view that Germans do not "stick together." Finally, Germans are "well known" to anglophone "other ethnics", but are not at all "well known" to French-Canadian and francophone "other ethnic" respondents.

French-Canadian respondents are more negative than the other groups in their reaction to *Chinese Canadians*. It is also the French-Canadians who are most extreme in their judgement that the Chinese are not "similar to me." Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnic" respondents more than the others judge that the Chinese "stick together." Finally the Chinese are least "well known" by French-Canadian and francophone "other ethnic" Canadians.

In terms of overall evaluation, anglophone "other ethnic" respondents are most favourable and French-Canadian respondents least favourable in their reactions to *Ukrainian Canadians*. Anglophone "other ethnics" also judge Ukrainians to be "similar do me," whereas French Canadians clearly do not. On the question of whether Ukrainians "stick together" there is no difference of opinion. However in terms of familiarity, the Ukrainians are not "well known" to French Canadians, whereas they are better known to anglophone "other ethnics."

French-Canadian and francophone "other ethnic" respondents respond less favourably to *Jewish Canadians* than Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnic" respondents. The same pattern emerges for "similar to me"; the two French-speaking groups view Jewish Canadians as less similar than the two English groups. Anglophone "other ethnic" respondents more than the others are firm in their belief that Jewish Canadians "stick together," and Jewish Canadians seem equally "well known" to all four groups.

In their judgement of *Italian Canadians* anglophone "other ethnic" Canadians are least negative and French Canadians are most negative. Angloceltic and French Canadians do not judge Italians to be "similar to me," whereas the two "other ethnic" respondent groups are more neutral in their ratings. All agree that Italians "stick together" but French Canadians are less extreme in their judgements. Finally, Italians are "well known" to francophone "other eth-

tics" and to some extent by Anglocelts, but not so "well known" to the other groups.

A consistent pattern of results emerged from this analysis of the ethnic attitudes of respondents of different cultural background. Angloceltic respondents had positive attitudes toward their own group, English Canadians, and toward French Canadians as well. Their attitudes toward Immigrants in general and Canadians of other than British or French origin was generally less favourable. The same pattern emerged for French Canadians with an even greater differential in their reactions to the charter groups as compared to Canadians of other than British or French origin. Thus French Canadians were extremely favourable in their reactions to their own group and to English Canadians, and were noticeably negative in their reactions to groups of other than British or French origin.

This pattern of findings for French Canadians is consistent with the findings in the regional analysis, where Quebecers were relatively negative in their ethnic attitudes.

Finally, whereas Angloceltic and French Canadians were biased in favour of the charter groups relative to other groups, our anglophone "other ethnic" respondents were most favourable in their reactions to the groups of other than British or French origin and Immigrants in general.

Angloceltic and French-Canadian stereotypes of ethnic groups. In the previous analysis we found some evidence that Angloceltic respondents rated themselves and French Canadians favourably, and those of other than British or French origin less favourably. An identical pattern emerged for French-Canadian respondents, who appeared to exaggerate even more than the Angloceltic respondents their differential responses to the charter groups and "other ethnic" groups.

Because of the importance of this pattern of results, the present analysis focused exclusively on Angloceltic and French-Canadian responses in order to present a more complete picture of the similarities and differences between their ethnic attitudes. We examined reactions to the standard ethnic groups on each of the ten attitude dimensions separately.

The essence of the analysis for *Angloceltic respondents* appears in Table 5.10. This table lists for each ethnic group, those attitude dimensions where significant above average ratings (+ .5 scale units) and significant below average ratings (- .5 scale units) were given by Angloceltic respondents on the attitude dimensions. Presenting the table in this form allows for an immediate impression of Angloceltic ethnic attitudes.

As expected Angloceltic respondents rate English Canadians very favourably. Beyond this, French Canadians receive above average ratings on three attitude dimensions and are not perceived negatively on any of the dimensions. Finally, German Canadians receive positive ratings on two attitude dimensions and no strikingly unfavourable responses.

For most other ethnic groups the number of above average ratings is small relative to the number of average or below average ratings. For example,

Table 5.10

**Attitude Dimensions for which Each Standard Ethnic Group
Received Higher and Lower than Average Ratings
by Angloceltic Respondents**

	Mean difference + .5 Above average	Mean difference - .5 Below average
English Canadian	important Canadian clean similar to me likeable wealthy well known to me	stick together
French Canadian	Canadian similar to me well known to me	
Immigrants in general	(not higher or lower on any dimension)	
Canadian Indian	Canadian stick together	hardworking clean similar to me wealthy well known to me
German Canadian	hardworking clean	
Chinese Canadian	stick together	Canadian similar to me well known to me
Ukrainian Canadian		well known to me
Jewish Canadian	wealthy	
Italian Canadian	stick together	Canadian

Immigrants in general, Italians and Ukrainians do not receive above average ratings on any of the attitude dimensions. Canadian Indians and Chinese Canadians all receive above average ratings on "stick together" a characteristic which is frequently, although not always, viewed as a negative characteristic.

French-Canadian reactions to Canadian ethnic groups parallel closely those of the Angloceltic respondents (see Table 5.11). French-Canadian respondents, however, make an even greater distinction between charter groups and groups of other than British or French origin. That is, French-Canadian re-

spondents rate their own group favourably on most attitude dimensions and are almost as favourable in their reactions to English Canadians. For all other groups however, the responses are at best neutral and to a large extent below average. The striking pattern which emerges in Table 5.11 then, is a number of attitude dimensions on the above average column of the table with no below average entries for English Canadians and French Canadians, with a consistent but reversed pattern for groups of other than British or French origin.

The structure of Angloceltic and French-Canadian attitudes. The preceding analyses of ethnic attitudes have dealt with the judgements of various ethnic groups made by Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents. Each respondent rated nine ethnic groups on each of ten attitude dimensions, a total of 90 separate judgements. Since such a large number of judgements was required, the question arises as to how respondents organized this myriad of judgements. The purpose of the analyses which follow was to seek some pattern or underlying structure to respondents' judgements. The question then is, do Angloceltic and French Canadians have characteristic attitudinal structures with which to evaluate various ethnic groups in Canada?

To assess the structure of Angloceltic and French-Canadian attitudes, two factor analyses were performed, one for Angloceltic and a second for French-Canadian respondents. The aim of factor analysis is to structure a set of inter-related variables (for a detailed treatment of factor analysis see Harman, 1967). For our purposes each of the 90 judgements is to be considered as one "variable." Thus the rating of Canadian Indian on the attitude dimension "hardworking" is one variable, the rating of Canadian Indian on "important" is a second variable and so on. For this analysis we are not concerned with the actual rating *per se* but rather with relationships among the ratings. Three relationships are of particular interest: firstly, we want to find out whether the ratings of certain ethnic groups, independent of attitude dimension, are related; secondly, we wish to know whether there is a relationship between certain attitude dimensions independent of particular ethnic groups; and, finally, we want to discover if there is some relationship between the ratings of certain ethnic groups on certain attitude dimensions.

For both the Angloceltic and French Canadian respondents five meaningful factors were extracted. For the Anglophone respondents the five factors accounted for 39.3% of the variance; for the French Canadian respondents the five factors accounted for 33.9% of the variance. While it is customary to present the loadings for each of the 90 variables on each of the five factors, for the sake of clarity we have only presented those variables with loadings above .40, and selected loadings between .30 and .40 which fit the pattern of a particular factor.

The Angloceltic factor structure is summarized in Table 5.12. An examination of the variables with loadings above .40 shows that Factor 1 can be defined by the attitude dimensions "hardworking," "important," and "Canadian" as they apply to all ethnic groups except English Canadians and Canadian Indians. For Angloceltic respondents "hardworking," "important" and "Canadians"

Table 5.11

**Attitude Dimensions for which Each Standard Ethnic Group
Received Higher and Lower than Average Ratings
by French-Canadian Respondents**

	Mean difference + .5 Above average	Mean difference - .5 Below average
English Canadian	important Canadian clean similar to me wealthy well known to me	
French Canadian	hardworking important Canadian clean similar to me likeable interesting well known to me	
Immigrants in general		important Canadian wealthy
Canadian Indian	Canadian stick together	hardworking important clean similar to me wealthy well known to me
German Canadian	clean	important Canadian stick together well known to me
Chinese Canadian		important Canadian clean similar to me interesting wealthy well known to me
Ukrainian Canadian		important Canadian similar to me likeable wealthy interesting well known to me
Jewish Canadian	wealthy	similar to me likeable
Italian Canadian		clean

Table 5.12
Substantial Loadings from Varimax Rotation of Principal Components
Factor Analysis of Ethnic Matrix for Angloceltic Respondents

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
.42 Germ/ Hardworking	.50 Ind/ Stick'gether	.42 Ind/ Clean	.42 Ind/ Likeable	.48 Ind/ Similar me
.74 Germ/ Important	.60 Germ/ Clean	.50 Eng/ Hardworking	.54 Ind/ Interesting	.64 Germ/ Similar me
.61 Germ/ Canadian	.52 Germ/ Stick'gether	.52 Eng/ Important	.41 Ind/ Well known me	.41 Germ/ Likeable
.47 Chin/ Hardworking	.41 Ukran/ Hardworking	.45 Eng/ Canadian	.64 Germ/ Interesting	.68 Chin/ Similar me
.77 Chin/ Important	.43 Ukran/ Clean	.60 Eng/ Clean	.52 Germ/ Well known me	.42 Chin/ Likeable
.69 Chin/ Canadian	.61 Jew/ Stick'gether	.42 Eng/ Similar me	.62 Chin./ Interesting	.73 Ukran/ Similar me
.40 Ukran/ Hardworking	.53 Jew/ Wealthy	.50 Eng/ Likeable	.45 Chin/ Well known me	.43 Ukran/ Likeable
.72 Ukran/ Important	.54 Ital/ Stick'gether	.38 Eng/ Stick'gether	.67 Ukran/ Interesting	.80 Jew/ Similar me
.69 Ukran/ Canadian	.41 Fren/ Stick'gether	.44 Eng/ Wealthy	.48 Ukran/ Well known me	.46 Jew/ Likeable
.41 Jew/ Hardworking	.45 Im.gen/ Stick'gether	.60 Eng/ Interesting	.61 Jew/ Interesting	.79 Ital/ Similar me
.72 Jew/ Important	.41 Chin/ Hardworking	.58 Fr./ Hardworking	.53 Ital/ Interesting	.47 Ital/ Likeable
.56 Jew/ Canadian	.61 Chin/ Stick'gether	.50 Fr./ Important	.43 Fr./ Interesting	.60 Fr./ Similar me
.71 Ital/ Important		.47 Fr./ Canadian	.67 Im.gen/ Interesting	.54 Im.gen/ Similar me
.59 Ital/ Canadian		.69 Fr./ Clean	.44 Im.gen/ Well known me	
.46 Fren/ Important		.45 Fr./ Similar me		
.41 Fren/ Canadian		.62 Fr./ Likeable		
.44 Im.gen/ Hardworking		.58 Fr./ Wealthy		
.63 Im.gen/ Important		.55 Fr./ Interesting		
.55 Im.gen/ Canadian				

are related, but only as they apply to the various groups of other than British or French origin, immigrants and French Canadians. English Canadians and Canadian Indians are treated differently on these attitude dimensions. Factor 2 receives the majority of its highest loadings from one attitude dimension, "stick together." Again it is interesting to note that for Angloceltic respondents, English Canadians are not included with the other groups for this factor.

Factor 3 is defined clearly by the two charter groups on all attitude dimensions. In the minds of Angloceltic respondents there is a shared perception of English and French Canadians to the exclusion of other ethnic groups.

The attitude dimensions "interesting" and "well known to me" appear to define Factor 4. We note that again the ratings of English Canadians on these two attitude dimensions are not contained on this factor.

Factor 5 is defined by the attitude dimensions "likeable" and "similar to me" as they apply to almost all of the ethnic groups. The noticeable exception is again the "own group," English Canadians. In general it would seem the Angloceltic respondents make a clear distinction between charter groups and groups of other than British or French origin. However, for certain clusters of attitude dimensions there is a tendency to include French Canadians with other ethnic groups and to keep English Canadians separate.

A summary of the French Canadian factor structure is presented in Table 5.13. Factor 1 for French-Canadian respondents is largely defined by the attitude dimensions "important," "Canadian," "clean," "likeable," and "interesting." It is striking however that only groups of other than British or French origin on these attitude dimensions define the factor and that French Canadians, English Canadians and Canadian Indians are excluded.

Factor 2, as was the case for Factor 3 of the Angloceltic solution, represents a charter group cluster. All of the attitude dimensions as they apply to French Canadians and many of the attitude dimensions applied to English Canadians load on this factor.

Factor 3 is defined by the attitude dimension "stick together as a group." As has become the pattern, the loadings on this attitude dimension emerge for all ethnic groups except French Canadians.

"Similar to me" is the attitude dimension which seems to define Factor 4, however occasionally "likeable" and "clean" emerge as well. For this Factor these attitude dimensions as they apply to French Canadians and English Canadians do not load on this factor.

Finally Factor 5 is defined by "well known to me" as it applied to all ethnic groups with the exception of French Canadians.

There was a consistency in the structure of Angloceltic and French-Canadian responses in the ethnic matrix. For both groups a charter groups factor emerged indicating that both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents make a clear English-French versus groups of other than British or French origin distinction. For both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents there was a "stick together as a group" factor, however the respondents' own group was not included in the cluster. Similarly for both groups of respondents some form

Table 5.13

Substantial Loadings from Varimax Rotation of Principal Components Factor Analysis of Ethnic Matrix for French-Canadian Respondents

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5
53 Germ./Important	46 Eng./Hardworking	49 Ind./Stick'gether	52 Ind./Clean	49 Ind./Well known me
52 Germ./Canadian	36 Eng./Important	48 Germ./Hardworking	71 Ind./Similar me	56 Germ./Well known me
36 Germ./Clean	48 Eng./Clean	55 Germ./Stick'gether	49 Ind./Likeable	64 Chin./Well known me
35 Germ./Likeable	41 Eng./Similar me	63 Chin./Stick'gether	59 Germ./Similar me	56 Ukran./Well known me
50 Germ./Interesting	48 Eng./Likeable	66 Ukran./Stick'gether	41 Germ./Likeable	70 Jew./Well known me
63 Chin./Important	37 Eng./Stick'gether	65 Jew./Stick'gether	66 Chin./Similar me	71 Ital./Well known me
61 Chin./Canadian	34 Eng./Wealthy	58 Ital./Stick'gether	62 Ukran./Similar me	66 Eng./Well known me
46 Chin./Clean	37 Eng./Interesting	43 Eng./Stick'gether	64 Jew./Similar me	61 Im.gen./Well known me
47 Chin./Likeable	58 Fr./Hardworking	54 Im.gen./Stick'gether	62 Ital./Similar me	
57 Chin./Interesting	54 Fr./Important		65 Im.gen./Similar me	
62 Ukran./Important	48 Fr./Canadian		41 Im.gen./Likeable	
62 Ukran./Canadian	63 Fr./Clean			
33 Ukran./Clean	58 Fr./Similar me			
37 Ukran./Likeable	65 Fr./Likeable			
57 Ukran./Interesting	55 Fr./Stick'gether			
47 Jew./Important	48 Fr./Wealthy			
55 Jew./Canadian	53 Fr./Interesting			
47 Jew./Clean	44 Fr./Well known me			
48 Jew./Likeable				
58 Jew./Interesting				
60 Ital./Important	Factor 1 (Continued)			
66 Ital./Canadian	40 Im.gen./Canadian			
49 Ital./Clean	36 Im.gen./Clean			
57 Ital./Likeable	46 Im.gen./Likeable			
65 Ital./Interesting	53 Im.gen./Interesting			
43 Eng./Interesting				
50 Im.Gen./Important				

of evaluative dimension involving such attitude dimensions as "hardworking," "important," "Canadian," and "likeable" emerged.

Summary of Angloceltic and French-Canadian ethnic attitudes. From our analyses of Angloceltic and French-Canadian responses to ethnic groups four patterns emerged. First, both French and Angloceltic Canadians had favourable images of their own group. Second, French Canadians were consistently less favourable in their attitudes toward ethnic groups than Angloceltic Canadians. Third, both French and Angloceltic Canadians rated each other favourably, with less favourable ratings given to groups of other than British or French origin. Finally, French Canadians made an even greater distinction between charter groups (French and English Canadians) and Canadians of other than British or French origin.

Socioeconomic Status and Ethnic Attitudes

We performed separate analyses to determine the effects of income, education and occupational status on ethnic attitudes. The same pattern of results emerged for all three analyses. Since education results were most discriminating and because of its importance in the earlier chapters, the results for education are presented in detail in this section. Specifically, we examined for each of the nine ethnic groups, how level of education affected attitudes on four key dimensions, "overall evaluation," "similar to me," "stick together," and "well known to me." The results on "overall evaluation" are presented in Table 5.14, while Appendix 5.5 provides data for the other three scales.

Educational differences do not dramatically affect responses to *English Canadians*. Those respondents who had completed high school or less, evaluate English Canadians more favourably than those with post secondary school education. For "similar to me" and for "well known to me" the trend seems to be for those of lesser education to feel English Canadians are less similar and less well known than respondents of higher education. Finally, the higher the education of the respondent the greater is the tendency to believe that English Canadians "stick together."

For only the overall evaluation measure is there a discernable pattern regarding the effects of education on attitudes to *French Canadians*. As was the case for English Canadians, higher education is associated with less positive attitudes toward French-Canadians. This trend is reversed in the case of attitudes toward *Immigrants*. Thus, respondents' educational level is associated with more (rather than less) positive attitudes toward "immigrants in general."

Level of education seems to have little effect on people's attitudes toward *Canadian Indians*. There is, however, a tendency for higher educated people to rate Indians as not "similar to me." Similarly, education has little effect on attitudes toward *Germans* although those of higher education are stronger in their view that Germans do not "stick together."

A pattern did emerge for attitudes toward *Chinese* such that the lower the educational level of the respondent the more negative are his or her attitudes. Conversely, respondents of little education are less inclined than the

Table 5.14
Means of Differences between Overall Evaluation Ratings of Each Standard Ethnic Group and
Respondents' Average Ratings of Ethnic Groups by Education

Education	N	English Canadian	French Canadian	Immigrants in general	Canadian Indian	German Canadian	Chinese Canadian	Ukrainian Canadian	Jewish Canadian	Italian Canadian
Some primary	177	.58	.65	-.37	-.40	.01	-.40	-.02	-.04	-.18
Primary (graduated)	251	.48	.48	-.16	-.48	.08	-.34	-.16	-.11	-.15
Some high school	534	.60	.53	-.10	-.41	-.12	-.29	-.20	-.09	-.18
High school (graduated)	341	.55	.51	-.12	-.46	.08	-.29	-.19	-.04	-.22
Technical training	188	.44	.38	-.01	-.62	.12	-.20	.00	-.01	-.27
Some college, university or more	302	.41	.25	-.09	-.48	.12	-.10	-.05	.11	-.23
F-test		3.49**	6.29***	5.20***	1.43	6.27***	5.30***	3.26**	3.93**	.77

highly educated to feel that the Chinese "stick together."

There seems to be little systematic relationship between level of education and attitudes toward *Ukrainians*. And the only strong finding for *Jewish Canadians* is that respondents with some university education are familiar with Jewish Canadians, whereas all other respondents rate Jews as not "well known to me." Finally, no systematic effects appear for education on attitudes toward *Italian Canadians*.

In general education had less effect on attitudes than might have been expected. In two cases no significant trends emerged and even where they did the differences were not pronounced. The only noticeable trend was for respondents of higher education to be less positive toward the charter groups on one hand and to be more favourable to "other ethnic" groups on the other. In contrast, respondents of lower education evaluated the charter groups highly but were less favourable in their attitudes toward groups of other than British, or French origin.

Discussion

Our approach to the study of ethnic attitudes was to begin with more open ended questions and then proceed to a more detailed examination of specific attitudes toward selected ethnic groups. We first analyzed respondents' awareness of ethnic groups in Canada, then studied their perception of ethnic groups and thirdly performed a detailed analysis of specific ethnic attitudes. We will discuss some of the important results which emerged in each of the sections and then focus on the main themes which were consistent across all sections.

Respondents were, of course, aware of Canada's two charter groups, English Canadians and French Canadians. The only other two groups which were known to at least 40% of respondents were Italians and Germans. At one level this is to be expected since Germans and Italians are numerically the next two largest ethnic groups in Canada. On the other hand, these two groups present an interesting contrast. German Canadians are more numerous than Italians, while Italians have more recently immigrated to Canada. With this in mind it is interesting to note that Italians were more visible to our respondents than Germans, indicating that while group size is important, recency of immigration is crucial.

Two important results emerged from our analysis of ethnic group perception. First, of the almost infinite number of ethnic groups respondents might have associated themselves with, it was striking to see the close association respondents perceived among "Myself," "English Canadians" and "French Canadians." Thus, Angloceltic respondents were associated with "French Canadians" and French Canadians were associated with "English Canadians," although to a lesser extent. While there is much publicity about French and English conflict, it would seem that in the larger context of Canadian ethnic diversity, French and English Canadians align themselves more closely.

The second finding of interest concerns the dimensions used by both An-

gloceltic and French-Canadian respondents for classifying ethnic groups. One dimension involved classifying ethnic groups on the basis of their length of residence in Canada. Thus Canada's indigeneous groups along with the charter groups, were contrasted with more recently arrived non-British, non-French groups. It should be pointed out however, that many groups appear to be classified as "new" Canadians when in fact they have a lengthy history in Canada.

For the second dimension both Angloceltic and French Canadian respondents made distinctions between groups on the basis of race, as opposed to religion, with culture occupying a position between these extremes. Respondents rated themselves along with most ethnic groups in the cluster of "cultural" groups, feeling somewhat removed from groups of a different race and from those with unique religious affiliation. That respondents isolate certain racial and religious groups is revealing, and arises perhaps because of the visibility associated with these groups.

Our examination of Canadian attitudes toward specific ethnic groups provides a more concrete understanding of ethnic attitudes. In general respondents appeared to be at least tolerant of "other ethnic" groups and there was no evidence of extreme ethnic prejudice. This statement requires qualification, however, since respondents had clear preferences. They reacted very favourably to the charter groups as compared to groups of other than British or French origin. Of the non-charter groups, North European groups were evaluated positively compared to the South and East European groups, who were in turn rated more positively than several of the non-white groups.

This rank ordering of preferences is consistent with studies of social distance in both the Canadian (Driedger, 1975), and American context (Ehrlich, 1973). It is especially striking when viewed in terms of reported discrimination in Canada prior to 1920. Palmer notes that:

Patterns of discrimination paralleled preferences of immigrant sources with Northern and Western Europeans encountering relatively little discrimination, Central and Southern Europeans and Jews encountering more discrimination, and non-whites encountering an all pervasive pattern of discrimination which extended to almost all aspects of their lives. Discrimination was one of the main factors which led to the transference (with only a few exceptions) of the same ethnic "pecking order" which existed in immigration policy to the place each group occupied in the "vertical mosaic." (Palmer, 1976, p.20)

The fact that so little has changed in the last fifty or sixty years suggests that ethnic group attitudes may be an inherent part of Canadian life. Two features of the ethnic "pecking order" deserve comment. First, the position of "Immigrant in general" is revealing in that it ranks conspicuously toward the middle of the non-French, non-British groups. The term "immigrant" was used in the questionnaire because we have found in pilot studies that it was a term which many people use in a generic manner to refer to any Canadian of other than British or French origin. Clearly, not all Canadians use the term in this manner; however the results indicate that for most respondents the phrase "immi-

grants in general" signals "other ethnic" groups as one collectivity. And second, a notable departure from the pre-1920 ethnic attitudes is the currently favourable attitudes toward the Japanese.

From the regional analysis certain consistencies emerged. Quebecers, for the most part, were least positive in their evaluation of groups of other than British or French origin. Beyond this, certain groups such as the Germans and Ukrainians were rated more favourably in the Prairies and British Columbia than in other provinces. It would be tempting to conclude that positive attitudes emerge in provinces where there is a large concentration of the ethnic group in question. In fact, we noted that a substantial correlation emerged between "well known to me" and overall evaluation of a particular group. It would seem that, in general, familiarity or contact with a group is associated with positive attitudes toward that group. This relationship should not be generalized to all circumstances or for all groups since contact may not ensure familiarity with a group (see Brewer and Campbell, 1976) and the conditions of contact must also be specified (see Amir, 1969). For example, if there were a positive relationship between contact and ethnic attitudes we would expect that Canadian Indians would be rated more favourably in the western provinces and the Chinese would be evaluated more positively in British Columbia. The fact that this did not occur systematically indicates that attitudes are specific to certain conditions of contact. On most occasions a high concentration of a particular group was associated with more positive attitudes toward that group; however, in some cases a high concentration was not associated with positive attitudes. Many of the findings from our regional analysis are better understood when we take into consideration the respondent's own ethnic background. We will reserve discussion of these crucial analyses until later in the discussion since they feature prominently in the consistent themes which emerged throughout the chapter.

Respondents of higher education were less positive than those of lower education in their reactions to the charter groups and conversely were more positive than those of lower education in their attitudes toward "other ethnic" groups. The relationship between socioeconomic status and attitudes toward ethnic groups was generally less strong than between socioeconomic status and immigration (see Chapter 4) or multiculturalism attitudes (see Chapter 6).

We have discussed separately some of the major findings of our analysis of ethnic attitudes. Together these results provide not only a description of, but some understanding of, ethnic attitudes in Canada. Our discussion now focuses on the important consistencies which emerged in the data.

To begin with, a consistent finding was the favourable response given to English Canadians. Most respondents were aware of English Canadians, and judged themselves similar to English Canadians in the card sorting task. Further, English Canadians featured prominently in the factor analysis data, and finally on all attitude dimensions English Canadians were rated favourably. The term "English Canadian" is ambiguous however. For some respondents it may literally mean a Canadian from England, for others it may be a term synonymous

with Canada's English-speaking majority. Notwithstanding this potential ambiguity it can be noted that while all our respondents reacted favourably to English Canadians, Angloceltic respondents were most favourable in their reactions to English Canadians. In short, Angloceltic Canadians responded favourably to their own group. That a group evaluates itself highly raises an important question in the context of multiculturalism. Does it mean that Angloceltic Canadians are ethnocentric in that they value their own group to the detriment of others or, as is implied by the assumption of multiculturalism, is this positive self-image a necessary prerequisite to developing favourable attitudes toward other ethnic groups? We will attempt to resolve this issue in later Chapters, but for the moment it is important to note that Angloceltic respondents' favourable reactions to their own group was a consistent feature of the many analyses performed to examine ethnic attitudes.

Paralleling the Angloceltic ratings of their own group were the consistent judgements made by French-Canadian respondents of their own group. French-Canadian respondents were, of course, very much aware of their own group and in our analysis of the card sort they aligned themselves closely with "French Canadians" and "Québécois." Further, in the factor analysis French Canadians gave their own group special status, and, finally, French-Canadian respondents were very favourable in their reactions to their own group.

This positive self-image on the part of French Canadians is particularly important. A consistent theme in the literature on ethnic relations in Canada is the negative image French Canadians had of themselves prior to 1960 (e.g., Lamarque, in press). Lambert's series of experiments in the 1950s (Lambert, 1967) continually pointed to the tendency for French Canadians to downgrade their own group in favour of the majority English-Canadian group. Such a phenomenon has in its extreme form been labelled "self-hate" and has usually arisen in situations where a minority group attempts to become part of, or become similar to the larger and more powerful majority group (see Allport, 1958, p. 147-150). By exaggerating the favourable qualities of the majority group and simultaneously viewing one's own group as inferior, it rationalizes the attempts to adopt the values, norms, beliefs and ultimately gain the acceptance of the majority group.

One way in which some majority groups maintain their power, is by preventing other groups from joining the majority. When a minority group realizes that identification with the majority group is impossible, it often abandons its desire to join the privileged majority. This can result in the development, through group pressures, of a new sense of its own identity and in the growth of a positive self-image. This interpretation can perhaps be applied to French-Canadian society as it has moved from the beginnings of industrialization through the quiet revolution to the present development of French-Canadian nationalism.

Whether or not such an explanation is accurate, it is nevertheless the case that earlier research had shown a tendency for French Canadians to devalue their own group while the results of the present study demonstrate un-

equivocally a positive self image and group image on the part of French-Canadian respondents. Again at a later time we will explore whether or not such attitudes are conducive to favourable outgroup attitudes in the context of multiculturalism.

Not only do Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents have a positive view of their own group, they also have positive attitudes toward each other. This is an especially significant finding given the publicity that surrounds English/French conflicts. We might have expected Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnic" Canadians to form a coalition, with French and francophone "other ethnic" Canadians on the other side. Instead we have some evidence of mutually positive attitudes between French and English Canadians to the exclusion of Canadians of other ethnic origin. This finding is similar to results of Simard, Mercier, de Brain-Garneau (1976) in their study of ethnic identity of French Canadians.

For example, in the card sorting task Angloceltic respondents often placed "Myself," "English Canadian" and "French Canadian" together. The same was not true of French-Canadian respondents, however, to the same extent. The factor analytic results revealed that a "charter group" factor emerged for both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents. The clearest evidence for some mutual attraction between English and French Canadians was the ratings respondents gave to the standard ethnic groups on the ten attitude dimensions. Both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents rated each other very favourably and by comparison the groups of other than British or French origin were evaluated less favourably.




What these results demonstrate perhaps is that ethnic alliances shift according to context. In many arenas French and English Canadians are the main actors because of their special status as the two charter groups. Hence there are many instances of competition between the two with the result that it is tacitly assumed that this conflict is pervasive. Our results show that in the broader context of ethnicity in Canada, alliances shift such that English and French Canadians combine to be contrasted with Canadians of other than British or French origin.

Canada's two majority groups have positive self evaluations as well as mutually positive attitudes toward each other. But what of their attitudes toward other ethnic groups? Angloceltic respondents clearly favoured English Canadians and French Canadians; however, their reactions to the other ethnic groups would be described as less favourable, rather than negative. All ethnic groups were judged to be "hardworking," a clearly positive attribute, and one that seems to be stereotypic of most ethnic groups, except for Canadian Indians. Beyond this, Germans and Ukrainians were rated somewhat more favourably than groups such as the Chinese, Italian, Jewish and Immigrants in general.

Like their Angloceltic counterparts French-Canadian respondents maintained a very positive self-image. However, French-Canadian self perception was even more exclusive than Angloceltic respondents as evidenced by the very close association of "Myself," "French Canadian" and "Quebecer" in the

card sorting task. We noted also from the regional analysis, that Quebecers rated French Canadians extremely positively and in subsequent analyses French-Canadian respondents rated themselves extremely favourably. In short, French Canadians rated themselves more favourably than Angloceltic respondents rated themselves.

However, these positive ratings do not generalize to other ethnic groups. That is, French Canadians were consistently less favourable in their ratings of ethnic groups than were other respondents. The precise reason for the French-Canadian attitudes is difficult to articulate. A more comprehensive discussion of Angloceltic and French-Canadian attitudes is presented later in Chapters 7 and 8 where attitudes toward immigration, multiculturalism, and psychological variables combine with data from the present chapter to provide a more detailed profile of multicultural and ethnic attitudes.



One of the many responses a society may make to cultural diversity is to adopt a position of cultural pluralism or multiculturalism. In general terms, such a view acknowledges the value of having cultural variety within a societal system, as long as the various components do not maintain a conflict relationship. Further, this view rejects the more common opinion that cultural variety should be reduced. At a policy level, such a position is expressed in programmes which attempt to persuade people of this view as well as programmes which actively encourage the expression of cultural variety.

In our research a sequential approach to the evaluation of this general view and of the formal policy which has attempted to give it expression, has been taken. General ideas are considered first, more concrete examples follow, and questions of behavioural intentions about the policy define the most concrete end of the dimension. In this way we hoped to avoid sensitizing the respondent, thereby creating a response bias. Essentially, the sequence of questions was as follows: what ideology is held about cultural diversity by Canadians; what is perceived as the policy of multiculturalism; what is known about the policy; what are the perceived consequences of such a policy; what are the attitudes held toward some specific multicultural programmes; and, what are the behavioural intentions of respondents toward the policy?

Multicultural Attitudes and Scales

Multicultural ideology. The assessment of ideology is extremely difficult; because there is no concrete referent, the problems of validation are great. Further, because the questions are necessarily general, problems of reliability, response bias, acquiescence, and respondent indifference are also high.

The question of multicultural ideology had not been raised previously in the research literature and so there was no ready-made conceptualization of the problem, nor any ready-made instruments. One research approach (Berry, 1970, 1974; Berry & Annis, 1974; Sommerlad & Berry, 1970) which provided an indication of how to proceed was the study of the attitudes of native peoples in Australia and Canada toward their relations with the larger society. A conceptual scheme had been developed based upon two questions: (1) Is it of value to retain one's traditional culture?, and (2) Is it of value to work together with the larger society in the pursuit of common goals? When these two questions were crossed, four options appeared. These are displayed in Table 6.1. While attitude items usually express only a single idea, in this multicultural ide-

ology scale, two ideas are included in each item. The reason for this is that the two questions noted above almost always receive affirmative answers, but when they are posed in relation to one another, a more discriminating answer is required of the respondent; thus a finer distribution of attitudes is more likely to emerge. However, the major reason for juxtaposing the two ideas, of course, is that they define the four orientations indicated in Table 6.1. When simple "yes" or "no" responses are provided, the four combinations may be designated as they appear in the table. Statements may be phrased which incorporate combinations of these answers (e.g., "Any Indian living within the white community should try to behave in the same way as those around him" is an "assimilation" item), and an individual may be assessed on his relative valuation of these four attitudes. It should be noted that attitude items suitable for the "deculturation" response are almost never accepted in a population; thus no scale has been developed to assess it.

When the research question has to do with multicultural ideology, the same conceptualization may be employed. In this case, however, the respondent answers not for his own ethnic group but about how all ethnic groups should be related in the larger society. The option which was designated "integration" in Table 6.1 is virtually identical to the values expressed in the multicultural policy, and so this combination was emphasized in the development of the new multicultural ideology scale. Many statements were prepared and pre-tested, and nine were eventually incorporated in the multicultural ideology scale. Of these, four are positive, and five are negative. Of the negative five, two express "assimilation" values, one expresses a "rejection" (or segregation) value, and two are negations of an "integration" value. This scale is shown in Table 6.2. Note that three additional items were included in this question. While of the same general nature as the others, these items are specifically devoted to language use in relation to the two majority groups in Canada. This specificity suggests that they be analysed separately.

Table 6.1
Conceptual Analysis of Four Possible
Orientations toward Intergroup Relations

		"Is traditional culture worth retaining?"	
		YES	NO
"Is it useful to have positive relations with the larger society?"	YES	"Integration"	"Assimilation"
	NO	"Rejection" ("Segregation")	"Deculturation"

In the scale, items a, c, e and l are positive with respect to multiculturalism while items d and h are negative. In addition, items f and g are clearly “assimilationist” while item b is clearly “segregationist.” In the analysis and reporting of the results in the balance of this section, these nine items are considered cumulatively as multicultural ideology. To incorporate them into a

Table 6.2

Multicultural Ideology

General items		Sign	Attitude
a.	Canada would be a better place if members of ethnic groups would keep their own way of life alive.	+	Integration
b.	If members of ethnic groups want to keep their own culture, they should keep it to themselves and not bother other people in this country.	—	Segregation
c.	There is a lot that Canadians can gain from friendly relations with immigrants.	+	Integration
d.	Having lots of different cultural groups in Canada makes it difficult to solve problems.	—	Integration (negative)
e.	It would be good to see all the ethnic groups in Canada retain their cultures.	+	Integration
f.	It is best for Canada if all immigrants forget their cultural background as soon as possible.	—	Assimilation
g.	People who come to Canada should change their behaviour to be more like us.	—	Assimilation
h.	The unity of this country is weakened by ethnic groups sticking to their old ways.	—	Integration (negative)
l.	A society which has a variety of ethnic groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur.	+	Integration
Language items (not included in Scale)		Sign	Attitude
i.	A person who doesn't speak English has no right to get ahead in Canada.	n/a	
j.	A person who doesn't speak French has no right to get ahead in Canada.	n/a	
k.	A person who doesn't speak both English and French has no right to get ahead in Canada.	n/a	

cumulative score, the responses to each of the negative items were subtracted from 8 (that is, "reversed" around 4.0, the mid-point on the 7-point scale), then all item scores were added and a total score was calculated for each respondent. This total score represents this respondent's summed score divided by the number of items (nine) in the scale. At the sample level, the mean score represents the individual total scores averaged across all respondents in the sample, and a higher score indicates greater acceptance of multicultural ideology.

Before a set of items can be legitimately referred to as a "scale," it is necessary to demonstrate that in fact they belong together and that it is thus proper to add them to obtain an overall score. These item-to-item-correlations are provided in Appendix 6.1. The item-to-total correlations are also provided along with similar statistics for the three excluded language items. The item-to-item correlations indicate relationships among the single items themselves, while the item-to-total correlations indicate how an item relates to the total score (after that particular item has been removed from the total).

For the nine items in the scale, the mean item-to-item correlation is .22 and the range is from a substantial + .53 (for items f and g) to -.08 (for items a and d). All signs are in the appropriate direction, confirming the initial allocation of signs to the items. This pattern of coefficients is indicative of a moderate degree of clustering and permits labeling of the items as a "scale." For these same nine items, the item-to-total correlations are also substantial (mean of .48), ranging from .64 to .35. This, too, supports their use as a single scale.

With respect to the three language items which were excluded from the more general scale analysis, it appears that their item-to-item correlations are substantial as well (+ .50, + .36 and + .60) but that their relationships to the nine general items are lower (mean $r = + .13$). Moreover, the pattern of coefficients between the three language items and the total ideology score is not high. Both these statistics confirm the original decision to separate the language from the general items and to proceed with two separate groups of items.

Perception of multicultural policy. With this question we attempted to discover how the sample considered that cultural groups are treated at the policy level. In order to avoid a response bias based on political or other factors we wanted to make a somewhat indirect enquiry before referring to *the* government policy. The respondent was presented with three ways in which a government *might* handle relations between immigrants and the general population. Respondents were asked to select which option they thought was the case in Canada. One option paraphrased an "assimilation" policy in which immigrants are encouraged to give up their old customs and way of life in order to take on the customs of their new country. A second option was a statement of "permissive integration" where immigrants are allowed to maintain their customs and old ways of life. The third option was one of "supportive integration" where immigrants are encouraged to maintain their customs and old ways of life. This third option was intended to represent current multicultural policy in

Canada, which provides institutional and monetary support for a multicultural mosaic within Canadian society. These three options are indicated in Table 6.3.

The question about the perception of multicultural policy employed the term "immigrants" rather than another term such as "ethnic group," "Third Force" or "non-British/non-French peoples." There were three reasons for this decision. One was that during pilot research, it was found that the term "immigrant" was employed colloquially as a general label among the two charter groups for both new arrivals and their descendants who exhibited a distinctive life style. In support of this point, some data were presented in Chapter 5 which showed that the psychological response to "Immigrants in general" is statistically similar to the average response to a number of "ethnic groups." Thus, although sociologically there is a clear difference, psychologically the difference is not that apparent.

Table 6.3

Perception of Multicultural Policy in Canada, with Three Options

A.	Assimilation option	"Some countries <i>encourage</i> immigrants to <i>give up</i> their old customs and ways of life, and take on the customs of their new country."
B.	Permissive integration option	"Other countries <i>allow</i> immigrants to <i>maintain</i> their customs and old ways of life when they come to a new country."
C.	Supportive integration option	"Still other countries <i>encourage</i> immigrants to <i>maintain</i> their customs and old ways of life when they come to a new country."

"Which of these best represents the way *Canada* deals with immigrants?"

Secondly, as we have pointed out previously, the survey style of research must employ terms which are readily meaningful to the respondents whose views are the focus of the study. It is clear that the identification of the term "immigrant" with the more accurate but cumbersome term "descendant of non-British, non-French ancestry" would not as likely be made by the "other ethnic" respondents. Thus, for them, the meaning of the question on multi-cultural policy perception may have been different from its meaning for those respondents of British or French origin; some caution is therefore required in the interpretation of those results.

Thirdly, the preception of the treatment of immigrants is a "test case" for the perception of the treatment of their descendants. That is, if there is any perception that in Canada there is a tolerance or promotion of ethnic retention, it is likely to be apparent in the case of immigrants. Any bias inherent in this "immigrant" formulation of the issue is likely to be on the conservative side; tolerance of the cultural retention of "immigrant" peoples is unlikely to diminish with the passage of time or generations.

Knowledge of multicultural policy. At this point in the survey it was asked whether the respondent actually knew about the federal government's multiculturalism policy. Those who indicated that they did not *know* about it were asked if they had *heard* about it. The reason behind this two-step sequence was that the first question might have been threatening to some respondents; they might have anticipated some probe about their actual knowledge and responded in the negative. Thus, in order to pick up these more cautious respondents, as well as some lower level of policy awareness, the second weaker question was posed.

Perceived consequences of multiculturalism. The last three questions in the multicultural sequence were intended to make the multicultural situation more concrete for respondents. They were designed to tap attitudes to specific aspects of multiculturalism. In the first of them, we wanted to discover what respondents thought would happen to life in Canada *if* a multicultural policy were in effect. Little previous work had been done in this area so a list of seven possible consequences was generated. These were then phrased into attitude items (see Table 6.4). Five of these seven items were incorporated into a perceived consequences scale. Of these five, three items were positive and two were negative with respect to multiculturalism. A total was constructed for each respondent by employing the reversing and summing procedure outlined in the section on multicultural ideology. Two other items were excluded from the scale because they dealt with specific groups (French and English Canadians), and both were negative with respect to multiculturalism.

A scale analysis was carried out with the five general items as a group, and the two excluded items separately (see Appendix 6.2). For the five general items, the item-to-item correlations range from $+ .63$ to $-.12$, with a mean of $.36$. The signs are all appropriate to the original classification as positive or negative items. One item (the one concerned with "interesting TV and radio programmes") exhibits only a minimal relationship with two other items ("Canadian way of life destroyed" and "children's education will suffer"). However, there is a good relationship with the other two items and the item has been retained in the scale. Item-to-total correlations are also substantial, ranging from $.67$ to $.44$, with a mean of $.58$. They are sufficiently high to warrant the use of all items in a perceived consequences of multiculturalism scale. Once again a higher score indicates a more positive attitude.

The two other items which were kept separate from the general scale correlate strongly with each other ($+ .71$) but they also correlate well with the items in the general scale (with the exception of the "TV and radio" item). The mean correlation of these two items with those in the general scale is $.34$. The range is from $.58$ to $.10$. It is probably valid to include these two group-specific items in the general scale since their correlation with the general scale items is not different from items within the scale. However, their differential patterning, when analysed by ethnicity of respondent (see later section), suggests that it is worthwhile keeping them separate from the general scale.

Attitudes toward multicultural programmes. Continuing with our attempt

Table 6.4

Perceived Consequences of Multiculturalism in Canada

General items	Sign
a. . . . our Canadian way of life will be destroyed.	-
d. . . . Canada will be richer in culture.	+
e. . . . social harmony in Canada will improve.	+
f. . . . our children's education will suffer because there will be even more languages to worry about.	-
g. . . . there will be all kinds of interesting cultural programmes on T.V. and radio.	+
French-English items (not included in Scale)	
b. . . . the English Canadian's voice in Canada will become weaker and weaker.	-
c. . . . the French Canadian's voice in Canada will become weaker and weaker.	-

to make the multicultural policy more concrete, we sought attitudes toward eight "programmes," most of which were gleaned from extant programmes. Once again, some items were of a general nature and were included in a total attitude score. Two items were concerned with English and French language teaching and were left out of the total. These items are indicated in Table 6.5. Of the six general items, three refer to actual programmes, which are now sponsored by the government: community centres, ethnic histories, and folk festivals. The other three items refer to programme options which are the subject of current debate: "third language" broadcasting, and teaching in either regular or special schools. In the case of programme attitudes, no reversals were necessary, since all items were positive; thus, a total scale score was calculated directly, incorporating the first six items. As before, a higher score indicates more positive attitudes.

A scale analysis (see Appendix 6.3) indicates substantial positive item-to-item correlations, ranging from .48 to .23, with a mean of .39; item-to-total correlations are also high, ranging from .62 to .53, and with a mean of .59. These coefficients indicate a cohesive scale with a high degree of internal consistency. When the two items which were excluded from the scale are examined, somewhat lower correlations with the general items are found (range of .42 to .16; mean of .27) and there are lower item-to-total correlations (.18 and .26).

Table 6.5

Attitudes toward Multicultural Programmes in Canada

General items	Sign
a. Community centres where people from various cultural backgrounds can meet each other and share their heritage.	+
b. Radio and T.V. shows in languages other than English or French.	+
c. Histories written about the major cultural groups who have settled in Canada.	+
d. Teaching, in regular school programmes, of the languages of the major cultural groups who have settled in Canada.	+
e. Teaching in special school programmes (after hours or weekends) of the languages of the major cultural groups.	+
f. Folk festivals to display the cultural heritage of groups in Canada (Dance, Song, Drama, etc.).	+
French-English items (not included in Scale)	
g. Courses to teach English to members of the various cultural groups.	+
h. Courses to teach French to members of the various cultural groups.	+

Note. Items a,c,f,g and h indicate existing programmes; the others are programme options currently debated.

Table 6.6

Behavioural Intentions toward Multicultural Programmes

Items	Sign
a. . . . vote for a political candidate who supported such a programme?	+
b. . . . try to convince other people that the programme was a good one?	+
c. . . . be willing to pay taxes to support such a programme?	+

Behavioural intentions toward multicultural programmes. To make the survey situation even more concrete for our respondents, we asked for their behavioural intentions toward multicultural programmes. Three statements were made representing behaviours increasing in degree of commitment. These are indicated in Table 6.6. Note that all are in a positive direction so a total score was calculated directly by summing across the three items; a higher score indicates more positive behavioural intentions. Although no actual behaviour has been observed in survey work, it has been claimed (Triandis, 1971) that such behaviourally-specific questions reduce the potential discrepancy between what people say and what they actually do.

Scale analyses (Appendix 6.4) again reveal substantial inter-correlations: item-to-item coefficients range from .79 to .71; and item-to-total coefficients range from .82 to .77. These are remarkably high and indicate an extremely cohesive, if short, scale.

Relationships among Attitude Measures

Although diverse in coverage, it is expected that these six areas of attitude measurement should be related in systematic ways (see Appendix 6.5). As expected the four general scales are highly inter-related, with coefficients ranging from +.62 to +.49. With such a level of inter-correlation, it would be tempting to collapse all four scaled attitude variables into a single multicultural attitude score. However, despite their relatively strong empirical relationship, they remain conceptually distinct (ranging along an abstract to more concrete dimension) and they do focus on detailed features of multiculturalism in Canada which should be kept separate for practical reasons.

It is of interest to note that the pattern of these inter-correlations suggests that the dimension along which the scales were intuitively ordered (from abstract ideology, through attitudes, to more concrete behavioural intentions) has some empirical basis. The highest correlations exist for scales close on the dimension, for example, behavioural intentions and programme attitudes at +.62. They decline in order as scales become further apart on the dimension, for example, behavioural intentions and ideology at +.49.

Considering the two non-scaled questions, we again find systematic relationships (see Appendix 6.6). For the respondents who perceive the policy as one of assimilation, total scores on all four multicultural scales are lower than are those for respondents who perceive the policy as one of permissive integration. In turn scores for this latter group are lower than those for respondents who perceive it as one of supportive integration. These effects are very clear and very strong. A similar but less consistent pattern exists for the knowledge of multicultural policy question: for each question ("know of" and "heard of"), three of the four scales receive lower acceptance from those respondents who indicate no knowledge of the policy.

Finally the cross-tabulation for the multicultural policy perception and multicultural policy knowledge questions (see Appendix 6.7) shows that for both the "know about" and "heard about" policy knowledge questions, there is

a significant relationship with policy perception. Clearly a higher percentage of respondents who claim some policy knowledge perceive it to be one of supportive integration, while conversely, those who claim no policy knowledge tend to perceive it more as one of assimilation.

Attitudes in the Total Sample

In this section we are concerned with how people in the sample generally respond to the six attitude areas. The purpose of such a general overview is to indicate the probable position in the total Canadian population. Such a description has value in its own right, but it is also necessary to set the stage for the more local analyses which follow in subsequent sections. The later analyses will qualify and clarify the general picture which emerges in this section.

Multicultural ideology. The mean scores for each of the items in the total sample are presented in Table 6.7. Above the first nine items, the total multicultural ideology score is given. Note that the means for individual items are direct reports of the numbers provided by the respondents on the 7-point scale. However, the total has been computed by "reversing" the negative items. In addition to mean scores, standard deviations are provided; these indicate the spread of responses around the central tendency, and percentages further indicate the degree of dispersion in the total sample.

It is clear from examining the means across items, and the standard deviations and percentage distributions for each item, that there is a fairly large variation in response. That is, we did not obtain predominantly neutral or stereotyped responses. Such a pattern would be indicated by a tendency for all means to hover around 4.00 and/or to have a low standard deviation or percentage dispersion.

In Table 6.7 the overall total score lies on the positive side of the 7-point scale mid-point. In general, this level of support for a multicultural ideology exists for most of the constituent items in the scale; that is, all positive items obtain means above the mid-point and one negative item ("forget cultural background") falls below. However, responses to two negative items detract from this view. One item which was designed to represent a segregation alternative ("keep it to themselves") obtains a mean of 4.30. Another item which was designed to express as clearly as possible an assimilation alternative ("be more like us") obtains a mean of 4.28. Thus there is some indication that feelings contrary to a multicultural ideology are present in our sample; but overall we observe a mildly positive attitude toward multiculturalism. Given the fairly large standard deviation and the pattern in the percentage distribution column, it is not possible to mistake this mean near the mid-point for neutrality toward multiculturalism. On the contrary, these attitudes are distributed quite widely across the response range in the total sample.

For the three items which are concerned with speaking English or French, the total sample response is consistent: the use of English and French is not seen as essential for "getting ahead in Canada." All items are clearly rejected. This pattern is consistent with our general conclusion that a multicultural ideol-

Table 6.7

Multicultural Ideology in the Total Sample

(N = 1835)

General items	Mean	SD	% Disagree (1-3)	% Neutral (4)	% Agree (5-7)
Total score	4.51	1.21	32.2	3.9	63.9
a. Canada would be a better place if members of ethnic groups would keep their own way of life alive.	4.16	2.15	36.0	17.4	46.7
b. If members of ethnic groups want to keep their own culture they should keep it to themselves and not bother other people in the country.	4.30	2.28	38.0	13.1	48.9
c. There is a lot that Canadians can gain from friendly relations with immigrants.	5.80	1.56	8.6	10.5	81.0
d. Having lots of different cultural groups in Canada makes it difficult to solve problems.	3.73	2.08	45.3	18.9	35.8
e. It would be good to see all the ethnic groups in Canada retain their cultures.	5.07	1.91	18.7	16.9	64.4
f. It is best for Canada if all immigrants forget their cultural background as soon as possible.	3.05	2.15	61.6	12.3	26.1
g. People who come to Canada should change their behaviour to be more like us.	4.28	2.16	34.5	15.8	49.7
h. The unity of this country is weakened by ethnic groups sticking to their old ways.	3.68	2.10	47.0	16.8	35.7
i. A society which has a variety of ethnic groups is more able to tackle new problems as they occur.	4.65	1.88	23.1	24.4	52.5
i. A person who doesn't speak English has no right to get ahead in Canada.	2.47	2.00	73.7	8.7	17.7
j. A person who doesn't speak French has no right to get ahead in Canada.	1.95	1.60	83.6	7.9	8.5
k. A person who doesn't speak both French and English has no right to get ahead in Canada.	2.21	1.87	79.1	8.0	13.0

ogy is moderately acceptable in Canada.

Perception of multicultural policy. The three alternatives which were provided are indicated in Table 6.8.

In the total sample 60% select the permissive integration option while 27% select the supportive integration option. Only 13% think that assimilation is the Canadian policy. Thus, a clear perception exists that Canadian policy does not attempt to encourage the giving up of customs and life styles. However, there is no clear recognition that current policy is supportive of multiculturalism; indeed, twice as many respondents consider the policy to be merely permissive rather than supportive of cultural retention.

Knowledge of multicultural policy. In the total sample, less than one fifth knew about the policy and of the other four fifths, only a quarter had even heard about it. These distributions are provided in Table 6.9. Overall, the majority of the sample is unaware of the policy. Only 758 of the sample of 1835 give affirmative replies to either question, and less than half of these give the actual "knowledge" response. This low level of knowledge and awareness of the policy is important for an understanding and interpretation of the later material on multicultural attitudes and behavioural intentions.

Perceived consequences of multiculturalism. As in the case of multicultural ideology, the overall mean score on perceived consequences of multiculturalism (Table 6.10) is on the positive side of the mid-point suggesting at least no negative perceptions of multiculturalism. This generally positive response is evident for all the individual items in the scale. Again, the standard deviations and percentage distributions suggest that this moderate score in the total sample cannot be interpreted as neutrality; rather, there appears to be a large variation in individual scores.

Turning to the two items which were not included in the total score, both are moderately rejected in the total sample. Responses to these two items are not inconsistent with the generally positive view of multiculturalism noted in the scale itself.

Attitudes toward multicultural programmes. Over all six items in the total sample (Table 6.11), the total programme attitude score is 4.71, somewhat higher than for the two previous scales. This level of support is clearly separated into two groups: for all those extant programmes, there is strong support—all programmes obtain mean scores of 5 or above; for those which are possible programmes, support is much lower—"third language radio and TV shows" and "regular school teaching of third languages" receive negative ratings although "special school teaching of third languages" does obtain a positive mean score. Thus, the total score for this scale is somewhat misleading in that three items are clearly acceptable and two are clearly not.

The final items concerned with teaching of English and French to members of various cultural groups are generally accepted by the total sample. Since these two programmes are now in existence, this response strengthens the generally high acceptance of extant programmes which is noted above.

Table 6.8

Perception of Multicultural Policy in the Total Sample

 $N = 1728$

Options	%
a. "Some countries <i>encourage</i> immigrants to <i>give up</i> their old customs and ways of life, and take on the customs of their new country."	13.4
b. "Other countries <i>allow</i> immigrants to <i>maintain</i> their customs and old ways of life when they come to a new country."	60.1
c. "Still other countries <i>encourage</i> immigrants to <i>maintain</i> their customs and old ways of life when they come to a new country."	26.5

Table 6.9

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy in the Total Sample

	N	% No	% Yes
a. "Do you know about the federal government's policy of multiculturalism?"	1835	80.7	19.3
b. "If <i>NO</i> , have you heard about it?"	1463	72.5	27.5

Behavioural intentions toward multicultural programmes. The mean responses to these three attitude items are presented in Table 6.12 along with the standard deviations and the total score. In this case, no reversals were required in order to calculate the total score. Over the whole sample, response to the three items (averaged) is moderately low. It is a full point or more below responses to the earlier multicultural attitude scales. However, on the first item ("vote for a political candidate") the mean is almost up to the mid-point but drops to moderate rejection for the "campaign or convince others" item and to stronger rejection for the "pay taxes" item. The magnitude of this decline across scales and items contributes to the seriousness of the low average mean on this scale. The most obvious interpretation is that when "ideas" (such as in the multicultural ideology scale) are the focus, moderate acceptance is safe for a respondent but when effort and money are at stake (as in the present case), respondents switch to neutrality and even rejection of multiculturalism.

Table 6.10

Perceived Consequences of Multiculturalism in the Total Sample

 $N = 1827$

General items	Mean	<i>SD</i>	% Disagree (1-3)	% Neutral (4)	% Agree (5-7)
Total score	4.52	1.46	32.4	6.6	61.0
a. . . . our Canadian way of life will be destroyed.	3.43	2.18	53.7	14.9	31.5
d. . . . Canada will be richer in culture.	4.84	2.00	22.0	16.2	61.9
e. . . . social harmony in Canada will improve.	3.97	1.97	35.7	25.2	39.1
f. . . . our children's education will suffer because there will be even more languages to worry about.	3.53	2.29	53.6	11.0	35.4
g. . . . there will be all kinds of interesting cultural programmes on T.V. and radio.	4.79	1.92	21.7	19.3	59.0
French-English items (not included in scale)					
b. . . . the English Canadian's voice in Canada will become weaker and weaker.	3.53	2.15	51.2	14.7	34.1
c. . . . the French Canadian's voice in Canada will become weaker and weaker.	3.63	2.15	48.7	15.6	35.6

Summary of attitudes in the total sample. In summary, we may say that although knowledge of the multicultural policy was not high, there was no strong indication of negative attitudes toward the values inherent in such a policy. On scales of multicultural ideology and perceived consequences of a multicultural policy, reactions were generally in the middle range of the attitude scales but usually on the positive side. Such a pattern cannot be interpreted as one of clear national support; rather, there appears to be an overall lack of awareness (suggested by low knowledge and awareness scores). However, there seems to be a general set to respond favourably to the promotion of

Table 6.11

**Means of Attitudes toward Multicultural
Programmes in the Total Sample**

N = 1830

General items		Mean	<i>SD</i>	% Disagree (1-3)	% Neutral (4)	% Agree (5-7)
Total score		4.71	1.39	25.2	6.2	68.6
a.	Community centres where people from various cultural backgrounds can meet each other and share their heritage.	5.23	1.92	17.0	13.2	69.8
b.	Radio and T.V. shows in languages other than English or French.	3.73	2.18	46.0	15.7	38.3
c.	Histories written about the major cultural groups who have settled in Canada.	5.06	1.93	19.0	14.9	66.0
d.	Teaching, in regular school programmes, of the languages of the major cultural groups who have settled in Canada.	3.53	2.20	50.3	14.2	35.6
e.	Teaching in special school programmes (after hours or weekends) of the languages of the major cultural groups.	4.95	2.04	21.9	14.1	63.9
f.	Folk festivals to display the cultural heritage of groups in Canada (Dance, Song, Drama, etc.).	5.79	1.62	9.1	8.6	82.3
French-English items (not included in scale)						
g.	Courses to teach English to members of the various cultural groups.	6.07	1.53	7.1	6.0	86.9
h.	Courses to teach French to members of the various cultural groups.	5.48	1.90	15.2	11.5	73.3

such an ideology and policy. This pattern cannot be interpreted simply as neutrality, for there is clear evidence (in the standard deviations and the percentage distributions) of substantial variations in the national response.

Table 6.12

**Means of Behavioural Intentions Toward
Multicultural Programmes in the Total Sample**

N = 1824

General items	Mean	<i>SD</i>	% Disagree (1-3)	% Neutral (4)	% Agree (5-7)
Total score	3.54	2.00	53.2	8.8	38.0
a. . . . vote for a political candidate who supported such a programme?	3.97	2.21	38.5	19.9	41.6
b. . . . try to convince other people that the programme was a good one?	3.52	2.18	47.5	18.7	33.8
c. . . . be willing to pay taxes to support such a programme?	3.15	2.18	55.7	15.7	28.6

Of the two other areas of inquiry, one reinforces this general conclusion, and one detracts from it. That is, attitudes toward multicultural programmes were generally favourable (somewhat more positive than the first two) while behavioural intentions were generally unfavourable (somewhat below the mid-range of the scale). This contrast in support should not be theoretically disconcerting, however, for it is common to find a decreasing level of support as level of commitment is increased. In practice, though, it may mean that some Canadians think that the idea of multiculturalism is good, that some of the programmes are interesting, but that they do not want to get involved.

We turn now to a consideration of how these general trends hold up or alter when the sample is broken down according to a number of independent variables. Many of the general conclusions drawn in the preceding paragraph will become qualified and even revised as we direct our focus upon some specific groups in the Canadian population.

Geographic Differences

As one of the predominant features of Canadian life, regional divisions present a clear geographic and demographic basis upon which to begin our examination of internal variations in multicultural attitudes.

Multicultural ideology. Looking first at multicultural ideology (Table 6.13), there is significant variation across the five regions for all individual items in the scale as well as for the total score. In general, the highest scores are found in Ontario, the Prairies, and in British Columbia while in the Quebec and Atlantic

Table 6.13

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Geographic Region

Geographic region	N	Total score	"keep it to themselves"	"forget background"	"be more like us"	"need English"	"need French"	"need to be bilingual"
Atlantic provinces	176	4.5	4.3	3.6	4.1	2.2	1.8	1.6
Quebec	481	4.1	4.9	3.8	4.9	1.9	2.2	3.0
Ontario	689	4.7	4.0	2.7	4.0	2.8	1.8	1.9
Prairies	291	4.7	4.1	2.7	4.0	2.5	1.8	1.9
British Columbia	198	4.6	4.4	2.5	4.4	2.8	1.9	2.1
F-test		24.78***	12.02***	25.64***	14.49***	14.94***	5.56***	36.24***

regions the scores are less positive. For the three language items not included in the scale, an understandable difference occurs between Quebec and the rest of the country: the "English to get ahead" item receives the lowest acceptance in Quebec and the highest in Ontario and British Columbia; the "French to get ahead" and "bilingual" items receive highest acceptance in Quebec and uniformly lower ratings in the other regions. Interestingly, the "bilingual" item receives a higher acceptance in Quebec than does the "French" item, and this is true for all regions except the Atlantic. The nature of these differences points directly toward the possible role of the respondent's ethnicity itself, a question we will be considering in the next section.

Consistent with the regional distribution is the total score pattern for the five metropolitan areas (see Appendix 6.8). In Winnipeg and Calgary/Edmonton there is high acceptance with Toronto and Vancouver intermediate, and Montreal low, in acceptance. Similarly for the three language items, the "English" item is least rejected in Toronto and Vancouver while the "French" and "bilingual" items are least rejected in Montreal. It is of interest to note that differences between the regions and their respective metropolitan areas are minimal, all total scores being within two decimal points.

When the multicultural ideology scores are considered as a function of degree of urbanization (see Appendix 6.9) the total score varies significantly in all regions except in British Columbia, but it is strong only in the Atlantic and Quebec regions. Although less strong in Ontario and the Prairies, some items, particularly "forget culture" and "become more like us," vary significantly. In general, the pattern is a curvilinear one with small towns being least positive toward a multicultural ideology, rural areas somewhat more positive, and larger urban areas the most positive.

Perception of multicultural policy. Regional differences in the perception of how Canada deals with multiculturalism at the policy level are indicated in Table 6.14. Although all regions predominantly select the permissive integration option, those in the Quebec region select the assimilation option more often than those living to the west of it. Only those in the Atlantic region perceive a similar assimilation emphasis in Canadian multicultural policy. Those in the Quebec region choose the supportive integration option less often than do those in other regions with the exception of British Columbia. These regional patterns are essentially mirrored in the analysis by metropolitan areas (see Appendix 6.10).

Analyses by degree of urbanization (see Appendix 6.11) show that there are strong effects in all regions except in the Prairies. In the three eastern regions (Atlantic, Quebec and Ontario), selection of the assimilation option decreases as urbanization increases while the reverse trend is apparent for the supportive integration option. However, in the Prairies this effect is not present and it is reversed in British Columbia.

Knowledge of multicultural policy. When asked directly about their knowledge of the present multicultural policy (Table 6.15), those respondents in Quebec claim the highest knowledge while those in British Columbia and the Atlantic regions claim less. Given the results of our previous question, we may

Table 6.14

Perception of Multicultural Policy by Geographic Region

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
Atlantic provinces	155	16.0	54.8	29.2
Quebec	438	20.2	57.8	22.0
Ontario	671	10.4	57.9	31.7
Prairies	276	9.6	65.3	25.1
British Columbia	189	11.5	67.4	21.1
Chi-square = 41.22***				

Table 6.15

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy by Geographic Region

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Atlantic provinces	176	87.2	12.8	150	75.8	24.2
Quebec	480	76.7	23.3	364	76.5	23.5
Ontario	695	82.9	17.1	568	73.3	26.7
Prairies	290	83.1	16.9	241	63.0	37.0
British Columbia	198	88.5	11.5	175	75.5	24.5
Chi-square = 18.76***				Chi-square = 15.64**		

infer that more respondents in Quebec "know" the policy to be one of assimilation than do respondents in other regions. This finding could represent a number of realities, one of which is a recognition of their own threatened cultural position in the Canadian mosaic; another is a cynical view of the probable effect or success of the present policy.

If respondents claimed not to know about the policy, they were asked whether or not they had heard about it. To this second question only those in the Prairies claim a higher knowledge than do those in other regions. On overall familiarity with the policy ("know about" and "heard about" it), there is a clear indication that respondents in the Prairies claim the greatest knowledge with those in Quebec and Ontario next, followed by respondents in British Columbia and the Atlantic regions.

Once again, analyses by metropolitan areas follow the regional pattern; however, in this case respondents in Calgary/Edmonton claim a higher level of policy knowledge than do respondents in any other city or region (see Appendix 6.12). The degree of urbanization (see Appendix 6.13) has an effect in only the Atlantic and Quebec regions. In each case, affirmative responses to both questions ("know about" and "heard about") increases in frequency of knowledge as urbanization increases.

Perceived consequences of multiculturalism. On the scale employed to assess the perceived consequences of a multicultural policy, there is a significant but not large spread across the regions (Table 6.16). Respondents in the Quebec region provide the lowest ratings, while those in the other regions do not vary among themselves. Examining the two items which were not included in the scale, the "English Canadians voice" item does not vary across regions but the "French Canadians voice" item does. For this latter item, the highest score is provided by respondents in the Quebec region. As such, this score clearly distinguishes Quebec from all other regions. Once again these initial analyses by region point us toward a consideration of the role of the respondents' own ethnicity in the patterning of these findings. On the total score

Table 6.16
Means of Perceived Consequences of Multiculturalism
by Geographic Region

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"English Canadians weaker"	"French Canadians weaker"
Atlantic provinces	176	4.5	3.6	3.3
Quebec	478	4.1	3.4	4.1
Ontario	687	4.7	3.6	3.6
Prairies	290	4.6	3.5	3.4
British Columbia	198	4.9	3.6	3.4
F-test		13.93***	0.97	8.27***

metropolitan areas appear as similar to their regions in four of five cases (see Appendix 6.14). Only Winnipeg varies with a substantially positive view of the consequences of multiculturalism.

Analysis by degree of urbanization (see Appendix 6.15) indicates significant variation in all regions except Quebec; however, the variation is substantial only in the Atlantic region. There again appears to be a slight curvilinearity with lower scores occurring for towns, in the Atlantic, and for British Columbia. However, in the other areas there is a trend for perceived consequences to be viewed more positively with increasing urbanization.

Attitudes toward multicultural programmes. A number of extant multicultural programmes and some policy options being debated were considered in the scale of programme attitudes (Table 6.17). There is significant regional variation on the total score as well as on five of the six constituent items (the "folk festivals" item does not vary significantly). In all cases, respondents in the Quebec region have the lowest scores. It should be remembered, however, that even for Quebec the mean score is above the theoretical mid-point of the scale. Both of the two items for which there was no national acceptance ("third language broadcasting" and "regular school teaching of third languages") fall near or below the mid-point in all regions.

As may have been reasonably expected, the two language items ("teaching English" and "teaching French") vary by region, and in each case Quebec stands out with a relatively low score on the "English" item and a relatively high score on the "French" item.

Metropolitan areas again mirror the regional distribution (see Appendix 6.14) but here there is a trend for the cities to have marginally higher scores than for the regions as a whole. Such a trend is confirmed in the analysis by degree of urbanization (see Appendix 6.15) for all regions except Quebec and British Columbia. In Quebec, total scores do not vary by degree of urbanization while in British Columbia, rural respondents are more positive than are larger cities' inhabitants.

Behavioural intentions toward multicultural programmes. Finally, regarding behavioural intentions, there is a significant variation across regions on the total scale score and on each of the three constituent items (Table 6.18). And once again, on the total and on each item it is the Quebec region which stands in contrast to the others. Metropolitan areas essentially follow the above pattern, and exhibit a similar level of support. Again, the one exception is Winnipeg (see Appendix 6.14), where behavioural intentions are somewhat more positive than they are in the Prairie region as a whole. Analysis by degree of urbanization (see Appendix 6.15) indicates that behavioural intentions vary in all regions except Quebec and British Columbia. Variation is greatest in the Atlantic region, where each of the three items also varies by urbanization; here the trend is curvilinear with lowest scores coming from respondents living in towns and small cities. This pattern holds for British Columbia as well.

Summary of geographic differences. Our consideration of regional variation in multicultural attitudes leads us to observe a clear difference between

Table 6.17

Means of Attitudes toward Multicultural Programmes by Geographic Region

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"3rd. language broadcast- ing"	"regular 3rd. language teaching"	"special 3rd. language teaching"	"teach English"	"teach French"
Atlantic provinces	176	5.0	3.6	4.0	5.1	6.4	5.7
Quebec	480	4.4	3.4	3.1	4.6	5.2	6.1
Ontario	688	4.9	4.0	3.6	5.2	6.4	5.4
Prairies	288	4.7	3.7	3.7	4.9	6.2	4.6
British Columbia	198	4.7	3.8	3.6	4.8	6.6	5.2
F-test		11.99***	6.84***	7.83***	6.14***	54.69***	31.08***

Table 6.18

**Means of Behavioural Intentions toward Multicultural Programmes
by Geographic Region**

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"vote for"	"convince others"	"pay taxes"
Atlantic provinces	176	3.8	4.3	3.9	3.1
Quebec	480	3.0	3.5	3.1	2.4
Ontario	688	3.8	4.1	3.7	3.4
Prairies	286	3.6	4.1	3.3	3.3
British Columbia	195	3.7	4.1	3.6	3.6
F-test		10.84***	6.75***	7.38***	18.91***

one region, Quebec, and the rest of the country. On all scales, respondents in the Quebec region were distinctive in their less positive attitudes at all levels (i.e., abstract ideology through to behavioural intentions). Furthermore, this difference held when the focus is on metropolitan areas with the Montreal sample exhibiting consistently lower scores than those of respondents from the other major cities. And with respect to urbanization, two patterns were apparent: in the first, there is a tendency for multicultural attitudes to become more positive with increasing urbanization; and in the second there is a curvilinear relationship, with lowest scores appearing in towns and small cities, but with higher scores in both rural areas and larger cities.

Ethnic Differences

We have noted throughout our analyses of regional differences that the ethnicity of the respondent is likely to be a factor in the patterning of the data. If this is so, then we should expect to find a similar, although more striking, variation when the data are analysed by ethnicity. The real test of this expectation will be made when the data are analysed by both ethnicity *and* region.

Multicultural ideology. Looking first at our multicultural ideology scale (Table 6.19), the total score is significantly spread by ethnicity, and this is true for all constituent items except the first ("Canada a better place"). Overall, the French-Canadian respondents exhibit the lowest score; the two anglophone groups have the highest; and the francophone "other ethnic" respondents fall in between. This same pattern is obtained for the individual items as well. For example, the French Canadians agree quite strongly with the "keep to themselves" and the "more like us" items.

Table 6.19

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Ethnicity

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"keep it to themselves"	"forget background"	"be more like us"	"need English"	"need French"	"need to be bilingual"
Angloceltic	691	4.7	3.9	2.8	4.0	2.7	1.8	1.9
French	348	4.0	5.0	4.0	5.1	1.8	2.1	3.0
Anglophone "other ethnic"	512	4.7	4.4	2.7	4.1	2.6	1.8	2.0
Francophone "other ethnic"	34	4.4	4.5	3.4	4.6	2.8	3.1	3.5
F-test		34.62***	17.18***	30.95***	22.45***	18.79***	8.70***	38.57***

On the three language items, significant variation is also obtained. The Angloceltic, along with the anglophone and francophone "other ethnic" categories have the highest relative acceptance (although it is still very low) on the "English to get ahead" item. The opposite is the case for the items concerned with "French" and "bilingual to get ahead" items. It is of particular interest to note that the francophone "other ethnic" category has a higher acceptance of both the "French" and "bilingual" items than do the French-Canadian respondents.

Responses to multicultural ideology analysed by region and language of interview (see Appendix 6.16) demonstrate clearly that language of interview (as an indicator of ethnicity) accounts for the variation in the distribution. Scores do not vary within either language category regardless of whether the respondent resides in or outside Quebec. A similar phenomenon occurs for the three non-integration items but not for the three language items. In this latter case, the "need English" item varies by ethnicity, but the "need French" and "bilingual" items vary by region.

A further analysis was conducted employing religion as a factor relating to ethnicity (see Appendix 6.16). There are significant variations across religious groups for the total ideology score and for all of the items. On the total score, francophone Roman Catholics differ from all other groups, whereas none of the anglophone groups differ from each other. This pattern is true for three of the items ("keep it to themselves," "forget background," and "need English"), and while a similar contrast generally holds for the other three items, among two of these three there is an additional significant difference involving those with no religion. Like region, then, religion does not account for the observed differences between anglophone and francophone respondents; rather, the effect appears to be related to ethnicity.

When multicultural ideology is considered in relation to generational status (see Appendix 6.16), no variation in the total score occurs either by ethnic category or by generation. However, two of the items ("keep it to themselves" and "be more like us") do vary. Further analysis by ancestral country of origin (see Appendix 6.16) yield no differences among the groups either on the total score, or on any of the individual items.

Perception of multicultural policy. An examination of the ethnic group differences in the perception of multicultural policy in Canada (Table 6.20) reveals that while all categories select the permissive integration option more than half the time, the French-Canadian respondents select the assimilation option more than twice as often than do all others. Conversely, the French-Canadian respondents choose the supportive integration option less often than do the other respondents. Thus, the pattern is clear: in relation to the other three categories, the French-Canadian respondents over-emphasize assimilation in their perception of the Canadian situation and under-emphasize supportive integration.

As a check on region as a possible contributor to this relationship, an analysis was performed for anglophone and francophone respondents living

Table 6.20

Perception of Multicultural Policy by Ethnicity

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
Angloceltic	658	12.9	58.4	28.7
French	310	24.5	56.1	19.4
Anglophone "other ethnic"	493	8.8	63.2	28.0
Francophone "other ethnic"	33	5.0	61.1	33.9
Chi-square = 46.94***				

either inside or outside of Quebec (see Appendix 6.17). From this analysis it appears that more francophone respondents view the policy as assimilation than view it as one of supportive integration. A further check was performed, this time on religion (see Appendix 6.17), and the same conclusion is indicated: ethnicity, rather than religion, accounts for differences in the perception of the policy as assimilation.

The earlier discussion regarding the use of the term "immigrant" in this question should be recalled here. Inspection of Table 6.20 indicates little difference in the pattern of response between the Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnic" respondents. Although it is possible that the term carried differ-

Table 6.21

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy by Ethnicity

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Angloceltic	689	84.3	15.7	575	70.3	29.7
French	348	80.0	20.0	276	81.7	18.3
Anglophone "other ethnic"	517	81.6	18.4	418	69.2	30.8
Francophone "other ethnic"	34	79.3	20.7	26	71.5	28.5
Chi-square = 3.51				Chi-square = 15.25**		

ential meaning for the two groups of respondents, there is no indication of it in their responses.

Analyses by ethnicity and generational status (see Appendix 6.17) were carried out and a pattern of decreasing choice of supportive integration is apparent for the anglophone "other ethnic" respondents, but not for the Anglo-celtic category. An additional analysis (see Appendix 6.17) by father's ancestral country of origin fails to exhibit any differences across categories.

Knowledge of multicultural policy. When asked directly whether they know about the present multicultural policy, the four ethnic categories do not differ (Table 6.21). However, when asked whether they had heard about it, significant variation becomes apparent. Those in the French-Canadian category claim less often than the others that they have this knowledge. This analysis reveals that there is an overall lower policy awareness among French-Canadian respondents than among the others. This appears to eliminate the paradoxical finding outlined in the section on regional differences where Quebec respondents appeared to "know" that the policy was one of "assimilation." In actual fact, although the level of knowledge is high in the Quebec region it is not as high among French Canadians in general.

This finding of lower policy knowledge as a characteristic of French-Canadian respondents is confirmed by an analysis of the data by region and language of interview (see Appendix 6.18). Within Quebec, anglophone respondents answer "yes" to both questions more often than do francophone respondents; outside of Quebec, this trend is replicated for only the second ("heard about") question. A further analysis, by religion and language of interview (see Appendix 6.18) shows that no differences are exhibited on the first ("know about") question but on the second, there is a clear separation of francophone Roman Catholics from all other categories.

Of the two further analyses relating to ethnicity (generational status and

Table 6.22

Means of Perceived Consequences of Multiculturalism by Ethnicity

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"English Canadians weaker"	"French Canadians weaker"
Angloceltic	688	4.6	3.7	3.5
French	347	4.0	3.6	4.3
Anglophone "other ethnic"	510	4.8	3.3	3.3
Francophone "other ethnic"	34	4.7	2.9	3.6
F-test		23.42***	3.20*	16.93***

father's ethnic origin in Appendix 6.18) only policy knowledge varies, and only then among anglophone "other ethnic" respondents. Within this category there is a lower claim of policy knowledge among respondents whose ancestors came here some time ago.

Perceived consequences of multiculturalism. The perceived consequences of a multicultural policy significantly vary across ethnic categories and this is true for all five constituent items (Table 6.22). Consistent with the emerging pattern, it is the French-Canadian respondents who exhibit the lowest mean score, while differences between the other three are very small.

Similarly, for the item concerned with the voice of French Canadians, the mean response for French-Canadian respondents is higher than the total sample mean. This concern for the "voice" of one's own group, however, does not appear in the "English-Canadian" item; the Angloceltic mean is only slightly higher than the total sample mean.

Analyses by language and region (see Appendix 6.19) demonstrate that this pattern is primarily due to ethnicity rather than to geographic location; total scores within language categories do not vary no matter whether the respondent resided inside or outside Quebec. Ethnicity is also a significant factor in the two other items, although in the case of "English Canadians weaker," region is the stronger variable. Further analyses by language and religion (see Appendix 6.19) indicate that on the total score, francophone Roman Catholic respondents differ from all others. These other categories differ among themselves in only one case (i.e., in the comparison of those reporting "no religion" and those reporting "Anglican"). Thus, ethnicity rather than religion appears to be responsible for these differences on the total score.

In the case of generational status (see Appendix 6.19) there is no variation in perceived consequences, either by ethnicity or by generation. However, when these attitudes are considered by ancestral country of origin (see Appendix 6.19), significant but weak variation does occur. On the total score, Dutch and Italian Canadians perceive the most positive consequences while Russian and Ukrainian Canadians perceive less positive consequences.

Attitudes toward multicultural programmes. In the case of multicultural programme attitudes, we find once again (Table 6.23) that there is significant variation over the four ethnic categories. All constituent items vary as well. Once again, it is the French-Canadian respondents as a group who differ from the other three. The "teaching of English" item is approved most highly by the Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnic" respondents while the French Canadians and francophone "other ethnics" indicate less approval although their score is still well to the positive side of the mid-point. Conversely, the "teaching of French" item is most highly approved by the two francophone categories, while it receives less approval from the anglophone categories.

When these data are further analysed (see Appendix 6.20) by language and region, the ethnic difference remains within the Quebec region only, for the total score; the attitudes of francophone respondents living outside Quebec do not differ from those of anglophone respondents. On the "third language

Table 6.23
Means of Attitudes toward Multicultural Programmes by Ethnicity

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"3rd. Language broadcast- ing"	"regular 3rd. language teaching"	"special 3rd. language teaching"	"teach English"	"teach French"
Angloceltic	687	4.8	3.8	3.6	5.1	6.4	5.3
French	349	4.2	3.2	3.0	4.5	5.1	6.0
Anglophone "other ethnic"	509	4.8	4.0	3.7	5.1	6.4	5.0
Francophone "other ethnic"	34	4.8	3.9	3.6	5.1	5.7	6.4
F-test		16.84***	10.11***	9.55***	7.48***	72.97***	23.65***

broadcasting" item, ethnicity alone accounts for the variation, while on the "regular third language teaching" item, ethnic differences remain only among those living in Quebec. Interestingly, the two language items vary by region but only the "teach English" one varies by both region and ethnicity. Significant interactions occur for both items.

Further analyses by language and religion (see Appendix 6.20) show significant variation for the total score and for each item in the table. In the case of the total score, the francophone Roman Catholic respondents differ from all others which, with one exception (i.e., United Church adherents vs. anglophone Roman Catholics), do not differ among themselves. On the "third language broadcasting" and "regular third language teaching" items, a similar pattern of differences occurs except that in this case, United Church adherents do not differ from francophone Roman Catholics. The "teach English" and "teach French" items exhibit differences only between francophone Roman Catholics and all other groups.

Analyses by generational status (see Appendix 6.20) reveal no differences on the total score; however, some minor variations occur for the two "third language" and the two official language items. These attitudes do vary according to ancestral country of origin (see Appendix 6.20), with Russian and Ukrainian Canadians being least positive on the total score. For the "third language broadcasting" item, Russian Canadians are found to be least accepting while on the "teach French" item, Ukrainian Canadians respond with least acceptance.

Behavioural intentions toward multicultural policy. Respondents' behavioural intentions toward a multicultural policy vary significantly by ethnic category (Table 6.24), and all items do so. It is the French-Canadian respondents who are clearly more negative on the total score and on all three items. Once again, ethnicity, rather than region, appears to contribute to this variation (see Appendix 6.21); it is clear that behavioural intentions remain constant within language groups regardless of whether respondents reside inside or outside Quebec. Further, it seems clear (see Appendix 6.21) that behavioural intentions vary significantly between francophone Roman Catholic respondents and all the others who, with one exception (i.e., United vs. anglophone Roman Catholics on the "vote for" item), do not differ among themselves. Note that the largest difference exists between the two Roman Catholic categories (anglophone vs. francophone) on the total score. Thus, once again, it is ethnicity rather than religion which provides the greatest contribution to the variation.

Analyses by generational status (see Appendix 6.21) reveal no more than minimal variation. On the total score, only the interaction is significant, with behavioural intentions becoming *more* positive among later generations among the Angloceltic respondents, but *less* positive with time among the anglophone "other ethnic" respondents. Significant variation appears in relation to ancestral country of origin (see Appendix 6.21). Generally, respondents of Russian or Scandinavian ancestry (and to some extent those of Ukrainian ancestry) are least accepting; respondents of Italian background have the most positive be-

Table 6.24

**Means of Behavioural Intentions toward
Multicultural Programmes by Ethnicity**

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"vote for"	"convince others"	"pay taxes"
Angloceltic	686	3.7	4.1	3.6	3.4
French	349	2.9	3.4	3.1	2.2
Anglophone "other ethnic"	505	3.8	4.1	3.6	3.5
Francophone "other ethnic"	34	3.7	4.1	3.7	3.3
F-test		15.54***	9.65***	6.26***	28.54***

havioural intentions.

Summary of ethnic differences. Across all multicultural attitude scales, a consistent picture emerged of less positive attitudes among respondents of French-Canadian ethnicity. When this pattern was placed beside that found in our regional analyses, it became apparent that the differences between Quebec and the other regions were primarily due to the heavy concentration of French-Canadian respondents in that region. When analyses of these multicultural attitudes were made for the two critical sub-categories (i.e., respondents who live in Quebec but who took the interview in English, and respondents who live outside Quebec but who took the interview in French), we found in general that ethnicity (as indicated by language of the respondent), predominated over region in contributing to the distribution of responses. Similarly, when analyses were made for the effect of religious affiliation, the clear indication was that ethnicity rather than religion remained the major variable. Generally, little difference appeared to stem from generational status, but the ancestral country of origin emerged as a factor, with Italian Canadians responding most favourably to multiculturalism and Russian Canadians responding least favourably. In some attitude areas, such as multicultural ideology, Ukrainian Canadians tended to respond positively while in other areas, such as perceived consequences and programme attitudes, they tended to be more negative. *wrong!*

Socioeconomic Status Differences

While it is clear that, in Canada, socioeconomic status interacts with both the ethnicity and region variables, it is possible to consider the status variable as being conceptually distinct from the other two. Furthermore, the question of status determinants is sufficiently complex to approach it via three routes: the respondent's level of educational attainment, the Blighen Index of the head of the household (based upon occupation) and the income of the head of the

household. Although the three are related in our total sample (as noted in our earlier section), they are sufficiently distinct to warrant a multiple approach.

Multicultural ideology. Beginning with multicultural ideology (Table 6.25 and Appendix 6.22) we note that the total score varies significantly by all three socioeconomic variables, and that there is a progressive increase in total score across all three measures of socioeconomic status. This is a finding of striking regularity. However, unlike the analyses of variation by region and ethnicity, not all multicultural ideology items vary with the three socioeconomic indices: three do not on the Blishen Index, and two do not on the income and education variables. The one item consistently not spread is the first ("Canada a better place") in the scale. On the segregation item ("keep it to themselves"), and the two assimilation items ("forget cultural background" and "be more like us"), these trends are just as striking, but of course are reversed in direction. For the three language items, there are minimal variations across the various socioeconomic groupings, two of the three significant trends occurring for the classification by education.

Perception of multicultural policy. Turning to the perception of how Canada handles multiculturalism, there is significant variation on all three socioeconomic variables. For the permissive integration and supportive integration options there is little trend apparent (Table 6.26 and Appendix 6.23). But for the assimilation option there is a tendency for it to be chosen with declining frequency. That is, with increasing educational, occupational and income levels, there is a decline in those perceiving the policy as one of assimilation.

Knowledge of multicultural policy. On all three socioeconomic variables there is a trend for affirmative responses to both the "know about" and "heard about" questions to increase with socioeconomic status (Table 6.27 and Appendix 6.24). These trends are significant in five of the six cases (failing only on the "heard about" question for head's income). Thus, with increasing educational, occupational and income levels, there is an increase in the proportion of respondents claiming to know about the multicultural policy.

Perceived consequences of multiculturalism. In the case of the perceived consequences of multiculturalism (Table 6.28 and Appendix 6.25), there is again significant variation on all three socioeconomic variables, with a consistent trend for the total score to increase with the status of the respondent. Not all individual items show this significant variation; consistently two of the five do not (the "social harmony" and "interesting TV and radio programmes" items). But both items which were not included in the scale total ("English voice" and "French voice"), do vary significantly across all three socioeconomic variables, with the greatest agreement at the lower ranges of the scale.

Attitudes toward multicultural programmes. The programme attitudes total score (Table 6.29 and Appendix 6.25) also varies across all three socioeconomic variables, with a fairly consistent increase up the scales. Thus, attitudes toward these programmes in general become more positive as educational, occupational and income levels increase. This trend is the case for the "third language broadcasting" item on all three status variables, but neither of

Table 6.25
Means of Multicultural Ideology by Education

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"keep it to themselves"	"forget background"	"be more like us"	"need English"	"need French"	"need to be bilingual"
Some primary	180	3.8	5.2	4.3	5.7	2.4	2.3	2.5
Primary (graduated)	257	4.2	5.1	3.7	4.7	2.6	2.3	2.6
Some high school	540	4.5	4.2	3.1	4.2	2.4	1.8	2.2
High school (graduated)	345	4.5	4.2	2.9	4.2	2.6	1.9	2.2
Technical training	191	4.8	4.0	2.4	3.9	2.7	1.8	2.0
Some college, university or more	309	5.0	3.5	2.3	3.5	2.2	1.8	2.0
F-test		27.21***	20.65***	30.83***	28.97***	2.06	5.37***	4.05**

the two “third language teaching” items vary consistently; however, both do increase fairly systematically with an increase in respondents’ level of education. And in five of six cases (excepting the “teach French” item by income), both official language items tend to increase consistently with increasing socioeconomic status.

Table 6.26
Perception of Multicultural Policy by Education

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
Some primary	155	20.8	54.1	25.1
Primary (graduated)	232	19.0	52.1	28.9
Some high school	514	13.3	59.9	26.8
High school (graduated)	329	11.8	61.9	26.3
Technical training	188	13.6	59.9	26.5
Some college, university or more	303	6.4	66.1	27.5
Chi-square = 29.70**				

Behavioural intentions toward multicultural policy. Finally, turning to the behavioural intentions variable (Table 6.30 and Appendix 6.25) we find that on two of the three socioeconomic status variables (but not on income), the distributions vary significantly across the status dimensions. And in the case of the Blishen Index and education, each of the three constituent items also varies significantly, and fairly consistently, with low status levels being associated with more negative behavioural intentions. But an interesting discontinuity appears for the upper categories on both the occupation and education status dimensions; on both, mean scores jump dramatically between the second highest and highest status categories.

Summary of socioeconomic differences. In summarizing this section on socioeconomic status differences, there is a striking consistency apparent. At lower status ranges there was a lower awareness and acceptance of multiculturalism, while at the higher ranges, there was a consistently higher acceptance. And with few exceptions this was true for all three status variables for all measures of multicultural attitudes. This consistency is of particular interest since it is by no means an automatic consequence; as we noted earlier, our

Table 6.27

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy by Education

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Some primary	183	88.3	11.7	160	85.0	15.0
Primary (graduated)	257	87.2	12.8	221	78.8	21.2
Some high school	540	90.3	9.7	483	76.5	23.5
High school (graduated)	346	82.0	18.0	280	71.4	28.6
Technical training	193	77.2	22.8	149	64.1	35.9
Some college, university or more	310	65.1	34.9	199	57.2	42.8
Chi-square =				Chi-square =		
99.67***				49.65***		

Table 6.28

Means of Perceived Consequences of Multiculturalism by Education

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"English Canadians weaker"	"French Canadians weaker"
Some primary	180	4.2	3.8	4.0
Primary (graduated)	254	4.2	4.1	4.2
Some high school	538	4.5	3.6	3.6
High school (graduated)	346	4.4	3.5	3.6
Technical training	193	4.6	3.3	3.4
Some college, university or more	306	5.0	2.8	3.0
F-test		13.02***	12.36***	9.72***

three measures of socioeconomic status, although correlated in the +.35 to +.49 range, were clearly not identical measures. It appears, however, that all three do affect the distribution of these attitudes in mutually consistent ways.

Table 6.29

Means of Attitudes toward Multicultural Programmes by Education

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"3rd language broadcasting"	"regular language teaching"	"special 3rd language teaching"	"teach English"	"teach French"
Some primary	179	4.3	3.6	3.4	4.7	5.6	5.3
Primary (grad.)	255	4.5	3.4	3.3	4.7	5.8	5.4
Some high school	540	4.7	3.6	3.5	4.9	6.0	5.4
High school (graduated)	344	4.8	3.8	3.5	5.2	6.1	5.4
Technical training	193	4.6	3.5	3.2	4.9	6.5	5.6
Some college, university or more	308	5.2	4.4	4.0	5.3	6.3	5.7
F-test		10.99***	7.33***	4.10**	3.95**	8.87***	1.48

Table 6.30

Means of Behavioural Intentions toward Multicultural Programmes by Education

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"vote for"	"convince others"	"pay taxes"
Some primary	180	3.1	3.6	3.1	2.7
Primary (graduated)	253	3.4	3.9	3.4	3.0
Some high school	536	3.5	4.0	3.6	3.0
High school (graduated)	343	3.5	3.9	3.5	3.1
Technical training	193	3.3	3.7	3.3	3.0
Some college, university or more	308	4.1	4.4	4.0	4.0
F-test		7.48***	4.45***	4.76***	11.36***

Political Party Differences

One question on our survey requested information about the political party usually supported at the federal level. While it is recognized that such a simple index cannot validly classify a person as a subscriber to one political ideology or another, it may be sufficient to provide a glimpse at the relative party support for multiculturalism. There is a fairly strong relationship between ethnicity and political party preference in our sample, and so the data in this section are presented separately for each language group.

Multicultural ideology and attitudes (see Appendix 6.26 and 6.29) are significantly related to the federal political party preference of respondents. In general, Liberal supporters hold the most positive attitudes, while Social Credit and Cr ditiste voters are least positive. Similar trends are apparent for the policy perception and knowledge questions, but differences are not significant (see Appendix 6.27 and 6.28). Those supporting the New Democratic and Progressive Conservative parties hold attitudes in between; among anglophone respondents, attitudes of both groups are similar to those of Liberal supporters, while among francophone respondents Progressive Conservative supporters are more similar to Cr ditiste supporters.

Age Differences

When the data are analysed in relation to age, significant associations appear on the four multicultural attitude scales, but not on the policy perception and knowledge questions. In general, there is a decline in positive attitudes as age increases (see Appendix 6.30 to 6.33).

Sex Differences

There are virtually no sex differences on our multicultural attitude scales (see Appendix 6.34 to 6.37). In no more than two cases ("know about" the policy and programme attitudes) does a significant difference appear and in both of these the difference is not particularly interesting. Only a few of the individual items reach significance (three on the ideology scale, three on the programme attitudes scale, and two on the behavioural intentions scale), displaying a consistent but slight tendency for females to be more in favour of multiculturalism.

Psychological Predictors of Attitudes

Up to this point in the analysis, background variables have been considered which are of a sociocultural and demographic nature. In addition to these, some basic psychological variables were included in the study, and they too are related to the multicultural attitudes. In Appendix 6.38, the first set (non-psychological) refers to these sociocultural and demographic variables, while the second set refers to the psychological ones of ethnocentrism, authoritarianism and the twelve life values.

Among the non-psychological variables, there is a fairly clear pattern of

significant correlation between each of them and each of the four multicultural attitude scales. Of the 15 coefficients, between 9 and 11 are significant, depending upon the scale. The variables which tend to be correlated consistently and substantially are ethnicity (French Canadian vs. other), region (Quebec vs. other), education of the respondent and occupational status (Blishen) of the head of household. These simple correlations confirm the pattern which emerged from our earlier analyses.

Among the psychological variables, there is also a fairly clear pattern of significant correlation. Of 14 coefficients, either 10 or 11 are significant, depending upon the scale. In the case of these psychological variables, one stands out as substantial: the ethnocentrism scale score is clearly a major correlate of multicultural attitudes. To a lesser extent, authoritarianism and four life values (comfortable life, equality, freedom, and social recognition) contribute as well. Thus, there appears to be a major role being played by some of these psychological variables in the patterning of multicultural attitudes.

Multiple Regression Analysis

As we noted in Chapter 4, one way to provide order for a complex set of data, such as that found in this report, is to perform a multiple stepwise regression analysis. There is indeed a complex set of multiple relationships between our background variables and the four scales of multicultural attitudes (in Appendix 6.38). Of the 29 correlation coefficients, 20 are statistically significant for multicultural ideology, 19 for perceived consequences, 22 for programme attitudes and 20 for behavioural intentions.

The multiple regression analysis was performed twice, once without the psychological variables, and again with the psychological variables. These dual analyses were carried out for each of the four multicultural attitude scales.

Multicultural ideology. In the analysis with non-psychological variables (see Appendix 6.39) three variables are found to be independently predictive of multicultural ideology. In each case, the stability is demonstrated in the other two columns of the table, which show that the coefficients for ethnicity, education and age are statistically significant for each subsample. In brief, a respondent is more likely to have a positive multicultural ideology if he is (1) not French Canadian, (2) highly educated and (3) relatively young.

When the psychological variables are added in the second analysis, the picture changes dramatically. No longer are any of these three variables significant contributors; rather, they are replaced by ethnocentrism and a "value for peace." That is, a respondent is more likely to have a positive multicultural ideology if he (1) has a relatively low score on the ethnocentrism scale and (2) ranks a "value for peace" relatively highly.

Perceived consequences of multiculturalism. Among the non-psychological variables three variables again appear as stable and significant contributors (see Appendix 6.40). A respondent is more likely to perceive positive consequences to multiculturalism if he (1) is not French Canadian (2) is highly educated and (3) was raised in a relatively large community.

When psychological variables are added ethnocentrism again takes over as the dominant predictor. In this case, however, ethnicity remains as a significant and independent predictor. Two new variables (religiosity and a "value for happiness") enter into the picture but play less substantial roles than do either of the variables ethnocentrism and ethnicity. In short, a respondent is more likely to perceive positive consequences to multiculturalism if he (1) has a relatively low ethnocentrism score, (2) is not French Canadian, (2) attends church services relatively often, and (4) has a relatively high "value for happiness."

Attitudes toward multicultural programmes. A similar pattern emerges here. In the first analyses (see Appendix 6.41) ethnicity and age appear as significant and stable predictors, with education also significant, but unstable. That is, a respondent is likely to have more positive attitudes if he is (1) not French Canadian and (2) relatively young. However, when psychological variables are included, ethnocentrism joins ethnicity as a predictor, while age remains but drops to a secondary role. In short, a respondent is more likely to have positive attitudes if he (1) has a relatively low ethnocentrism score, (2) is not French Canadian, and (3) is relatively young.

Behavioural intentions toward multicultural programmes. Finally, ethnicity and age are found to be significant and stable predictors of behavioural intentions (see Appendix 6.42) with religiosity also contributing. That is, more positive behavioural intentions are likely for a respondent who (1) is not French Canadian, (2) is relatively young and (3) attends church services relatively often. When psychological variables are added ethnicity and age remain, but ethnocentrism, for the first time in this analysis does *not* enter as a contributor. Although stable, this prejudice variable falls just short of being a statistically significant contributor. Thus, a respondent is more likely to have positive behavioural intentions if he is (1) not French Canadian and (2) relatively young.

Summary of multiple regression analyses. Over the four multicultural attitude scales, there was a fairly consistent pattern of variation. When only non-psychological variables were included as independent variables, ethnicity always emerged as the strongest variable. Education, age and income also emerged but not to the same degree, and not in all cases. However, when the psychological variables were included in the regression analysis, the ethnocentrism scale score emerged as the major variable in all but one case (i.e., in the case of behavioural intentions); here ethnicity remained as the largest variable. Ethnicity also remained, but in second place, for two other scales (i.e., perceived consequences and attitudes toward programmes) but disappeared as a variable in multicultural ideology. Other psychological variables became implicated (such as values for peace and happiness) but their roles were far less substantial than was that of ethnocentrism.

Discussion of Results

In this chapter we have been concerned with the general orientation of our respondents toward multiculturalism. We conceived of this orientation as lying along a general dimension of positivity/negativity, that is, a dimension

which provided varying degrees of support through to rejection. Our approach to multiculturalism was phrased along a second dimension: one which varied from an abstract ideology, through some perceptions of the policy and its potential consequences, to some fairly concrete examples of what the policy means in terms of programmes as well as what it may mean regarding individual behaviour. The sequence of questioning in the six attitude areas was intended to follow this latter dimension.

Although we conceived of these six attitude areas as varying among themselves, it was anticipated that, in addition, there would be systematic relationships among them. In fact, there was a strong pattern of intercorrelation among the four attitude scale total scores (ranging from $+ .49$ to $+ .62$), and an equally strong set of relationships between these four attitudes and the policy perception and knowledge responses. This high level of internal relationships indicates that the common focus—multiculturalism—is fairly meaningful and stable; random responses to a vague notion would be unlikely to foster such a set of consistent relationships. Finally, there is some suggestion in our data that attitude scales which are adjacent or near each other on the abstract-concrete dimension tend to be more substantially related than are those which are further apart on the dimension. Such a graded pattern lends further support to the conclusion that respondents were behaving in systematic rather than random ways.

Concerning the dynamics in this pattern of attitudes there are intriguing relationships between the knowledge and perception of the policy and the four multicultural attitude scales. With respect to policy knowledge and perception, those not knowing of the policy tended more often to judge the policy to be one of assimilation. And with respect to policy knowledge and policy attitudes there was a tendency for some attitudes to be less positive among those who had no knowledge of the policy. However, the differences in policy attitudes between those claiming policy knowledge and those not knowing of it were small in comparison to the effect of other factors (such as ethnicity, education and ethnocentrism) considered earlier in relation to the distribution of policy attitudes. Thus, the widespread lack of awareness of the multiculturalism policy does not play as large a role as might be expected. And lastly, with respect to policy perception and policy attitudes there were significant relationships, indicating that those respondents who perceived the policy as one of assimilation exhibited consistently less positive multicultural attitudes; conversely, those who perceived the policy as one of supportive integration exhibited much higher multicultural attitudes. It thus appears that in a sense, respondents perceived as they believed.

How did our respondents react to the various questions about multiculturalism? Their responses clearly indicated that a moderately positive base exists in the sample for the multicultural ideal. Although in some portions of the sample, this generally positive view does not obtain, the general climate is one of a receptive orientation to multiculturalism. This conclusion may be surprising considering the relatively low level of knowledge about the multicultural policy.

However, the policy perception question, rather than the actual policy knowledge item maybe is a better indicator of policy "knowledge." It may be that although explicit knowledge of actual government policy was low, implicit knowledge of the Canadian situation (i.e., some form of integration, rather than assimilation) may still be high. Indeed, such was the case. Thus we may argue that although public awareness of government policies may not be evident, there was nevertheless a general sense of what is happening at the policy level.

As we move along the abstract to concrete dimension, it appears that attitudes become selectively less positive. In the perceived consequences of multiculturalism scale, general reactions were slightly less accepting than they were for the ideology. Somewhat platitudinous items (such as "Canada will be richer in culture" or "there will be interesting TV programmes"), received fairly strong support while the more negative items, although rejected, were not strenuously objected to. A similar picture emerged concerning attitudes toward multicultural programmes. While the total score was clearly indicative of support, it was the "folk festivals" and "community centres" items which received the strongest approval. Alternatively, the more contentious issues (such as "third language" broadcasting and teaching) were clearly rejected. When we inquired about behavioural intentions in the most concrete form, the total score dropped into the negative range. Respondents, on the average, said that they would not vote for, would not try to convince others about, and would not pay taxes for, a policy of multiculturalism. While it is recognized that this last item might have been worded so that it did not imply *extra* taxes, the intention of the item was to anchor the abstract-to-concrete dimension at the most concrete end. This it appears to have done.

Overall, we may conclude that the climate for multiculturalism is fairly positive in Canada. The ideological base is supportive and there are highly visible consequences and specific programmes which might be extremely popular. More contentious programmes could, if promoted, alter this base and perhaps lead to less favourable attitudes concerning future multicultural development in this country. Politically and economically, there may be problems in implementing some programmes; thus, the more popular ones might serve as vehicles for the policy as a whole.

Concerning the variations in respondent attitudes, the most striking result was that ethnicity was the major element in the distribution of all multicultural attitudes. Among French-Canadian, and to a lesser extent Russian-Canadian and Ukrainian-Canadian respondents, there was some evidence for a less-positive reaction to the multiculturalism scales. Consistent across all attitude variables, French-Canadian respondents appeared least supportive, whether at the ideology or behavioural intentions end of the dimension. And, as we noted, a similar but less clear pattern was apparent for the two "other ethnic" groups. In the Canadian context, these three groups commonly share the label of "national orphans": links with their original national culture have, to some degree, been severed. In the case of French Canada cultural links broke centuries ago, and subsequent history has been marked with a struggle to preserve language

and culture in an anglophone and largely Angloceltic nation. With Ukrainian and Russian Canadians a loss of touch with the culture of their ancestral nations has occurred in more recent times. In all three cases, one may view some of the attitudes held by these groups as functional in the self-protection of their group. That is, a furthering of multiculturalism in Canada might be viewed as weakening their own position in society. These findings for the Ukrainian- and Russian-Canadian respondents appear to run counter to those reported in the Non-Official Languages study (O'Bryan et al, 1975). However, as we noted in Chapter 2, there were differences in the meaning of multiculturalism between the two studies. In that study, there was a distinctive context of concern for the retention of "own group" language and culture. And when their single question regarding the multiculturalism policy was posed, it was phrased in terms of helping "all of these groups in their efforts to keep their own cultural characteristics and heritages" (Question 167 of NOL, p. 345). However, in the present study, the meaning of multiculturalism contains, in addition to "own language/culture retention," the notions of sharing and tolerating the cultural maintenance of other groups. Before leaving the issue, though, it is important to note that while the NOL study had much larger samples of "other ethnic" Canadians, they employed only a single question about an attitude toward multiculturalism. In the present study, although samples were smaller, they were more representative, and the effect was so strong as to be statistically reliable; and, as we have noted already, the measurement of multicultural attitudes was carried out by a number of scales, with a number of items on each, and all demonstrated a significant coherence in the attitude cluster.

A number of analyses were performed to check these ethnic-related distributions of attitudes. Results showed that with region controlled, ethnicity emerged as the dominant variable. In general, francophone respondents held similar attitudes independent of their region of residence; this was the case for anglophone respondents as well. This interpretation is also consistent with the findings in the multiple stepwise regression analysis. Although it was thought that religion might have been operating, results of these new analyses showed ethnicity again to be the dominant factor. Francophone Catholic respondents generally differed from anglophone Catholics but this second group did not differ greatly from the other religious denominations. Thus, a picture of multicultural attitudes emerged in which ethnicity of the respondent is isolated as the key variable.

This conclusion was altered somewhat when, during the multiple stepwise regression analysis, psychological variables were taken into consideration. The role of ethnocentrism emerged very clearly. In one sense this emergence is a major one, emphasizing psychological over sociocultural (or demographic) variables in the patterning of multicultural attitudes. In another sense, however, the change is not so dramatic, and can be considered as support for our earlier interpretation, since those groups who, in the present analysis, tended to be low in multicultural attitudes also tended to be high in their ethnocentrism scale scores. Thus, the additional information on this psychological variable supple-

ments and supports the earlier result and interpretation.

A second major set of variables which clearly affected the attitude distribution was the cluster of socioeconomic variables. Over all the four scales and considering all types of analyses, there is consistent evidence that higher socioeconomic status was related to greater acceptance of multiculturalism; conversely, lower status was associated with lesser acceptance. Although the three socioeconomic variables employed correlated only moderately with each other (ranging between $+ .35$ and $+ .49$), there were fairly consistent relationships between them and multicultural attitudes. This implies that each variable is providing a somewhat different perspective on our understanding of the background of multicultural attitudes. However, precisely how they differ is not clear from the patterning of relationships in our data.

Other variables which were related, although to a much lower degree, to the distribution of multicultural attitudes, were degree of urbanization, political party preference, and age. Sex was unimportant.

In general, while ethnicity tended to supersede most geographic variables, degree of urbanization remained important, particularly in the Atlantic region. Here, there tends to be a fairly straightforward relationship with increased urbanization being associated with more positive multicultural attitudes. However, in some other regions, a more complex pattern emerged with some evidence for more positive attitudes in rural areas and large cities and less positive attitudes in towns.

In terms of political party preference, a general finding across the scales was that Liberal and New Democratic Party supporters tended to be more in favour of multiculturalism than were Progressive Conservative and Social Credit supporters. This pattern was strong among francophone respondents, but minimal among anglophones. An interesting reversal to this pattern occurred for the behavioural intentions toward multicultural programmes. In this case, there were no differences stemming from political party preference among francophone respondents, but there was significant variation among anglophone respondents. It is possible that a "floor" has been reached on this scale among francophone respondents; the very low mean and standard deviation for this group suggests that acceptance was so uniformly low that variation by any other variable was virtually impossible.

In general, age was related inversely to multicultural attitudes: the older the respondent, the less positive the attitudes. While there are several possible reasons for this well-documented relationship, it is difficult to specify which is more likely to be operative. One feasible explanation is that social attitudes on many issues tend to "harden up" with age.

We have noted that with the multiple regression analyses psychological variables generally displace the sociocultural variables as factors in the variation of multicultural attitudes. For example, the variable of ethnocentrism displaced ethnicity to a second position on two of the scales (perceived consequences and programme attitudes); ethnicity was eliminated on one scale (ideology); but ethnocentrism did not appear as a major factor on behavioural intentions. Simi-

larly, some life values (such as peace and happiness) appeared as contributing variables and displaced some of the earlier sociocultural and demographic variables (such as age and education). Thus, we may conclude that in general the inclusion of psychological variables in our analysis of multicultural attitudes was an important decision; without these variables, a much smaller portion of the variation would have been accounted for.


Overall, what is the current climate for multiculturalism in Canada? Perhaps the most useful answer might be phrased in terms of the two dimensions considered earlier in this discussion, as well as their relationships to the background variables which appear to predict multicultural attitudes.

Using this approach, certain facts become clear. First, the general climate is more positive than negative; the typical multicultural attitude falls on the positive side of the mid-point. This moderate acceptance is not due to any sizeable neutrality or lack of concern; on the contrary, internal variation is rather large. Thus, on this first dimension (positive to negative) the picture is fairly clear.

Secondly, there is some evidence that this acceptance of multiculturalism becomes more negative as questions are phrased in terms of increasing concreteness and behavioural commitment. The ideology is fine, the folk festivals and cultural centres are interesting, but hesitation in personal support is indicated. Thus these first two dimensions appear to be related in such a way that for some programmes and for some degree of personal support, the typical response shifts down to below the mid-point of the first dimension.

Third, variations among groupings in our sample indicate quite clearly that multicultural attitudes vary with such factors as ethnicity, ethnocentrism and education. Thus, among respondents of French-Canadian background, for those with high levels of ethnocentrism and for those with lower education, multicultural attitudes tend to be less positive.

From the above discussion, it is clear that in order to understand multicultural attitudes in Canada, it is essential to take into account the three dimensions of study.



This chapter is intended to provide a transition between the detailed data which have been provided up to this point, and the more theoretical and interpretive material to be presented in Chapters 8 and 9. Although more data and statistical analyses are provided in this chapter, their purpose is to draw together — in summary and structural form — the myriad of observations with which we have been concerned.

In a first section we will examine the coherence of the attitudes — how the various measures relate to each other across the four attitude domains. A second section will then examine the data in terms of the ethnocentrism hypothesis outlined in Chapter 3. A third section will focus on the relative contribution of those two background variables that have consistently appeared as major predictors of multicultural and ethnic attitudes in this study: ethnicity and socioeconomic status. A fourth section introduces two new variables, cultural and economic security. These variables were developed after many analyses had been performed, because the concept of security emerged as a possible explanation of many of the results. Finally, in a fifth section, we will consider the question of the validity of our findings in the light of some of the usual criticism of survey and attitude studies.

Coherence of the Attitudes

Over the past three chapters we have presented, in some detail, the distribution of attitudes in the sample. Within each chapter, relationships between attitudes toward immigration, selected ethnic groups, multiculturalism and major background variables were also presented. At this point, then, there is a fairly clear picture of how these attitudes vary across Canada.

Of equal importance is the question of coherence — how these attitudes relate to each other, and how they may be clustered among themselves. At the outset (Chapters 1 and 2) we considered that these four attitude areas are conceptually related in the Canadian socio-cultural context. The entry of ethnic groups by immigration, and their development in a multicultural society, are topics which are related. And the relationships between all of these attitudes and general prejudice was also anticipated. However, such an expectation may or may not, be confirmed by psychological analysis. For example, attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism might, in fact, be compartmentalized by respondents. If such were the case, then implications for the two policies would be very difficult to draw out, and the policies themselves would be diffi-

cult to coordinate.

Already in the last three chapters, three indications of attitudinal coherence have been presented. First, for each attitude scale, evidence was provided which established that items within scales related consistently with each other. Secondly, for each attitude domain, a high degree of coherence across scales within each domain was established. For example, the authoritarianism and ethnocentrism scales were significantly related ($+ .61$), as were multicultural ideology and behavioural intentions toward the policy ($+ .48$). Finally, in the discussion of each attitude domain, it became clear that all these attitudes tended to be distributed in a similar way in relation to regional, ethnic and socio-economic variables. Such consistent patterning suggests that there may be a pattern of relationships among the attitudes themselves.

In this section, we take one further step, and examine the overall set of relationships among these various attitudes. In Table 7.1 a correlation matrix provides these relationships, and in Table 7.2, their factor structure is presented. From the correlation matrix there emerges a fairly clear picture of coherence among the attitudes; and from the factor analysis, a two factor solution is apparent.

Correlational analysis. Considering first the pattern of correlations, both the ethnocentrism and authoritarianism scales relate significantly with all immigration and multicultural attitudes except in one case (acceptability of immigrants with authoritarianism). A similar pattern is apparent for the group of correlations between immigration and multicultural attitudes; all are significant in the appropriate direction and they range from .21 to .55 in magnitude.

A less substantial picture is shown in the set of ethnic attitude correlations. Here a generally lower level of correlation characterizes the relationships among attitudes toward specific ethnic groups, although somewhat higher levels of relationship appear between the three earlier sets of attitudes and overall evaluation of own group, English Canadians and French Canadians. This latter finding should not be surprising, given that most of the respondents were of these two ethnic origins.

In summary, it is fair to say that the four sets of attitudes which have been assessed in this study are related in significant and understandable ways. On logical and theoretical grounds there were clear expectations that general measures of prejudice and more specific attitudes toward immigration, ethnic groups and multiculturalism should be related to each other. The empirical demonstration of this coherence thus confirms our expectation.

Factor analysis. When such correlational clustering is evident in a matrix, it is likely that factor analysis will exhibit a very coherent structure. Indeed a single principal component factor accounts for almost half of all the variance which is accounted for (24% of 57%); this appears to be a general ethnic prejudice factor. The next strongest factor (which is half as potent – 12%) appears to be specific to some ethnic groups.

When these two factors are rotated, (Table 7.2), the initial impression of a strong general prejudice factor supplemented by a secondary ethnic groups

Table 7.1

Intercorrelations of Attitude Scales in the Total Sample

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.
<i>Psychological variables</i>																		
1. Ethnocentrism																		
2. Authoritarianism	.61																	
<i>Immigration variables</i>																		
3. Perceived consequences	-.53	.33																
4. Acceptability	.21	.03	.38															
5. Discrimination	.37	.23	-.36	-.26														
<i>Multicultural variables</i>																		
6. Ideology	-.43	.28	.55	.38	.34													
7. Perceived consequences	.33	-.19	.44	.38	.27	.58												
8. Programme attitudes	-.23	-.15	.31	.41	-.24	.51	.54											
9. Behavioural intentions	-.16	-.15	.27	.32	-.21	.48	.52	.61										
<i>Evaluation of ethnic groups</i>																		
10. Own group	.37	.29	-.36	-.24	.45	-.39	-.29	-.27	.22									
11. English	.25	.20	-.23	-.12	.26	-.24	-.18	-.17	.14	.71								
12. French	.20	.11	-.22	-.11	.32	-.22	-.19	-.11	.10	.66	.38							
13. Immigrants in general	-.12	-.05	.21	.21	-.25	.22	.18	.14	.15	-.29	-.22	-.32						
14. Indian	-.08	-.10	-.02	-.02	.02	.00	-.02	.03	.03	-.04	.11	.02	-.10					
15. German	.08	-.02	.07	.00	.14	.05	.04	.01	.00	.32	.18	.33	-.04	-.23				
16. Chinese	-.18	-.14	.14	.03	-.20	.13	.13	.05	.03	.44	.30	.40	-.02	-.12	.15			
17. Ukrainian	-.06	-.04	.11	.01	.22	.13	.10	.06	.02	-.44	-.31	-.39	.08	-.26	.38	.21		
18. Jewish	.12	-.10	.11	.05	.15	.11	.11	.07	.06	.33	.26	.28	.03	.18	.03	.14	.14	
19. Italian	-.04	-.01	.07	.09	-.05	.10	.09	.12	.08	-.21	-.21	-.18	.03	-.21	-.11	.10	.02	.11

Note For $N = 1800$ r of .05, $p < .05$ r of .07, $p < .01$ r of .09, $p < .001$

Table 7.2

**Varimax Rotation of Two Principal Components
Factor Analysis of Attitudes^a**

	Factor I	Factor II
<i>Psychological Variables</i>		
1. Ethnocentrism	-.59	
2. Authoritarianism	-.42	
<i>Immigration Variables</i>		
3. Perceived consequences	.68	
4. Acceptability	.60	
5. Discrimination	-.47	.36
<i>Multicultural Variables</i>		
6. Ideology	.78	
7. Perceived consequences	.75	
8. Programme attitudes	.75	
9. Behavioural intentions	.68	
<i>Evaluation of Ethnic Groups</i>		
English		.56
French		.72
Immigrants in general	.30	
Indian		.33
German		-.55
Chinese		-.56
Ukrainian		-.65
Jewish		-.42
(Italian		-.20)

^aloadings of .3 or higher only

factor is reinforced. All of the prejudice, immigration and multicultural variables load on this first factor, while seven of nine ethnic groups load on the second factor. In one case (discrimination) there is a loading on both factors, and in one case (Italian Canadians) there is not a substantial loading on either factor. Finally, Immigrants in general appear on the general prejudice factor rather than on the specific group factor. The double loading for discrimination is understandable, since it logically shares elements of prejudice and action against groups. Similarly, the first factor loading of Immigrants in general is also plausible as an indicator of a more general attitude orientation. However, the absence of a loading for Italian Canadians is puzzling, given their high visibility in the Canadian population.

In summary, there appears to be a clear two factor solution: one of general prejudice which is anchored at its poles by the ethnocentrism scale score ($-.589$) and by multicultural ideology ($+.785$); and a second factor concerned with specific groups which is anchored by evaluation of French and English Canadians ($+.722$ and $+.563$) at one end and evaluation of Chinese and Ukrainian Canadians ($-.560$ and $-.650$) at the other.

An Examination of the Ethnocentrism Hypothesis

A theoretical discussion of the concept of ethnocentrism was provided in Chapter 3. Applying the ethnocentrism hypothesis to the present study, two sets of predictions can be made. First, ingroup evaluation should be negatively related to the evaluation of outgroups. In other words, individuals who evaluate their ingroup most highly should also show the most negative attitudes toward outgroups. Second, a direct measure of ethnocentrism, and measures that are theoretically related, should be positively associated with ingroup evaluation and negatively with the evaluation of outgroups. That is, individuals who are identified as being most ethnocentric on a direct measure of ethnocentrism should be most prone to show positive attitudes toward the ingroup and negative ones toward outgroups. These predictions require specification of what constitutes ingroup and outgroup. While these predictions follow from the ethnocentrism hypothesis in a straightforward manner, there remains the problem of defining ingroup and outgroup theoretically and empirically. The theoretical problem of distinguishing between ingroup and outgroup, and between these terms and membership group, has long been recognized in social science. Merton (Merton & Rossi, 1957; see also LeVine & Campbell, 1972, p. 60-71) has criticized Sumner (1906) for his failure to distinguish between ingroup and membership group. Merton has basically argued that a membership group does not always function as an ingroup.

It has also been recognized that nonmembership groups can become the focus of positive attitudes. In order to clarify the relationship between membership group and ingroup the term *reference group* has been borrowed from reference group theory (e.g., Hyman, 1942; Sherif & Sherif, 1953). A positive reference group is a group that serves as a model for emulation and whose standards are accepted by an individual. A negative reference group would be a

group whose standards are rejected by an individual. In the present context an ingroup can be defined as a membership group which also functions as a positive reference group. An outgroup is a nonmembership group which may, and usually does, function as a negative reference group. Furthermore, in the present discussion "membership group" and "own group" are used synonymously as are "nonmembership group" and "other group."

On the empirical level, the problem exists of how to determine ingroups and outgroups. Given the definitions above, an ingroup would be a membership group which also acts as a positive reference group. Membership group can be more easily determined than reference group. It seems reasonable to assume that for French-Canadian respondents "French Canadians" are the appropriate membership group. For Angloceltic respondents, a less compelling but still sound argument can be made that "English Canadians" are the membership group. To determine reference groups the rating of "similar to me" can be used. We can assume that groups which are rated high on "similar to me," function as positive reference groups, and groups that receive a low rating function as negative reference groups. Information on these ratings was provided in Chapter 5. In Appendix 5.4 it was shown that the two charter groups rated each other as "similar to me." We can therefore argue that the two charter groups serve as positive reference groups for themselves and for each other. Immigrants in general, Canadian Indians, Chinese, Ukrainians, Italians and Jews received below average ratings on "similar to me" by both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents. In other words, most of the "other ethnic" groups can be considered as negative reference groups. For Angloceltic respondents then, "English Canadians" are the ingroup, "French Canadians" are a positive reference group and most of the "other ethnic" groups are outgroups. For French-Canadian respondents, "French Canadians" are the ingroup, "English Canadians" are a positive reference group and most of the "other ethnic" groups are outgroups.

In order to test the ethnocentrism hypothesis, separate analyses were carried out within the Angloceltic and the French-Canadian samples. Table 7.3 shows correlation coefficients between the evaluations of the respondents' own group and the other charter group, (the ingroup and another positive reference group) and the "other ethnic" groups (the outgroups). Results generally support the ethnocentrism hypothesis. Among both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents own group evaluation is positively related to the evaluation of the other charter group. Own group evaluation is negatively related to the evaluation of Germans, Chinese, Ukrainians, Jews, Italians, and Immigrants in general. No linear relationship exists between own group evaluation and the evaluation of Canadian Indians. Some of these relationships are graphically depicted in Figure 7.1. To construct this figure, respondents were categorized according to their own group evaluation scores into six categories. The mean evaluation scores for the other groups were then calculated for the respondents in a given category. Analyses of variance and analyses for linear trends were performed in order to test the linearity of the relationships. These

Table 7.3

**Correlations between Evaluations of Own Group
and Ethnocentrism, and Evaluations of
Other Groups**

Correlation between:		Angloceltic <i>N</i> = 690	French Canadian <i>N</i> = 349
Own group and	English		.32***
	French	.35***	
	Indian	-.04	-.04
	German	-.22***	-.31***
	Chinese	-.41***	-.34***
	Ukrainian	-.38***	-.34***
	Jewish	-.31***	-.29***
	Italian	-.21***	-.20***
	Immigrants in general	-.19***	-.25***
Ethnocentrism	and own group	.36***	.22***
	English		.04
	French	.01	
	Indian	-.05	-.12*
	German	-.07	-.14*
	Chinese	-.15***	-.20***
	Ukrainian	-.02	-.18**
	Jewish	-.12**	-.12*
	Italian	-.08*	.07
	Immigrants in general	-.03	-.15*

Note. All ratings are relative evaluation scores, ie. mean of six evaluative adjectives for particular group minus mean of six evaluative adjectives for average of all groups.

analyses confirmed what is apparent visually, namely, that own and other group evaluation is linearly related.

A second way to test the ethnocentrism hypothesis is to relate respondents' ethnocentrism scale scores to their evaluation of own and other groups. As shown in Table 7.3, this evidence also supports the ethnocentrism hypothesis. Ethnocentrism shows a positive relationship with own group evaluation in the Angloceltic and the French-Canadian samples. Ethnocentrism is negatively related to the evaluation of Canadian Chinese and Jews in both character groups. Similar negative relationships exist between ethnocentrism scores and the evaluation of Canadian Indians, Germans, Ukrainians and Immigrants in general in the French-Canadian sample. These results are displayed in Figure 7.2.

The present results are not as strongly in support of the ethnocentrism hypothesis as those relating own group to other group evaluation. It is noteworthy, however, that none of the statistically significant results are contrary to the ethnocentrism hypothesis.

Discrimination against immigrants and multicultural ideology are conceptually related to ethnocentrism. These measures were also shown to be empirically related to the ethnocentrism scale earlier in this chapter. On the basis of the ethnocentrism hypothesis we would expect a positive relationship between discrimination and own group evaluation and a negative relationship with evaluation of outgroups.

Table 7.4 shows substantial support for the hypothesis. The greater the discrimination against immigrants shown by respondents, the more positively they evaluate their own group and the more negatively they evaluate Canadian Germans, Chinese, Ukrainians, and Immigrants in general. These relationships are statistically significant in both the Angloceltic and French-Canadian samples. Evaluations of Canadian Indians and Italians are not significantly related to discrimination in either sample. The relationships between discrimination and ethnic attitudes are presented graphically in Figure 7.3. This figure reveals that with the possible exception of evaluation of Chinese the trends are quite linear.

Endorsement of multicultural ideology by advocating the positive aspects of cultural diversity can be considered the opposite of ethnocentrism. Given this conceptualization, the ethnocentrism hypothesis predicts multiculturalism ideology to be negatively related to own group evaluation and positively with the evaluation of other groups. Table 7.4 provides support for the ethnocentrism hypothesis. In both Angloceltic and French-Canadian samples, respondents who are most supportive of the multiculturalism ideology are also least positive in the evaluation of their own group. Concerning the evaluation of other groups the results are not particularly strong in the Angloceltic sample. Multicultural ideology shows the predicted positive relation significantly only in the case of the evaluation of Canadian Jews and Immigrants in general. In the French-Canadian sample the results are more strongly in line with the hypothesis. The predicted relationships are significant for Canadian Germans, Chinese, Ukrainians, Jews and Immigrants in general. The relationships between multicultural ideology, and ethnic attitudes are graphically presented in Figure 7.4.

The results on the relationships between own group evaluation, eth-

Figure 7.1. The relationship between own group evaluation, the evaluation of the other charter group and selected "other ethnic" groups.







Figure 7.2. The relationship between ethnocentrism, the evaluation of own group and selected "other ethnic" groups.




Table 7.4

**Correlations between Discrimination, Multicultural
Ideology, and Evaluations of Own and Other Groups**

Correlation between:		Angloceltic <i>N</i> = 690	French Canadian <i>N</i> = 349
Discrimination	and own group	.43***	.34***
	English		.03
	French	.12**	
	Indian	-.06	-.02
	German	-.14***	-.16**
	Chinese	-.16***	-.19***
	Ukrainian	-.16***	-.29***
	Jewish	-.18***	-.07
	Italian	-.03	.04
	Immigrants in general	-.09*	-.29***
Multicultural ideology	and own group	-.34***	-.27***
	English		-.05
	French	.02	
	Indian	.05	-.05
	German	.00	.15**
	Chinese	.05	.20***
	Ukrainian	.07	.28***
	Jewish	.13***	.14*
	Italian	.06	.11
	Immigrants in general	.13***	.16**

Note. All ratings are relative evaluation scores, ie. mean of six evaluative adjectives for particular group minus mean of six evaluative adjectives for average of all groups.

Figure 7.3. The relationship between discrimination, the evaluation of own group and selected "other ethnic" groups








Figure 7.4 The relationship between multicultural ideology, the evaluation of own group and selected "other ethnic" groups.



nocentrism scale scores and related attitudes, and attitudes toward "other ethnic" groups, provide considerable support for the ethnocentrism hypothesis. When correlations were statistically significant they were in favour of the hypothesis. No significant result was obtained that was contrary to the hypothesis. Not every predicted relationship was found to be significant and some of the significant results were not very strong. However, graphs and tests for linearity showed most of the significant relationships to be linear. The ethnocentrism hypothesis was generally supported more strongly in the French-Canadian than the Angloceltic sample.

At the beginning of this section, it was argued that the determination of what constitutes an ingroup or an outgroup could be made on the basis of the rating of "similar to me." According to this analysis, the two charter groups were considered to be mutual positive reference groups and all "other ethnic" groups to be outgroups for Angloceltic as well as French-Canadian respondents. This classification can now be reconsidered in the light of the ethnocentrism results. To what extent were the relationships predicted from the ethnocentrism hypothesis, actually obtained for each group? That English Canadians and French Canadians functioned as ingroups for Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents respectively, was strongly supported by the correlations. That the two charter groups function as mutual positive reference groups was supported only for the relationships where own groups evaluation was the measure of ethnocentrism. Concerning outgroups, the results were less consistent. Chinese Canadians functioned most consistently as outgroups. Of eight relevant correlations, all were in the predicted direction, with seven being statistically significant. Canadian Germans, Ukrainians, Jews, and Immigrants in general showed the ethnocentric relationships of outgroups reasonably consistently. Canadian Indians and to some extent Italians failed to function as outgroups. Relationships were frequently near zero. These results suggest that Canadian Indians occupy a special position in the attitude structure of Canadians. Although they received a low evaluation and were not perceived to be "similar," their evaluation was unrelated to any of the measures of ethnocentrism.

Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status as Predictors of Attitudes

In our earlier discussions of ethnic attitudes in Canada, there were frequent references to the importance of both the socioeconomic status and the ethnicity of respondents in the distribution of the attitudes. For example, throughout Chapters 4, 5 and 6, both of these independent variables generally emerged as significant indicators in the analyses of variance and multiple stepwise regression analyses. Although the latter enabled us to separate the independent contributions of each variable, because there were three measures of status employed in the analyses, a clear picture of their relative contributions was difficult to obtain. This may be accomplished by two-way analyses of variance which set out both the independent effects and any interactions which may exist. In Table 7.5, for each attitude that is listed, the F-ratio for each inde-

Table 7.5

**Two-way Analyses of Variance:
Ethnicity and Education on Attitudes**

Attitude	F-ratio		
	Ethnicity	Education	Interaction
Ethnocentrism	20.40***	37.55***	1.15
Authoritarianism	5.28*	27.85***	4.41***
Perceived consequences of immigration	22.18***	24.92***	1.83
Acceptability of immigrants	1.43	3.79**	.60
Discrimination against immigrants	77.57***	6.11***	.65
Multicultural ideology	48.65***	15.51***	.43
Perceived consequences of multiculturalism	18.82***	9.05***	.57
Multicultural programme attitudes	16.01***	8.28***	.67
Multicultural behavioural intentions	12.58***	6.08***	1.29
Evaluation of own group	124.93***	4.17***	2.41*
Evaluation of English Canadians	.13	2.58*	2.76*
Evaluation of French Canadians	313.04***	3.04**	1.45

pendent variable and their interaction is provided. In these analyses, ethnicity is categorized as Angloceltic or French-Canadian, and socioeconomic status is based upon respondents' education. Although Table 7.5 presents only data for education as an index of socioeconomic status, the results for income and occupational status show generally a similar pattern of relationships.

The results confirm our original one-way analyses: both variables are consistently effective in producing significant variation across the attitudes. For all attitudes (except evaluation of English and French Canadians), French-Canadian respondents hold less positive views. With respect to evaluation of English Canadians, there is no significant difference, while in the case of evaluation of French Canadians, French-Canadian respondents hold more positive attitudes. And for all attitudes in Table 7.5, those of lower education hold less positive attitudes than those with higher educational attainment.

Inspection of the interaction column shows that these main effects are minimally qualified by interactions; only three of them are significant and all are relatively weak. For authoritarianism, there is a stronger decline with education

for Angloceltic than for French-Canadian respondents; that is, education had a weaker effect on French-Canadian attitudes. Similarly, education had a weaker effect on evaluation of own group and of English Canadians among French-Canadian respondents, than among Angloceltic respondents.

In summary, then, it is possible to conclude that both socioeconomic status (education) and ethnicity independently affect the distribution of these attitudes. In three of the attitudes, education tends to make less of a difference than ethnicity to attitudes which are expressed.

Cultural and Economic Security

Over the course of the research, the idea emerged that the security one feels in his or her cultural or ethnic group, and in his or her socioeconomic status, might be a major element in the distribution of these attitudes. In order to examine this possibility two variables were constructed — one to assess feelings of cultural security and the other to assess feelings of economic security. As *post hoc* variables, their status is clearly different from those variables which we set out to define and measure from the beginning of the study. That is, their empirical basis must, of necessity, be less firm than most others because they are created “after the fact” from the available data. However, since the idea of *security* emerged over and over again as a plausible interpretation for our findings, the theoretical basis is fairly strong.

The cultural security variable is comprised of the English or French item from the perceived consequences of immigration scale, (Table 4.1, item d or e; e.g., “English Canadians would lose their identity”), and the English or French item from the perceived consequences of multiculturalism, (Table 6.4, item b or c; e.g., “the English Canadian’s voice in Canada will become weaker and weaker”). The use of the “English” or “French” items was determined by the ethnicity of the respondent. The economic security variable is comprised of items a, f and h (dealing with unemployment, slums and lower wages) from the perceived consequences of immigration scale, (Table 4.1). In the case of items a,d,e,f,h from this question, the security items are subsets of the original immigration scale. However, in the case of items from the perceived consequences of multiculturalism, (Table 6.4, items b and c), the security items are independent, since they were excluded from the original scale construction.

The relationship between these two security variables is significant ($r = +.46$). Furthermore, relationships between these two variables and the multicultural and ethnic attitudes are indicated in Table 7.6. It is clear that, notwithstanding the limited item content of the scales, they are significant predictors of most immigration and multicultural attitude variables. They also correlate significantly with the two prejudice variables, but do not relate strongly to ethnic group attitudes. This pattern suggests that feeling of cultural and economic security may have some explanatory role for the more general attitudes, but have little importance in understanding attitudes toward specific groups. This observation of relatively low correlations between security and attitudes toward specific groups is consistent with a finding of Curtis and Lam-

bert (1975). In their study, a variable termed "status dissatisfaction" (similar to feelings of economic insecurity) correlated less than .10 with a variety of ethnic groups in Canada.

Table 7.6

Correlations between Cultural Security, Economic Security and Attitudes by Ethnicity within Angloceltic and French-Canadian Samples

	Cultural security		Economic security	
	Angloceltic	French Canadian	Angloceltic	French Canadian
Ethnocentrism	-.47***	-.32***	-.51***	-.38***
Authoritarianism	-.35***	-.21***	-.36***	-.25***
Perceived consequences of immigration ^a	(.70)***	(.64)***	(.87)***	(.87)***
Acceptability of immigrants	.31***	.31***	.23***	.36***
Discrimination against immigrants	-.22***	-.17**	-.28***	-.32***
Multicultural ideology	.52***	.49***	.50***	.44***
Perceived consequences of multiculturalism	.55***	.44***	.38***	.30***
Multicultural programme attitudes	.39***	.39***	.26***	.29***
Multicultural behavioural intentions	.38***	.32***	.24***	.29***
Evaluation of:				
Own group	-.21***	-.07	-.33***	-.19***
English	-.21***	.02	-.33***	.00
French	.03	-.07	-.06	-.19***
Immigrants in general	.09*	.06	.18***	.17**
Indian	-.01	-.09	-.02	-.08
German	-.04	.00	.04	.15**
Chinese	.02	.04	.14***	.08
Ukrainian	.09*	.07	.05	.26***
Jewish	.07	.08	.13***	.02
Italian	.07	.02	.07	-.07

^aThere is item overlap between perceived consequences of immigration and the two security variables.

There is some evidence in Table 7.6 that discrimination against immigrants is more strongly related to feelings of economic security than to cultural security, while the four multicultural attitudes are more strongly related to feelings of cultural security than to economic security. In both cases, as expected, greater security is related to more positive and tolerant attitudes.

There is also some evidence that these security variables are more strongly related to prejudice and to multicultural and immigration attitudes in the Angloceltic sample than in the French-Canadian sample. Although not a large difference, all coefficients in the Angloceltic sample equal or exceed those in the French-Canadian sample for cultural security. However, such a trend is not the case for the economic security variable. A higher correlation with own group evaluation is also present for both security variables in the Angloceltic sample than in the French-Canadian sample.

The relationship between cultural and economic security, and the manner in which respondents rated their own group is negative. Thus, insecurity is related to positive own group evaluation. Those who feel more culturally or economically insecure evaluate their own group more favourably. One implication of such a relationship is that exaggerated evaluations of one's own group are a means by which people attempt to adjust to the cultural and economic insecurities they feel.

Finally, as we have noted, the correlations between cultural and economic security and the nine standard ethnic groups are for the most part low. However, two trends do emerge. First, in general the relationships for the groups who are well known to all respondents (see Appendix 5.4), English Canadians, French Canadians and Immigrants in general, are generally higher than is the case for the specific non-French, non-British groups. In the case of English and French Canadians the relationships are negative indicating that a positive evaluation of these ingroups for most respondents is associated with cultural and economic insecurity. By contrast the positive correlations with Immigrants in general reveal that it is those who feel cultural and economic security who have positive attitudes toward immigrants.

Since cultural and economic security appear to play an important role in ethnic attitudes, it is important to determine the extent to which various Canadian groups feel culturally and economically insecure. The two most important groupings which have been implicated in ethnic attitudes are ethnicity and socioeconomic status. Hence in Table 7.7 we compare French Canadians to Angloceltic Canadians and various educational groups in terms of their cultural and economic security. Two-way analyses of variance indicate that both socioeconomic status (education) and ethnicity (French Canadian vs. Angloceltic Canadian) have significant effects on both feelings of cultural and economic security; there are no interactions.

It is clear from these analyses, that, independently of each other, education and ethnicity are major factors in the distribution of feelings of security. Those who have higher education feel both culturally and economically more secure than those of lower education, and this is true in both French-Canadian

Table 7.7

**Means and Analyses of Variance of Cultural
and Economic Security by Ethnicity and Education**

	Cultural Security	Economic Security
Angloceltic		
Some primary	3.43	3.04
Primary (graduated)	3.82	3.61
Some high school	4.75	3.79
High school (graduated)	4.74	4.21
Technical training	5.08	4.37
Some college, university or more	5.52	4.84
French Canadian		
Some primary	3.50	3.04
Primary (graduated)	3.30	2.54
Some high school	3.93	3.31
High school (graduated)	4.77	3.78
Technical training	4.62	3.87
Some college, university or more	4.57	3.89
F-test ethnicity	11.61***	22.91***
F-test education	18.25***	14.52***
F-test interaction	1.76	1.79

and Angloceltic samples. Those who are Angloceltic feel more culturally and economically secure than those who are French Canadian and this is true right across the educational spectrum.

Thus we have converging evidence that French Canadians and people of lower socioeconomic status feel relatively less secure economically and culturally. The consistency of this finding is reinforced by the earlier findings that French Canadians and respondents of lower socioeconomic status were generally less favourable in their attitudes toward immigration, multiculturalism and groups of other than British or French origin.

Finally, we may ask whether these two security variables in fact carry any explanatory weight. Since they covary with ethnicity and socioeconomic status, and since ethnicity and socioeconomic status have been employed as predic-

tors of attitudes, it is logically possible that there is no independent role for the two security variables in understanding the various attitudes. We have seen already (Curtis & Lambert, 1975) that a variable similar to our economic security variable correlated minimally with attitudes toward some ethnic groups. And when Curtis and Lambert statistically partialled out socioeconomic status, they found that the initial low correlation was virtually eliminated.

To check on this possibility in our own data, a multiple stepwise regression analysis (Appendix 7.1) was performed on seven of our attitude variables (ethnocentrism scale, discrimination, own group evaluation, evaluation of Chinese and Jews, multicultural ideology and multicultural behavioural intentions). It is clear that, as in the case of Curtis and Lambert, initial low simple correlations between security and the two ethnic groups (ranging from .08 to .14) drop well down (to a range of .02 to .08) when ethnicity and socioeconomic status (both education and Blishen) are partialled out. But for our five general scale measures, there remains a substantial correlation with both security variables. That is, even when the effects of ethnicity and socioeconomic status are removed, the feelings of economic and cultural security retain significant power as predictors of these more general attitudes. A substantial role is being played, then, by these feelings of security over and above the other variables. What this role is, is not entirely clear; however, in Chapter 9, an attempt will be made to incorporate the role of security into a theoretical interpretation of our general findings.

Validity and Bias in Attitude Measurement

As social psychologists and sociologists have continued to work in the area of attitude measurement, a number of problems have been identified which question the validity of current measurement techniques. In this section, we present a brief statement of some of these problems, and provide a discussion of how we attempted to deal with them in our study.

There is no ready-made or generally acceptable classification of these problems, and so for the purposes of this review, a fivefold classification will be used. Firstly, the issue of *reactivity* will be considered, followed by a discussion of the relationship between *attitudes and behaviour*. Then *demand characteristics* which emanate from an interviewer, and other *unintentional influences* will be considered. Finally a number of *measurement biases* will be presented.

Reactivity. This is a term coined by Campbell and Stanley (1963) to refer to the fact that any act of measurement may affect that which is measured. In our case, the mere existence of the survey, the survey instrument and the interviewer may lead to the expression of attitudes which differ from those which a respondent would express in other circumstances (for example, to his or her family or in his or her club). This problem has no solution once a survey (or other "intrusive" form of research) has been decided upon. Indeed it may be a problem in all science where actual contact and interruption of the phenomena are elements in their measurement. In social psychology, "non-reactive" or "unobtrusive" techniques have been proposed (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, &

Sechrest, 1966) but few studies have been able to implement them successfully. Hence, we must acknowledge and accept the possibility that, in a very fundamental sense, asking questions produces answers; in their absence, other answers, or indeed no answers, may be more characteristic of those who became our respondents.

Attitudes and behaviour. Among the many proposed solutions to reactivity problems has been the suggestion (Webb et al., 1966) that unobtrusive observations of behaviour should be the primary data for some social psychological research. In these cases, behaviour is sampled without the individual knowing that he or she is a participant in a study. This suggestion raises the complicated question of the relationship between behaviour and attitudes (Deutscher, 1973; Dillehay, 1973). The basic problem is that most studies, including the present one, wish to predict how individuals will *act* in the future; to make this prediction, it is usual to assess general attitude dispositions which are often expressed verbally. However, the link between present statements and future acts has been both questioned and defended continuously since the development of attitude measurement in the 1930's (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Problems of prediction exist for both techniques: if a specific behaviour is gauged now, it may have little predictive validity to another specific behaviour in the future; lacking generality, any individual act may say little or nothing about future acts. On the other hand, while attitudes are considered to be a more broadly-based and general predisposition, and hence are more likely to predict future behaviour in the same class, the problem exists of verbally expressing one attitude (for a variety of reasons to be discussed below), while intending to behave in quite a different manner.

We recognize the difficulty of asserting any necessary link between attitudes and behaviour. However, during the development of the survey instrument, a number of "behavioural orientations" were given to the respondent. For example in the card-sorting task, in the perceived consequences of immigration and multiculturalism statements, and in the behavioural intentions toward the multiculturalism policy items, respondents were directed away from "opinion" questions to concrete statements and to behaviourally specific situations. Furthermore, there were significant relationships in our data between the more abstract and the more concrete or behaviourally-oriented measures (for example, $+ .48$ between multicultural ideology and multicultural behavioural intentions). Thus, there is convergence among our measures which vary in their degree of behavioural orientation. While not eliminating the doubt which exists in the attitude-behaviour literature, and while certainly not solving any of the major problems which exist in that literature, we are of the opinion that the level of behavioural specificity and concreteness have been satisfactory in the present study. Consequently, we feel that prediction from our attitudinal results to future behaviours is possible.

Demand characteristics. Over and above the problem of general reactivity, where mere measurement may affect a phenomena, there is a problem of affecting a phenomenon in specific ways because of the "demands" emanating

from the survey instrument or interviewer (Orne, 1962). In experimental and laboratory studies, a number of solutions have been proposed to hide these demands. One is the established one of a placebo in medical sciences, and the other is the use of deception or disguise in psychological studies. However, such strategies cannot be used in survey work. It was clear to respondents, in our study, that the focus of interest was upon ethnic groups, immigration and multiculturalism. Although it was not possible to disguise the intent of the survey, it was occasionally possible to reduce the demands by the sequence and phrasing of the questions. For example, "subjective" ethnic identity was sought after "objective" information on ancestral country of origin; attitudes toward specific groups were requested after seeking the relative visibility of groups to the respondent; multicultural policy knowledge followed the perception of the policy and even then the perception question was not phrased in terms of *the* Canadian government policy, but in terms of how a country *might* deal with such issues. These strategies may have reduced the demand characteristics, even if the intent of the questions was certainly clear to respondents.

Unavoidable biases. These may be present due to the age, sex, ethnicity, social class, race and attitudes of the interviewer, especially if these are perceived by the respondent as discrepant from his or her own (Sudman & Bradburn 1974). Furthermore, the length of the interview, the ambience of the room in which it is conducted (noise and heat levels, ventilation), the temporary condition of the respondent (health, fatigue, mood) and the local and national salience of the survey topic at the time, may all contribute to variation in attitudes. To some extent, interviewer training, and ratings of interview conditions can serve as a check on these problems; as we noted in Chapters 2 and 3, many of the issues appear not to have been a problem in the present study. In particular, the free choice of language of interview probably eliminated the potentially most important bias in conducting survey work in Canada.

Measurement biases. One of the major controversies in the history of attitude measurement has been on the degree to which measurement biases can affect results of attitude studies. Three of the more prominent issues have been *acquiescence response set*, *social desirability* and *cross-cultural equivalence*.

The basic issue in acquiescence response set is whether some respondents have a consistent tendency or response style to agree (or conversely to disagree) with attitude statements. If such a response set does indeed exist, then attitude statements should be phrased in both positive and negative directions; that is, items should be constructed so that agreement with the statement sometimes indicates a positive attitude, and sometimes a negative attitude. When this prescription is followed, a scale is said to be "balanced," and a respondent who consistently agrees or disagrees with items of an attitude scale would achieve a score toward the middle of the scale.

This problem became a major issue in the study of the authoritarian personality, (Adorno et al., 1950), and indeed almost destroyed the credibility of the study (Christie & Jahoda, 1954). In the assessment of authoritarianism it is

of particular importance because the very dimension of authoritarianism may be a basis for the tendency to be acquiescent in responding to attitude scales.

In the present study, the problem of acquiescence generally presented itself in two forms. The first was the positive-negative balance of attitude scales, and the second was in the use of the standard 7-point scale. With respect to the first, the standard technique of "reversing" some items was employed in order to counteract acquiescent response set. For example in the multicultural ideology scale, six items were classified as integration items and two of these were negative; that is, on these two items a respondent who agreed with them would be assigned a lower rather than a higher score. Three other items (one segregation and two assimilation) were also scored as negative. Thus five of the nine items were negative and four were positive with respect to multicultural ideology, thereby yielding a balanced scale. Similar efforts were made to balance the perceived consequences of multiculturalism and of immigration scales.

In some scales, balancing could not be attempted because of the nature of the item content. This was true, for example, of multicultural programme attitudes and behavioural intentions. And in the case of standard scales such as authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, attempts at balancing would have changed the scales beyond the reach of comparability with other studies. We therefore decided to risk a component of acquiescence in order to maintain standardization and comparability. However, even in these unbalanced scales we have evidence that results from them are valid; this argument is based upon the concurrent validity of scores which can be seen in the correlational analyses. For example the unbalanced multicultural programme attitude scale correlated $+ .50$ and $+ .54$ with the balanced ideology and perceived consequences scales respectively; a similar level of correlation exists for the unbalanced behavioural intentions scale ($+ .52$ and $+ .48$ respectively). These are substantial indicators of covariation, and they are only marginally lower than the two coefficients which indicate the correlation between the two balanced ($+ .58$) and the two unbalanced ($+ .61$) multiculturalism scales. And they are only marginally lower than the correlation between the unbalanced authoritarianism and ethnocentrism scale scores ($+ .61$). Thus we may conclude that the presence or absence of balancing has not appreciably affected the correlations among scales, and further that the generally high level of covariation among scales, independent of balancing, demonstrates substantial concurrent validity.

Since the greatest problem of acquiescence traditionally has existed for the ethnocentrism and authoritarianism scales, it is important to note here that an essentially similar pattern of results emerges in both the ethnocentrism scale and in the analyses of ethnocentrism using the difference between ingroup and outgroup evaluation. Own group evaluation correlated $+ .37$ with the ethnocentrism scale, and the distribution of the scale results and the ingroup-outgroup results in Chapters 5 and 7 corresponded to a high degree. Given this congruence in results provided by our various approaches to the concept of ethnocentrism, we may claim some confidence in the validity of our

measurement.

The second aspect of acquiescence, as we noted earlier, is the tendency to use a higher (or conversely, a lower), range of the standard 7-point scale. Recognizing that such a tendency may be present, our analyses of ethnic attitudes (in the attitude matrix) employed a score based upon the *difference* between a respondent's rating of a particular ethnic group, and the average rating of all ethnic groups on that adjective by that respondent. That is, each respondent provided his or her own "neutral" point, and all his or her evaluations of ethnic groups were measured as deviations from that point. It may be noted, however, that an analysis of these attitudes employing the "raw" (rather than the "difference") scores exhibits essentially, the same pattern of evidence for the distribution of ethnic attitudes in the sample. This statistical check might have been unnecessary had we been able to reverse some of the ten adjectives in the matrix. That is if we had been able to have five of the adjectives positive and five negative, an internal balance might have been a sufficient check on acquiescence. However, many words in the English and French languages are "marked"; that is, one phrasing is neutral and the other is negative in ordinary usage (Adams-Webber & Benjafield, 1973). For example, if we ask how "important" a group is, the word "important" is both neutral and positive; however, if we were to ask how "unimportant" a group is, the word "unimportant" is only negative. A similar situation exists for terms such as Canadian, likeable, interesting. Thus to observe this phenomenon of many words being "marked," we had to employ terms which were generally positive in tone.

One term in the matrix, however, was negative in value: "stick together as a group." If respondents had been tending to employ consistently either high or low numbers on the 7-point scale, then we should expect to find all correlations positive. But this was not the case for "stick together as a group."

The other major category of bias has been termed one of *social desirability* (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). This bias stems from a presumed tendency of respondents to present a false picture of their attitudes, one which puts them in a more favourable light. For example there are general norms in a society which tend to limit the expression of racist or bigoted attitudes; similarly there may be a norm or temporary vogue for the expression of attitudes in particular ways (such as the choice of "Quebecois" in the question on ethnic identity, or the rejection of taxation in the question on multicultural behavioural intentions). In general there is little that can be done to detect or discount the effect of social desirability other than to include a scale to assess it as a respondent characteristic; however this takes up valuable space in a survey, and was not employed for that reason.

Evidence in our own data suggests that social desirability may have been present for some social issues and absent for others. For example "race" was an important criterion for classification of groups in the card sorting task, and non-European racial groups were clearly in the lower range of evaluations in the attitude matrix. However, in some other attitude items (e.g., the "purity of the

Canadian race" and "immigrants who are coloured") racism was not expressed. Thus there is evidence that overt racist sentiments are not being expressed, while other questions indicate that race is, nevertheless, an important dimension. This issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter 8.

Another example, one which has often been raised in the literature on attitude measurement, is that of differential awareness of these desirable social norms: those who have higher levels of education may not be more open in their social attitudes at all; they may simply be more aware of the socially acceptable response. Conversely, those with lower educational attainment may be less aware of these norms, and not in fact be more bigoted. In the present study, we certainly did find that on most attitudes, those with higher education were more positive in their views. However, for every educational level it was not the case that homogeneous views were expressed; on the contrary the whole range of attitudes could be detected in each category, although to different extents. It is thus difficult to argue that the assumed link between education and the awareness of socially desirable norms accounts for our results. Further, the alternative interpretation in terms of the greater threat felt by lower educational status groups is a plausible one, and is supported by the security analyses presented in Chapter 7. While we are not in a position to discount entirely the social desirability arguments, we are able to diminish them and to provide a plausible alternative explanation.

A final measurement issue is that of cross-cultural equivalence. The basic question is how to be sure when data from two cultural groups can be compared, and any observed differences interpreted as valid indicators of group differences (Berry, 1969). In the present study the issue is of particular importance in the interpretation of the observed differences in attitudes between Anglocelts and French Canadians. One approach has been suggested by Berry and Dasen (1974, p. 14); valid comparisons can be made when there exist three kinds of equivalence — *functional*, *conceptual* and *metric*.

Functional equivalence exists when the behaviour (in our case ethnic attitudes and discrimination) serve the same function in the two groups being compared. In Canada it is fair to assert that for all groups, ethnic attitudes serve to define the boundaries of one's own group and to orient one's group toward relationships with other groups. Thus the first kind of equivalence may be claimed.

Conceptual equivalence exists when the instruments (in our case the survey) possess the same meaning in two or more cultures. At the simplest level, this may be accomplished by translation controls. For example, our survey instrument was developed with mutual expression of ideas in both French and English kept in mind. Thus when it came time to render a French version, few problems were encountered. In the case of problems that did arise, the English and French language versions were modified until translation equivalence was attained. Our opinion is that such a procedure has yielded a single instrument with two equivalent versions, one in French and one in English.

One set of evidence for this opinion comes from the consistent difference

in attitudes between Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents; it is difficult to imagine a persistent, unvarying translation bias throughout all of the questionnaire so that such a constant pattern of attitudes would emerge. Further evidence derives from the fairly consistent difference between French-Canadian respondents and francophone "other ethnic" respondents in most attitudes. If one wanted to interpret the Angloceltic-French Canadian difference as a persistent translation or language bias, this could not account for differences *within* the French language version between these two francophone groups. Although the francophone "other ethnic" group was relatively small numerically, the consistent patterning of the data on this issue makes them a very important control for the issue of translation bias.

At a deeper level, it may be possible to assert that this is an "English-Canadian study; its conceptual framework, its ethnic attitude item content, and so on, are the concerns of English Canadians." Such an assertion cannot be ignored. It is indeed possible that such a bias is present in the study, leading to distortions in the data which have been gathered from the French Canadian and "other ethnic" respondents. To overcome such biases, Campbell (1961) has urged that every cross-cultural study should be done four times: once with a team from group A studying group B; once with a team from group B studying group A; and twice more with the team from each culture studying its own group. For Campbell, only then would it be possible to disentangle the sources of apparent differences which are contributed by the observer and those which actually exist in the observed. However, no study has yet accomplished this fourfold design, and so we share the bias with all of social science.

Finally, metric equivalence exists when the data from two groups are internally structured in similar ways. It has been argued that mean differences in behaviour between groups should only be compared when the statistical evidence suggests that there is a shared psychological construct. In the case of the present study, there has emerged a high degree of structural similarity. In the factor analysis and multidimensional analysis in Chapter 5, in the ethnocentrism analyses in this chapter, and in the way both French and Angloceltic attitudes correlated with our independent variables in similar ways, we have consistent evidence for the metric equivalence of the data gathered from the two major cultural groups in the study.

Over three kinds of equivalence, then, we have evidence that the observed differences are real, and that they may be interpreted as being valid indicators of attitudinal differences between Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents.

In summary, this final section has attempted to survey some of the more usual validity problems in attitude measurement, and to evaluate our own data in relation to them. Our view is that there are grounds for claiming a reasonable degree of concurrent, convergent and construct validity for our study, and for discounting various biases as major contributors to our findings.

Summary of Attitude Structure

In this chapter we have attempted to draw together some of the threads which have been carried through the study up till this point. Essentially, we have been concerned with four kinds of evidence: coherence, ethnocentrism, security and validity.

It is quite evident from both the correlational and factor analyses that most of the attitudes which have been gauged in this study cluster in a distinctive way. A general factor of ethnic prejudice emerged clearly, and this was a major element of the total attitude picture. A secondary factor also emerged, and it was concerned with attitudes toward specific ethnic groups. But overall we may safely say that the bulk of our attitudinal measures is associated with a core of general prejudice.

Secondly we have been able to determine the structure of intergroup attitudes, and thereby to assess the ethnocentrism hypothesis. There emerged a fairly clear pattern of support for the ethnocentrism hypothesis; for most ethnic groups, both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents progressively devalued the outgroup as they increasingly valued their own group. In only one analysis did the opposite structure appear: When these two ethnic categories of respondents evaluate each other, there is a positive relationship across the evaluative dimensions. However, even this finding may support the ethnocentrism hypothesis, for there is evidence that Anglocelts and French Canadians view each other, not as outgroups, but as mutual positive reference groups.

Finally, we have noted that, consistent with the earlier patterning of these attitudes according to objective indices of respondents' ethnicity and socioeconomic status, the two estimates of feelings of security emerged as theoretically plausible and empirically significant factors. Feelings of both cultural and economic security were clearly related to ethnocentrism, authoritarianism and to both immigration and multicultural attitudes. Although relationships with specific ethnic group attitudes were low, this reduced level of correlation is consistent with the earlier correlational and factor analyses. It is perhaps the case that general psychological orientations are related to general feelings of cultural and economic security, while more specific ethnic attitudes are to be accounted for by more specific variables which are not adequately represented in our variables.

Despite this, the picture which has emerged is one of large scale attitudinal coherence, displaying an ethnocentric structure, and this is related to individual and group indices of ethnicity and socioeconomic status, and to the feelings of security or insecurity which accompany such positions in Canadian society.



At the beginning of this volume, some basic questions were posed: in Chapter 1 these were phrased in general terms in relation to cultural history and policy in Canada; in Chapter 2 they were made more concrete by relating them to the specific features of this research. In both chapters, it was noted that while pursuing answers to these core questions, a number of supplementary issues would appear, some because of their expected logical or social relevance to the core, while some might emerge from the findings themselves. In this chapter, our intention is to display the themes which run through our data. Our previous analyses examined the data rather systematically; here the same findings will be considered thematically. Although no new findings will be presented, we recognize that *how* data are presented, can affect their meaning and interpretation. To permit a fuller understanding of the results of the survey, then, we have selected for discussion ten issues which stand out both in our data, and in the research literature on attitudes generally, and on intergroup attitudes in Canada specifically.

Public and Individual Attitudes

A common response to hearing about social psychological findings is that such things have been known all along. There are probably two sources of such a reaction. One is that research findings often resemble public pronouncements on the issue; that is, previous statements by officials, journalists, and opinion leaders often foreshadow the publication of research findings. A second source is that very often social psychological research confirms what many would regard as just "plain common sense." In the case of the present study, such a reaction might be that surveys are not necessary to tell us that French Canadians are not in favour of immigration, or that all people like their own groups more than they like others.

At least two answers are possible to such arguments. In the case of the first one, although there is clear documentation of public pronouncements against immigration into French Canada (see Chapter 1), such evidence does not provide any necessary indication about whether such attitudes are held in the population at large. There are probably highly variable relationships between public and private attitudes, ranging from perfect identity to large discrepancy; for any specific issue, this degree of inconsistency may not be known in advance. Thus public pronouncements may or may not be a sure indicator of private reactions, and only a survey or other individual-based research project is

likely to provide the answer. In the case of the present example, public assertions and policies about immigration in French Canada appear to be highly predictive of individual attitudes toward immigration; but in addition, they appear also to be predictive of multicultural and ethnic attitudes more generally. Thus, even in this case where there is a consistency between public pronouncements and private attitudes, a survey approach extends our knowledge well beyond the possible claims of those who "knew it already."

Furthermore, the survey can turn up unexpected results and question conventional wisdom. For example, the existence of mutually positive attitudes of Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents, and the lack of generational status differences, of differences between Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnics," and of differences between French Canadians in Quebec and outside Quebec on many attitudes, all counter both conventional knowledge and numerous public assertions. It should be apparent, then, that the present state of public or common knowledge is no sure guide to what individuals feel about these issues.

The second argument relates not so much to knowledge of public assertions, but to what is believed to be "common sense." In this case knowledge that an individual tends to like his or her own group more than all others is claimed to be obvious and self-evident. However, a social psychological analysis is able to confirm such propositions, and go well beyond them to the examination of ethnic or socioeconomic status differences in such a phenomenon, and further to relate it structurally to outgroup evaluations. Only with such research can the obvious be transcended.

Furthermore, on any particular question, there are often many "common sense" positions; that is, discrepant or contradictory positions may all be labelled as "common sense." In such a case, research is essential to arbitrate among them and to assess the relative validity of each position.

The argument being made, then, is that even with solid public indications, or with a firm basis in common sense, attitudes of the sort which have been investigated in this study can only be thoroughly described, understood and perhaps interpreted by sampling and assessing the individual attitudes which exist in the population at large.

The Issue of "Race"

The question of whether there is racism in Canada is often raised in the context of immigration and multiculturalism. The present survey clearly shows that Canadians reject explicit racism. Several questions involving "race" were asked, in two of the attitude domains. A majority of respondents rejected the idea that it would be wrong to "have coloured people for foremen and leaders over whites," or that the "purity of the Canadian race" would be affected by further immigration. A substantial majority also found "coloured" immigrants acceptable. A skeptical or even cynical interpretation of these findings would have it that the racial tolerance shown was due to the explicit and blunt form of questions. The survey format, depending on relatively direct questions, cannot

tap the more subtle manifestations of racism. But even a more straightforward interpretation of the finding that grants a sizable level of racial tolerance in Canada warrants caution. Explicit racism may be endorsed by only a minority of Canadians. However, it may become a problem for the implementation of multiculturalism and immigration policies to the extent that the racist minority becomes vocal and active.

Although explicit racism may not be characteristic of Canadians, race, i.e., visible physical differences among groups, is nevertheless an important dimension in the perception of groups. Canadian Indians, Chinese, Negroes, East Indians and Japanese were rated among the lowest on the adjective dimension "similar to me." Race was also implicated in one of the two basic dimensions in the structure of perceptions of ethnic groups. And finally in the card sort, cards with the labels "East Indian," "Arab" and "Chinese" were very rarely placed in the same pile as the cards labelled "Myself." The fact that Canadians use racial cues in the perception of ethnic groups does not necessarily mean, of course, that they are racist in the sense of treating certain races as inferior. It does mean, however, that race is an important aspect of intergroup relations.

Racism, in the sense of treating racially different groups as inferior, was evident in the evaluative ranking of groups (see Table 5.6). Of the 26 groups that could be ranked according to the evaluations they received, the bottom six groups contained four that are racially different. There were Chinese, Canadian Indians, Negroes and East Indians.

To summarize the findings concerning the issue of racism we can state that a majority of Canadians reject explicit racism. Race, however, is a salient dimension in the perception of ethnic groups. Implicit racism appeared in that racially different groups received the lowest evaluations. It should be noted in this connection that the survey technique has limitations in uncovering racism. Respondents may be reluctant to admit explicitly racist views in a country and at a time in history where racial tolerance is a norm. The survey technique, aiming to describe the views of the population at large, may also fail to reveal racism, if it should occur primarily in specific and circumscribed geographic pockets.

Attitudes in Anglophone Canada

A number of factors might lead us to expect differences in attitudes between Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia, since the concentration of "other ethnic" Canadians is greater in the West, and immigration patterns have differed in terms of time and origin. Furthermore, there is the supposed "rift" between East and West (between Metropolis and hinterland) which has figured in Canadian political history and is still frequently mentioned in the press. Yet the psychological orientations and immigration and multiculturalism attitudes were remarkably similar from Ontario westward. The most notable exception to this attitude similarity was the more positive evaluation of Ukrainians, Germans and Chinese in the Prairies and British Columbia.

The Atlantic provinces, although primarily anglophone, differed in several

respects from the rest of English Canada. Atlantic residents were second to those from Quebec in ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and had more negative attitudes toward immigration than residents of Ontario and regions to the West. However, the multiculturalism attitudes of Atlantic residents were as positive as those of the rest of English Canada. The signs of ethnic intolerance revealed by the first-mentioned attitudes may well be due to a combination of factors. The Atlantic provinces are more rural and less affluent than the rest of English Canada; these are generally factors associated with lower ethnic tolerance. This picture of less positive attitudes in the Atlantic provinces is consistent with existing research. For example, Meisel (1975, p.24) has noted that the Atlantic region, along with Quebec, exhibited the least liberalism and tolerance, and the most authoritarianism, of all Canadian provinces.

Attitudes of Angloceltic and "Other Ethnic" Canadians

An argument can be made that Canadians of "other ethnic" origin should have particularly positive attitudes in the areas of immigration and multiculturalism. These Canadians may wish to retain their ethnic heritage and ethnic identity and hence expect tolerance from others. Even those "other ethnic" Canadians who have integrated with the larger Canadian society might be sensitized to cultural diversity and accepting of it. This plausible difference in attitudes between Angloceltic and "other ethnic" Canadians did not occur. In fact, there were very few, if any, attitudinal differences between these categories of respondents. This finding can be interpreted in two ways depending on the perspective taken. We can take the response of "other ethnic" Canadians as a standard and regard it as a position of ethnic tolerance and acceptance of ethnic diversity. From this point of view, it is remarkable that Angloceltic Canadians are as ethnically tolerant as Canadians in minority positions who have a direct stake in ethnic tolerance. From this perspective, the outlook for ethnic relations in Canada is quite positive.

Another perspective is possible, however. We can take the response of Angloceltic Canadians as a standard and judge it as positive, but not extremely so. From this perspective, the less than completely positive response of "other ethnic" Canadians requires explanation. A likely possibility is the fact that "other ethnic" Canadians is a very inclusive category. It is comprised of persons from a variety of ethnic origins, of recent arrivals in Canada and those who have been here for generations. It also includes those who wish to preserve their ethnic heritage and identity and those who have assimilated. In other words, we are putting together a heterogeneous set of people who have a variety of attitudes which average out to the same level as those of Anglocelts. Whatever interpretation is favoured — and it is possible that both are correct — the present results clearly show that in terms of the attitudes under consideration, an "ethnic block" has no psychological reality.

Generational Status

Another aspect of ethnicity, generational status was only slightly related to the attitudes under investigation in the present study. There are at least two reasons why this finding is unexpected. First, the Non-Official Languages study (O'Bryan et al., 1975) found generational status to be a major variable. Knowledge of a "third" (i.e., "other ethnic") language decreased rapidly from generation to generation, as did a desire for "third" language retention. Desire for "third" language can be regarded as one aspect of support for multiculturalism. There was more direct evidence on the relationship between generational status and multicultural attitudes in the Non-Official Languages study. There was a steady decline in support for the multiculturalism policy from generation to generation.

A second reason for expecting a generation difference is the common view expressed by Keyfitz (1976) that people's regard for their ancestral culture changes from generation to generation. According to this view, immigrants frequently repudiate the ethnicity of their fathers because this ethnicity may be an obstacle to social mobility. The children of immigrants look down on their parents because of their imperfect mastery of new world culture. It is the third generation which shows an increased interest in and affiliation with the ancestral culture. Assuming that the repudiation of one's own ethnic background is associated with unfavourable attitudes toward multiculturalism in general, we would expect first and second generation Canadians of "other ethnic" origin to have less favourable attitudes than Canadians of less recent immigration.

The results of the present study are discrepant from the line of thinking exemplified by Keyfitz as well as from the findings of the Non-Official Languages study. Regarding the first discrepancy, our study shows that common sense reasoning, as plausible as it may appear, at times is not borne out by facts. The second discrepancy poses a more serious problem. Is the Non-Official Language study or the present investigation correct, concerning the relationship between generational status and multicultural attitudes? Or is it possible that both studies might be correct?

The apparent discrepancy between the two studies must be examined by taking note of differences in procedure between them. Respondents in the Non-Official Languages study were from the ten most numerous "other ethnic" groups in Canada and lived in the five largest urban centres. "Other ethnic" respondents in the present study were a much smaller but also more representative sample of "other ethnic" Canadians from 95% of the total population. The sample included respondents from most "other ethnic" groups, those from rural as well as all urban areas. A second major difference between the two studies lies in the variables under study. The Non-Official Languages study restricted its focus mainly to an investigation of the desire to retain the language of the respondent's own ethnic group. There was only one question dealing with multiculturalism in general. The interviewer read a statement describing the government's policy as helping cultural and ethnic groups in their efforts to keep their own cultural characteristics and heritages. Given that most

of the questions in the interview dealt with the respondent's own ethnic group, it is conceivable that even the general question on multiculturalism was interpreted as referring primarily to the respondent's own group. It is quite possible therefore that a positive attitude toward multiculturalism in the Non-Official Languages study meant a positive attitude toward applying the multiculturalism policy to one's own group.

The variables under investigation in the present study were broader in several respects. A number of attitude objects were involved: immigration, multicultural ideology, multicultural programmes, and ethnic groups. The basic meaning of multiculturalism in our study was tolerance for ethnic diversity in general. It appears therefore, that the two studies measured quite different attitudes. The Non-Official Languages study measured the attitude toward retaining one's own ethnicity, while the present study measured attitudes toward ethnic diversity in general. One of these attitudes does not necessarily imply the other. In other words one can be in favour of retaining one's own cultural heritage, without being at the same time in favour of other groups retaining their identity. Therefore, what appeared to be a contradiction between the two studies turns out to be most likely the result of dealing with two quite different attitudes toward multiculturalism.

Political Party Preference

Many of the attitudes were consistently patterned by the political party preference of respondents. Multicultural and immigration attitudes, in particular, differed according to the reported federal party preference of the respondents. Consistently the most negative attitudes were held by those supporting Social Credit and the Creditiste parties, among both anglophone and francophone respondents. There was also a consistent, but less strong, tendency for Liberal supporters to be the most positive in their attitudes among both anglophone and francophone respondents. However, among anglophone respondents both Progressive Conservative and New Democratic Party supporters tended to hold positive attitudes similar to those of Liberal supporters, while among francophone respondents the attitudes of Progressive Conservative supporters were more negative and similar to those of Creditiste supporters.

Although the ranking of attitude means by party preference is similar in both anglophone and francophone analyses, it must be noted that in keeping with the observed attitude differences between Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents, the most positive francophone party category (Liberals) generally exhibited attitudes at a level between anglophone Progressive Conservative and anglophone Social Credit supporters.

Interpretations of these consistent findings across most attitudes are not obvious; however they do correspond to what has been established in analyses of political behaviour in Canada (Meisel, 1975, p.23-25).

Socioeconomic Status

The role of socioeconomic status variables in the patterning of these atti-

tudes has emerged from many sources. Consistently, on attitudes toward immigration, on measures of discrimination, on multicultural ideology and programme attitudes, on scales of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism, and on a number of attitudes toward specific ethnic groups, those respondents of lower socioeconomic status exhibited less tolerant attitudes. And in those cases where attitudes toward one's own group were assessed, lower socioeconomic status respondents exhibited more favourable attitudes toward their own group. This pattern is again one of ethnocentrism, a pattern in which positive ingroup attitudes are combined with relatively negative outgroup attitudes, and in which intolerance of diversity and outgroup discrimination are manifested. Of the three socioeconomic status variables, education emerged as the strongest, and the most consistent variable.

A number of explanations are possible for this pattern of results. First, it may be the case that those lower in education were less wary about expressing ethnocentric attitudes; this possibility is often advanced, and has been acknowledged in our earlier discussion of response biases.

Related to this possible explanation is one advanced by Seiznick and Steinberg (1969). In their view, western society contains at least two "cultures" – one common and one enlightened – and prejudice and ethnocentrism are simply part of the common culture. Education, in their view, enlightens the belief system, freeing it from prejudice. In other words new cultural norms are acquired with education; these are not simply norms for *expressing* liberal attitudes (as was argued in the case of response bias) but norms about tolerating other groups in the society.

Another possibility which has often been suggested is that those in lower socioeconomic groups are more threatened by immigration and by ethnic groups which may compete directly with them for economic resources. We have seen in Chapter 7 (Table 7.7) that there are indeed relatively lower feelings of cultural and economic security among those lower in socioeconomic status. Thus feelings of threat or insecurity which seem to accompany lower status positions in society may contribute to this consistent expression of more negative ethnic attitudes.

However, two factors would tend to counteract this interpretation. One is that there has been a dramatic shift in recent years toward higher status immigration. This being the case, such a general explanation would lead one to expect ethnocentric attitudes among higher status respondents as well, but this pattern did not emerge. It may be that lower status respondents still think of immigration as being primarily in the lower socioeconomic ranges; this would maintain a "perceived threat" among these respondents, a situation consistent with their more ethnocentric attitudes. The second bit of evidence derives from recent analyses of an earlier national study (Curtis & Lambert, 1975; 1976). These studies tend to discount the status dissatisfaction or economic insecurity variable as a major contributor to ethnic attitudes in Canada. When education and occupational status are statistically controlled, there remain no significant relationships between dissatisfaction and ethnic attitudes among

English Canadians; among French Canadians a small effect was found, but only on attitudes toward two groups (Curtis & Lambert, 1975, p.185).

A fourth possible explanation is that since ethnicity and socioeconomic status are related in the Canadian population (Porter, 1965, Chap. 3; Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book IV, 1969, p. 40-41, 50-53 and 100-107), and in our sample (Table 3.19), apparent status effects may really be ethnicity effects. However, in Chapter 7 (Table 7.5), we noted that education (as an index of status) independent of ethnicity, significantly affected most of the attitudes examined in this study. Furthermore, analyses by occupational status essentially paralleled these educational analyses. That is, we cannot discount the effects of status on attitudes on the basis of its covariation with ethnicity.

We are faced, then, with a consistent and robust phenomenon; we are also faced with a number of possible explanations of the phenomenon. Unfortunately, all the explanations receive some support in the literature, and none can be entirely discounted on the basis of the data in our study. Whatever the explanation, though, it is clear that attitudes do vary with socioeconomic status.

Canadian Indians and Other Native Peoples

A number of references have been made to Canadian Indians and other native peoples over the course of this volume, and there is some suggestion of a special status in the patterning of the findings. Before discussing this, however, it is important to recall that the sampling frame excluded the 5% of the Canadian population which lives in the Northwest Territories or the northern reaches of the provinces. In addition, those resident on reservations were also excluded. The effect of this sampling strategy was to reduce greatly the number of native peoples in the sample. Two consequences of this exclusion are apparent. First, with so few in the sample, the attitudes they held, as an ethnic category, could not be analysed separately. This is a serious loss; although we have made much of the analyses of the attitudes of the two European-derived charter groups, we are unable to do so in the case of Canada's original inhabitants. Secondly, because they are minimally-represented in the sample, their "own group" attitudes are not part of the overall picture which we have obtained. On the assumption that most groups hold more positive attitudes toward themselves than toward others, the effect of this is to render the overall evaluation mean in the total sample lower than it would have been if native peoples had been fully-represented in the sample.

Even though the attitudes of native people are not well-represented in the study, attitudes toward native peoples are a definite part of our results. First in the analysis of awareness of ethnic groups, Indians, Metis or Eskimo (Inuit) were not in the first twenty-five groups mentioned. This could be due to relatively low visibility (except in the more northern areas, where non-native respondents were also under-represented). However, it is more likely due to the phrasing of the question in terms of people who arrived in Canada "from vari-

ous parts of the world over the past few hundred years." We may consider their absence from Table 5.1 to be in all likelihood a function of the question, rather than a lack of awareness of native peoples.

On the assumption that native peoples are a visible part of the Canadian population, and because of their indigenous status, Canadian Indians were selected as one of the groups in the card sorting task and in the attitude matrix. Looking first at the results of the card sort, we found (Table 5.2) that among both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents, there was a fairly high frequency of placement of the three native groups with the "Myself" card. About one third of Angloceltic respondents placed "Canadian Indian" and "Canadian Eskimo" with "Myself," as did the French-Canadian respondents for Canadian Indian; these frequencies dropped to around 20% for "Métis" for both groups of respondents and for "Canadian Eskimo" for French-Canadian respondents. These frequencies are remarkably high, and are exceeded only for "English Canadian," "French Canadian" and "Québécois" in both groups of respondents.

When these card sorts were subjected to multi-dimensional scaling, both Angloceltic and French-Canadian analyses exhibited a fairly definite clustering around "Myself." In both cases this cluster included "Myself," "English Canadian," "French Canadian," "Québécois," "Canadian Indian," "Canadian Eskimo," and "Métis" (with the latter being marginal in the French-Canadian analysis). What appears to be occurring is that a distinction is being made between charter groups and native peoples on the one hand, and more recent immigrant groups on the other. There is some indication, then, that native peoples are not "ethnic groups" like ethnic groups from other than British and French background, that there is some recognition of their special status as "pre-charter" or "quasi-charter" groups.

When we turn to the attitudes and stereotypes held about native peoples, we are only able to provide information about Canadian Indians, since they alone were selected as a standard group. The other native groups were not frequently nominated as attitude groups by the respondents. Looking first at stereotypes of Canadian Indians (Table 5.5), they were seen as above the average on "Canadian" and "stick together." Since they were here first and have been set apart on reservations, this result holds no surprise. They were also above the average on "interesting" (Table 5.4), but not significantly so. Canadian Indians were not considered to be (that is, were rated below the average on) "hardworking," "clean," "similar to me," "wealthy" and "well known to me." For some of these (e.g., "wealthy") there is evidence of objective appraisal in national income statistics. For others (e.g., "similar to me" and "well known to me") there is a consistency with above average rating on "stick together." All three ratings suggest that the Canadian Indians are viewed as really quite distinctive in the Canadian mosaic. In one sense this confirms the results of the card sorting task (where they were distinct from "other ethnic" groups), but in another sense, their low rating on "similar to me" contradicts the clustering of native peoples around "Myself" on that task. This situation may indicate that indeed they are a marginal people in the Canadian mosaic (Berry, 1971; 1975).

This suggested position of being near the charter groups and yet not entirely accepted by them is supported in the attitude analyses. Of the ten standard groups, Canadian Indians were lowest on the overall evaluation (Table 5.6). They were exceeded only by "Negro" and "East Indian," both of which were nominated as target groups by the respondents themselves. As we noted in the discussion on stereotypes, Canadian Indians were below average on ratings of "hardworking" and "clean," both adjectives which enter into the overall evaluation score. On the other four objectives which entered into this score, we have noted that on two of them ("Canadian" and "interesting") they were rated above the average. But of the remaining two, on "important" they were rated second lowest, exceeded only by the rating of Chinese Canadians and matched by the rating of Ukrainian Canadians; and on "likeable," they were rated second lowest, exceeded only by the rating of Jewish Canadians and matched only by the ratings of Chinese Canadians and Italian Canadians.

Finally in the analyses of the ethnocentrism hypothesis, there was some evidence that the hypothesis did not hold with respect to Canadian Indians. Angloceltic and French-Canadian views of each other were generally correlated positively but their views of some "other ethnic" groups were generally correlated negatively. The structure of attitudes toward Canadian Indians fitted neither pattern, the correlations being near zero. Given the clear structures and significant correlations found for most other groups, the finding of no relationship for Canadian Indians is an important exception; once again there emerges something special about attitudes toward native Canadians.

A picture has emerged of Canadian Indians (and of native peoples more generally) which shows that they hold a unique position in the structure of Angloceltic and French-Canadian attitudes, but that this position is highly ambiguous. On the one hand they are given special status as Canadians, one which appears to be related to their indigenous presence; but on the other hand they are clearly relegated to the bottom of the ethnic hierarchy. In short it would be fair to say that they occupy a marginal position, and are rejected by the larger Canadian society.

Attitudes of Ukrainian and Russian Canadians.

There were reasonably consistent results in the present study indicating that Canadians of Ukrainian and Russian descent were less positive in the attitudes under consideration than members of other non-English/non-French ethnic groups. These results appear to be in conflict with findings from the Non-Official Languages study, where Ukrainians were among those groups showing the strongest support for the multiculturalism policy. When the responses of Ukrainians and Russians were compared as a group with those from other non-English/non-French origins, and with Angloceltic and French Canadians, the following pattern emerged (see Appendix 8.1). Ukrainians and Russians were less positive than the rest of the "other ethnic" groups and Anglocelts in their perception of consequences of immigration. They were particularly concerned, more so in fact than French Canadians, about unemployment. They also had the

most negative attitude, more negative again than French Canadians, concerning the acceptability of various types of immigrants. In particular they were least likely of all groups to find "coloured immigrants" and "immigrants from communist countries" acceptable. Ukrainian and Russian respondents were also more likely than those of other non-British/non-French origin to show discrimination against immigrants, to perceive negative consequences of multiculturalism and to score high on the ethnocentrism scale. In contrast to these results, Ukrainians and Russians were no different from other anglophone groups in multicultural ideology and in attitudes toward multicultural programmes. Ukrainian and Russian respondents were in fact most positive of all groups toward third language teaching in the schools.

This pattern of results becomes understandable, and apparent contradictions between the present and the Non-Official Languages study disappear, when the differences in context of the interviews on the two studies are acknowledged. Firstly the Non-Official Languages study was mainly concerned with the retention of one's own language, while the primary concern in the present study was with the acceptance of the ethnicity of others, and with the tolerance of ethnic diversity in general. The difference in the context of the interviews could well have coloured the meaning of multiculturalism such that support for multiculturalism in the Non-Official Languages study meant support for the policy as applied to one's own group. Support for multiculturalism in the present study, however, meant support for applying the policy to all groups. Given this interpretation, the results from the two studies are quite compatible. Canadians of Ukrainian and Russian origin may be strongly in favour of multiculturalism in the sense of wanting to retain and develop their own cultural identity. However, they may be less strongly in favour of multiculturalism than Canadians of other non-British/non-French origin, in the sense of allowing and encouraging all ethnocultural groups to develop their identity. Such a pattern of attitudes held by Ukrainian and Russian Canadians may be explained in a similar fashion as French-Canadian attitudes (see next two sections). The cultural survival of Ukrainians and Russians is more threatened than that of other ethnic groups because of a number of factors. Immigration and prospects for immigration for these two groups are virtually nonexistent. Travel and communication with their country of origin is severely restricted. Finally, the ethnic identity and survival of Ukrainian and other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union is threatened in their own homeland by a totalitarian government. It may well be that in response to such cultural threat, Ukrainians and Russians have adopted a "siege orientation" (Baker, 1973) which at the psychological level involved the adoption of a posture of ethnocentrism.

An alternative explanation is also possible. In the present study, many of the questions were concerned with immigration into Canada, and even some of the questions about the multiculturalism policy employed terms such as "immigrant" and "people who come to Canada". While these terms were chosen primarily for their relevance to members of the two charter groups, and have been shown to be appropriate for those respondents, it is likely that they were far

less suitable for members of the "other ethnic" groups. And it may be that these attitude items were even less appropriate for Ukrainian and Russian Canadians for two reasons: one is that, as we have already noted, further immigration from these areas is unlikely; and the other is that over 80% of those two ancestral origins were born in Canada, and do not accept the "immigrant bias" of the survey context. Thus an alternative explanation to the earlier one is simply that for some groups the present study too closely attaches multiculturalism as a concept to current immigration as a practice. Whatever the explanation or interpretation of this phenomenon, there clearly exist important attitudinal differences between the Ukrainian and Russian Canadian respondents and the balance of the "other ethnic" sample.

Mutual Attitudes of Angloceltic and French Canadians

From the data there has emerged a fairly consistent indication that Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents possess relatively positive attitudes toward each other. For example, on the card sorting task, each group often included the other in the same pile, and on the evaluative attitude dimensions, each group held relatively positive attitudes toward the other. Furthermore, Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents tended to rate each other fairly highly on the "similar to me" dimension. From the factor analysis for ratings of the standard ethnic groups on the attitude dimensions a "charter group" factor emerged for both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents. Finally, in those immigration and multicultural attitude items concerned with English and French relations and the positions of English and French in Canada, there is little indication that the charter groups feel apprehensive about each other; however, this is relatively more true for Angloceltic than for French-Canadian respondents. Thus, there would seem to be converging evidence for mutually positive attitudes between Angloceltic and French Canadians. This pattern of results led to the conclusion in Chapter 7 that Angloceltic and French Canadians serve as positive reference groups for each other.

One possible explanation is that when Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents are asked about their attitudes in the context of multiculturalism, judgements of similarity and mutual acceptance emerge; but when they are asked about their attitudes in the context of biculturalism, relative dissimilarity and mutual rejection become manifest.

A series of studies which focused on the identity pattern of French and English Quebecers illustrates the differences that emerge in the context of biculturalism and multiculturalism. Two studies (Taylor, Simard & Aboud, 1972; Taylor, Bassili, & Aboud, 1973) examined ethnic identity in a situation where Quebecers of other than British or French origin were not included in the context of the study. In those studies, French-Canadian respondents identified more with Quebec than with Canada. By contrast English-Canadian respondents identified more with English Canadians and Canada, and felt somewhat removed from French Canadians and Quebec.

A subsequent study by Simard, Mercier, and de Brain Gareau (1976) using

the same methodology examined the identity of French Canadians but in this case the context was one of multiculturalism; that is, "other ethnic" groups were included in the context of the study. The results showed that French Canadians identified most closely with French-speaking groups; however they did feel that on certain dimensions English Canadians served as a positive reference group.

It would seem that identification with groups and the ethnic attitudes which ensue are not static. As the context shifts so too may ethnic attitudes and allegiances. In the present case it may be that conflicts can be heightened or diminished depending upon the social context. Specifically, the comparative context of intergroup relations may be a crucial factor in determining how Angloceltic and French Canadians relate to each other. Such reasoning suggests that the multicultural context may actually promote bicultural acceptance, however, it may do so at the risk that the charter groups reject the "other ethnic" groups.

Although it may be the case that mutual attitudes have become more accepting, it is still an open question whether this mutual acceptance is beneficial or detrimental to actual relationships between Angloceltic and French Canadians. For, as Rocher (1976) has argued, the conflict which exists between the two groups may be obscured by both the mutually positive attitudes, and by the deflection of interest away from French-English relations to ethnic relations more generally in the multicultural society.

French Canadian Attitudes

There are two components of the French-Canadian profile of attitudes which have important implications for multiculturalism. On the one hand French Canadians had an extremely favourable perception of their own group and a positive attitude toward English Canadians. On the other hand, French Canadians were more negative than others in their reactions to groups of other than British or French origin, toward immigration and multiculturalism. In short, French Canadians evidenced a profile of attitudes which can be described as ethnocentric and this pattern was more pronounced for French Canadians than for any other Canadian ethnic group.

The importance of the positive own group evaluation was discussed in Chapter 5 where it was noted that some literature had alluded to rather negative own group evaluations on the part of French Canadians in the 1950s (Lambert, 1967; Lamarche, 1975-1976; Larimer, 1972). This shift in own group attitudes is reflected in the observation that there have been a number of institutional changes in Quebec which are the "results of deep-seated rapid changes in the ideology of French Quebecers who, since about the middle of the 1960s, have considered themselves not the Canadian minority but the Quebec majority" (Gendron Commission, 1972, p.14).

The history of French-Canadian nationalism is a consistent but complex theme in Canadian history (see Cook, 1969). From the British conquest of new France in 1763 to the present, French Canada has struggled against assimilation

into English Canada. In the 1930s industrialization came to French Canada, a world created by the English, and this no doubt contributed to the psychological feeling among French Canadians that they were a Canadian minority. There was a desire on the part of French Canadians to integrate into the dominant English economic and social structure. Such circumstances may explain the relatively positive image French Canadians had of English Canadians and the feelings of own group inferiority. However, later French Canadians developed a new sense of identity with their own group, and in this case a positive social identity. This sequence of intergroup dynamics follows closely Tajfel's (1974) theory of intergroup relations. He proposes that members of a disadvantaged group will first make attempts at individual social mobility with the aim being to "pass" or become accepted into the more powerful group. To the extent that such a strategy is not possible, group strategies for changing the status of the group will be taken. These will include re-evaluating features of the group which were previously believed to be undesirable. Such a process may explain the development of positive own group evaluations by French Canadians. Aspects of French-Canadian language and culture which had previously been evaluated negatively have been re-evaluated and now serve as a basis for a positive own group identity.

Associated with the positive ingroup evaluations among French Canadians was the corresponding negative outgroup attitudes. French Canadians scored higher on authoritarianism and ethnocentrism scales. They were less favourable in their attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism and they proved to be less positive about "other ethnic" groups than members of the other ethnicity categories. This is not to say that *all* or even a majority of French Canadians have negative attitudes. It does mean that French Canadians are more negative in their attitudes than members of the other major groups in Canada.

Two possible explanations for this finding have already been eliminated through detailed data analysis. It might be argued that because most French Canadians are Catholic, their ethnic attitudes may have something to do with Catholicism. The present study found however that anglophone Catholics were no different in their attitudes from members of the United and Anglican churches. It might also be argued that because French Canadians live in Quebec, the socio-political climate of Quebec may be responsible for their attitudes. Results from our study indicated that such is not the case. French Canadians outside Quebec were very similar to French Canadians living in Quebec and anglophone Quebecers resembled anglophones from other regions.

The negative attitudes among French Canadians follow directly from a number of social psychological theories given the historical and sociocultural conditions of Canada. A variety of theories of intergroup relations has emerged, some dealing with societal processes (e.g., the Realistic Group Conflict Theory, which sees economic competition as a basis for prejudice; see LeVine and Campbell, 1972), others dealing with individualistic psychological processes (e.g., scapegoat theories of prejudice). The basic assumption of Realistic Group

Conflict theory is that intergroup hostility is caused by real conflict between groups, over scarce resources (including economic and political resources), and that ethnic attitudes can be understood in terms of both these conflicts and the ensuing perceptions of threat which result (see Despres, 1975). In an attempt to systematize the variety of hypotheses which are generated by Realistic Group Conflict theory, Levine and Campbell (1972) enumerated a number of propositions which follow from the basic assumptions of the theory. The more relevant of these have been listed below, so we can examine the extent to which Realistic Group Conflict theory provides a meaningful explanation of French-Canadian attitudes.

- 1) Real conflict of group interests causes intergroup conflict.
- 2) Real threat causes hostility to the source of threat.
- 3) Real threat causes ingroup solidarity.
- 4) Real threat causes increased awareness of own ingroup identity.
- 5) Real threat increases the tightness of group boundaries.
- 6) Real threat increases ethnocentrism.
- 7) The weakest group should be the most ethnocentric.
- 8) The strongest and most threatening outgroup should be the target of the most ethnocentric hostility from the ingroup.
- 9) Intergroup conflict is reduced by superordinate common goals or shared threats.

There are a number of aspects of the socio-political and historical reality of French Canada which converge to explain why an ethnocentric pattern of attitudes among French Canadians would emerge. First, the very survival of the French culture and language is threatened in the context of English domination in North America. This insecurity was reflected in the data reported in Chapter 7 where French-Canadian respondents revealed lower feelings of security than Angloceltic respondents. What makes the cultural survival issue even more crucial are the dual effects of declining birth rate in Quebec (see Arés, 1975), and the tendency for immigrants to integrate within the anglophone community. The French-Canadian population grew from about seventy thousand right after the conquest to millions today. This increase is all the more remarkable when it is realized that it occurred with virtually no migration into French Canada from any source, including the country of origin. French-Canadian survival then depended upon internal growth and hence the drop in birth rate presents a realistic threat to cultural survival.

The recent waves of immigration to Quebec have only made the issue of survival more salient. Most newly-arrived groups have oriented themselves to the English population (see Gendron Commission, 1972) with the result that the stable balance between the anglophone and French community will be dramatically changed if this trend continues. This issue is reflected in the present study where the standard groups we chose to study are all groups who have integrated to some extent within the anglophone social structure. This is certainly the case for Ukrainian and Chinese Canadians. Italian and Jewish Cana-

dians who do contribute significantly to ethnic diversity in Quebec have tended to opt for integration with the anglophone sector. Because of these issues it is reasonable to describe French Canada as a "siege culture" (Baker, 1973), and the result is a pattern of ethnocentric attitudes which would seem only reasonable under the circumstances.

Beyond the French-Canadian concern for cultural survival there is the more pervasive issue of the social and economic status of French Canadians vis-à-vis English Canadians. The economically advantaged position of Anglo-celtic Canadians has been well documented and was reviewed earlier in this volume. Through the processes of social comparison (see LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Tajfel, 1974) feelings of relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970; Crosby, 1976) are bound to emerge among French Canadians. The historical as well as present conflicts involving cultural survival and economic equity are the realities which allow us some understanding of French-Canadian attitudes. As would be expected from Realistic Group Conflict theory, there has emerged in French Canada ingroup solidarity, awareness of own ingroup identity, tightness of group boundaries and ethnocentrism. One prediction from Realistic Group Conflict theory did not emerge in the present study. Although Anglocelts are to some extent a powerful source of threat, they were not the particular target of French-Canadian ethnocentrism. In fact, as was discussed previously, French Canadians had a generally positive attitude toward English Canadians. There are a number of reasons why such a finding did not emerge. First, Anglocelts are not the only source of conflict; as we noted earlier groups of other than British or French origin may pose a threat to French-Canadian culture. Second, Anglocelts are a powerful group and hence there may be some fear of retaliation (see Coser, 1964). Third, as was noted earlier there may indeed be French-Canadian ethnocentrism toward English Canadians but this may not have surfaced due to the multicultural context of the study. Finally, French and English Canadians share certain features as the two charter groups which might serve to reduce intergroup hostility somewhat.

French-Canadian ethnocentrism then is viewed here as a natural outgrowth of realistic conflict. This is in opposition to the view that ethnocentrism is an inherent feature of the French-Canadian personality. This is not to suggest, however, that French-Canadian ethnocentrism is superficial. The conflicts that have led to these attitudes have existed for centuries and as such they are bound to become deeply rooted.

The conditions which have given rise to French-Canadian ethnocentrism may also be responsible for other attitudes which prevail in French Canada. These attitudes are ones which develop as a group attempts to change its disadvantaged position. Tajfel (1974) has elaborated three group strategies which might be applied to French Canadians. 1) Direct social action; 2) re-evaluation of existing group characteristics; and 3) creation of new valued group characteristics. The first form of group action involves a direct attempt by the disadvantaged group to compete effectively with the advantaged group on already defined lines of social comparison. This may take the form of training members of


the group for status positions, of actively seeking positions of power within the established system or of capitalizing on existing features of the group which bring status within the established society. This process may explain why the French-Canadian respondents in our study emphasized certain similarities between themselves and English Canadians; by so doing the group was able to capitalize on their charter group status, which gave them a basis for a positive social comparison with Anglocelts. This positive social comparison in turn contributes positively to their social identity.

A second form of group action involves the development of a new kind of distinctiveness based on some existing group characteristics. Characteristics which have previously been perceived by the group to be inferior are reinterpreted so that they acquire positively valued distinctiveness from the advantaged group. This "prise de conscience" is often initiated by an active minority (see Moscovici, 1972) but as the new found distinctiveness begins to contribute positively to social identity the process will be diffused quickly to all group members.

Manifestations of this re-evaluation of existing group characteristics are evident in French Canada. The recent pride of French Canadians in their language and dialect, the new felt need to preserve language and culture even to the point of separation, and the extremely positive self image evidenced by French Canadians in our study are concrete examples of the operation of this process.

The third form of group action involves the creation of *new* group characteristics which have a positively valued distinctiveness from the advantaged group. This process of social originality or the creation of new distinctive characteristics has associated with it a new problem; that of convincing the advantaged group that the new characteristics represent a legitimate basis for comparison. Will the other group acknowledge the new image, separate but equal or even superior? The development of new ideologies and political objectives in Quebec may be good examples of social originality and we might anticipate the development of new ideologies from other disadvantaged groups in the near future.

The ethnocentric pattern of French-Canadian attitudes would seem to be understandable in terms of the threat to cultural survival and the unique history of intergroup relations in Canada. Based on this analysis the focus for promoting positive attitudes toward multiculturalism is clear: Rather than attempting to convince French Canadians of the desirable features of "other ethnic" groups it would seem necessary to ensure the survival of French Canada and promote a more equitable distribution of power and status.



In the first chapter of this volume two major questions were posed. One was whether Canadians view cultural diversity as a valuable resource, and the other whether confidence in one's own identity is prerequisite for accepting others (the multicultural assumption). An attempt is made in the present chapter to answer these questions in the light of the findings of this investigation. The first section of this chapter examines the climate for multiculturalism in Canada while a second section examines the multicultural assumption and proposes conditions conducive to intergroup tolerance.

The Climate for Multiculturalism

In Chapter 1 a distinction was made between multiculturalism as a social fact and multiculturalism as government policy. And in Chapter 7 we have seen that there is a strong pattern of inter-relationships generally among attitudes toward multiculturalism, defined at the levels of both policy and fact. Indeed this primary attitude pattern also included orientations toward immigration and measures of general ethnic prejudice. Thus respondents as a whole exhibited a coherent set of attitudes in which the domain of multiculturalism is linked to the domain of immigration, and both are linked to general prejudice. This implies that any summary statement about the climate for multiculturalism will reveal few inconsistencies across these levels and domains.

Concerning multiculturalism as a social fact, the present study revealed a reasonably high level of overt, or explicit tolerance for ethnic diversity. Specifically, ethnocentrism scores were quite low. Attitudes toward immigration and immigrants were generally positive. Respondents saw consequences of further immigration to be on the positive side. Immigrants of various types, including coloured immigrants, were found to be acceptable. Respondents also expressed positive intentions to interact with immigrants. When various ethnic groups were evaluated, few groups received low ratings. Multiculturalism ideology and the perceived consequences of multiculturalism were quite positive. Respondents generally saw value in cultural diversity; they were also willing to tolerate the retention and expression of ethnicity, and they saw the consequences of multiculturalism to be an asset for Canada.

However, a certain level of covert concern and reluctance to accept ethnic diversity was also uncovered. Although overt racism was rejected, race was shown to be an important dimension for categorizing people, and those ethnic groups that are racially different from the charter groups were found to be at

the bottom of the perceived ethnic group hierarchy. Although respondents expressed a willingness to interact with immigrants, they still preferred members of the charter groups over immigrants; in other words, they showed prejudice. The present study also gives rise for some concern in that two segments of the population, that is, French Canadians and persons of lower socioeconomic status, displayed consistently less positive attitudes. Specifically, French Canadians and those of lower socioeconomic status scored higher on measures of prejudice; their attitudes toward immigration and "other ethnic" groups were less positive; and they placed a lower value on cultural diversity.

Concerning multiculturalism as government policy, the present study revealed a considerable lack of knowledge. Only a small minority had specific knowledge of the present government policy. However, a great majority also indicated that assimilation was *not* Canada's policy, but correctly identified integration as government policy. The fact that the results from the multiculturalism ideology scale were quite positive indicates general ideological support for the government's programme. However, results also showed that the degree of support depends on the specific programmes involved. We can expect quite a positive reception for community centres and folk festivals. Somewhat negative reactions are likely to accompany such options as third language teaching and broadcasting. Also detracting from the overall positive picture is the fact that behavioural intentions toward multiculturalism were less positive than ideology.

What then are the prospects for multiculturalism in Canada? We can expect multiculturalism, both as social fact and as state policy, to be generally accepted. Although there is no reason to assume that attitudes of the sort measured in this study fluctuate from year to year, some change is possible. Multicultural and ethnic attitudes may change for the worse if the economic situation deteriorates or if the current racial composition in Canada changes drastically as a function of further immigration. Furthermore, shifts in other policies and programmes (such as Bilingualism), or current issues (such as constitutional arrangements), or rising political movements (such as regional discontent) may all seriously alter the level and patterning of these attitudes.

Analysis of the Multicultural Assumption

Although knowledge of the psychological climate for multiculturalism is important, it does not, of course, provide the rationale for implementing a policy regarding multiculturalism. When the policy was announced in fact, the climate was largely unknown. Yet the government had a very explicit rationale for initiating the current policy. The Prime Minister outlined a three-stage argument for promoting multiculturalism. First the policy's joint goals were to "break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies" and thus assure "the cultural freedom of Canadians" (Prime Minister's Statement, October 1971, p.2). Secondly, it was asserted that such cultural group freedom from discrimination "must be founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes

and assumptions" (ibid). Finally, it proposed that "a vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence" (ibid). In short, the Prime Minister essentially proposed a theoretical position which holds that the promotion of multiculturalism leads to increased confidence in one's own identity which in turn leads to respect for the identity of others. The purpose of this section is to examine results from the present investigation that bear on the second part of the Prime Minister's contention. Is confidence in one's own identity in fact associated with tolerance for others?

A direct measure of "confidence in one's identity" is not possible. It is a concept which must be operationalized, and a number of operational meanings are possible. In order to test the multicultural assumption we therefore need to make certain assumptions concerning measures which may be indirect indices of confidence. If we assume that individuals with a strong confidence in their own identity evaluate their own group highly we can examine the relationships between own group versus other groups evaluations as a test for the multiculturalism assumption. This examination shows the assumption to be incorrect. At the level of aggregate analysis, it has been shown that French Canadians evaluated themselves more highly than Angloceltic Canadians did. Yet this higher self evaluation on the part of the French Canadians did not extend to the evaluation of other groups. In fact, other groups were evaluated less favourably by French Canadians than by Anglocelts. Similar findings were obtained at the level of individual differences. An extensive test of the ethnocentrism hypothesis in Chapter 7 showed that, generally, the more positively an individual evaluates his or her own group the more negatively he or she evaluates "other ethnic" groups. In this context, a positive ingroup attitude is associated with a negative outgroup attitude. It seems, therefore, that by employing own group evaluation as a measure of confidence in one's own identity, the results of this investigation go contrary to the multiculturalism assumption.

If we rely on a different measure of confidence, however, the multiculturalism assumption appears to be validated. In Chapter 7, measures of economic and cultural security were developed and their relationship to the various attitude domains demonstrated. Individuals who were secure in their economic and cultural context were also tolerant of "other ethnic" groups and had generally positive attitudes toward cultural diversity. Results involving cultural and economic security, therefore, appear to support the multiculturalism assumption that confidence in one's own identity is associated with respect for the identity of others.

What are we to conclude from these apparently contradictory results? Is the multiculturalism assumption half correct and half incorrect? The answer to this last question is clearly "no." What emerges, however, from this analysis of the multiculturalism assumption are its conceptual ambiguities. In fact, the Prime Minister's statement and the government's response to Book IV of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism contain several similar yet distinct terms. In addition to "confidence in one's own identity" the phrases "feeling of security in one particular social context" and "sen-

sitivity to own identity and to the richness of the country'' are used. Are the psychological characteristics named by these phrases equivalent? No conclusive answer is possible. It does seem clear that own group evaluation and cultural and economic security cannot be simultaneously measures of confidence. In fact in our study own group evaluation and the two measures of security were negatively related. Individuals who gave the most positive own group evaluation were the most insecure. These results are quite consistent with the ethnocentrism hypothesis and the theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950) outlined in Chapter 3. According to Adorno et al. the positive evaluation by the ethnocentric person of his or her own group does not result from an objective appraisal. On the contrary the ethnocentric person is incapable of objective self appraisal. Instead his or her positive ingroup attitudes are the result of uncritical glorification of the ingroup. This glorification or exaggerated positive evaluation of the ingroup is a defense against feelings of ambivalence. Without endorsing completely the psychodynamic theory on which the study of the authoritarian personality was based, it seems clear that positive evaluation of one's own group can be a defensive reaction against feelings of insecurity and ambivalence. We would not then expect a positive self evaluation that is based on defensiveness to be associated with tolerance toward others. If we in fact assume that the measure of own group evaluation employed in the present study is primarily a measure of defensive own group attitudes, a number of apparent contradictions disappear. Results bearing upon the relationship between own group and ''other ethnic'' group no longer invalidate the multiculturalism assumption, but these results can be interpreted as supporting the Prime Minister's contention. The apparent contradiction between the multiculturalism assumption and the ethnocentrism hypothesis also disappears. Both hypotheses can be interpreted as saying that confidence based on the objective appraisal and acceptance of one's own group is associated with tolerance for other groups. Such objective appraisal and acceptance involves the acknowledgement and recognition of the faults as well as the virtues of one's own group, as opposed to selective and defensive attention to virtues only.

Such reasoning has brought us a considerable distance from the results of the present survey. A reasonably sober and cautious assessment of the Prime Minister's statement leads to the following conclusions, however. ''Confidence in one's own identity'' should not be equated with positive self evaluation. Such self evaluation can be the result of selective and defensive attention to exclusively positive attributes of one's own group and is most likely associated with a lack of tolerance for others. In fact care should be taken that a multiculturalism programme does not foster a defensively positive self evaluation but promotes an objective appraisal and acceptance of one's own group.

The point that exclusive attention to one's own ethnic group may in fact increase one's commitment to that group but not promote cultural integration has been persuasively argued by Kelner and Kallen (1974). It may emphasize diversity at the expense of national unity. These authors contend that ''if cultural

interchange is to contribute to full integrations into Canadian society, then each must learn about the others' living culture, in order to appreciate human affinities as well as differences" (p.31).

The following section is an elaboration of the psychological conditions that we consider conducive to intergroup tolerance.

Conditions for Intergroup Tolerance

As we have seen the rationale for a policy of multiculturalism is that the policy will produce the conditions, defined loosely as confidence in one's own individual identity, which will in turn be conducive to intergroup tolerance. It becomes important to understand these conditions at a theoretical level, so that policy and practice can be adjusted to fit the dynamics of a changing society. The articulation of such an idealized theory is, of course, beyond the scope of any one investigation. However, the results of our study point to three inter-related necessary components of the conditions for intergroup tolerance. These are *group definition*, *group evaluation* and *group security*. Each of these will be discussed separately, followed by an examination of the inter-relationships between the three components. These inter-relationships are crucial since the absence of one of the components may not only neutralize the effects of the remaining two, but in some cases may foster intergroup conflict.

Group definition. A logical prerequisite to having tolerant relationships between groups is the existence of a subjective group reality. That is, individuals must feel that they belong to a group that is well defined both in objective and subjective terms. For example, French Canadians belong to a group which is well defined in terms of language and culture and French Canadians are aware of the distinctive features of their group. Evidence for this in the present study came from a variety of sources, including the number of respondents who identified themselves subjectively as "French Canadian", and the data regarding language retention in Chapter 3. The group identity of English-Canadians, on the other hand, may be less well defined. While there are elements of language and cultural distinctiveness these are not accentuated or articulated in as clear a fashion.

The reason for emphasizing the need for a well defined collective sense of cultural distinctiveness is that members of a poorly defined group will constantly have needs to justify and define themselves and be concerned about group survival. Given that cultural groups often maintain themselves even when confronted with active attempts at assimilation, avoiding intergroup conflict through homogenization would not seem realistic. If cultural groups are to survive it is perhaps desirable to facilitate group definition in order to avoid the threat of disintegration.

It should be noted that ethnicity, in the strict sense of the term, is not the only basis for an individual's group definition. Individuals may define themselves according to a national identity ("I am a Canadian"), or occupational affiliation ("I am a carpenter"), or a variety of other social and recreational groups.

Group evaluation. A second component for intergroup tolerance is group

evaluation. It might seem obvious to hypothesize that members of a group must have a *positive* evaluation of their cultural group. However, as we have seen, those who are most positive toward their own group are also those who are most negative toward outgroups. This does not imply that a negative own group evaluation is conducive to intergroup harmony. Negative evaluations have been noted especially among groups who are totally dominated by a more powerful group. This process has been labelled "self hate" and seems to arise when conditions are such that all other ego defences fail (see Allport, 1954). Self hate may mean that a group member is himself or herself ashamed of his or her characteristics as a group member and this state is likely to lead to feelings of helplessness and a general lack of motivation. Alternatively, a group member may dislike or blame other members of his or her own group with the result that intragroup tensions and conflicts arise. In either case a negative group evaluation would not appear conducive to intergroup harmony.

The resolution of the difficulties surrounding positive and negative own group evaluation rests with an understanding of the motivation underlying the manner in which members evaluate their group. A positive own group evaluation may arise as a defensive reaction in which case the evaluation is likely to be unrealistically positive and be associated with negative attitudes toward outgroups. A more realistic positive own group evaluation is nevertheless possible. Individuals may be able to acknowledge in themselves both positive and negative characteristics. This way of looking at oneself has been called "objective self appraisal" (Adorno et al., 1950). In order to understand the conditions under which an objective positive own group evaluation might arise, it is necessary to consider the third necessary condition for intergroup harmony.

Group security. The relationship of own group evaluation to outgroup attitudes must be understood in terms of the third necessary condition for intergroup harmony, group security. The analyses presented in Chapter 7 showed a relationship between both cultural and economic security and a variety of attitudes central to intergroup relations. Lack of cultural and economic security was related to ethnocentrism including positive own group attitudes and negative outgroup attitudes and negative attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism. Based on these analyses it would seem that it is lack of cultural and economic security which is associated with defensive ethnic attitudes in the form of ethnocentrism, exaggerated own group evaluation and negative outgroup attitudes. Objective positive own group evaluations and objective positive outgroup attitudes would seem to be associated with cultural and economic security.

That the conditions for intergroup tolerance are related to both cultural and economic security is revealing. French Canadians, for example, have reason to be threatened in terms of cultural survival (see Chapter 8) but also have reasons to be economically threatened as well. Ukrainian and Russian Canadians may feel culturally threatened because of the impossibility of further immigration. It should be added that a feeling of security is not only dependent upon

the efforts and achievements of a group but also upon acceptance and tolerance on the part of the larger community.

Implications of the Conditions for Intergroup Tolerance


What has emerged from our investigation is some understanding of what conditions are most conducive to promoting tolerance among ethnic groups. The concepts in the Prime Minister's statement of "confidence in one's own identity," "feeling of security" and "sensitivity to own identity," which have been used to express the aim of a multicultural policy, can perhaps be more clearly expressed in terms of the interrelated concepts of group definition, group evaluation and group security. Having outlined the meaning of these concepts it is important that their inter-relationship be studied. As was pointed out earlier if one of the conditions is lacking this may have the effect of producing heightened conflict rather than fostering intergroup tolerance.

Such is the case, for example, with *group definition*. While we have argued that well defined cultural boundaries are desirable, this is only true if there is also cultural and economic security along with objective positive own group evaluation. If the last two conditions are lacking the potentially positive implications of well defined group boundaries become destructive. A group can use its well defined cultural boundaries to exclude others from the group. Group definition then can have positive and negative implications; it is the state of the remaining conditions which will determine the outcome.

Similarly, a positive own group evaluation by itself is not conducive to the development of favourable attitudes toward others. In fact it is just the opposite. What is required is an objectively based realistic own group evaluation which overall is favourable. In this case the term "positive evaluation" is perhaps misleading. A better term might be "a positive acceptance or appreciation."

Precise definitions of the concepts of cultural and economic security cannot be deduced directly from this investigation. We do note however a relationship between the two aspects of security. This suggests that threat in one domain (e.g., economic) can generalize to the other (cultural). It seems essential that the true basis of a group's insecurity be determined. The risk is that efforts may be directed at identifying the wrong issue. What appears as cultural insecurity may actually have its roots in economic insecurity.

A further need for precision is in the concept of cultural security. For some groups the focus may be cultural survival; for others, group survival may be assured, but insecurity may depend upon the social status of the group within the larger society. Thus there is no one strategy for promoting cultural security: groups may differ in the bases of their insecurity, and hence the promotion of cultural security requires a thorough analyses of these differences.



The present study was designed to investigate the attitudes of Canadians toward multiculturalism. For the purposes of this research, multiculturalism refers to the existence of ethnic groups in Canada which derive from cultural traditions other than French or British, some members at least of whom wish to maintain their identity. The term also refers to the current policy of the Federal Government which seeks to promote the retention of these heritages and the sharing of them among all Canadians. The historical roots of the research lie in Book IV of the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism concerned with "the contribution made by the other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada, and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution" (Book IV, p.1). In 1971 a "policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" was announced by the Prime Minister in response to the recommendations contained in Book IV. It sought to promote the retention of characteristic cultural features by those groups which desired to do so, and to encourage the sharing of these cultural features with other members of the larger Canadian society. The policy was based upon the assumption that if an individual is to be open in his or her ethnic attitudes, and have respect for other groups, he or she must have confidence in his or her own cultural foundations. Given this assumption, the policy is also designed to help break down discriminatory attitudes and cultural jealousies.

The Research Question

A number of questions for research are implied in the policy. Two of the more obvious are whether Canadians view cultural diversity as a valuable resource, and whether confidence in one's own identity is a prerequisite for accepting others. These two questions constitute the core of the present study.

More specifically, the research reported here consisted of an examination of four attitude domains. The first dealt with the attitudes held by Canadians toward a variety of ethnic groups in the country; in this study these are referred to as "ethnic attitudes." The second domain involved general beliefs regarding cultural diversity, and more specific attitudes concerning various aspects of the multiculturalism policy; these are referred to as "multicultural attitudes." Third, as the Report of the Royal Commission (Book IV, p.5) indicates, immigration from a variety of national origins creates the possibility for multiculturalism; clearly, attitudes toward immigration form an essential part of the study of atti-

tudes toward multiculturalism. And finally, sections of this study were directed toward an area of concern implied in the Prime Minister's statement, namely, the psychological phenomena of ethnic prejudice and discrimination.

The Survey Instrument

A survey instrument was developed to gather information in all four attitude domains, and to assess demographic characteristics of respondents. The instrument not only employed "opinion" questions, but also made extensive use of psychological scales and sorting procedures in an attempt to improve reliability and validity of the data. For most opinion questions, respondents were provided with 7-point rating scales. These scales were used to express respondents' degrees of agreement/disagreement, their behavioural intentions, and the degrees to which specific ethnic groups possessed given characteristics.

The Sample

The sample of respondents was selected from a national sampling frame, covering approximately 95% of the population of Canada. Excluded were persons located in the extreme northern parts of the country, and those living on reservations and in institutions.

The sample design was complex and included stratification as well as clustering. The principles guiding the stratification procedures were region and population density. All census metropolitan areas were included in the sample. Stratification further ensured that in the rest of Canada, in each region and within regions each level of population density was adequately represented. Clustering was a way of making the sampling procedure economically feasible. It involved limiting the geographic areas from which sampling units were to be obtained. The sample selection process involved three stages. In the first, 374 census enumeration areas were chosen; in the second, 2844 households were selected; in the final stage 2628 eligible persons were obtained. To be eligible for inclusion in the sample, a person had to be at least 16 years of age and able to speak English or French. Interviews were completed with 1849 respondents; that is, the completion rate was 70%.

Each respondent was interviewed in person. On the average an interview took about one hour to complete. Interviews were conducted during June and July 1974, in either French or English. The interviewers were members of the field staff of the Survey Research Centre at York University and the Centre de Sondage at the Université de Montréal.

An examination of the sample's basic demographic (region of residence, age, sex), ethnic (ancestral country of origin, mother tongue) and socio-economic status (occupation, income and education) characteristics indicates that it closely approximates the characteristics of the Canadian population as revealed in the 1971 Census.

Variations in attitudes according to a number of background variables were examined. Among these were region of residence, ethnicity and socio-

economic status of respondent. In addition, analyses were carried out to examine variations in attitudes according to degree of urbanization, religion, political party preference, age and sex.

Demographic Variables

Geographic region. Respondents were categorized according to region of residence (Atlantic provinces ($N=176$), Quebec ($N=488$), Ontario ($N=695$), Prairies ($N=291$), British Columbia ($N=199$). Additional analyses were carried out on the five largest metropolitan areas (Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Calgary-Edmonton, Vancouver). Degree of urbanization was also considered within each region (rural, towns, small cities, and where possible metropolitan areas).

Ethnicity. A complex code was used to group respondents into four categories. This code took into account: (1) father's origin, (2) mother's birthplace, (3) ethnic self identity, (4) mother tongue, and (5) language of interview. In simplified terms, an Angloceltic Canadian was defined as a respondent whose father's ancestry was British or Irish. A French Canadian was a person who derived his ancestry from France. An anglophone "other ethnic" was a respondent whose father's ancestry was other than Angloceltic or French and who gave the interview in English. A francophone "other ethnic" was a person of non-British/non-French origin who gave the interview in French.

Generational status was another aspect of ethnicity that was examined. Respondents were categorized as immigrants, second, or third and higher generation Canadians. Since relatively few francophones in Canada are immigrants or second generation, generational status is strongly related to ethnicity. In order to control for ethnicity francophone respondents were excluded from this analysis and it was carried out separately for Angloceltic and "other ethnic" respondents.

A further analysis of ethnicity categorized respondents of "other ethnic" origin into the most numerous national descent groups (Dutch, German, Italian, Polish, Russian, Scandinavian, Ukrainian).

Socioeconomic status. Three indices of this demographic variable were employed: (1) head of household's occupational status (Blishen index), (2) head of household's income, and (3) respondent's educational level.

Political party preference. Respondents were grouped according to which of the four major federal political parties they supported. Since party support is related to ethnicity (French Canadians tend to be primarily Liberal), separate analyses were carried out within anglophone and francophone subsamples. Respondents who expressed a preference for something other than the four major parties were excluded from this analysis.

Age and sex. These were the final variables that were used in the analysis of attitudes.

Inter-relationships among demographic variables. Many of these demographic variables were related to each other. Of particular interest are those variables within the socioeconomic cluster, and their relationships to ethnicity and region. First, the three socioeconomic indices were substantially inter-

related, with occupational status and education exhibiting the strongest relationship, and education and income the least. However, they were far from identical as measures of status, and so the three indices were employed separately in all analyses.

Among regions Ontario was high on all three socioeconomic variables; whereas, the Atlantic provinces and Quebec were lower, particularly on income and education. There was also a strong relationship between region and ethnicity, with the largest proportion of French-Canadian respondents residing in Quebec. And finally, there was a clear relationship between ethnicity and all three socioeconomic variables. French-Canadian respondents tended to occupy lower educational and occupational status categories, while Angloceltic respondents were notably higher on all three status indices.

Psychological Variables

In addition to collecting demographic information on respondents, some of their psychological characteristics were assessed. The survey instrument included measures of authoritarianism, ethnocentrism and personal values, all of which have previously been related to ethnic prejudice. Since these measures have been extensively used in other societies, primarily the United States, it was possible to provide a tentative comparison of American and Canadian residents. The scales for authoritarianism and ethnocentrism were shown to measure coherent belief systems which correlated substantially with each other. While precise comparisons are difficult, Canadians appeared to be more authoritarian than Americans, but were not shown to be different from Americans in ethnocentrism. Canadians, like Americans, valued a world at peace and family security most highly and a world of beauty and social recognition the least. The value equality, which is predictive of ethnic tolerance, appeared in the middle of the value hierarchy in the present Canadian as well as in a United States' sample. Analyses of differences within the present sample showed that French-Canadian respondents occupied a unique position in terms of the psychological characteristics under consideration. They, as compared with anglophone Canadians, were more authoritarian and ethnocentric, and they placed a relatively higher value on salvation and social recognition and a lower value on freedom and true friendship. Francophone "other ethnic" Canadians were like French Canadians in some respects and like anglophone Canadians in others. Angloceltic and anglophone "other ethnic" Canadians were not different from each other in terms of these psychological characteristics. A geographic analysis showed remarkable similarity among residents from Ontario to British Columbia. Quebec, being populated primarily by French Canadians, showed a profile essentially similar to that of French Canadians. Respondents from the Atlantic provinces were more authoritarian and ethnocentric than residents from other anglophone regions. Socioeconomic status differences were in line with previous research. Educational level, the index of socioeconomic status chosen here, showed a strong linear and inverse relationship with authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. With regard to values, it was found that the

highly educated, as compared with the less educated, placed a lower priority on a comfortable life and on salvation, and a greater priority on freedom and self-respect.

Attitudes toward Immigration

Attitudes toward immigration were assessed in the present survey because of their relevance to multicultural ideology. Three attitude areas were tapped: (1) perceived consequences of immigration, (2) the acceptability of various types of immigrants, and (3) behavioural intentions toward immigrants and discrimination against them.

To assess perceived consequences of immigration, respondents were asked for their opinions regarding possible consequences of further immigration. They had to indicate their degree of agreement/disagreement with ten potential outcomes, such as "more unemployment," "this country would be better off" and "the purity of the Canadian race would be affected."

Analyses of responses showed that the ten items reflected a general attitude toward immigration consequences. The responses to the ten items were averaged to obtain an overall attitude score. Subsequent analyses were performed on this total score as well as on the specific items dealing with "unemployment" and the "purity of the Canadian race."

The assessment of acceptability of immigrants was accomplished by asking respondents whether the government should accept or reject various types of immigrants, such as immigrants "who are coloured," "who have relatives in Canada," "who are highly educated," and "who are from communist countries." While some of these categories may be ambiguous (e.g., are immigrants from communist countries "pro-" or "anti-" communist?) it would have been difficult to be completely specific within the context of a national survey. After establishing that responses to the ten separate items reflected a general attitude, items were averaged to yield a total acceptability score. Subsequent analyses emphasized the total score but also dealt with the specific items concerning "coloured immigrants" and those from "communist countries."

Behavioural intentions toward immigrants were assessed by asking respondents a series of questions dealing with their willingness to interact with immigrants and members of the majority groups, of high or low status, in business or personal relationships. A discrimination score was constructed to reflect respondents' preference for English Canadians (in the case of anglophone respondents), or French Canadians (in the case of francophone respondents) over immigrants.

The attitude scales just described correlated significantly with each other. However, the correlations were far from perfect, indicating that while the scales reflect a general attitude toward immigration, each scale also measures something unique.

Attitudes toward immigration in the total sample. Perceived consequences of immigration were slightly positive, but there was considerable difference of opinion. Of greatest concern to respondents was the possibility that "there

would be more unemployment" with continued immigration. There was, however, reasonably strong consensus that the identity of English and French Canadians, and the relations between these two groups, would not be affected.

Most types of immigrants were rated to be quite acceptable. Considered as most acceptable were "immigrants who could be useful to this country," "immigrants with a skilled trade," and "immigrants who are highly educated." The only types of immigrants that received negative ratings were "immigrants from communist countries" and "anyone who wants to immigrate."

In view of the abundant public debate on the issue, it is notable that "immigrants who are coloured" were found to be acceptable.

Regarding their behavioural intentions, respondents showed a considerable willingness to interact with immigrants. However, they also expressed a slight but consistent preference for members of the majority groups. These results suggest that there is still discrimination against them, with other things being equal. Discrimination was greatest against high status immigrants in a business relationship, and was least against low status immigrants in a business relationship. The combination of these results with those reported earlier suggests the following paradox. While highly educated and skilled immigrants are considered highly desirable for admission to Canada, there is some reluctance to use their services, especially if they are of high status.

Geographic differences. Quebec residents were least positive in their perceived consequences of immigration; they found "immigrants from communist countries" less acceptable than residents of other regions, and they were most prone to show discrimination against immigrants. The Atlantic provinces followed Quebec in these attitudes. The more negative attitudes in Quebec and the Atlantic provinces were primarily obtained from rural respondents. Residents from Ontario, the Prairies and British Columbia were very similar in terms of these attitudes, except that Ontario residents were least concerned about unemployment. There were virtually no differences in the views of respondents from the five largest metropolitan areas, except that Montrealers showed a greater tendency to discriminate against immigrants than respondents from other cities.

Ethnicity differences. The pattern of results from the geographic analysis suggests that ethnicity may be the basis of geographic differences. Such was in fact the case. French-Canadian respondents were least positive in their perceptions of the consequences of immigration. They were also most concerned about "unemployment" and the "purity of the Canadian race." French Canadians also found immigrants of all types, and particularly "immigrants from communist countries" less acceptable than members of the other ethnic categories, and they were most prone to show discrimination against immigrants. Detailed analyses showed that French-Canadian attitudes cannot be explained as a Quebec regional response, or as a result of the Catholic religion. French Canadians outside Quebec were very similar in their attitudes to French Canadians from Quebec. Anglophone Catholics were indistinguishable in their attitudes from anglophones of other religions.

There was a remarkable similarity between the attitudes of Anglocelts and members of "other ethnic" groups as a whole. Recency of immigration was virtually unrelated to the attitudes under consideration, after controlling for ethnicity of respondents. The classification of respondents from "other ethnic" origin showed that those of Russian and Ukrainian descent were somewhat less positive in their perception of immigration consequences, more concerned about unemployment, and found immigrants of all kinds less acceptable than members of other non-English/non-French descent groups.

Socioeconomic status differences. Three indices of socioeconomic status showed very similar relationships with immigration attitudes. The higher the socioeconomic status of respondents the more positive they were in their attitudes. Education was most strongly related, followed by income and occupational status.

Political party preference differences. Attitude differences between the supporters of various political parties were more pronounced among francophones than among anglophones. Among francophones, Liberal and New Democratic Party supporters had more positive attitudes toward immigration than supporters of the Progressive Conservative and Creditiste parties. In the case of anglophone respondents, differences among supporters of the four political parties were small or nonexistent, except that supporters of the Social Credit Party showed the least acceptance of immigrants, especially "coloured" and those from "communist countries."

Age differences. The relationship between age and immigration attitudes depended on the specific attitude variable involved. Respondents in their thirties and forties were most positive concerning perceived consequences of immigration. Younger and older respondents were less positive. Concerning the other attitudes, the older the respondents, the less acceptable they found all types of immigrants and the more they tended to discriminate.

Sex differences in attitudes toward immigration were very small or nonexistent.

The relative importance of predictors of immigration attitudes. A more complex strategy, was employed: (1) to isolate the most important variables predictive of immigration attitudes, (2) to assess their relative importance, and (3) to compare the predictive power of psychological versus demographic variables. Results of this analysis showed that of the demographic variables ethnicity and educational level were the most important independent predictors of immigration attitudes. Ethnicity was more important than educational level. Other demographic variables were related to some specific attitude variables, but these relationships did not attain the strength of the two major predictors. When psychological variables were included in the analysis, ethnocentrism consistently became the most important predictor of immigration attitudes.

Attitudes toward Ethnic Groups

Respondents' attitudes toward various ethnic groups in Canada were assessed in three ways. First, respondents were asked to indicate which groups

they were aware of in the Canadian population. Secondly, they were provided with a set of cards, with names of ethnic groups on each, and were asked to sort the cards on the basis of their perceived similarity. And last, respondents were asked to rate a number of ethnic groups on ten attitude dimensions.

Awareness of Ethnic Groups

Respondents were asked which groups, who originally came from various parts of the world, they were aware of now in Canada. The purpose of this question was to discover the relative visibility of various groups in an open-ended manner.

The groups mentioned most often (around 50% of the time) by respondents were Italians, British, French and Germans. Other groups such as the Ukrainians, Chinese and Poles were the next most frequently mentioned groups; however, these groups were only named by a quarter or less of the respondents. In general, the most numerous groups were also the most visible. Yet, the Italians who are less numerous than the Germans but who have more recently immigrated to Canada, were more visible than the Germans. Such a finding suggests that both group size and recency of immigration are important determinants of visibility.

A second finding is that while Anglocelts and French Canadians tend to be aware of the same groups, and in much the same order, there were a few notable differences. For example, Angloceltic respondents were more aware of Ukrainians, Scots and Dutch, while French-Canadian respondents were more aware of Greeks, Jews and Belgians.

Perception of Ethnic Groups

The second step in the analysis of ethnic attitudes was to find out how respondents organized their perceptions of ethnic groups. The method used to examine this issue was to provide each respondent with 27 cards, with the name of a different ethnic group on each card. On a twenty-eighth card was printed "Myself." The respondent was asked to sort the cards into piles according to which ethnic groups were thought to be similar to each other. The respondent was free to create as many piles, and to put as many ethnic group cards in a pile as he or she wished. By assessing the frequency with which any two ethnic group cards were placed in the same pile, we were able to perform an analysis of how respondents perceived or categorized the ethnic group. Using multi-dimensional scaling, separate analyses were carried out for Anglo-celtic and French-Canadian respondents.

The ethnic group which Angloceltic respondents considered closest to "Myself" was "English-Canadian" (about 75% of the time) while "Myself" and "English-Canadian" were placed with "French-Canadian" about half of the time. Angloceltic respondents appeared to focus on two major features of the "other ethnic" groups when making their categorizations. The first was the length of time a particular group was established in Canada in considerable

numbers. The second dimension appeared to be based upon visible group differences.

French-Canadian respondents also made a charter groups—"other ethnic" group distinction in their classification of groups. "Myself" was most often placed with "Québécois" (90%), "French-Canadians" (84.0%) and "English-Canadians" (56%) while the frequencies for "other ethnic" groups was much lower. French-Canadian respondents frequently placed the "English-Canadian" and "French-Canadian" group cards together (69%). The results of the analysis for French-Canadian respondents mirrored those of the Angloceltic respondents. French-Canadian respondents appeared to categorize the various ethnic groups along two dimensions, again an established Canadian-new Canadian and a visible difference dimension, although the dichotomies were not as clear as for the Angloceltic respondents.

Attitudes toward Selected Ethnic Groups

In the study of attitudes it was necessary, for purposes of comparison, to pre-select a number of ethnic groups to serve as the focus for study. The pre-selection of groups was guided by statistics on ethnic concentration in the 1971 Census, the results of informal pilot research, and the literature on ethnic group relations. On this basis nine groups were chosen: English-Canadians, French-Canadians, Immigrants in general, Canadian-Indians, German-Canadians, Chinese-Canadians, Ukrainian-Canadians, Jewish-Canadians and Italian-Canadians. In addition, for each respondent two groups which had been nominated earlier were added making a total of eleven. Respondents were asked to provide ratings for each of the eleven groups on ten adjective dimensions: hard-working, important, Canadian, clean, similar to me, likeable, stick together as a group, wealthy, interesting and well known to me.

Attitudes in the total sample. In general respondents appeared to be at least tolerant of "other ethnic" groups, and there was no evidence of extreme ethnic prejudice; however, respondents did have clear preferences. They reacted very positively to the two charter groups in comparison to "other ethnic" groups. Of the non-charter groups, North European groups were evaluated relatively favourably (e.g., Germans, Belgians, Dutch, Scandinavians) compared to the South and East European groups (e.g., Greeks, Italians, Poles, Yugoslavs), who were in turn rated more favourably than several other groups (e.g., East Indians, Negroes, Spaniards, Portuguese).

Geographic differences. Respondents in Quebec were generally the least positive in their evaluation of non-charter groups. In addition, certain groups such as the Germans, Ukrainians and Chinese were rated relatively more favourably in the Prairies and British Columbia than in other regions, and Canadian Indians were rated relatively less favourably in those two regions.

Ethnicity differences. The most important determinant of ethnic attitudes to emerge from numerous analyses was the ethnicity of the respondent. Firstly, both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents evaluated each other rela-

tively highly. However, own group evaluation by French-Canadian respondents was higher than own group evaluation by Angloceltic respondents. Angloceltic respondents' evaluation of French-Canadians, while relatively favourable, was not as positive as French-Canadian respondents' evaluation of English-Canadians. Each charter group, then, serves as a positive reference group for the other.

In contrast, both Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents held less favourable attitudes toward all other groups. These less favourable attitudes were relatively more negative among French-Canadian than among Angloceltic respondents.

Socioeconomic status differences. Generally respondents lower in socioeconomic status (particularly in education) held more favourable attitudes toward their own group, and relatively less favourable attitudes toward "other ethnic" groups. Although a fairly consistent trend, the finding is not as strong as that found for ethnicity.

Attitudes toward Multiculturalism

This attitude domain is concerned with the ideology and policy of multiculturalism. "Ideology" refers to the general beliefs associated with the existence of cultural diversity in Canada. "Policy" refers to the present multiculturalism policy of the federal government. Specifically we were interested in respondents' knowledge of the policy and their attitudes toward it. In all, six series of questions in the survey were directed at these issues.

The multicultural ideology of respondents was assessed through the use of a nine-item scale. Two examples illustrate the nature of the items: "Canada would be a better place if members of ethnic groups would keep their own way of life alive" and "The unity of this country is weakened by ethnic groups sticking to their old ways." In the first example a positive and in the second, a negative statement is made about the existence of cultural diversity in Canada. By averaging responses to all nine items (taking into account the positive or negative direction of each item), an overall indication may be obtained about the acceptance of a multicultural ideology.

The perception of one aspect of multicultural policy was assessed by presenting respondents with three options describing how a country might deal with immigrants. One option involved "assimilation" (people are encouraged to give up ways of life), another "permissive integration" (people are allowed to maintain old ways of life), and a third "supportive integration" (people are encouraged to maintain old ways of life). Respondents were asked which option they thought was current policy in Canada.

Knowledge about the policy was assessed by asking respondents whether they knew about the federal government's policy of multiculturalism, and if not, if they had heard about it.

Perceived consequences of multicultural policy were assessed by obtaining respondents' reactions to five statements, such as "our Canadian way of life will be destroyed" and "Canada will be richer in culture." An average score

across the five items was calculated.

Attitudes toward multicultural programmes were measured by presenting respondents with six present or potential multicultural programmes, such as "community centres where people from various cultural backgrounds can meet each other and share their heritage." Respondents' reactions were summed to yield an average programme attitude score.

Behavioural intentions to multiculturalism were measured by asking respondents' intentions concerning three possible political actions: "vote for a political candidate who supported such a programme," "try to convince other people that the programme was a good one" and "be willing to pay taxes to support such a programme." Responses were averaged to yield a general behavioural intentions score.

The approach taken to multicultural attitude assessment was to begin with a broad and somewhat abstract enquiry into ideology, and from there to proceed to more concrete attitudes concerning policy consequences and programmes, and then to very concrete examples of behaviour which might be exhibited in response to the policy. All four attitude domains were significantly related among themselves; for example, respondents with a positive multicultural ideology score tended also to have positive attitudes on the other three scales. Furthermore, the four attitude scales and the two knowledge questions were also consistently related. For example, those who perceived the policy as being one of assimilation tended to have lower multicultural ideology scores and also less favourable attitudes on the other three scales. That is, we have obtained evidence of a cluster of attitudes which appear to be stable and internally consistent. This finding implies some degree of reliability for the results as a whole.

➤ *Attitudes toward multiculturalism in the total sample.* Knowledge of the multiculturalism policy was not widespread (only one fifth knew about the policy), and most people perceived the government's current policy to favour "permissive" rather than "supportive" integration. Despite this low level of knowledge and the inaccurate perception of the policy, multicultural attitudes were generally positive. With respect to multicultural ideology, respondents were on the whole slightly in favour of cultural diversity in Canada. The perceived consequences of multiculturalism were also slightly positive. Although programme attitudes were greeted with general acceptance, there was evidence of greater acceptance for some programmes (e.g., "community centres" and "folk festivals") than for others (e.g., "radio and television shows in languages other than English or French" and "teaching, in regular school programmes, of the languages of the major cultural groups who have settled in Canada"); indeed, respondents showed slight rejection of the last two programmes. Finally, behavioural intentions were less favourable than attitudes. This contrast in support between the ideology and the behavioural intentions may be understood in terms of the abstract through to concrete dimension which was noted above. It may well be that Canadians think that the idea of multiculturalism is good, that some of the programmes are enjoyable, but that they do not want to get involved. Overall, however, the climate for multiculturalism is fairly positive; the

ideological base is supportive, and there are some specific programmes which appear to be generally highly acceptable. Detracting from this conclusion is the existence of some programmes which if promoted may be rejected, and the notable lack of acceptance when personal commitment is involved.

Geographic differences. Respondents from Quebec were less positive in their attitudes regarding multiculturalism than those from other regions. This regional analysis is supported by the pattern of attitudes across the five metropolitan areas; the response in Montreal was consistently less favourable than in the other major cities. With respect to degree of urbanization, there was a tendency, especially in the Atlantic region, for increased urbanization to be associated with more positive attitudes.

Ethnicity differences. A likely interpretation of these regional differences is in terms of ethnicity. This interpretation was confirmed; French-Canadian respondents were consistently least positive in their multicultural attitudes. Furthermore, the less positive attitudes were not limited to French Canadians living in Quebec, but extended to those outside of Quebec. Angloceltic respondents, whether from Quebec or elsewhere, had consistently more positive attitudes. Religion did not account for these attitude differences; anglophone Catholics were generally more positive than francophone Catholics, and were indistinguishable from anglophones of other religions.

Multicultural attitudes were highly similar among angloceltic, anglophone and francophone "other ethnic" respondents, all standing in contrast to the attitudes of French-Canadian respondents. Recency of immigration in terms of generation was not related to these attitudes. There was evidence that among some groups of "other ethnic" origin (notably Ukrainian and Russian) perceived consequences and behavioural intentions were somewhat less positive than among others. These differences did not extend to multicultural ideology and programme attitudes.

Socioeconomic status differences. The three measures of socioeconomic status were very similar in their relationship to multicultural attitudes; the higher the socioeconomic status the more positive the attitudes. And of the three variables, it was consistently education which was related most strongly.

Political party preference differences. For most multicultural attitudes, the political party preference of the respondent was a significant factor. Generally, among both anglophone and francophone respondents, Social Credit supporters were least positive, while Liberal supporters were most positive. Among anglophone respondents, New Democratic Party and Progressive Conservative supporters were generally favourable and similar to Liberal supporters; however, among francophone respondents, Progressive Conservatives were similar to Creditiste supporters in having less favourable attitudes.

Age differences. On three of the four multicultural attitudes, as age increased, attitudes became progressively less positive. However, on the fourth (perceived consequences) and the question regarding knowledge and perception of policy, no age trend was apparent.

Virtually no sex differences appeared in any of the multicultural attitudes.

When differences did appear, they were for single items only, and suggested that females were somewhat more positive than males.

The relative importance of predictors of multicultural attitudes. Multiple regression analyses showed that among the demographic variables, ethnicity and education were consistently the most important independent predictors of multicultural attitudes, with age contributing as well on all but the perceived consequences. When the psychological variables were included in the analyses, ethnocentrism emerged (in three cases) as the most powerful predictor, surpassing but not eliminating the demographic variables; on behavioural intentions, the ethnicity of the respondent remained the single most important predictor.

Structure of the Attitudes

Many questions arise when examining such a large number of attitudes. These questions involve such fundamental issues as their coherence, their relationship to ethnocentrism and to the major independent variables, and their validity.

Coherence of attitudes. To assess the relationship among the attitudes, an overall correlation matrix was generated, and then it was factor analysed. In the matrix, all attitudes correlated in the expected direction; for example, ethnocentrism and multicultural ideology were negatively related, while ethnocentrism and discrimination showed a positive relationship. Furthermore, most of the attitudes were significantly related, suggesting a fair degree of coherence. In the factor analysis, this was confirmed, with two factors emerging as the most appropriate solution. The first was one of general prejudice and all attitude scales loaded on this factor. The second was an ethnic groups factor and all groups except "Italians" loaded on it. One variable (discrimination) loaded on both factors. This factor structure means that while all of the attitudes tend to correlate with each other, general prejudice and attitudes toward immigration and multiculturalism tend to cohere in one cluster. Attitudes toward specific ethnic groups tend to cohere in another cluster.

The ethnocentrism hypothesis. Further relationships among these attitudes were studied in order to assess the hypothesis that ingroup and outgroup attitudes would be negatively related. When attitudes toward one's own group (English or French Canadian) were correlated with attitudes toward all "other ethnic" groups, a clear pattern emerged: all correlations were negative, and all (except for attitudes toward Canadian Indians) were significant. In sharp contrast attitudes toward the other charter group were both positive and significant. This same pattern emerged in three further analyses, in which attitudes toward all "other ethnic" groups were correlated with the ethnocentrism scale, the discrimination and the multicultural ideology scale scores. On the basis of the earlier similarity judgements, it may be asserted that the two charter groups serve as positive reference groups for each other. Given this classification, and this pattern of correlations, it is clear that there is an ethnocentric structure to the ethnic attitudes of Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents.

Correlates of attitudes. Throughout the earlier descriptions of how attitudes were related to various background factors, there was consistent evidence that both ethnicity (French Canadian vs. Angloceltic) and socioeconomic status (particularly education) were contributing. Since they are known to be mutually related, a question arises concerning their independent contributions to the attitudes. Two-way analyses of variance were carried out. For all attitudes (except evaluation of English Canadians) both ethnicity and education significantly and independently affected the level of attitudes. Thus it is clear that in any interpretation of the distribution of these attitudes both background factors must be taken into account.

Cultural and economic security. During earlier discussions of these attitudes, it became apparent that the cultural and economic security felt by various groups (particularly ethnic and socioeconomic groupings) may also be factors in the distribution of attitudes. To assess this possibility, two new variables were constructed. Correlational analyses indicated that, for both the Angloceltic and French-Canadian samples, feelings of cultural and economic security were significantly related to most attitudes. Among both groups, feelings of security were positively associated with such attitudes as acceptability of immigrants, multicultural ideology and multicultural behavioural intentions. On the other hand, feelings of security were negatively related to the ethnocentrism score, discrimination against immigrants, and the evaluation of one's own group. Thus the notion of security appears to be of some value in understanding the distribution of most of these attitudes.

Validity of attitude measurement. In all surveys and other studies of attitudes, questions of validity arise. In particular, there are problems concerning the prediction of behaviour from attitudinal data, and the distortion of responses to attitude scales due to acquiescence response set or to social desirability. A number of checks and internal controls suggest that this study has attained a reasonable degree of validity. These controls include the occasional use of behavioural intention scales and of balanced item content within scales.

A further issue concerns the validity of the observed differences between Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents. While recognizing that cross-cultural studies are fraught with problems of this nature, there are some controls available to ensure comparability of data. These include adequate translation checks, and the analyses of the structure of the data. In the present study the structure of attitudes of Angloceltic and French-Canadian respondents was similar, they bore similar relationships to independent variables, and there was consistency in the difference between the groups, no matter which specific attitude was being measured. All these point to a valid finding of differences in attitudes between the two majority groups.

Some Emerging Themes

Up to this point in the study all data have been analysed and presented rather systematically. However, some findings may be drawn together thematically, around a number of issues which either emerge from the data or which

are important in studies of Canadian attitudes.

Public and private attitudes. Often survey results are greeted with the reaction that such things have been known all along. In some cases public statements have previously indicated the likelihood of a particular result, or in other cases the finding appears to be just good common sense. However detailed studies of attitudes, such as this one, can be defended against both views. In the first case, there is no necessary relationship between public pronouncements and attitudes held by the population. Sometimes officials and opinion leaders reflect public sentiment and sometimes they do not. In the second case, there are usually many obvious or common sense views of an issue, and they often do not coincide. In both cases, studies of attitudes are needed in order to assess the validity of the public and common sense knowledge.

The issue of race. Racism is a topic of major concern to many people, and the question naturally arises whether there is evidence for racism in our study. A number of points need to be made in response to such a question. First, there was a rejection of "explicit" racism in the sample; that is, there was little evidence for overt bigotry. Second, though, there was evidence that race (in the sense of physical differences) was employed as an important dimension in the perception of groups, and in the judgement of similarity to respondents. And, even more importantly, many groups which are racially-different were at the lower end of the evaluative ranking of groups in Canada. Thus there is some evidence that race is an issue, and is being employed by Canadians in their acceptance or rejection of groups of people. Moreover, it should be noted that a survey technique is not the most suitable way to study "pockets" of racist belief or activity; field studies are necessary to pick up such troubled areas.

Attitudes in anglophone Canada. It is reasonable to expect that attitudes might differ across the regions and peoples of anglophone Canada, given the varied history of settlement, contact with ethnic diversity, and ethnic background. However, except for the Atlantic provinces, these attitudes were remarkably constant from Ontario on westward; the "rift" between East and West did not appear. In the Atlantic region, attitudes were generally less accepting of diversity and more ethnocentric when compared with the balance of the anglophone sample.

Attitudes of Angloceltic and "other ethnic" Canadians. It is also reasonable to expect that those of "other ethnic" backgrounds might have more positive attitudes toward cultural diversity than those of Angloceltic background. However, in general there were few differences, both being generally positive. It is difficult to know whether to interpret this lack of difference as a lower-than-expected response from "other ethnic" respondents, or as a greater-than-expected response from Angloceltic respondents.

Generational status. Despite an indication in the literature that attitudes would be related to generational status, there was generally no relationship found. One possible interpretation of this finding is that the concern here was for a broad range of attitudes toward both one's own and other groups. In contrast, much of the other literature has been concerned only with one's own

group and its linguistic and cultural position.

Political party preference. In keeping with a general view of their respective ideologies, and with other literature on the topic, there were fairly clear but small differences in attitudes according to respondents' preferred federal political party. Among both anglophone and francophone samples, Liberal and New Democratic Party supporters held the more positive attitudes, while Progressive Conservative and Social Credit/Creditiste supporters held less positive attitudes.

Socioeconomic status. Consistently in the patterning of attitudes, the roles of socioeconomic status variables were indicated; in all cases, higher status respondents held more positive attitudes than those of lower socioeconomic status. These differences were particularly evident for educational level, but the same pattern was generally exhibited for the occupational status and income measures as well. A number of interpretations are possible, all of which receive some support in our data and in the literature. One of these is that more positive attitudes are simply the norm of higher socioeconomic status groups, and that the expression of less positive attitudes is not acceptable. Another is that immigration and multiculturalism may affect more directly the position of lower socioeconomic groups; hence more negative attitudes accompany their vulnerability. However, no single interpretation is likely for such a fundamental patterning of results.

Native peoples. As a group unlike either the two charter groups or those of "other ethnic" background, attitudes toward native peoples are an important element in understanding a multicultural society. First, native peoples were viewed as relatively similar to themselves by most respondents, but second, they were placed at the bottom of the evaluation scale. And in the structural analysis of attitudes, Canadian Indians seemed to occupy a position which was supporting neither the ethnocentrism hypothesis nor the multicultural assumption. The evidence suggested that native peoples occupy a special position in the attitudes of Canadians; this position may be best characterized by the term "marginal." That is, there appears to be some recognition of their special status as indigenous people, but this is insufficient to create a set of positive attitudes toward them.

Attitudes of Ukrainian and Russian Canadians. On a number of attitudes, respondents of Ukrainian and Russian "other ethnic" background exhibited a lower acceptance than those of many other backgrounds. However, not all attitudes showed this reduced level of acceptance. An analysis of the pattern revealed that on some attitudes, such as certain multicultural programmes, their attitudes were very positive, but on many (such as perceived consequences of immigration, acceptability of immigrants, perceived consequences of multiculturalism and the ethnocentrism scale) they were among the least positive. This lower level of acceptance stands in contrast to other findings in the area; but this contrast may be understood in terms of the above pattern. This pattern indicates that Ukrainian and Russian Canadians favour multiculturalism when it means own group cultural maintenance, but are less in favour when

multiculturalism refers to the development of other groups. One possible interpretation is that since the cultural survival of these two peoples is being threatened in their homelands, their distinctiveness as a people depends in part on their position in a multicultural Canada. Thus a set of protective attitudes can be viewed as a response to such a situation. Another possible interpretation is that the notion of multiculturalism was too closely identified with immigration in the survey context. Since further immigration from their homelands is unlikely, a lower level of support was exhibited by them than by the balance of the "other ethnic" respondents.

Mutual attitudes of Angloceltic and French Canadians In a number of ways, data from this study indicated that there exists a set of fairly positive attitudes between the two charter groups. These data suggest that each group acts as a positive reference group for one another. One interpretation of this finding (which is surprising in the light of the conventional wisdom on the subject) is that when Angloceltic and French Canadians view each other within the context of multiculturalism a relative similarity and mutual acceptance will emerge; but when they are asked about their attitudes in the context of biculturalism, a relative dissimilarity and mutual rejection become manifest. That is, the comparative context of intergroup relations (and of studies of these relations) may be a crucial factor in determining how Angloceltic and French Canadians will relate to each other. If this is the case, the multicultural context may actually promote bicultural acceptance; however it may do so at the risk of rejecting the "other ethnic" groups. Although multiculturalism appears to foster mutual attitudinal acceptance, it may or may not be beneficial to actual intergroup relations. On the one hand it may blind Canadians to the conflicts that actually do exist between the two groups, and on the other hand the shift away from bilingualism and biculturalism toward multiculturalism may increase the feelings of insecurity of French Canadians, and thereby reduce the level of these positive attitudes.

French-Canadian attitudes. Two features of French-Canadian attitudes stood out in this study. While evaluating their own group very positively, they tended to hold the most negative attitudes toward "other ethnic" groups. Such a pattern of attitudes has been termed one of ethnocentrism. Our data indicate that this pattern cannot be explained on the basis of the linguistic, regional or religious features of French-Canadian life. Rather it appears to be related to the socioeconomic, demographic and cultural features of life in French Canada, one which has been termed a "siege culture." That is, this pattern of protective attitudes makes sense as a response to the cultural and linguistic threat experienced in an English continent, and to the precarious demographic position of both the declining French-Canadian birth-rate and the tendency for immigrants to integrate into anglophone Canada. Psychologically, self and group protection has involved the development of ethnocentric attitudes.

Implications for Multiculturalism

The present study was designed to answer two major questions. One was whether Canadians view cultural diversity as a valuable resource, and the other whether confidence in one's own identity is prerequisite for accepting others, as the Prime Minister stated in the announcement of the multiculturalism policy (the multicultural assumption).

The climate for multiculturalism. Respondents in our survey showed a reasonably high level of overt tolerance for ethnic diversity and a general acceptance for multiculturalism as a social fact. However a certain level of covert concern and reluctance to accept ethnic diversity was also uncovered. Although overt racism was low, race was shown to be an important dimension for categorizing people, and racially different groups appeared at the bottom of the perceived ethnic group hierarchy. The present study also revealed a considerable lack of knowledge concerning multiculturalism as government policy. Degree of support for multicultural programmes depended on the specific programmes involved. Community centres and folk festivals were positively received, while respondents had reservations about third language teaching and broadcasting.

Analysis of the multicultural assumption. Although the present study did not contain a direct measure of "confidence in one's own identity," it was possible to test the multicultural assumption by making certain assumptions concerning indirect measures. Taking own group evaluation as a measure of confidence, the assumption was clearly not supported. On the contrary, an ethnocentric pattern of attitudes emerged, with the most positive ingroup attitudes being associated with negative outgroup attitudes. By taking measures of economic and cultural security as indices of confidence, the multicultural assumption was supported. Those who were most secure were also tolerant toward "other ethnic" groups. Such apparently contradictory results suggest conceptual ambiguities in the multicultural assumption. Clearly, "confidence in one's own identity" cannot be equated with positive own group evaluation. Results from the present study and from earlier investigations of the authoritarian personality suggest that positive evaluations of one's own group is associated with other group tolerance only when self evaluation is objective and not defensive.

Conditions for intergroup tolerance. The results of our study point to three interrelated conditions for intergroup tolerance: group definition, objective own group evaluation, and group security. Individuals should feel that they belong to a group that is well defined both in objective and subjective terms. Individuals should have a positive, but objective appraisal of their own group, which is free of defensiveness and exaggeration. And finally, individuals should be secure in their cultural and economic context. All three conditions are viewed as necessary for intergroup tolerance to flourish. The absence of any one may turn the others into promoters of intergroup conflict instead.

Appendices

Appendix 3.1

Cross-tabulation of Education of Respondent and Occupational Status^a of Head of Household in the Total Sample

		Occupational status						Total
		Under 30.0000	30.0000 to 39.9999	40.0000 to 49.9999	50.0000 to 59.9999	60.0000 to 69.9999	70.0000 to 79.9999	
Educational level								
Primary (no graduation)	<i>N</i>	100	38	33	9	3	0	183
	%	54.6	20.8	18.0	4.9	1.6	0	100.0
Primary (graduation)	<i>N</i>	106	57	59	19	11	1	253
	%	41.9	22.5	23.3	7.5	4.3	0.4	100.0
High school (no graduation)	<i>N</i>	161	103	101	45	40	10	460
	%	35.0	22.4	22.0	9.8	8.7	2.2	100.0
High school (graduation)	<i>N</i>	60	56	78	62	50	8	314
	%	19.1	17.8	24.8	19.7	15.9	2.5	100.0
Technical training	<i>N</i>	32	35	46	31	37	5	186
	%	17.2	18.8	24.7	16.7	19.9	2.7	100.0
University, college or more	<i>N</i>	30	25	40	49	108	58	310
	%	9.7	8.1	12.9	15.8	34.8	18.7	100.0
Total	<i>N</i>	489	314	357	215	249	82	1706
	%	28.7	18.4	20.9	12.6	14.6	4.8	100.0

Chi-square = 493.2***

^aBlishen Index

Appendix 3.2

Cross-tabulation of Education of Respondent and Income of Head of Household in the Total Sample

Educational level		Income of Head of Household					Total
		Under 4,000	4,000 to 7,999	8,000 to 13,999	14,000 to 19,999	20,000 +	
Primary (no graduation)	<i>N</i>	76	67	31	7	6	187
	%	40.6	35.8	16.6	3.7	3.2	100.0
Primary (graduation)	<i>N</i>	67	77	80	26	9	259
	%	25.9	29.7	30.9	10.0	3.5	100.0
High school (no graduation)	<i>N</i>	73	104	187	57	23	444
	%	16.4	23.4	42.1	12.8	5.2	100.0
High school (graduation)	<i>N</i>	28	70	142	35	19	294
	%	9.5	23.8	48.3	11.9	6.5	100.0
Technical training	<i>N</i>	20	41	72	35	13	181
	%	11.0	22.7	39.8	19.3	7.2	100.0
University, college or more	<i>N</i>	21	54	112	67	47	301
	%	7.0	17.9	37.2	22.3	15.6	100.0
Total	<i>N</i>	285	413	624	227	117	1666
	%	17.1	24.8	37.5	13.6	7.0	100.0

Chi-square = 239.1***

Appendix 3.3

Cross-tabulation of Income of Head of Household and Occupational Status^a of Head of Household in the Total Sample

		Occupational status						Total
		Under 30.0000	30.0000 to 39.9999	40.0000 to 49.9999	50.0000 to 59.9999	60.0000 to 69.9999	70.0000 to 79.9999	
Income								
Under 4,000	<i>N</i>	102	43	44	21	7	3	220
	%	46.4	19.4	20.0	9.5	3.3	1.4	100.0
4,000-7,999	<i>N</i>	132	94	73	58	21	6	384
	%	34.4	24.5	18.9	15.0	5.5	1.6	100.0
8,000-13,999	<i>N</i>	140	115	146	95	98	21	615
	%	22.8	18.7	23.7	15.4	16.0	3.4	100.0
14,000-19,999	<i>N</i>	32	26	50	25	65	32	230
	%	13.8	11.2	21.7	11.0	28.2	14.0	100.0
20,000 +	<i>N</i>	26	8	7	5	46	17	110
	%	23.9	7.4	6.3	4.4	42.2	15.8	100.0
Total	<i>N</i>	432	286	319	204	238	80	1559
	%							100.0

Chi-square = 306.0***

^aBlishen Index

Appendix 3.4

Cross-tabulation of Region of Residence and Occupational Status^a of Head of Household in the Total Sample

Region		Occupational status						Total
		Under 30.0000	30.0000 to 39.9999	40.0000 to 49.9999	50.0000 to 59.9999	60.0000 to 69.9999	70.0000 to 79.9999	
Atlantic provinces	<i>N</i>	54	21	23	16	17	9	140
	%	38.6	15.0	16.4	11.4	12.1	6.4	100.0
Quebec	<i>N</i>	139	105	118	58	76	20	516
	%	26.9	20.3	22.9	11.2	14.7	3.9	100.0
Ontario	<i>N</i>	130	112	136	87	115	33	613
	%	21.2	18.3	22.2	14.2	18.8	5.4	100.0
Prairies	<i>N</i>	111	50	51	30	33	13	288
	%	38.5	17.4	17.7	10.4	11.5	4.5	100.0
British Columbia	<i>N</i>	59	26	34	24	10	7	160
	%	36.9	16.3	21.3	15.0	6.3	4.4	100.0
Total	<i>N</i>	493	314	362	215	251	82	1717
	%	28.7	18.3	21.1	12.5	14.6	4.8	100.0

Chi-square = 61.0***

^aBlishen Index

Appendix 3.5

Cross-tabulation of Region of Residence and Income of Head of Household in the Total Sample

Region		Income					Total
		Under 4000	4000 to 7999	8000 to 13999	14000 to 19999	20000 +	
Atlantic provinces	<i>N</i>	39	50	32	11	2	134
	%	29.1	37.3	23.9	8.2	1.5	100.0
Quebec	<i>N</i>	84	156	179	40	24	483
	%	17.4	32.3	37.1	8.3	5.0	100.0
Ontario	<i>N</i>	81	110	256	111	54	612
	%	13.2	18.0	41.8	18.1	8.8	100.0
Prairies	<i>N</i>	51	66	97	45	31	290
	%	17.6	22.8	33.4	15.5	10.7	100.0
British Columbia	<i>N</i>	30	32	64	21	6	153
	%	19.6	20.9	41.8	13.7	3.9	100.0
Total	<i>N</i>	285	414	628	228	117	1672
	%	17.0	24.8	37.6	13.6	7.0	100.0

Chi-square = 103.6***

Appendix 3.6

Cross-tabulation of Region of Residence and Education of Respondent in the Total Sample

Region	Education					Total
	Some primary	Primary (graduated)	Some high school	High school (graduated)	Technical training	
Atlantic provinces	<i>N</i> 22 12.5	19 10.8	60 34.2	20 11.4	29 16.3	176 100.0
Quebec	<i>N</i> 77 16.2	79 16.6	116 24.3	92 19.3	35 7.4	475 100.0
Ontario	<i>N</i> 44 6.3	88 12.7	205 29.5	157 22.6	69 10.0	694 100.0
Prairies	<i>N</i> 36 12.4	44 15.1	88 30.4	42 14.6	40 13.8	289 100.0
British Columbia	<i>N</i> 4 1.9	29 14.6	73 37.0	36 18.0	20 10.0	198 100.0
Total	<i>N</i> 183 10.0	258 14.1	541 29.5	347 18.9	193 10.5	1832 100.0

Chi-square = 88.5***

Appendix 3.7

Inter-item Correlations for Authoritarianism (Question 15)

	Total less item	a.	b.	d.	e.	g.	i.	j.
a. People can be divided into two distinct classes: the weak and the strong.	.26							
b. An insult to our honour should always be punished.	.48	.25						
d. What the youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination and the will to work and fight for the family and country.	.60	.18	.32					
e. A person who has bad manners, habits and breeding can hardly expect to get along with decent people.	.48	.12	.26	.38				
f. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents.	.57	.11	.31	.45	.44			
i. Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped.	.51	.14	.36	.37	.26	.37		
j. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.	.60	.14	.31	.52	.30	.47	.44	
l. Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.	.53	.14	.26	.44	.29	.41	.33	.52

Appendix 3.8

Inter-item Correlations for Ethnocentrism (Question 15)

	Total less item	c.	g.	h.	k.	m.
c. Foreigners are alright in their place, but they carry it too far when they get too familiar with us.	.55					
g. It is only natural and right for each person to think that his family is better than any other.	.27	.22				
h. The worst danger to real Canadianism during the last 50 years has come from foreign ideas and agitators.	.52	.48	.25			
k. It would be a mistake ever to have coloured people for foremen and leaders over whites.	.47	.46	.18	.37		
m. People who do not believe that we have the best kind of government in the world should be made to leave the country.	.41	.31	.14	.27	.29	
n. Canada may not be perfect, but the Canadian Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society.	.29	.17	.11	.22	.17	.29

Appendix 3.9

Intercorrelations among Measures of Authoritarianism, Ethnocentrism and Personal Values

	Authoritarianism	Ethnocentrism
Ethnocentrism	.61***	
Personal values		
Comfortable life	-.17***	-.23***
World at peace	-.04	-.02
World of beauty	.12***	.10***
Equality	.17***	.16***
Family security	-.09***	-.05*
Freedom	.20***	.20***
Happiness	-.01	-.01
National security	-.17***	-.14***
Salvation	-.15***	-.09***
Self-respect	.14***	.12***
Social recognition	-.08***	-.16***
True friendship	.13***	.12***

Appendix 4.1

Inter-item Correlations for Perceived Consequences of Immigration

	Total less item	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.	i.
a. "unemployment"	.47									
b. "better off"	.40	-.39								
c. "English-French relations"	.54	.28	-.24							
d. "English-Canadian identity"	.53	.22	-.18	.47						
e. "French-Canadian identity"	.49	.20	-.16	.45	.65					
f. "slums"	.63	.42	-.35	.38	.32	.30				
g. "purity of race"	.69	.37	-.33	.43	.45	.46	.54			
h. "low wages"	.59	.36	-.28	.35	.34	.33	.44	.48		
i. "criminals"	.60	.29	-.28	.35	.35	.28	.54	.51	.44	
j. "political problems"	.61	.33	-.30	.37	.30	.30	.49	.49	.43	.58

Appendix 4.2

Inter-item Correlations for Acceptability of Immigrants

	Total less item	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.	i.
a. "relatives"	.60									
b. "educated"	.69	.55								
c. "skilled trade"	.71	.50	.77							
d. "speak English"	.70	.51	.63	.69						
e. "speak French"	.68	.51	.60	.59	.74					
f. "do work"	.46	.34	.33	.34	.42	.43				
g. "coloured"	.62	.40	.48	.48	.46	.47	.38			
h. "communist"	.35	.22	.24	.27	.21	.22	.15	.40		
i. "useful"	.63	.46	.57	.58	.53	.51	.37	.49	.31	
j. "anyone"	.38	.28	.25	.26	.27	.28	.24	.32	.28	.22

Appendix 4.3

Intercorrelations among Measures of Attitudes toward Immigration

	Acceptance of immigrants	Discrimination
Perceived consequences	.38***	-.36***
Acceptance of immigrants		-.26***

Appendix 4.4

Means of Behavioural Intentions toward Target Persons of Varying Ethnicity and Status and Involving Two Types of Relationships

	Immigrant	English / French Canadian
Low status		
Friendship	5.8	6.5
Business relationship	6.2	6.6
High status		
Friendship	6.0	6.5
Business relationship	5.7	6.6

Appendix 4.5

Analysis of Variance Source Table for Behavioural Intentions

Source	<i>df</i>	Mean square	F-test
Subject	1822	7.730	
Ethnicity	1	1507.912	478.83***
Ethnicity by subject	1822	3.149	
Status	1	14.859	35.44***
Status by subject	1822	.419	
Type of relation	1	19.224	20.69***
Type of relation by subject	1822	.929	
Ethnicity by status	1	33.359	108.33***
Ethnicity by status by subject	1822	.308	
Ethnicity by type of relation	1	.082	.17
Ethnicity by type of relation by subject	1822	.470	
Status by type of relation	1	125.429	365.01***
Status by type of relation by subject	1822	.344	
Ethnicity by status by type of relation	1	88.877	325.48***
Ethnicity by status by type of relation by subject	1822	.273	

Appendix 4.6

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Metropolitan Area

Metropolitan area	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Montreal	218	4.3	4.5	3.6
Toronto	215	4.4	4.2	3.0
Winnipeg	54	4.4	4.9	3.2
Calgary-Edmonton	70	4.7	4.4	2.8
Vancouver	106	4.3	4.7	3.2
F-test		1.21	2.10	2.54*

Appendix 4.7

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

Degree of urbanization	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Atlantic provinces				
Rural	88	3.8	4.6	3.9
Towns/small cities	76	3.8	5.2	4.2
Cities	40	5.0	3.7	2.7
F-test		9.71***	6.10**	5.64**
Quebec				
Rural	38	4.0	5.3	4.0
Towns	96	3.3	5.6	5.2
Cities	42	3.8	4.8	4.8
Metropolitan areas	62	4.0	5.0	4.0
Montreal	218	4.3	4.5	3.6
F-test		8.76***	4.28**	8.82***

Appendix 4.7 (Continued)

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

Degree of urbanization	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Ontario				
Rural	106	4.5	4.5	3.2
Towns	49	4.7	4.3	2.6
Cities	88	4.5	4.4	3.2
Metropolitan areas	231	4.8	4.0	2.5
Toronto	215	4.4	4.2	3.0
F-test		3.06*	1.11	2.82*
Prairies				
Rural	77	4.2	5.0	3.1
Towns	33	4.2	5.4	3.4
Cities	35	4.7	4.0	3.2
Metropolitan areas	147	4.6	4.6	2.9
F-test		2.67*	3.33*	.65
British Columbia				
Rural	17	4.6	4.8	2.8
Towns	16	4.7	4.5	1.8
Cities	35	4.4	4.9	3.1
Metropolitan areas	132	4.4	4.6	3.2
F-test		.29	.22	1.74

Appendix 4.8

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Metropolitan Areas

Metropolitan area	Acceptance of immigrants				N	Discrimination
	N	Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
Montreal	217	5.0	5.2	3.6	216	3.8
Toronto	215	5.0	5.0	3.9	215	1.3
Winnipeg	53	5.2	5.7	3.6	54	1.9
Calgary-Edmonton	70	5.0	5.5	3.6	70	1.9
Vancouver	106	5.1	5.4	3.9	105	1.0
F-test		.28	2.50*	.55		10.94***

Appendix 4.9

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

Degree of urbanization	Acceptance of immigrants				N	Discrimination
	N	Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
Atlantic provinces						
Rural	88	5.2	5.4	3.2	88	4.1
Towns / small cities	77	5.0	5.3	3.1	77	4.0
Cities	40	5.3	5.9	3.6	40	1.4
F-test		1.12	1.46	.68		5.08**
Quebec						
Rural	38	4.6	4.7	2.0	38	3.9
Towns	93	4.7	5.1	2.8	94	5.9

Appendix 4.9 (Continued)

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

Degree of urbanization	Acceptance of immigrants				N	Discrimination
	N	Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
Cities	42	5.0	5.4	2.7	42	5.1
Metropolitan areas	62	4.8	5.1	3.0	62	3.4
Montreal	217	5.0	5.2	3.6	216	3.8
F-test		1.56	.86	6.53***		2.33
Ontario						
Rural	106	4.9	4.9	3.2	106	1.9
Towns	49	4.7	5.5	3.8	48	2.4
Cities	88	5.2	5.1	3.2	88	1.8
Metropolitan areas	232	5.1	5.4	3.8	232	.7
Toronto	215	5.0	5.0	3.9	215	1.3
F-test		2.21	2.33	2.61*		3.43**
Prairies						
Rural	77	4.4	4.4	3.1	75	2.4
Towns	31	4.7	4.8	2.8	33	1.7
Cities	32	4.9	5.0	3.8	35	1.6
Metropolitan areas	147	5.1	5.5	3.7	147	2.0
F-test		4.61**	6.30***	2.80*		.41
British Columbia						
Rural	17	5.8	6.2	4.6	17	.3
Towns	15	4.7	5.0	3.4	15	.5
Cities	35	4.8	5.3	3.7	35	1.0
Metropolitan areas	131	5.0	5.3	3.9	130	1.1
F-test		3.60*	1.90	.84		.41

Appendix 4.10

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Region and Language of Interview

Group	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Quebec				
Anglophone	73	4.9	4.0	2.5
Francophone	484	3.8	5.0	4.4
Outside Quebec				
Anglophone	1241	4.5	4.4	3.0
Francophone	28	4.1	4.8	3.5
F-test region		.26	.17	.31
F-test language of interview		21.11***	7.46**	21.15***
F-test interaction		4.30*	1.23	7.44**

Appendix 4.11

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Religion

Religion	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
No religion	116	4.8	4.2	2.5
Anglican	203	4.4	4.4	3.2
United	291	4.6	4.6	2.8
Anglophone Roman Catholic	388	4.5	4.4	3.0
Francophone Roman Catholic	424	3.8	5.0	4.4
F-test		21.92***	6.16***	33.44***

Appendix 4.12

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Ethnicity and Generational Status

Group	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Angloceltic				
Immigrant	86	4.7	3.8	3.2
Second generation	126	4.4	4.7	3.1
Third generation and higher	431	4.4	4.6	3.1
Anglophone "other ethnic"				
Immigrant	204	4.8	3.7	2.6
Second generation	136	4.4	4.6	3.0
Third generation and higher	149	4.6	4.5	2.7
F-test generation		5.05**	14.79***	.39
F-test ethnicity		2.30	.24	6.02*
F-test interaction		.42	.00	.74

Appendix 4.13

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Ethnic Groups

Ethnic group	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Dutch	44	4.6	4.1	3.1
German	106	4.8	4.2	2.5
Italian	51	4.6	3.4	3.3
Polish	42	4.9	4.0	2.6
Russian	44	4.1	5.3	3.2
Scandinavian	46	4.8	4.6	2.7
Ukrainian	31	4.0	5.3	3.2
Other "other ethnic"	175	4.9	3.8	2.6
F-test		4.12***	4.76***	1.50

Appendix 4.14

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Region and Language of Interview

Group	Acceptance of immigrants				N	Discrimination
	N	Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
Quebec						
Anglophone	72	5.2	4.9	4.1	71	1.4
Francophone	481	4.8	5.2	3.0	482	5.0
Outside Quebec						
Anglophone	1237	5.0	5.1	3.5	1237	1.6
Francophone	27	5.2	5.1	2.1	27	4.8
F-test region		.21	.16	8.19**		.01
F-test language of interview		.21	.44	25.34***		36.41***
F-test interaction		3.60	.31	.37		.17

Appendix 4.15

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Religion

Religion	Acceptance of immigrants				<i>N</i>	Discrimination
	<i>N</i>	Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
No religion	116	5.0	5.2	4.4	116	.7
Anglican	202	5.0	5.1	3.6	203	2.2
United	289	4.9	5.2	3.5	292	1.5
Anglophone Roman Catholic	388	5.2	5.2	3.6	386	1.8
Francophone Roman Catholic	423	4.9	5.2	3.0	424	4.9
F-test		2.97*	.29	11.32***		38.54***

Appendix 4.16

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Ethnicity and Generational Status

Group	N	Acceptance of immigrants			N	Discrimination
		Total score	“coloured”	“communist countries”		
Angloceltic						
Immigrant	85	5.2	5.2	3.7	85	2.0
Second generation	124	4.9	4.9	3.6	124	1.8
Third generation	432	5.0	5.1	3.5	431	1.8
Anglophone “other ethnic”						
Immigrant	201	5.4	5.4	3.9	202	1.0
Second generation	135	4.7	4.6	3.6	135	1.9
Third generation	149	4.8	5.1	3.5	149	1.0
F-test generation		16.44***	5.96**	1.66		.86
F-test ethnicity		.49	.04	.46		3.43
F-test interaction		2.43	1.44	.29		1.52

Appendix 4.17

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	Acceptance of immigrants				<i>N</i>	Discrimination
	<i>N</i>	Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
Dutch	44	5.3	5.5	4.3	44	.4
German	105	5.1	5.1	4.0	105	1.5
Italian	51	5.6	5.7	4.2	51	1.0
Polish	41	5.0	4.6	4.0	42	1.0
Russian	44	4.5	4.6	2.8	43	2.7
Scandinavian	46	5.2	5.4	4.0	46	1.2
Ukrainian	30	3.7	4.0	2.7	31	1.8
Other ethnic	174	5.4	5.5	3.9	174	.9
F-test		11.67***	4.88***	3.24**		1.68

Appendix 4.18

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Head of Household's Occupational Status and Income

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Head of Household's Occupational Status				
Under 30.0000	498	4.0	4.9	3.7
30.0000-39.9999	324	4.3	4.7	3.4
40.0000-49.9999	361	4.4	4.6	3.3
50.0000-59.9999	209	4.6	4.3	3.2
60.0000-69.9999	253	4.9	3.8	2.5
70.0000-79.9999	82	5.0	4.0	2.5
F-test		18.29***	10.13***	10.27***
Head of Household's Income				
Under \$4,000	247	3.8	5.0	3.9
\$4,000-\$7,999	399	4.1	4.8	3.6
\$8,000-\$13,999	635	4.5	4.5	3.3
\$14,000-\$19,999	251	4.7	4.1	2.8
\$20,000 and over	118	5.0	3.7	2.4
F-test		24.44***	10.16***	13.34***

Appendix 4.19

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Head of Household's Occupational Status and Income

Acceptance of immigrants						
	<i>N</i>	Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"	<i>N</i>	Discrimination
Head of Household's Occupational Status						
Under 30.0000	494	4.8	5.0	3.1	496	2.9
30.0000 – 39.9999	326	5.1	5.4	3.4	326	2.6
40.0000 – 49.9999	359	5.0	5.2	3.7	359	2.5
50.0000 – 59.9999	210	5.0	5.3	3.7	209	1.7
60.0000 – 69.9999	250	5.1	5.4	4.0	253	1.4
70.0000 – 79.9999	82	5.0	5.1	4.1	82	.7
F-test		2.74*	2.51*	8.46***		6.23***
Head of Household's Income						
Under \$4,000	247	4.8	4.8	2.8	243	3.4
\$4,000 – \$7,999	398	5.0	5.3	3.2	398	3.1
\$8,000 – \$13,999	634	5.0	5.2	3.6	635	2.2
\$14,000 – \$19,999	248	5.0	5.3	3.8	253	1.2
\$20,000 and over	118	5.0	4.7	3.7	118	.8
F-test		2.41*	6.40***	9.51***		12.10***

Appendix 4.20

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Language of Interview and Political Party Preference

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Anglophone				
Liberal	429	4.6	4.4	2.9
NDP	152	4.4	4.4	2.8
PC	293	4.5	4.5	3.0
Social Credit	12	4.8	4.7	2.4
F-test		.91	.28	.50
Francophone				
Liberal	192	4.2	4.7	3.9
NDP	19	3.8	4.3	4.8
PC	22	3.4	5.6	4.7
Social Credit	25	3.4	5.6	4.7
F-test		3.25*	2.46	2.41

Appendix 4.21

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Language of Interview and Political Party Preference

	Acceptance of immigrants					
	<i>N</i>	Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"	<i>N</i>	Discrimination
Anglophone						
Liberal	428	5.2	5.3	3.8	428	1.5
NDP	152	4.9	5.2	3.6	151	1.1
PC	292	4.8	5.0	3.2	296	2.0
Social Credit	12	4.1	2.8	2.0	10	1.8
F-test		9.71***	8.44***	6.51***		2.03
Francophone						
Liberal	192	5.2	5.3	3.0	192	4.1
NDP	19	5.1	6.0	5.0	19	4.2
PC	22	3.9	4.2	1.4	22	8.2
Social Credit	25	4.4	5.0	2.5	25	7.3
F-test		9.74***	3.97**	9.52***		4.75**

Appendix 4.22

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Age

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Teens	204	4.3	4.7	3.4
Twenties	428	4.3	4.7	3.3
Thirties	325	4.6	4.4	3.0
Forties	314	4.6	4.3	3.0
Fifties	264	4.2	4.5	3.5
60 and over	289	4.0	5.0	3.8
F-test		9.30***	3.90**	5.31***

Appendix 4.23

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Age

	Acceptance of immigrants				<i>N</i>	Discrimination
	<i>N</i>	Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
Teens	203	5.2	5.8	4.2	204	1.6
Twenties	425	5.0	5.4	4.0	427	1.8
Thirties	324	5.0	5.3	3.6	323	2.4
Forties	310	5.0	5.2	3.4	311	2.4
Fifties	263	4.8	5.0	3.0	263	2.7
60 and over	290	4.9	4.6	2.5	288	3.5
F-test		3.46**	12.62***	25.77***		5.82***

Appendix 4.24

Means of Perceived Consequences of Immigration by Sex

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"unemployment"	"purity of race"
Male	854	4.4	4.4	3.3
Female	988	4.3	4.7	3.4
F-test		.34	10.14**	.32

Appendix 4.25

Means of Acceptability of and Discrimination against Immigrants by Sex

	Acceptance of immigrants				<i>N</i>	Discrimination
	<i>N</i>	Total score	"coloured"	"communist countries"		
Male	847	4.9	5.0	3.6	849	2.3
Female	985	5.1	5.3	3.4	984	2.5
F-test		10.21**	9.69**	1.73		.62

Appendix 4.26

Zero Order Correlations Between Independent Variables and Attitudes Toward Immigration

Independent variables (values)	Dependent variables		
	Perceived consequences	Acceptability of immigrants	Discrimination against immigrants
<i>Non-Psychological</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>r</i>
Region (Quebec / other)	.16***	.04	-.24***
Community size in childhood	.11***	.11***	-.07**
Community size, current	.07**	.06**	-.05*
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian / other)	.23***	.06*	-.32***
Ethnicity 7 (Anglo Celts / other)	-.04	.02	.10***
Ethnicity 8 (anglophone "other ethnic" / other)	-.15***	-.06*	.17***
Ethnicity 9 (francophone "other ethnic" / other)	-.03	-.06*	.02
Generational status (immigrant / first / second)	-.15***	-.12***	.14***
Sex (male / female)	-.01	.08**	.02
Age	-.08***	-.08***	.13***
Head of household's income	.24***	.04	-.17***
Education	.32***	.05*	-.20***
Head of household's occupational status	.22***	.06*	-.13***
Religiosity — belief strength	-.04	.05	.09***
Religiosity — church attendance	-.01	.05*	.10***
<i>Psychological</i>			
Ethnocentrism	-.53***	-.21***	.37***
Authoritarianism	-.33***	-.03	.23***
Value — a comfortable life	.16***	.13***	-.12***
Value — a world at peace	.02	-.05*	-.01
Value — a world of beauty	-.02	.00	.02
Value — equality	-.15***	-.09***	.11***
Value — family security	-.05*	.01	-.05*

Appendix 4.26 (continued)

Zero Order Correlations Between Independent Variables and Attitudes Toward Immigration

Independent variables (values)	Dependent variables		
	Perceived consequences	Acceptability of immigrants	Discrimination against immigrants
Value — freedom	-.13***	-.07**	.16***
Value — happiness	.05*	.02	.02
Value — national security	.07**	.04	-.02
Value — salvation	.04	-.01	-.07**
Value — self-respect	-.04	.01	.01
Value — social recognition	.12***	.07**	-.12***
Value — true friendship	-.08***	-.04	.06**

Appendix 4.27

Multiple Stepwise Regression of Perceived Consequences of Immigration

Independent variables	Total sample			Subsample 1		Subsample 2	
	Order ^a	R ^b	beta ^c	beta	R	beta	R
		(N = 1842)		(N = 924)		(N = 917)	
Excluding psychological variables							
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian / other)	2	.37	.23*** ^c	.21***	.20	.25***	.26
Education	1	.32	.23***	.18***	.34	.27***	.40
Ethnicity 7 (Anglo Celts / other)	4	.40	.12***	.15***	.36	.08*	.40
Head of household's income	3	.39	.11***	.15***	.39	.08*	.42
Occupational status	5	.40	.06*	.09*	.40	.02	.42
Religiosity — church attendance	6	.41	.05*	.04	.40	.06*	.42
Community size in childhood	7	.41	.05*	.04	.40	.07*	.42
Including psychological variables							
Ethnocentrism	1	.53	-.46*** ^d	-.50***	.55	-.41***	.50
Education	2	.54	.11***	.06*	.56	.16***	.53
Head of household's income	4	.56	.09***	.10***	.57	.08**	.54
Value — equality	6	.57	-.09***	-.04	.57	-.14***	.55
Value — family security	5	.57	-.08***	-.08**	.57	-.09**	.55
Generational status (immigrant / first / older)	3	.56	-.08***	-.06*	.58	-.11***	.57
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian / other)	8	.58	.07***	.05	.58	.08**	.58
Religiosity — church attendance	9	.58	.06**	.06*	.58	.06*	.58
Age	7	.58	.06**	.05	.59	.06*	.58

^aorder in which independent variable was entered in original stepwise regression according to BEST criterion.

^bMultiple correlation coefficient at a given step.

^cstandardized coefficient (beta weight)

^dp associated with t-test of coefficient ($t = \text{coefficient} / \text{standardized error of coefficient}$).

Appendix 4.28

Multiple Stepwise Regression of Acceptability of Immigrants

Independent variables	Total sample			Subsample 1		Subsample 2	
	Order ^a	<i>R</i> ^b	beta ^c	beta	<i>R</i>	beta	<i>R</i>
		(<i>N</i> = 1831)		(<i>N</i> = 919)		(<i>N</i> = 911)	
Excluding psychological variables							
Generational status (immigrant / first / older)	1	.12	-.14**** ^d	-.16***	.14	-.12***	.10
Age	3	.18	-.10***	-.12***	.19	-.08*	.13
Community size in childhood	2	.16	.10***	.12***	.22	.08*	.14
Religiosity — church attendance	4	.20	.09***	.08*	.23	.11**	.18
Sex	5	.22	.07**	.11***	.26	.03	.18
Including psychological variables							
Ethnocentrism	1	.21	-.26**** ^d	-.25***	.22	-.28***	.20
Authoritarianism	2	.25	.16***	.15***	.25	.18***	.24
Generational status (immigrant / first / older)	3	.26	-.11***	-.13***	.28	-.08*	.25
Community size in childhood	4	.28	.09***	.10**	.29	.07*	.26
Religiosity — church attendance	5	.29	.09***	.07*	.30	.10**	.28
Age	7	.31	-.07**	-.09*	.32	-.05	.28
Sex	8	.31	.06*	.08**	.33	.03	.28
Value — equality	9	.32	-.05*	-.02	.33	-.10**	.30
Value — comfortable life	6	.30	.05*	.09**	.34	.01	.30

^aOrder in which independent variable was entered in original stepwise regression according to BEST criterion.

^bMultiple correlation coefficient at a given step.

^cStandardized coefficient (beta weight)

^dp associated with t-test of coefficient ($t = \text{coefficient} / \text{standardized error of coefficient}$).

Appendix 4.29

Multiple Stepwise Regression of Discrimination against Immigrants

Independent variables		Total sample			Subsample 1		Subsample 2	
		Order ^a	R ^b	beta ^c	beta	R	beta	R
			(N = 1833)		(N = 922)		(N = 910)	
Excluding psychological variables								
Ethnicity 6 (French-Canadian / other)	1	.32	-.35*** ^d	-.38***	.34	-.30***	.30	
Education	2	.35	-.10***	-.06	.36	-.14***	.35	
Age	3	.37	.10***	.09**	.37	.10**	.36	
Region (Quebec / other)	6	.38	.10*	.14**	.38	.04	.36	
Ethnicity 8 (anglophone ethnics / other)	5	.38	.08**	.11***	.40	.03	.36	
Head of household's income	4	.37	-.07**	-.11**	.41	-.04	.36	
Including psychological variables								
Ethnocentrism	1	.37	.28*** ^d	.26***	.36	.31***	.38	
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian / other)	2	.44	-.23***	-.25***	.44	-.20***	.44	
Head of household's income	3	.45	-.06**	-.07*	.45	-.04	.44	
Value — equality	4	.45	.06*	.03	.45	.08**	.45	
Age	5	.45	.05*	.06	.46	.04	.45	
Generational status (immigrant / first / older)	6	.45	.05*	.04	.46	.06	.46	

^aorder in which independent variable was entered in original stepwise regression according to BEST criterion.

^bMultiple correlation coefficient at a given step.

^cstandardized coefficient (beta weight)

^dp associated with t-test of coefficient ($t = \text{coefficient} / \text{standardized error of coefficient}$).

Appendix 5.1

Mean Difference between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Average Ratings in the Total Sample

	English	French	Immigrant	Indian	German	Chinese	Ukrainian	Jewish	Italian
1. Hardworking									
Mean difference	.06	.00	.18	-1.71	.46	.30	.22	.36	.23
T-test	2.21*	.02	6.91***	-42.66***	17.99***	10.54***	7.91***	11.94***	8.20***
2. Important									
Mean difference	.69	.59	-.09	-.17	-.31	-.42	-.32	.10	-.16
T-test	26.54***	20.63***	3.32***	-4.89***	-11.96***	-17.41***	-15.54***	3.79***	-7.00***
3. Canadian									
Mean difference	.90	.78	-.50	.82	-.39	-.71	-.38	-.26	-.43
T-test	30.22***	23.75***	-16.72***	21.33***	-14.36***	-26.7***	-14.84***	-9.20***	-16.39***
4. Clean									
Mean difference	.66	.48	-.12	-1.65	.69	-.22	.28	.20	-.33
T-test	29.91***	18.88***	-5.54***	-45.09***	27.51***	-7.85***	11.94***	7.97***	-12.09***
5. Similar to me									
Mean difference	1.45	1.08	-.06	-1.05	.27	-1.08	-.12	-.34	-.27
T-test	41.72***	28.62***	-2.09*	-27.26***	8.34***	-35.67***	-4.06***	-11.42***	-9.68***

Appendix 5.1 (Continued)

Mean Difference between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Average Ratings in the Total Sample

	English	French	Immigrant	Indian	German	Chinese	Ukrainian	Jewish	Italian
6. Likeable									
Mean difference	.59	.51	-.13	-.26	-.04	-.21	-.04	-.30	-.19
T-test	22.83***	18.05***	-5.24***	-8.17***	-1.54	-8.52***	-1.46	-11.49***	-7.22***
7. Stick together as a group									
Mean difference	-.81	-.04	-.29	.50	-.45	.40	-.22	.47	.42
T-test	-24.32***	-1.25*	-10.28***	17.33***	-16.04***	16.00***	-8.42***	19.32***	16.95***
8. Wealthy									
Mean difference	.73	.13	-.40	-2.29	.04	-.05	-.10	1.66	.29
T-test	30.01***	5.52***	-16.40***	-77.75***	1.54**	-1.72	-4.09***	61.14***	12.06***
9. Interesting									
Mean difference	.28	.48	.00	.16	-.13	-.18	-.19	-.20	-.28
T-test	10.34***	16.63***	-.24	4.53***	-5.20***	-7.14***	-8.07***	-8.13***	-11.23***
10. Well known to me									
Mean difference	1.68	1.16	-.20	-.69	-.33	-.94	-.62	-.18	.00
T-test	54.59***	28.78***	-6.40***	-16.75***	-9.23***	-31.28***	-16.77***	-5.33***	-1.05

Appendix 5.2

Mean Difference between Ratings of Nominated Groups and Average Ratings in the Total Sample

	Belgian	Czechoslovakian	Dutch	East Indian	Greek	Hungarian	Irish	Japanese	Negro
1. Hardworking									
Mean difference	.40	.45	.81	-.50	.06	.38	.09	.69	-.52
T-test	2.61*	3.02***	10.06***	-3.44***	.57	4.10***	1.96	6.72***	-2.01
2. Important									
Mean difference	.03	-.45	.21	-.92	-.32	-.11	.30	-.26	-.94
T-test	.18	-2.35*	9.10**	-5.39***	-3.49***	-1.18*	3.58***	-3.43***	-3.52***
3. Canadian									
Mean difference	-.18	-.64	.14	-1.73	-.74	-.29	.22	-.43	-.41
T-test	-.98	-3.14**	1.67	-11.82***	-6.64***	-2.73**	2.54**	-5.20***	-1.44
4. Clean									
Mean difference	.86	.56	.94	-.99	-.44	.46	.55	.50	-.61
T-test	5.88***	3.03**	11.80***	-5.82***	-4.02***	4.74***	8.09***	5.31***	-2.44*
5. Similar to me									
Mean difference	1.20	.03	.83	-1.32	-.56	.56	1.42	-.48	-.85
T-test	5.31***	1.12	7.20***	-7.37***	-5.06***	4.14***	11.92***	-3.58***	-2.76**

Appendix 5.2 (continued)

Mean Difference between Ratings of Nominated Groups and Average Ratings in the Total Sample

	Belgian	Czechoslovakian	Dutch	East Indian	Greek	Hungarian	Irish	Japanese	Negro
6. Likeable									
Mean difference	.83	.02	.58	-1.18	-.46	.23	.71	.16	-.22
T-test	4.61***	1.14	7.14***	-6.65***	-3.98***	2.21*	9.35***	1.50	-.86
7. Stick together as a group									
Mean difference	-.19	-.16	-.50	.58	.19	-.19	-.86	.07	-.16
T-test	-1.12	-1.03	-4.00	4.06***	1.73	-2.00*	-8.27***	.55	-.66
8. Wealthy									
Mean difference	.08	-.29	.34	-.35	.14	-.06	.14	.32	-.90
T-test	.56	-1.55	4.57***	-2.56*	1.23	-.72	2.20*	2.97**	-3.89***
9. Interesting									
Mean difference	.57	.16	.05	-.37	-.31	-.03	.37	.32	-.52
T-test	3.87***	1.97	1.68	-2.74**	-2.29**	-.32	4.70***	2.64**	-2.34*
10. Well known to me									
Mean difference	1.09	.13	.95	-.51	-.35	.21	1.29	-.23	-.44
T-test	3.98***	.59	7.33***	-3.13**	-2.21*	1.25	10.04***	-1.33*	-1.63

Appendix 5.2 (continued)

Mean Difference between Ratings of Nominated Groups and Average Ratings in the Total Sample

	Polish	Portugese	Russian	Scandinavian	Scottish	Spanish	West Indian	Yugo-slavian
1. Hardworking								
Mean difference	.32	.28	.55	.50	.27	-.48	-.36	.16
T-test	4.59***	2.44*	5.11***	5.20***	3.91***	-2.22*	-1.72	.95
2. Important								
Mean difference	-.12	-.46	-.46	.13	.41	-.60	-.45	-.19
T-test	-2.15*	-4.22***	-2.92**	1.38	5.73***	-3.27**	-2.87**	-2.06*
3. Canadian								
Mean difference	-.07	-.88	-.44	.03	.47	-.47	-.66	-.63
T-test	-1.06	-7.96***	-3.56***	.26	6.18***	-2.78**	-2.63*	-4.94***
4. Clean								
Mean difference	.31	-.20	.10	.98	.61	-.08	.15	.24
T-test	5.10***	-1.87	.88	10.61***	10.43***	-.41	.69	3.01**
5. Similar to me								
Mean difference	.31	-.19	.27	1.05	1.43	-.01	-.13	.24
T-test	3.78***	-1.79	2.08*	7.45***	13.02***	-.01	-.46	1.47
6. Likeable								
Mean difference	.24	-.12	-.12	.68	.73	.13	.30	.08
T-test	3.60***	-1.17	-.98	7.48***	10.85***	.90	1.45	.72

Appendix 5.2 (continued)

Mean Difference between Ratings of Nominated Groups and Average Ratings in the Total Sample

	Polish	Portugese	Russian	Scandinavian	Scottish	Spanish	West Indian	Yugo-slavian
7. Stick together as a group								
Mean difference	-.14	.39	-.32	-.56	-.78	-.39	.03	-.27
T-test	-2.02*	3.56***	-2.76**	-4.28***	-7.54***	-2.04*	.20	-1.88
8. Wealthy								
Mean difference	-.01	-.58	-.12	.03	.42	-.52	-.85	-.19
T-test	-.14	-5.62***	-1.20	.35	6.50***	-4.59***	-4.00***	-1.68
9. Interesting								
Mean difference	-.11	-.20	-.05	.12	.40	-.02	.26	-.21
T-test	-1.73	-1.69	-.41	1.30	5.14***	-.12	1.40	-1.92
10. Well known to me								
Mean difference	.14	-.05	-.09	.54	1.28	-.18	.28	-.43
T-test	1.39	-.30	-.46	3.28**	10.77***	-.69	1.06	-2.00

Appendix 5.3

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of these Groups by Geographic Region

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
English Canadians				
Atlantic provinces	169	1.93	— .36	2.29
Quebec	465	1.25	— .29	1.40
Ontario	691	1.45	—1.03	1.77
Prairies	282	1.46	—1.24	1.62
British Columbia	193	1.50	.97	1.60
F-test		6.67***	33.64***	16.32***
French Canadians				
Atlantic provinces	164	.80	.24	1.43
Quebec	475	2.28	— .28	2.62
Ontario	687	.76	.03	.74
Prairies	280	.36	.16	.20
British Columbia	180	.57	.03	.23
F-test		118.86***	9.31***	189.38***
Immigrants in general				
Atlantic provinces	157	.01	— .13	— .53
Quebec	416	— .38	— .36	— .42
Ontario	690	.04	— .29	.01
Prairies	279	— .05	— .35	— .38
British Columbia	193	.15	— .15	.04
F-test		9.30***	1.92	13.20***

Appendix 5.3 (continued)

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of these Groups by Geographic Region

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
Canadian Indians				
Atlantic provinces	167	— .66	.52	— .65
Quebec	453	— .85	.62	— .81
Ontario	689	—1.06	.42	— .78
Prairies	281	—1.42	.58	— .46
British Columbia	195	—1.20	.39	— .49
F-test		8.56***	2.23*	2.99*
German Canadians				
Atlantic provinces	141	— .42	— .53	— .95
Quebec	414	.00	— .59	—1.04
Ontario	687	.31	— .34	— .24
Prairies	283	.71	— .48	.48
British Columbia	192	.47	— .47	.16
F-test		23.87***	3.45**	67.36***
Chinese Canadians				
Atlantic provinces	147	—1.21	.12	— .94
Quebec	430	—1.27	.18	—1.13
Ontario	685	—1.02	.42	—1.08
Prairies	281	— .87	.70	— .65
British Columbia	193	—1.14	.60	— .47
F-test		5.20***	14.89***	15.45***

Appendix 5.3 (continued)

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of these Groups by Geographic Region

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
Ukrainian Canadians				
Atlantic provinces	126	— .40	— .15	— .91
Quebec	334	— .54	— .14	—1.48
Ontario	675	— .15	— .26	— .69
Prairies	282	.39	— .19	.49
British Columbia	185	.10	— .28	— .18
F-test		29.51***	1.05	90.92***
Jewish Canadians				
Atlantic provinces	145	— .30	.00	— .14
Quebec	439	— .60	.43	.06
Ontario	680	— .20	.52	— .07
Prairies	276	— .29	.59	— .50
British Columbia	177	— .33	.56	— .78
F-test		7.48***	10.22***	15.89***
Italian Canadians				
Atlantic provinces	135	— .25	.17	— .26
Quebec	442	— .47	.29	.17
Ontario	680	— .18	.61	.33
Prairies	273	— .34	.29	— .84
British Columbia	189	— .11	.33	— .20
F-test		5.50***	11.39***	40.99***

Appendix 5.4

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of these Groups by Ethnicity of Respondent

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
English Canadians				
Angloceltic	683	1.86	— .98	2.06
French	334	1.17	— .20	1.39
Anglophone "other ethnic"	507	1.02	— 1.04	1.37
Francophone "other ethnic"	32	.80	— .65	1.12
F-test		42.00***	29.19***	38.51***
French Canadians				
Angloceltic	672	.73	.02	.78
French	344	2.45	— .30	2.87
Anglophone "other ethnic"	493	.30	.06	.22
Francophone "other ethnic"	32	1.22	— .45	1.82
F-test		183.60***	8.98***	255.97***
Immigrants in general				
Angloceltic	671	— .08	— .28	— .25
French	292	— .44	— .41	— .39
Anglophone "other ethnic"	506	.28	— .24	.11
Francophone "other ethnic"	30	— .03	— .35	— .50
F-test		23.02***	1.40	12.44***

Appendix 5.4 (continued)

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of these Groups by Ethnicity of Respondent

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
Canadian Indians				
Angloceltic	681	— .98	.48	— .59
French	327	— .77	.61	— .73
Anglophone "other ethnic"	503	—1.37	.41	— .83
Francophone "other ethnic"	31	—1.18	.72	— .35
F-test		10.35***	2.08	2.28
German Canadians				
Angloceltic	668	.19	— .42	— .33
French	287	— .10	— .52	—1.19
Anglophone "other ethnic"	502	.67	— .46	.32
Francophone "other ethnic"	30	.12	— .91	— .91
F-test		24.44***	2.05	77.65***
Chinese Canadians				
Angloceltic	667	—1.06	.48	— .91
French	308	—1.34	.08	—1.15
Anglophone "other ethnic"	503	— .94	.54	— .83
Francophone "other ethnic"	28	— .67	.53	— .91
F-test		7.36***	13.33***	4.35**

Appendix 5.4 (continued)

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of these Groups by Ethnicity of Respondent

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
Ukrainian Canadians				
Angloceltic	639	— .15	— .20	— .56
French	230	— .68	— .14	—1.56
Anglophone "other ethnic"	494	.27	— .27	— .12
Francophone "other ethnic"	28	— .05	— .02	—1.12
F-test		37.14***	1.10	63.04***
Jewish Canadians				
Angloceltic	660	— .23	.45	— .13
French	313	— .62	.40	— .11
Anglophone "other ethnic"	485	— .24	.59	— .30
Francophone "other ethnic"	31	— .54	.50	— .09
F-test		8.64***	2.72*	1.69
Italian Canadians				
Angloceltic	653	— .37	.46	— .14
French	315	— .42	.31	.17
Anglophone "other ethnic"	493	.03	.46	.05
Francophone "other ethnic"	32	.15	.63	.62
F-test		11.90***	2.17	5.86***

Appendix 5.5

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of These Groups by Education

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
English Canadians				
Some primary	169	1.12	— .49	1.27
Primary (graduated)	251	1.11	— .60	1.36
Some high school	534	1.59	— .76	1.78
High school (graduated)	341	1.60	— .82	1.86
Technical training	188	1.32	—1.06	1.60
Some college, university or more	302	1.58	—1.09	1.86
F-test		7.02***	6.45***	9.93***
French Canadians				
Some primary	177	1.38	— .05	1.65
Primary (graduated)	245	.93	.13	1.03
Some high school	522	1.14	.01	1.22
High school (graduated)	340	1.17	— .14	1.21
Technical training	186	.89	— .20	.88
Some college, university or more	300	.92	— .03	.96
F-test		3.17**	2.36*	5.31***

Appendix 5.5 (Continued)

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of These Groups by Education

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
Immigrants in general				
Some primary	156	— .26	— .09	— .16
Primary (graduated)	227	.04	— .25	.06
Some high school	526	— .09	— .25	— .26
High school (graduated)	332	.01	— .46	— .26
Technical training	184	.09	— .23	— .13
Some college, university or more	295	— .15	— .30	— .29
F-test		2.29*	2.52*	2.70*
Canadian Indians				
Some primary	174	—1.03	.36	— .61
Primary (graduated)	242	— .94	.41	— .59
Some high school	529	— .89	.49	— .59
High school (graduated)	338	—1.13	.58	— .85
Technical training	184	—1.15	.56	— .68
Some college, university or more	302	—1.27	.53	— .82
F-test		2.72*	1.16	1.47

Appendix 5.5 (Continued)

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of These Groups by Education

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
German Canadians				
Some primary	151	.23	— .26	— .34
Primary (graduated)	224	.31	— .43	— .20
Some high school	516	.17	— .42	— .45
High school (graduated)	330	.24	— .30	— .44
Technical training	182	.46	— .50	— .02
Some college, university or more	297	.32	— .72	— .26
F-test		1.50	5.44***	3.18**
Chinese Canadians				
Some primary	156	—1.28	— .03	—1.17
Primary (graduated)	223	—1.06	.22	— .91
Some high school	525	—1.12	.34	— .91
High school (graduated)	335	—1.12	.47	— .92
Technical training	183	—1.09	.60	—1.03
Some college, university or more	298	— .91	.67	— .88
F-test		1.96	12.54***	1.59

Appendix 5.5 (Continued)

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of These Groups by Education

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
Ukrainian Canadians				
Some primary	134	.14	— .15	— .68
Primary (graduated)	208	.01	— .25	— .52
Some high school	483	— .28	— .28	— .59
High school (graduated)	312	— .18	— .20	— .63
Technical training	170	.08	— .17	— .46
Some college, university or more	285	— .13	— .17	— .79
F-test		4.99***	.71	1.41
Jewish Canadians				
Some primary	161	— .33	.35	— .26
Primary (graduated)	228	— .44	.45	— .40
Some high school	504	— .36	.46	— .34
High school (graduated)	331	— .40	.49	— .16
Technical training	178	— .35	.54	— .16
Some college, university or more	299	— .11	.51	.26
F-test		2.62*	.75	8.54***

Appendix 5.5 (Continued)

Means of Differences between Ratings of Standard Ethnic Groups and Respondents' Average Ratings of These Groups by Education

	<i>N</i>	"similar to me"	"stick together"	"well known to me"
Italian Canadians				
Some primary	156	— .23	.31	.05
Primary (graduated)	223	— .17	.33	.05
Some high school	514	— .25	.40	.03
High school (graduated)	334	— .32	.37	.08
Technical training	178	— .35	.50	— .13
Some college, university or more	296	— .31	.57	— .12
F-test		.77	2.43*	1.08

Appendix 6.1

Inter-item Correlations for Multicultural Ideology

	Total less item	Item with sign										
		a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.	i.	j.	k.
<i>Nine scale items</i>												
a. "keep own ways"	.35	+	-	+	-	+	-	-	-	+	-	-
b. "keep it to themselves"	-.48	-.18										
c. "Canadians can gain"	.39	.12	-.18									
d. "difficult to solve problems"	-.45	-.08	.33	-.21								
e. "retain cultures"	.50	.45	-.20	.26	-.16							
f. "forget background"	-.64	-.20	.37	-.33	.37	-.39						
g. "be more like us"	-.57	-.16	.39	-.21	.29	-.25	.53					
h. "unity weakened"	-.58	-.21	.32	-.19	.44	-.29	.48	.46				
i. "can tackle new problems"	.39	.22	-.15	.29	-.19	.33	-.21	-.17	-.14			
<i>Three language items</i>												
i. "need English"	-.34	-.09	.11	-.08	.11	-.12	.16	.20	.17	-.06		
j. "need French"	-.31	-.01	.13	-.19	.14	-.10	.23	.20	.15	-.08	.50	
k. "need to be bilingual"	-.37	-.05	.14	-.21	.17	-.11	.23	.23	.17	-.11	.36	.60

Appendix 6.2

Inter-item Correlations for Perceived Consequences of Multiculturalism

	Total less item	Item with sign						
		a.	d.	e.	f.	g.	b.	c.
<i>Five scale items</i>								
		-	+	+	-	+	-	-
a. "Canadian way destroyed"	.57							
d. "richer in culture"	.67	-.38						
e. "social harmony improve"	.67	-.36	.63					
f. "education will suffer"	.53	.50	-.34	-.33				
g. "T.V. and radio"	.44	-.19	.39	.41	-.12			
<i>Two group items</i>								
b. "English Canadians weaker"	-.63	.58	-.29	-.28	.44	-.10		
c. "French Canadians weaker"	-.62	.54	-.30	-.29	.46	-.11	.71	

Appendix 6.3

Inter-item Correlations for Attitudes toward Multicultural Programmes

	Total less item	Items							
		a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.
<i>Six scale items</i>									
a. "community centres"	.59								
b. "3rd language broadcasting"	.62	.41							
c. "histories written"	.62	.42	.42						
d. "regular 3rd language teaching"	.53	.28	.49	.39					
e. "special 3rd language teaching"	.58	.39	.36	.41	.32				
f. "folk festivals"	.58	.48	.34	.48	.23	.48			
<i>Two language items</i>									
g. "teach English"	.26	.30	.21	.28	.16	.32	.42		
h. "teach French"	.18	.28	.22	.28	.17	.24	.31	.31	

Appendix 6.4

Inter-item Correlations for Behavioural Intentions toward Multicultural Programmes

Three scale items	Total less item	a.	Items b.	c.
a. "vote for"	.82			
b. "convince others"	.82	.79		
c. "pay taxes for"	.77	.73	.71	

Appendix 6.5

Intercorrelations among Four Multicultural Attitude Scales

	1.	2.	3.	4.
1. Multicultural ideology	—			
2. Perceived consequences of multiculturalism	.58	—		
3. Multicultural programme attitudes	.50	.56	—	
4. Behavioural intentions toward multiculturalism	.49	.54	.62	—

Appendix 6.6

Means of Four Multicultural Attitude Scale Total Scores by Perception and Knowledge of Policy

		Multicultural ideology	Perceived consequences	Programme attitudes	Behavioural intentions
<i>N</i>		Total score	Total score	Total score	Total score
Perception of policy					
Assimilation	231	3.8	3.9	4.2	2.8
Permissive integration	1030	4.6	4.5	4.7	3.5
Supportive integration	461	4.9	5.0	5.0	4.1
F-test		50.37***	32.98***	21.71***	23.09***
Knowledge of policy					
NO	1506	4.5	4.4	4.7	3.5
YES	323	4.7	4.8	4.8	3.8
F-test		12.82***	17.11***	1.84	8.15**
Heard of policy					
NO	1086	4.4	4.4	4.6	3.4
YES	404	4.6	4.6	4.9	3.5
F-test		9.98**	4.45*	8.66**	.86

Appendix 6.7

Cross-tabulation of Perception of Policy and Knowledge of Policy

	Perception of policy		
	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
<i>Knowledge of policy</i>			
NO	86.5	82.1	78.1
YES	13.5	17.9	21.9
Chi-square = 7.64*			
<i>Heard of policy</i>			
NO	83.2	72.5	65.4
YES	16.8	27.5	34.6
Chi-square = 20.21*			

Appendix 6.8

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Metropolitan Areas

Metropolitan area	N	Total score
Montreal	217	4.3
Toronto	212	4.7
Winnipeg	54	4.8
Calgary-Edmonton	70	4.8
Vancouver	106	4.6
F-test		5.25***

Appendix 6.9

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

Region	<i>N</i>	Total score
Atlantic provinces		
Rural	88	4.4
Town/Small city	77	4.0
City	40	4.9
F test		8.99***
Quebec		
Rural	38	4.0
Town	95	3.7
City	41	4.1
Metropolitan area	62	4.1
Montreal	217	4.3
F-test		4.15**
Ontario		
Rural	106	4.6
Town	49	4.7
City	88	4.6
Metropolitan area	231	4.9
Toronto	212	4.7
F-test		2.69*
Prairies		
Rural	77	4.4
Town	33	4.4
City	35	4.9
Metropolitan area	147	4.8
F-test		3.08*

Appendix 6.9 (continued)

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

Region	<i>N</i>	Total score
British Columbia		
Rural	17	5.2
Town	15	4.8
City	35	4.3
Metropolitan area	132	4.6
F-test		2.61

Appendix 6.10

Perception of Multicultural Policy by Metropolitan Areas

Metropolitan area	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
Montreal	199	16.0	64.9	19.1
Toronto	208	9.9	51.3	38.8
Winnipeg	51	15.1	60.2	24.7
Calgary-Edmonton	68	5.6	73.2	21.2
Vancouver	99	16.7	68.0	15.3
Chi-square = 35.08***				

Appendix 6.11

Perception of Multicultural Policy by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
Atlantic provinces				
Rural	76	20.7	49.6	29.8
Town / Small city	69	11.6	66.2	22.2
City	38	5.0	54.1	40.9
Chi-square = 9.67*				
Quebec				
Rural	34	37.8	58.3	3.8
Town	84	26.3	51.5	22.2
City	34	26.3	50.3	23.4
Metropolitan area	59	20.2	39.8	40.0
Montreal	199	16.0	64.9	19.1
Chi-square = 29.09***				

Appendix 6.11 (Continued)

Perception of Multicultural Policy by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
Ontario				
Rural	99	12.4	63.4	24.2
Town	48	27.5	54.9	17.6
City	86	13.3	66.3	20.4
Metropolitan area	228	5.4	59.1	35.5
Toronto	208	9.9	51.3	38.8
Chi-square = 36.06 ***				
Prairies				
Rural	72	8.2	65.0	26.8
Town	32	19.5	54.9	25.6
City	32	7.7	64.6	27.7
Metropolitan area	141	8.5	68.2	23.3
Chi-square = 4.80				
British Columbia				
Rural	15	5.9	32.9	61.2
Town	15	0	83.7	16.3
City	35	2.9	76.8	20.3
Metropolitan area	125	15.9	67.4	16.8
Chi-square = 23.10 ***				

Appendix 6.12

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy by Metropolitan Area

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Montreal	216	72.3	27.7	153	69.2	30.8
Toronto	215	80.4	19.6	172	72.1	27.9
Winnipeg	54	84.6	15.4	46	69.7	30.3
Calgary-Edmonton	70	71.6	28.4	50	57.3	42.7
Vancouver	106	85.1	14.9	90	83.0	17.0
Chi-square = 10.90*				Chi-square = 11.19*		

Appendix 6.13

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Atlantic provinces						
Rural	88	94.5	5.5	81	89.0	11.0
Town/Small city	77	86.1	13.9	66	61.4	38.6
City	40	69.0	31.0	27	63.0	37.0
Chi-square = 15.05***				Chi-square = 16.80***		
Quebec						
Rural	38	75.9	24.1	29	88.5	11.5
Town	94	89.2	10.8	82	80.7	19.3
City	42	72.4	27.6	31	86.9	13.1
Metropolitan area	62	76.5	23.5	47	84.3	15.7

Appendix 6.13 (Continued)

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Montreal	216	72.3	27.7	153	69.2	30.8
Chi-square = 10.93*				Chi-square = 11.20*		
Ontario						
Rural	107	84.2	15.8	89	83.9	16.1
Town	49	80.8	19.2	40	65.2	34.8
City	88	85.9	14.1	73	73.9	26.1
Metropolitan area	233	83.8	16.2	192	71.4	28.6
Toronto	215	80.4	19.6	172	72.1	27.9
Chi-square = 1.88				Chi-square = 6.96		
Prairies						
Rural	77	81.2	18.8	62	66.5	33.5
Town	33	86.9	13.1	28	56.4	43.6
City	35	97.2	2.8	34	61.4	38.6
Metropolitan area	147	79.3	20.7	116	63.2	36.8
Chi-square = 6.97				Chi-square = .89		
British Columbia						
Rural	17	100.0	0.0	17	78.4	21.6
Town	15	93.2	6.8	14	81.8	18.2
City	35	94.1	5.9	33	62.0	38.0
Metropolitan area	132	85.1	14.9	112	77.3	22.7
Chi-square = 5.12				Chi-square = 3.74		

Appendix 6.14

Means of Multicultural Attitudes by Metropolitan Area

	<i>N</i>	Perceived consequences total score	Programme attitudes total score	Behavioural intentions total score
Montreal	214	4.2	4.5	3.1
Toronto	208	4.7	5.1	4.0
Winnipeg	54	5.1	5.2	4.0
Calgary-Edmonton	70	4.7	4.8	3.8
Vancouver	106	4.8	4.8	3.8
F-test		7.29***	5.93***	5.90***

Appendix 6.15

Means of Multicultural Attitudes by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

		Perceived consequences total score	Programme attitudes total score	Behavioural intentions total score	
Atlantic provinces					
	Rural	88	4.4	5.0	3.9
	Town/Small city	77	4.2	4.4	3.0
	Cities	40	5.1	5.3	4.4
F-test		5.71**	7.02**	8.08***	
Quebec					
	Rural	38	4.0	4.4	3.1
	Town	93	4.0	4.1	2.7
	City	42	4.2	4.5	3.2
	Metropolitan area	62	4.3	4.4	3.2
	Montreal	214	4.2	4.5	3.1
F-test		0.46	1.25	.90	

Appendix 6.15 (Continued)

Means of Multicultural Attitudes by Degree of Urbanization in Five Regions

			Perceived consequences total score	Programme attitudes total score	Behavioural intentions total score
Ontario					
	Rural	106	4.4	4.7	3.4
	Town	49	4.4	4.6	3.3
	City	88	4.6	4.6	3.6
	Metropolitan area	233	4.8	5.0	3.9
	Toronto	208	4.7	5.1	4.0
F-test			2.42*	3.38**	2.39*
Prairies					
	Rural	77	4.3	4.2	3.1
	Town	32	4.4	4.7	4.0
	City	35	4.9	5.0	3.5
	Metropolitan area	147	4.8	5.0	3.8
F-test			3.05*	5.75***	3.19*
British Columbia					
	Rural	17	5.5	5.1	4.4
	Town	15	4.5	4.3	3.8
	City	35	4.8	4.0	3.0
	Metropolitan area	132	4.8	4.8	3.8
F-test			1.43	3.64*	1.97

Appendix 6.16

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	Total score		
Region and language of interview				
Quebec				
Anglophone	71	4.8		
Francophone	482	3.9		
			F-test region	.11
Outside Quebec			F-test language of interview	29.22***
Anglophone	1241	4.6		
Francophone	27	4.0	F-test interaction	.50
Religion				
No religion	116	4.9		
Anglican	203	4.6		
United	292	4.7	F-test	3.84*
Anglophone Roman Catholic	387	4.7		
Francophone Roman Catholic	423	4.0		

Appendix 6.16 (Continued)

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	Total score		
Ethnicity and generational status				
Angloceltic				
Immigrant	86	4.4		
Second generation	126	4.6		
Third generation	433	4.7	F-test generation	1.29
Anglophone "other ethnic"			F-test ethnicity	.68
Immigrant	201	4.6	F-test interaction	.69
Second generation	135	4.6		
Third generation	149	4.7		
Ancestral country of origin for selected ethnic groups				
Dutch	44	4.9		
German	105	4.7		
Italian	49	4.8		
Polish	42	4.6	F-test	1.08
Russian	44	4.3		
Scandinavian	46	4.7		
Ukrainian	31	4.6		
Other ethnic	171	4.7		

Appendix 6.17

Perception of Policy by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Integration		Chi-square
			Permissive	Supportive	
Region and language of interview					
Quebec					
Anglophone	52	6.3	66.1	27.6	7.27 *
Francophone	386	22.1	56.6	21.3	
Outside Quebec					
Anglophone	1269	11.0	60.4	28.6	1.53
Francophone	22	15.6	66.9	17.5	
Religion					
No religion	108	6.0	73.0	21.0	37.42 ***
Anglican	197	9.6	61.0	29.4	
United	276	10.1	61.3	28.6	
Anglophone Roman Catholic	377	10.8	62.3	26.9	
Francophone Roman Catholic	379	21.2	57.3	21.6	

Appendix 6.17 (Continued)

Perception of Policy by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Integration		Chi-square
			Permissive	Supportive	
Ethnicity and generational status					
Angloceltic					
Immigrant	82	14.4	60.2	25.4	1.16
Second generation	130	10.9	58.2	30.9	
Third generation	435	13.1	58.2	28.7	
Anglophone "other ethnic"					
Immigrant	201	10.2	56.2	33.6	11.58*
Second generation	141	7.1	65.0	27.9	
Third generation	142	9.0	72.7	18.4	
Ancestral country of origin					
Dutch	41	14.0	60.1	25.8	11.10
German	103	4.5	70.7	24.7	
Italian	49	7.6	56.7	35.7	
Polish	41	6.1	57.4	36.5	
Russian	43	12.2	64.3	23.5	
Scandinavian	43	8.2	61.8	30.0	
Ukrainian	28	3.4	61.6	35.0	
Other ethnic	167	10.0	64.3	25.7	

Appendix 6.18

Knowledge of Policy by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Region and language of interview						
Quebec						
Anglophone	55	62.5	37.5	34	51.8	48.2
Francophone	425	78.6	21.4	330	79.1	20.9
	Chi-square = 6.25*			Chi-square = 11.21**		
Outside Quebec						
Anglophone	1328	84.2	15.8	1108	71.3	28.7
Francophone	30	88.2	11.8	26	94.4	5.6
	Chi-square = .11			Chi-square = 5.70*		
Religion						
No religion	116	77.8	22.2	88	70.3	29.7
Anglican	203	81.3	18.7	163	70.2	29.8
United	292	83.3	16.7	242	67.3	32.7
Anglophone Roman Catholic	389	84.3	15.7	323	73.0	27.0
Francophone Roman Catholic	424	79.1	20.9	331	80.9	19.1
	Chi-square = 5.32			Chi-square = 15.64**		

Appendix 6.18 (Continued)

Knowledge of Policy by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Ethnicity and generational status						
Angloceltic						
Immigrant	84	79.8	20.2	65	70.0	30.0
Second generation	139	83.9	16.1	117	61.8	32.2
Third generation	455	85.0	15.0	383	72.9	27.1
	Chi-square = 1.45			Chi-square = 5.34		
Anglophone "other ethnic"						
Immigrant	209	76.2	23.8	158	76.6	23.4
Second generation	150	83.7	16.3	125	65.7	34.3
Third generation	147	86.1	13.9	126	66.5	33.5
	Chi-square = 6.32*			Chi-square = 5.08		
Ancestral country of origin						
Dutch	44	86.5	13.5	38	69.8	30.2
German	106	81.3	18.7	85	65.6	34.4
Italian	51	84.0	16.0	43	87.6	12.4
Polish	42	72.7	27.3	31	57.0	43.0
Russian	44	86.0	14.0	38	69.3	30.7
Scandinavian	46	82.1	17.9	38	63.0	37.0
Ukrainian	31	81.1	18.9	25	65.0	35.0
Other ethnic	174	79.1	20.9	134	70.2	29.8
	Chi-square = 4.24			Chi-square = 10.28		

Appendix 6.19

Means of Perceived Consequences of Multiculturalism by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	Total score		
Region and language of interview				
Quebec				
Anglophone	70	4.7	F-test region	.46
Francophone	479	4.1	F-test language of interview	11.83***
Outside Quebec				
Anglophone	1235	4.6	F-test interaction	.05
Francophone	27	4.0		
Religion				
No religion	115	5.0		
Anglican	203	4.5		
United	292	4.7	F-test	16.65**
Anglophone Roman Catholic	386	4.6		
Francophone Roman Catholic	422	4.0		

Appendix 6.19 (Continued)

Means of Perceived Consequences of Multiculturalism by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	Total score		
Ethnicity and generational status				
Angloceltic				
Immigrant	85	4.5		
Second generation	125	4.6		
Third generation	431	4.5	F-test generation	1.17
			F-test ethnicity	2.59
			F-test interaction	1.89
Anglophone "other ethnic"				
Immigrant	200	4.9		
Second generation	135	4.6		
Third generation	149	4.5		
Ancestral country of origin				
Dutch	44	5.2		
German	106	4.5		
Italian	47	5.3		
Polish	42	4.8		
Russian	44	4.3	F-test	3.53**
Scandinavian	46	4.7		
Ukrainian	31	4.4		
Other ethnic	170	5.0		

Appendix 6.20

Means of Attitudes toward Multicultural Programmes by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	Total score		
Region and language of interview				
Quebec				
Anglophone	72	5.1	F-test region	.05
Francophone	487	4.3	F-test language of interview	6.61*
Outside Quebec			F-test interaction	5.32*
Anglophone	1244	4.8		
Francophone	27	4.7		
Religion				
No religion	116	5.0		
Anglican	203	4.9		
United	292	4.6		
Anglophone Roman Catholic	386	5.0	F-test	18.56***
Francophone Roman Catholic	424	4.3		

Appendix 6.20 (Continued)

Means of Attitudes toward Multicultural Programmes by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	Total score		
Ethnicity and generational status				
Angloceltic				
Immigrant	84	4.5		
Second generation	125	4.5		
Third generation	437	4.8	F-test generation	0.31
Anglophone "other ethnic"			F-test ethnicity	1.79
Immigrant	201	4.8	F-test interaction	2.84
Second generation	135	4.8		
Third generation	150	4.6		
Ancestral country of origin				
Dutch	44	4.7		
German	106	4.6		
Italian	47	5.2		
Polish	42	4.7		
Russian	44	4.6	F-test	1.69
Scandinavian	46	4.7		
Ukrainian	29	5.1		
Other ethnic	171	5.0		

Appendix 6.21

Means of Behavioural Intentions toward Multicultural Programmes by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	Total score		
Region and language of interview				
Quebec				
Anglophone	70	3.7	F-test region	.02
Francophone	482	2.9	F-test language of interview	10.07**
Outside Quebec			F-test interaction	.04
Anglophone	1233	3.6		
Francophone	27	3.0		
Religion				
No religion	116	3.7		
Anglican	203	3.7		
United	291	3.6		
Anglophone Roman Catholic	386	3.9	F-test	15.62***
Francophone Roman Catholic	424	2.9		

Appendix 6.21 (Continued)

Means of Behavioural Intentions toward Multicultural Programmes by Region and Language, Religion, Ethnicity and Generational Status, and Ancestral Country of Origin for Selected Groups

	<i>N</i>	Total score		
Ethnicity and generational status				
Angloceltic				
Immigrant	84	3.3		
Second generation	125	3.4		
Third generation	430	3.7	F-test generation	0.67
Anglophone "other ethnic"			F-test ethnicity	0.52
Immigrant	199	3.9	F-test interaction	4.39*
Second generation	133	3.4		
Third generation	149	3.4		
Ancestral country of origin				
Dutch	42	3.9		
German	105	3.5		
Italian	47	4.2		
Polish	42	3.6		
Russian	43	3.1	F-test	2.27*
Scandinavian	46	3.3		
Ukrainian	29	3.7		
Other ethnic	171	4.1		

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Head of Household's Occupational Status and Income

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"keep it to themselves"	"forget background"	"be more like us"	"need English"	"need French"	"need to be bilingual"
Head of household's occupational status								
Under 30,0000	497	4.3	4.7	3.6	4.6	2.5	2.1	2.3
30,0000 - 39,9999	326	4.5	4.3	3.0	4.2	2.4	2.0	2.3
40,0000 - 49,9999	361	4.5	4.4	3.0	4.2	2.5	2.0	2.3
50,0000 - 59,9999	207	4.6	4.2	2.6	4.4	2.4	1.7	2.1
60,0000 - 69,9999	253	4.8	3.8	2.5	3.8	2.3	1.7	1.9
70,0000 - 79,9999	82	5.0	3.4	2.4	3.5	2.3	1.9	2.0
F-test		10.02***	8.19***	14.89***	6.91***	0.75	3.45**	2.20
Head of household's income								
Under \$4,000	245	4.2	4.8	3.6	4.9	2.5	2.0	2.4
\$4,000 - \$7,999	399	4.4	4.4	3.5	4.5	2.4	2.0	2.2
\$8,000 - \$13,999	636	4.6	4.2	2.8	4.2	2.4	1.9	2.1
\$14,000 - \$19,999	250	4.7	3.9	2.6	3.9	2.7	1.7	2.2
\$20,000 and over	118	4.9	4.0	2.5	4.0	2.6	2.0	2.2
F-test		13.49***	6.58***	16.00***	8.39***	0.93	1.21	1.08

Appendix 6.23

Perception of Multicultural Policy by Head of Household's Occupational Status and Income

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
Head of household's occupational status				
Under 30.0000	453	15.3	62.1	22.7
30.0000 – 39.9999	310	14.8	57.5	27.7
40.0000 – 49.9999	341	12.6	65.2	22.2
50.0000 – 59.9999	200	14.6	56.2	29.1
60.0000 – 69.9999	246	9.0	60.2	30.9
70.0000 – 79.9999	81	14.5	54.1	31.4
Chi-square = 16.74				
Head of household's income				
Under \$4,000	228	16.6	60.4	23.1
\$4,000 – \$7,999	366	16.9	58.9	24.2
\$8,000 – \$13,999	616	11.5	60.8	27.7
\$14,000 – \$19,999	238	11.5	58.0	30.5
\$20,000 and over	115	6.2	61.7	32.1
Chi-square = 16.83*				

Appendix 6.24

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy by Head of Household's Occupational Status and Income

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Head of household's occupational status						
Under 30.0000	499	87.6	12.4	433	79.1	20.9
30.0000 – 39.9999	326	85.6	14.4	279	74.5	25.5
40.0000 – 49.9999	358	82.7	17.3	292	74.2	25.8
50.0000 – 59.9999	210	80.3	19.7	167	68.1	31.9
60.0000 – 69.9999	253	71.6	28.4	178	64.4	35.6
70.0000 – 79.9999	82	67.0	33.0	54	46.7	53.3
Chi-square = 44.90***					Chi-square = 36.07***	
Head of household's income						
Under \$4,000	248	85.4	14.6	209	73.9	26.1
\$4,000 – \$7,999	397	87.5	12.5	346	76.3	23.7
\$8,000 – \$13,999	636	82.6	17.4	518	73.1	26.9
\$14,000 – \$19,999	253	72.4	27.6	180	66.7	33.3
\$20,000 and over	118	71.1	28.9	84	71.0	29.0
Chi-square = 35.19***					Chi-square = 5.82	

Appendix 6.25

Means of Multicultural Attitudes by Head of Household's Occupational Status and Income

		Perceived consequences	Programme attitudes	Behavioural intentions
	<i>N</i>	Total score	Total score	Total score
Head of household's occupational status				
Under 30.0000	493	4.3	4.5	3.4
30.0000 – 39.9999	323	4.4	4.7	3.5
40.0000 – 49.9999	360	4.5	4.7	3.6
50.0000 – 59.9999	209	4.6	4.7	3.5
60.0000 – 69.9999	253	4.9	4.9	3.6
70.0000 – 79.9999	81	5.0	5.1	4.2
F-test		7.54***	4.65***	2.70*
Head of household's income				
Under \$4,000	243	4.2	4.5	3.4
\$4,000 – \$7,999	397	4.4	4.7	3.5
\$8,000 – \$13,999	633	4.6	4.8	3.6
\$14,000 – \$19,999	251	4.7	4.9	3.6
\$20,000 and over	118	4.9	4.7	3.6
F-test		7.75***	2.33	0.82

Appendix 6.26

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Language
of Interview and Political Party Preference

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"keep it to themselves"	"forget background"	"be more like us"	"need English"	"need French"	"need to be bilingual"
Anglophone								
Liberal	426	4.7	4.1	2.6	4.1	2.8	2.0	2.1
NDP	152	4.7	4.2	2.7	4.0	2.8	1.8	2.0
PC	293	4.6	4.2	2.8	4.1	2.7	1.7	1.8
Social Credit	12	3.7	5.3	3.5	5.6	2.0	1.6	1.8
F-test		2.64*	1.01	.87	1.95	.68	3.57*	2.21
Francophone								
Liberal	191	4.1	4.9	3.8	5.0	1.8	2.0	2.9
NDP	19	4.2	5.6	3.0	4.8	3.4	2.6	3.6
PC	22	3.2	6.1	5.2	5.8	2.2	2.5	2.4
Social Credit	25	3.2	5.8	5.5	5.8	1.7	2.1	2.1
F-test		9.29***	3.66*	8.60***	2.44	4.55*	1.19	1.65

Appendix 6.27

Perception of Multicultural Policy by Language of Interview and Political Party Preference

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
Anglophone				
Liberal	418	10.9	57.3	31.8
NDP	149	11.2	60.4	28.4
PC	278	8.5	62.7	28.7
Social Credit	12	11.6	58.8	29.5
Chi-square = 2.66				
Francophone				
Liberal	177	19.5	55.8	24.7
NDP	13	12.4	57.9	29.7
PC	20	33.4	59.3	7.3
Social Credit	23	41.3	39.1	19.5
Chi-square = 9.91				

Appendix 6.28

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy by Language of Interview and Political Party Preference

	Knowledge of multicultural policy			Heard of multicultural policy		
	<i>N</i>	% No	% Yes	<i>N</i>	% No	% Yes
Anglophone						
Liberal	428	81.6	18.4	343	68.9	31.1
NDP	152	84.2	15.8	126	72.2	27.8
PC	296	80.5	19.5	236	63.8	36.2
Social Credit	12	85.0	15.0	10	52.9	47.1
Chi-square = 1.01				Chi-square = 4.08		
Francophone						
Liberal	193	79.6	20.4	151	76.8	23.2
NDP	19	43.8	56.2	8	62.8	37.2
PC	21	82.0	18.0	17	91.6	8.4
Social Credit	25	85.3	14.7	21	83.3	16.7
Chi-square = 13.83**				Chi-square = 3.43		

Appendix 6.29

Means of Multicultural Attitudes by Language of Interview and Political Party Preference

		Perceived consequences	Programme attitudes	Behavioural intentions
	<i>N</i>	Total score	Total score	Total score
Anglophone				
Liberal	425	4.8	5.0	4.1
NDP	152	4.6	4.7	3.7
PC	295	4.5	4.7	3.4
Social Credit	12	4.2	3.6	2.1
F-test		2.62*	7.75***	9.84***
Francophone				
Liberal	190	4.4	4.6	3.2
NDP	18	3.6	4.5	2.8
PC	22	3.6	3.7	2.7
Social Credit	25	3.6	3.4	2.3
F-test		4.60**	6.49***	1.86

Appendix 6.30

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Age

	N	Total score	"keep it to themselves"	"forget background"	"be more like us"	"need English"	"need French"	"need to be bilingual"
Teens	204	4.7	3.6	2.9	3.5	2.1	1.8	2.2
Twenties	426	4.6	3.8	2.7	3.8	2.4	2.0	2.3
Thirties	322	4.6	4.4	2.9	4.1	2.4	2.0	2.1
Forties	314	4.6	4.3	3.0	4.4	2.2	1.7	2.0
Fifties	261	4.4	4.6	3.3	4.8	2.8	2.2	2.4
60 and over	290	4.1	5.1	3.6	5.1	2.9	2.1	2.2
F-test		9.20***	16.96***	6.49***	21.44***	7.47***	3.50**	1.53

Appendix 6.31

Perception of Multicultural Policy by Age

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
Teens	190	16.6	55.1	28.3
Twenties	412	10.7	63.7	25.5
Thirties	308	11.1	63.6	25.3
Fourties	300	12.7	54.8	32.5
Fifties	238	15.1	61.2	23.8
60 and over	269	17.1	57.2	25.6
Chi-square 17.57				

Appendix 6.32

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy by Age

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Teens	203	89.2	10.8	180	79.6	20.4
Twenties	427	83.0	17.0	350	70.4	29.6
Thirties	325	82.6	17.4	266	71.4	28.6
Fourties	313	81.6	18.4	253	71.2	28.8
Fifties	263	79.2	20.8	207	77.0	23.0
60 and over	290	81.3	18.7	232	71.2	28.8
Chi-square = 8.81				Chi-square = 7.92		

Appendix 6.33

Means of Multicultural Attitudes by Age

	<i>N</i>	Perceived consequences	Programme attitudes	Behavioural intentions
		Total score	Total score	Total score
Teens	204	4.6	5.0	4.0
Twenties	425	4.6	5.0	3.8
Thirties	323	4.5	4.8	3.5
Forties	309	4.5	4.7	3.3
Fifties	262	4.6	4.4	3.2
60 and over	287	4.3	4.5	3.3
F-test		1.48	8.98***	6.62***

Appendix 6.34

Means of Multicultural Ideology by Sex

	<i>N</i>	Total score	"keep it to themselves"	"forget background"	"be more like us"	"need English"	"need French"	"need to be bilingual"
Male	851	4.5	4.4	3.2	4.4	2.5	1.9	2.2
Female	984	4.6	4.2	2.9	4.2	2.4	2.0	2.2
F-test		2.96	1.52	5.00*	6.61*	0.82	0.47	0.27

Appendix 6.35

Perception of Multicultural Policy by Sex

	<i>N</i>	% Assimilation	% Permissive integration	% Supportive integration
Male	818	15.1	57.0	27.9
Female	911	11.8	62.3	25.8
Chi-square = 6.20*				

Appendix 6.36

Knowledge of Multicultural Policy by Sex

	<i>N</i>	Knowledge of policy		<i>N</i>	Heard of policy	
		% No	% Yes		% No	% Yes
Male	851	78.3	21.7	662	74.5	25.5
Female	987	85.9	14.1	837	71.7	28.3
Chi-square = 17.56***				Chi-square = 1.29		

Appendix 6.37

Means of Multicultural Attitudes by Sex

	<i>N</i>	Perceived consequences	Programme attitudes	Behavioural intentions
		Total score	Total score	Total score
Male	847	4.5	4.6	3.5
Female	980	4.5	4.8	3.6
F-test		0.24	3.25	1.37

Appendix 6.38

Simple Correlations Between Independent Variables and Four Attitudes toward Multiculturalism

Independent variables	Ideology <i>r</i>	Perceived consequences <i>r</i>	Program attitudes <i>r</i>	Behavioural intentions <i>r</i>
<i>Non-Psychological</i>				
Region (Quebec/other)	.22***	.16***	.15***	.15***
Community size in childhood	.10***	.09***	.10***	.07**
Community size, current	.03	.04	.05*	.04
Ethnicity 6 (French Cdn./other)	.24***	.20***	.18***	.17***
Ethnicity 7 (Anglocelts/other)	-.12***	-.05	-.07**	-.06*
Ethnicity 8 (Anglophone ethnics/other)	-.10***	-.12***	-.08**	-.08**
Ethnicity 9 (Francophone ethnics/other)	.02	-.01	-.01	-.01
Generation in Canada (immigrant/ 1st/2nd)	-.06**	-.14***	-.05*	-.08***
Sex (male/female)	.04	.01	.04	.03
Age	-.15***	-.05*	-.14***	-.12***
Income of head of household	.18***	.15***	.07**	.04
Education of respondent	.26***	.17***	.16***	.12***
Occupational status of head of household	.16***	.14***	.10***	.06*
Religiosity—belief strength	-.03	-.01	-.01	.02
Religiosity—church attendance	-.02	.01	-.02	.01
<i>Psychological</i>				
E-Scale	-.43***	-.33***	-.23***	-.16***
F-Scale	-.28***	-.19***	-.15***	-.15***
Value—A comfortable life	.17***	.14***	.14***	.11***
Value—A world at peace	-.07**	-.05*	-.08***	-.06*
Value—A world of beauty	-.08**	-.08***	-.08***	-.08**
Value—equality	-.15***	-.12***	-.13***	-.14***
Value—family security	.02	.03	.07**	.10***

Appendix 6.38 (continued)

Simple Correlations Between Independent Variables and Four Attitudes toward Multiculturalism

Independent variables	Ideology <i>r</i>	Perceived consequences <i>r</i>	Program attitudes <i>r</i>	Behavioural intentions <i>r</i>
Value—freedom	-.10***	-.08***	-.11***	-.08**
Value—happiness	.06**	.07**	.04	.05
Value—national security	.04	.05*	.00	-.05*
Value—salvation	.02	.01	.07**	.02
Value—self-respect	.00	-.01	.05	.07**
Value—social recog.	.16***	.10***	.08**	.07**
Value—true friendship	-.08**	-.07**	-.07**	-.04

Appendix 6.39

Multiple Stepwise Regression of Multicultural Ideology

Independent variables (Excluding psychological variables)	Total Sample			Subsample 1		Subsample 2	
	order ^a	<i>R</i> ^b	beta ^c	beta	<i>R</i>	beta	<i>R</i>
		(<i>N</i> = 1834)		(<i>N</i> = 921)		(<i>N</i> = 912)	
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian/Other)	2	.33	.21***	.17***	.25	.25***	.28
Education	1	.26	.17***	.14***	.28	.20***	.37
Age	3	.34	-.10***	-.09**	.30	-.12***	.39
Head of household's income	4	.35	.08**	.10**	.31	.06	.39
Sex	5	.36	.06**	.10**	.33	.02	.39
Independent variables (Including psychological variables)							
Ethnocentrism	1	.43	-.34***	-.37***	.43	-.34***	.44
Region (Quebec/Other)	7	.48	.09*	.00	.44	.20***	.48
Education	4	.47	.09***	.04	.45	.13***	.50
Value—A world at peace	5	.48	-.09***	-.07*	.45	-.10***	.51
Value—Equality	3	.47	-.08***	-.03	.45	-.13***	.52
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian/Other)	2	.46	.07	.11*	.45	.00	.52
Value—Salvation	6	.48	-.07**	-.08**	.46	-.05	.53
Head of household's income	8	.49	.05*	.06	.46	.06	.53
Value—True friendship	9	.49	-.05*	-.08*	.47	-.01	.53

^aorder in which independent variable was entered in original stepwise regression according to BEST criterion.

^bMultiple correlation coefficient at a given step.

^cstandardized coefficient (beta weight)

^dp associated with t-test of coefficient ($t = \text{coefficient} / \text{standardized error of coefficient}$).

Appendix 6.40

Multiple Stepwise Regression of Perceived Consequences of Multiculturalism

Independent variables (Excluding psychological variables)	Total Sample			Subsample 1		Subsample 2	
	order ^a	<i>R</i> ^b	beta ^c	beta	<i>R</i>	beta	<i>R</i>
		(<i>N</i> = 1827)		(<i>N</i> = 915)		(<i>N</i> = 912)	
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian / Other)	1	.20	.14***	.12***	.17	.16***	.22
Education	2	.24	.10***	.08*	.22	.12***	.26
Head of household's income	3	.25	.08**	.12**	.25	.04	.27
Community size in childhood	7	.27	.08**	.09*	.26	.08*	.28
Religiosity—Church attendance	4	.28	.06**	.07*	.26	.06	.28
Ethnicity 8 (Anglophone ethnic / Other)	5	.28	-.05*	-.05	.27	-.05	.30
Generational status	6	.26	-.05*	-.01	.27	-.10**	.31
Independent variables (Including psychological variables)							
Ethnocentrism	1	.33	-.28***	-.26***	.33	-.28***	.34
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian / Other)	2	.36	.12***	.10**	.34	.13***	.37
Generational status	3	.36	-.08***	-.03	.35	-.13***	.39
Religiosity—Church attendance	6	.38	.07**	.08*	.35	.06*	.39
Value—Happiness	4	.37	.06**	.07*	.36	.06*	.40
Head of household's income	5	.38	.06*	.08*	.37	.04	.40
Value—Equality	7	.39	-.05*	-.07*	.38	-.04	.40
Community size in childhood	8	.39	.05*	.06	.38	.06	.41

^aorder in which independent variable was entered in original stepwise regression according to BEST criterion.

^bMultiple correlation coefficient at a given step.

^cstandardized coefficient (beta weight)

^dp associate with t-test of coefficient ($t = \text{coefficient} / \text{standardized error of coefficient}$).

Appendix 6.41

Multiple Stepwise Regression of Attitudes toward Multicultural Programmes

Independent variables (Excluding psychological variables)	Total Sample			Subsample 1		Subsample 2	
	order ^a	<i>R</i> ^b	beta ^c	beta	<i>R</i>	beta	<i>R</i>
		(<i>N</i> = 1829)		(<i>N</i> = 918)		(<i>N</i> = 911)	
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian / Other)	1	.18	.18***	.14***	.14	.22***	.22
Age	2	.23	-.12***	-.13***	.20	-.12***	.27
Education	3	.25	.09***	.03	.20	.15***	.30
Community size in childhood	4	.26	.07**	.10**	.22	.06	.31
Religiosity—Church attendance	5	.26	.05*	.05	.23	.05	.31
Sex	6	.27	.04*	.04	.23	.05	.32
Independent variables (Including psychological variables)							
Ethnocentrism	1	.23	-.15***	-.14***	.22	-.16***	.25
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian / Other)	2	.26	.15***	.11**	.24	.20***	.30
Age	4	.30	-.09***	-.09**	.25	-.09**	.32
Community size in childhood	6	.31	.08**	.10**	.27	.06	.32
Value—A world at peace	5	.30	-.07**	-.09**	.28	-.06	.33
Value—Equality	3	.28	-.06*	-.01	.28	-.10**	.35
Value—A comfortable life	7	.32	.06*	.05	.29	.06	.36
Religiosity—Church attendance	8	.32	.05*	.05	.29	.05	.36

^aorder in which independent variable was entered in original stepwise regression according to BEST criterion.

^bMultiple correlation coefficient at a given step.

^cstandardized coefficient (beta weight)

^dp associated with t-test of coefficient ($t = \text{coefficient} / \text{standardized error of coefficient}$).

Appendix 6.42

Multiple Stepwise Regression of Behavioural Intentions toward Multicultural Programmes

Independent variables (Excluding psychological variables)	Total Sample			Subsample 1		Subsample 2	
	order ^a	<i>R</i> ^b	beta ^c	beta	<i>R</i>	beta	<i>R</i>
		(<i>N</i> = 1824)		(<i>N</i> = 915)		(<i>N</i> = 908)	
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadian / Other)	1	.17	.18***	.15***	.16	.20***	.18
Age	2	.21	-.11***	-.10**	.19	-.13***	.23
Religiosity—Church attendance	4	.23	.07**	.08*	.20	.07*	.24
Community size in childhood	5	.23	.06*	.07*	.22	.05	.24
Education	3	.22	.05*	.07	.23	.04	.24
Independent variables (Including psychological variables)							
Ethnicity 6 (French Canadians / Other)	1	.17	.15***	.13***	.16	.17***	.18
Religiosity—Belief strength	6	.27	.08***	.10**	.16	.06	.18
Value—Equality	2	.21	-.08**	-.03	.18	-.12***	.25
Age	4	.25	-.08**	-.07*	.22	-.09*	.28
Authoritarianism	9	.29	-.07*	-.08	.24	-.06	.29
Ethnocentrism	3	.24	-.07*	-.07	.25	-.07	.29
Value—Family security	5	.26	.07**	.09**	.26	.04	.30
Value—National security	7	.28	-.06*	-.08*	.28	-.03	.30
Community size in childhood	8	.28	.06*	.09*	.29	.03	.30
Value—Self respect	10	.29	.05*	.04	.29	.07*	.31

^aorder in which independent variable was entered in original stepwise regression according to BEST criterion.

^bMultiple correlation coefficient at a given step.

^cstandardized coefficient (beta weight)

^dp associated with t-test of coefficient ($t = \text{coefficient} / \text{standardized error of coefficient}$).

Appendix 7.1

Multiple Stepwise Regression and Partial Correlations of Selected Attitude Variables on Major Independent Variables and Measures of Security in the Total Sample

Attitude variables	Regression step	Ethnicity	Education	Socio- economic status	Economic security	Cultural security
Ethnocentrism	0	-.24	-.41	-.28	-.44	-.44
	1	-.24	-.38	-.27	-.41	-.42
	2	-.17	-.38	-.10	-.35	-.35
	3	-.17	-.33	-.10	-.34	-.35
Discrimination	0	-.33	-.20	-.14	-.31	-.25
	1	-.33	-.15	-.11	-.27	-.21
	2	-.30	-.15	-.04	-.24	-.17
	3	-.30	-.12	-.05	-.23	-.17
Evaluation of own group	0	-.40	-.19	-.17	-.33	-.22
	1	-.40	-.12	-.12	-.28	-.16
	2	-.37	-.11	-.07	-.26	-.13
	3	-.37	-.07	-.08	-.25	-.13
Evaluation of Chinese	0	.25	.11	.09	.14	.08
	1	.25	.08	.07	.10	.04
	2	.24	.08	.04	.08	.02
	3	.24	.06	.04	.08	.02
Evaluation of Jews	0	.14	.09	.11	.10	.09
	1	.14	.07	.10	.08	.07
	2	.13	.07	.08	.06	.05
	3	.13	.03	.09	.06	.05
Multicultural ideology	0	.25	.27	.18	.46	.53
	1	.25	.24	.16	.43	.51
	2	.21	.23	.06	.39	.47
	3	.21	.20	.06	.39	.47
Multicultural behavioural intentions	0	.16	.13	.10	.27	.39
	1	.16	.11	.08	.24	.38
	2	.14	.11	.03	.22	.36
	3	.14	.09	.04	.22	.36

Appendix 8.1

Means of Four Ethnic Categories on Major Attitude Variables

	"Other ethnics" ^a N = 289	Ukrainians/ Russians N = 75	Anglocelts N = 691	French Canadians N = 349	F-test	T-test col. 1, 2 ^b
Perceived consequences of immigration						
Total score	4.8	4.0	4.5	3.8	30.68***	4.31***
"unemployment"	4.1	5.3	4.5	5.1	15.18***	-4.37***
"purity of race"	2.8	3.2	3.0	4.5	43.55***	-1.65
Acceptability of immigrants						
Total score	5.2	4.2	5.0	4.9	16.48***	6.86***
"coloured"	5.2	4.4	5.1	5.2	4.71**	3.54***
"communist countries"	4.1	2.8	3.6	2.9	18.18***	4.72***
Discrimination	1.1	2.3	1.8	5.2	53.81***	-2.47
Multicultural ideology (total score)	4.7	4.4	4.7	4.0	33.06***	1.73
Perceived consequences of multiculturalism (total score)	4.8	4.3	4.6	4.0	21.42***	2.60
Attitudes toward multicultural programmes						
Total score	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.2	14.71***	-.26
Third language broadcasting	3.8	3.5	3.8	3.2	6.32***	1.08
Third language teaching in regular schools	3.6	4.0	3.6	3.0	8.67***	-1.12
Behavioural intentions (total score)	3.7	3.3	3.7	2.9	13.88***	1.36
Authoritarianism	4.7	5.0	4.7	5.1	10.09***	-1.39
Ethnocentrism	3.1	3.6	3.4	4.0	30.97***	-2.97*

^a "Other ethnics" category excludes Ukrainians and Russians.

^b T-test for difference between "other ethnics" and Ukrainians/Russians.

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
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